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Exhibit 27

Part 1



Transcript of Mr. Jerome Muller

Date: May 20, 2022

Case: Picard -v- Square One Fund, Ltd, et al.

Planet Depos

Phone: 888.433.3767

Email: transcripts@planetdepos.com

www.planetdepos.com

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Transcript of Mr. Jerome Muller

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      UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
                                                                                                                                                            Friday, May 20, 2022
      SECURITIES INVESTOR PROTECTION CORPORATION,
Plaintiff-Applicant,
                                                                                                                                                            10:03 a.m.
(British Summer Time)
                                                      Adv. Pro. No.
08-01789(CGM)
      BERNARD L. MADOFF INVESTMENT SECURITIES LLC,
Defendant.
                                                                                                                                                    Videotaped deposition of JÉRÔME MÜLLER at
                                                                                                                                the offices of Browne Jacobson LLP, 6 Bevis Marks,
      In re:
                                                                                                                                Bury Court, London EC3A 7BA, England, United Kingdom,
      BERNARD L. MADOFF
Debtor
                                                                                                                                before Mr. Frederico Singarajah, having been duly
      IRVING H. PICARD, Trustee for the:
Liquidation of Bernard L. Madoff:
Investment Securities LLC and the:
Chapter 7 Estate of Bernard L.
                                                                                                                                appointed as the Examiner in this matter as ordered by
                                                                                                                           10
                                                                                                                                Senior Master Fontaine in the High Court of Justice,
                     Plaintiff,
                                                                                                                                Queen's Bench Division, such order being dated
13
                                                                                                                                 April 14, 2022.
      SQUARE ONE FUND LTD.,
Defendant.
                                                                                                                           14
15
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16
                                  CONFIDENTIAL
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17
                 VIDEOTAPED DEPOSITION OF JÉRÔME MÜLLER
                                                                                                                           17
18
                             Friday, May 20, 2022
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                      London, England, United Kingdom
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      Job No. 449048
23
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      Pages: 1 - 354
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      Reported stenographically by: LEAH M. WILLERSDORF, RPR, CRR, FBIVR, ACR, QRR2, CLR
25
                                                                                                                          24
                                              Claim No. QF-2022-001838
                                                                                                                                                      APPEARANCES
                                                                                                                                On behalf of the Trustee/Applicant:
      IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION
                                                                                                                          3
                                                                                                                                         BAKER HOSTETLER, LLP
      IN THE MATTER OF THE EVIDENCE (PROCEEDINGS IN OTHER JURISDICTIONS) ACT 1975
                                                                                                                                                New York, NY 10
(212) 589 4200
                                                                                                                          5
      AND IN THE MATTER OF THE HAGUE CONVENTION OF 18 MARCH 1970 ON THE TAKING OF EVIDENCE ABROAD IN CIVIL OR
                                                                                                                                        BY: MARCO MOLINA, ESQ.
VICTORIA L. STORK, ESQ.
ANDREW M. SERRAO, ESQ.
mmolina@bakerlaw.com
                                                                                                                          6
      COMMERCIAL MATTERS
      AND IN THE MATTER OF RULES 34.17\ {
m TO}\ 34.21 OF THE CIVIL PROCEDURE RULES 1998
                                                                                                                          8
                                                                                                                                                vstork@bakerlaw.com
                                                                                                                                                aserrao@bakerlaw.com
      AND IN THE MATTER OF PROCEEDINGS NOW PENDING BEFORE THE UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
                                                                                                                          9
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                                                                                                                                         BROWNE JACOBSON, LLP
                                                                                                                          11
                                                                                                                                               15th Floor
6 Bevis Marks
Bury Court
London EC3A 7BA
                                                                                                                           12
      Between
                                                                                                                          13
13
                                                                                                                                               England, United Kingdom
44 (0)370 270 6000
14
                                TRVING H PICARD
                                                                                                                          14
              (Trustee for the substantively consolidated
SIPA liquidation of Bernard L. Madoff
Investment Securities LLC and
15
                                                                                                                          15
                                                                                                                                               JOHN ADAMS (Partner)
ANDREW WOOLSEY (Solicitor)
                     the Estate of Bernard L. Madoff)
16
                                                                                                                          16
                                                                                                                                                john.adams@brownejacobson.com
                                                                                                                                                andrew.woolsey@brownejacobson.com
17
                                                          Applicant
                                                                                                                          17
 18
                                                                                                                           18
                                                                                                                                On behalf of the witness, Jérôme Müller:
                                        -and-
19
                                   JÉRÔME MÜLLER
                                                                                                                          19
                                                                                                                                         JENNER & BLOCK, LLP
                                                                                                                                               25 Old Broad Street
London EC2N 1HQ
England, United Kingdom
44 (0)330 060 5400
20
                                                          Respondent
                                                                                                                          20
21
                                                                                                                          21
22
                                                                                                                          22
                                                                                                                                        BY: MATTHEW WORBY (Solictor-Advocate) mworby@jenner.com
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2 (5 to 8)

| Conducted on May 20, 2022 | | | | | |
|---|--|---|--|--|--|
| 5 | 7 | | | | |
| 1 APPEARANCES (continued) | EXHIBITS INDEX | | | | |
| 2 THE UK TRUSTEE FOR APPLICANT | 2 Trustee Description Page Exhibit No. | | | | |
| 3 ADAM GOODISON (Barrister) | B Exhibit 12 Order issued by the High 22 | | | | |
| 4 South Square Chambers | Court of Justice, Queen's Bench Division, date-stamped | | | | |
| 5 3-4 South Square Gray's Inn | 5 April 14, 2022 | | | | |
| 6 London WC1R 5HP | (3 pages, no Bates) (Bundle tab 1, pp. 11-13) | | | | |
| 44 (0)20 7696 9900 7 adamgoodison@southsquare.com | 7 Exhibit 13 Litigation Protective Order, 23 | | | | |
| 8 | dated June 6, 2011 (17 pages, no Bates) | | | | |
| THE COURT-APPOINTED EXAMINER 9 | (Bundle tab 2, pp. 15-31) | | | | |
| FREDERICO SINGARAJAH 10 | Exhibit 14 Tab 157 cover page, being an 59 email from Fabien Duteil to | | | | |
| Gatehouse Chambers 11 1 Lady Hale Gate | Luc Estenne, et al., dated 11 May 26, 2004, in the French | | | | |
| Gray's Inn 12 London WC1X 8BS | language, with an 12 English-language | | | | |
| 44 (0)20 7691 0290 13 frederico.singarajah@gatehouselaw.co.uk | translation, and an attachment entitled "DDQ | | | | |
| 14 | Partners Advisers03.doc," dated May 10, 2004 | | | | |
| 15 | (\$Q0000018126 - 163) (Bundle tab 157, 2907-2945) | | | | |
| ALSO PRESENT: | [Confidential] | | | | |
| 16 Wendy Viner - PD Videographer | Exhibit 15 Tab 162 cover page, being an 115 | | | | |
| 17 | 17 email in the French language, from Jérôme Müller | | | | |
| 18 | to Fabien Duteil, et al., dated May 19, 2004, with an | | | | |
| 19 | English translation, and an attachment entitled "DDQ | | | | |
| 20 | Partners Advisers01Final | | | | |
| 21 | doc," dated May 10, 2004 21 (\$\times 0.0000018325 - 362) (Bundle tab 162, 3111-3188) | | | | |
| 22 | [Confidential] | | | | |
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| 6 | 8 EVHIBITS INNEY | _ | | | |
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| 1 WITNESS INDEX 2 Witness: Page 3 JÉRÔME MÜLLER 4 Examination by Mr. Molina 16 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 | EXHIBITS INDEX 2 Trustee Exhibit No. 3 Exhibit 16 Email string, with the most recent being from Luc Estenne to Robert Kosowski, dated April 5, 2004, with various attachments (SQ0000015875 - 977) (Bundle tab 135, 2250-2352) [Confidential] 3 Exhibit 17 Summary Confidential 213 Memorandum - Square One Fund, Ltd. (FADSAD0005900 - 918) (Bundle tab 21, 502-520) 10 Exhibit 18 Email header to Partners Advisers S.A. from Tamsin Mann, dated December 20, 2001 (KING_000214554) (Bundle tab 23, page number cut off) 15 Exhibit 19 Email string in the French language, with the most recent being from Luc Estenne to Jérôme Müller, dated March 16, 2006, with a certified English translation attached (SQ000013895 - 896) (Bundle tab 117, 1838-1844) [Confidential] Exhibit 20 Email string in the French 269 language, with the most recent being from Timothée Henry to Marsha Johnson, | | | | |
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| 1 WITNESS INDEX 2 Witness: Page 3 JÉRÔME MÜLLER 4 Examination by Mr. Molina 16 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 | EXHIBITS INDEX 2 Trustee Exhibit No. Exhibit 16 Email string, with the most recent being from Luc Esterne to Robert Kosowski, dated April 5, 2004, with various attachments (SQ0000015875 - 977) (Bundle tab 135, 2250-2352) [Confidential] Exhibit 17 Summary Confidential 213 Memorandum - Square One Fund, Ltd. (FADSAD0005900 - 918) (Bundle tab 21, 502-520) Exhibit 18 Email header to Partners Advisers S.A. from Tamsin Mann, dated December 20, 2001 (KING. 000214554) (Bundle tab 23, page number cut off) Exhibit 19 Email string in the French language, with the most recent being from Luc Esterne to Jérôme Müller, dated March 16, 2006, with a certified English translation attached (SQ000013895 - 896) (Bundle tab 117, 1838-1844) [Confidential] Exhibit 20 Email string in the French 269 language, with the most recent being from Timothée Henry to Marsha Johnson, dated December 17, 2008, in the English language, with a certified French translation | | | | |
| 1 WITNESS INDEX 2 Witness: Page 3 JÉRÔME MÜLLER 4 Examination by Mr. Molina 16 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 | EXHIBITS INDEX 2 Trustee Exhibit No. Exhibit 16 Email string, with the most recent being from Luc Estenne to Robert Kosowski, dated April 5, 2004, with various attachments (SQ0000015875 - 977) (Bundle tab 135, 2250-2352) [Confidential] Exhibit 17 Summary Confidential 213 Memorandum - Square One Fund, Ltd. (FADSAD0005900 - 918) (Bundle tab 21, 502-520) Exhibit 18 Email header to Partners 237 Advisers S.A. from Tamsin Mann, dated December 20, 2001 (KING.000214554) (Bundle tab 23, page number cut off) Exhibit 19 Email string in the French language, with the most recent being from Luc Estenne to Jérôme Müller, dated March 16, 2006, with a certified English translation attached (SQ000013895 - 896) (Bundle tab 117, 1838-1844) [Confidential] Exhibit 20 Email string in the French 269 language, with the most recent being from Timothée Henry to Marsha Johnson, dated December 17, 2008, in the English language, with a certified French translation attached (SQ00000060639 - 940) | | | | |
| 1 WITNESS INDEX 2 Witness: Page 3 JÉRÔME MÜLLER 4 Examination by Mr. Molina 16 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 | EXHIBITS INDEX 2 Trustee Exhibit No. Exhibit 16 Email string, with the most recent being from Luc Estenne to Robert Kosowski, dated April 5, 2004, with various attachments (SQ0000015875 - 977) (Bundle tab 135, 2250-2352) [Confidential] Exhibit 17 Summary Confidential 213 Memorandum - Square One Fund, Ltd. (FADSAD0005900 - 918) (Bundle tab 21, 502-520) Exhibit 18 Email header to Partners 237 Advisers S.A. from Tamsin Mann, dated December 20, 2001 (KING.000214554) (Bundle tab 23, page number cut off) Exhibit 19 Email string in the French language, with the most recent being from Luc Estenne to Jérôme Müller, dated March 16, 2006, with a certified English translation attached (SQ000013895 - 896) (Bundle tab 117, 1838-1844) [Confidential] Exhibit 20 Email string in the French 269 language, with the most recent being from Timothée Henry to Marsha Johnson, dated December 17, 2008, in the English language, with a certified French translation attached (SQ00000060639 - 940) | | | | |

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| 8 9 10 11 12 13 | Exhibit 22 | Email string in the French language, with the most recent being from Timothée Henry to Otto Nilssen, dated December 18, 2008, with a certified English translation attached (\$00000015045 - 047) (Bundle tab 124, pages 2182-2184.008, 2185) [Confidential] | 275 | 8 9 10 11 12 13 | Exhibit 30 | (SQ000004727 - 4740) (Bundle tab 65, 1290 - 1306) [Confidential] Email string, with the most recent being from Jérôme Müller to Luc Estenne, dated June 11, 2022, forwarding an email string between himself and Brant Behr (SQ0000004776 - 4778) (Bundle tab 69, 1320 - 1322) | 313 | |
| 14 15 16 17 | Exhibit 23 | Email in the French language, from Timothée Henry to Luc Estenne, et al., dated December 12, 2008, with a certified English translation attached (\$Q0000015089) (Bundle tab 130, pages 2215 - 2215.0004) | 277 | 14 15 16 17 18 | Exhibit 31 | [Confidential] Email string, with the most recent being from Nathalie Mottier to Andre Stern, et al., dated June 27, 2003 (SQ0000004723 - 726) (Bundle tab 62, 1285 - 1288) [Confidential] | 317 | |
| 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 | Exhibit 24 | [Confidential] Email from Pascal Meilland to Jérôme Müller, dated December 12, 2008, with an attachment "Madoff memo. docx" (SQ0000007284 - 286) (Bundle tab 105, 1689-1691) [Confidential] | 279 | 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 | Exhibit 32 | Email string in the French language, with the most recent being from Jérôme Müller to Beatrice Bestgen, dated March 17, 2006, with a certified English translation attached (\$Q000004526 - 526.005) (Bundle tab 32, 1277 - 1278.006) [Confidential] | 320 | |
| 1 | | EXHIBITS INDEX | 10 | 1 | | EXHIBITS INDEX | | 12 |
| 2 | Trustee Exhibit No. | Description | Page | 2 | Trustee Exhibit No. | Description | Page | |
| 3 4 5 6 | Exhibit 25 | Email from Jérôme Müller to Pascal Meilland, dated December 12, 2008 (SQ0000007276 - 278) (Bundle tab 104, 1685-1687) [Confidential] | 281 | 3 4 5 6 | Exhibit 33 | Email string, with the most recent being from Luc Estenne on behalf of Nav to Nathalie Mottier, dated May 9, 2003, with an attachment (SOO000004976 - 979) | 323 | |
| 7 8 9 10 11 12 | Exhibit 26 | Email string in the French language, with the most recent being from Jérôme Müller to Timothée Henry, dated December 15, 2008, with a certified English translation attached (SQ0000015078 - 079) (Bundle tab 128, 2201 - 2202.004) [Confidential] | 283 286 | 7 8 9 10 11 12 | Exhibit 34 | (Bundle tab 77, 1449 - 1452) [Confidential] Email string in the French language, with the most recent being from Timothée Henry to Luc Estenne, et al., dated June 30, 2006, with an attachment SFXABC.pdf, with a certified English translation (SQ0000003529 - 534) (Bundle tab 48, 1097 - 1102) | 325 | |
| 13 14 15 16 17 | Exhibit 27 | Email string in the French language, with the most recent being from Timothée Henry to Jérôme Müller, dated December 16, 2008 (SQ0000006958 - 959) (Bundle tab 92, 1640 - 1641.004) [Confidential] | | 14 15 16 17 | Exhibit 35 | [Confidential] Email in the French language, from Timothée Henry to Luc Estenne, et al., dated December 12, 2008, with a certified English translation attached (SQ0000007521 - 252 | 330 | |
| 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 | Exhibit 28 | Email from Jérôme Müller to Luc Estenne, dated September 30, 2003, with an attachment "Square One Aug-03.pdf" (SQ0000016006 - 011) (Bundle tab 136, 2354-2359) [Confidential] | 297 | 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 | Exhibit 36 | (Bundle tab 102, 1678-1679) [Confidential] Email string in the French language, with the most recent being from Luc Estenne to muller@ parntersadvisers.com, et al., dated September 29, 2011, with redactions, and with a certified English translation attached (SQC000035488 - 489) Bundle tab 170 3365-3366.006 [Confidential] | 333 | |

| | | | Conducted on | 1 May 20, 2022 |
|----|------------------------|---|-------------------------|---|
| 1 | | EXHIBITS INDEX | 13 | 15 1 MR. MOLINA: Marco Molina for the Trustee, |
| 2 | Trustee Exhibit No. | Deposition | Page | 2 Irving Picard, from BakerHostetler. |
| 4 | Exhibit 37 | Email string, with the most recent being from Jérôme Müller to Richard Levin, | 339 | 3 MR. WORBY: Matthew Worby, Jenner & Block,4 counsel for Mr. Müller. |
| | | dated September 17, 2019, with redactions | | 5 THE EXAMINER: My name is Frederico |
| | | (SQ0000036712 - 713) (Bundle tab 172, 3370-3371) [Confidential] | | 6 Singarajah. I am the Examiner from Gatehouse |
| | Exhibit 38 | Email from Richard Levin to | 340 | 7 Chambers, 1 Lady Hale Gate, London WC1X 8BS. |
| | EXHIBIT 36 | Jérôme Müller, et al., dated September 20, 2019, with the | 340 | 8 Mr. Müller, you have indicated that you |
| 0 | | Picard v. Square One complaint attached | | 9 would like to affirm, so if I could please ask you to |
| 1 | | (SQ0000036797 - 874) (Bundle tab 173, 3373-3451) | | 10 repeat these words after me: I do solemnly, sincerely |
| 2 | | [Confidential] | | 11 and truly declare and affirm the evidence I shall give |
| 3 | Exhibit 39 | Email string, with the most recent being from Richard | 344 | 12 shall be the truth, the whole truth and nothing but |
| 4 | | Levin to Jérôme Müller, et al., dated June 25, 2021, | | 13 the truth. |
| 5 | | with redactions (SQ0000036881 - 882) | | , , , |
| 6 | | (Bundle tab 174, 3453-3454) | | · · |
| 7 | | | | having been duly affirmed, |
| 8 | | | | was examined and testified as follows: |
| 9 | | EXHIBITS PREVIOUSLY MARKED | | 17 THE EXAMINER: Thank you, Mr. Müller. |
| 9 | Trustee Exhibit No. | Description | Page | 18 Mr. Molina will now have some questions for you. |
| ı | Exhibit 11 | Certified English-language | 244 | 19 MR. MOLINA: Thank you. Before I begin |
| 2 | LXIIIDIL II | translation of the evidence of Mr. Albert Collette and | 277 | 20 asking questions, I want to state something for the |
| 3 | | Mrs. Melissa Alessandra Massetta Hariri, the hearing | | 21 record. |
| 1 | | date being October 18, 2021 (Bundle pages 152 - 184) | | 22 As has already been confirmed this |
| 5 | | (p , | | 23 morning, Mr. Jérôme Müller is being represented in |
| | | | | 24 this action by the law firm of Jenner & Block. We |
| | | | | 25 were first advised of this representation on April 21, |
| | | | 14 | 16 |
| | (O | on the record at 10:03 | a.m.) | 1 2022. And after studying this issue closely, the |
| 2 | | | Good morning. Here | 2 Trustee thinks it's appropriate at this time to note |
| | | | ition of Jérôme Müller, | 3 some concerns about the fact that the same attorneys |
| Ļ | _ | tter of Picard versus So | | 4 who represent the named defendant in this action, |
| | | he United States Bankı | - | 5 Square One Fund, are now representing Mr. Müller, a |
| | | | Case No. 08-01789(CGM), | 6 thirdparty witness who is being asked to provide |
| , | | Claim No. QF-2022-01 | | 7 testimony about facts that are relevant to the claims |
| | - | - | | |
| | | day's date is May 20, 2 | 2022, and the time | 8 and defenses against sorry, to the claims against |
| | is 10:04 a | | *** 1 *** | 9 Square One Fund. |
| 0 | | e videographer today i | s Wendy Viner on | We hereby reserve the Trustee's right to |
| | | Planet Depos. | | 11 make any objection related to this representation and |
| 2 | | is video deposition is | | 12 this deposition should in no way be deemed to be a |
| 3 | | acobson, 6 Bevis Mark | | 13 waiver of any such objection. |
| 4 | Co | ould I ask all parties pro | esent to | 14 Thank you. |
| 5 | identify tl | hemselves for the reco | ord. | 15 EXAMINATION ON BEHALF OF THE APPLICANT: |
| 6 | M | R. WOOLSEY: Andre | w Woolsey, Browne | 16 BY MR. MOLINA: |
| 7 | Jacobson | , for the applicant. | | Q. Now we have that out of the way, |
| 8 | | | ms, Browne Jacobson, | 18 Mr. Müller. My name is Marco Molina. Nice to meet |
| | | rustee, Irving Picard. | , | 19 you. |
| 20 | | _ | n Goodison, UK Trustee | 20 A. Nice to meet you, too. |
| | | UK counsel for the Tr | | 21 Q. I'm a partner at BakerHostetler and, as |
| 22 | | R. SERRAO: Andrew | | 22 you heard, we represent the Trustee, Irving H. Picard, |
| | | stetler, for the Trustee | | 23 in this action. |
| | | | _ | |
| 24 | | S. STORK: Victoria S | · · | |
| د2 | BakerHos | stetler, for the Trustee | , irving Picara. | Q. Before we begin, I just want to thank you |

(Part 1) Pg 7 of 65

Transcript of Mr. Jerome Muller

5 (17 to 20)

Conducted on May 20, 2022

17 19 1 again for taking the time to speak with us today. transcribed by the court reporter. The reporter 2 I understand this may be inconvenient for you; cannot record head-nods or hand gestures so you will 3 however, any and all information you can provide is need to answer my questions audibly, for example by greatly appreciated. saying yes or no. I want to state what you should -- what 5 Do you understand that? 6 should already be obvious: This is a very serious A. Yeah, absolutely. 6 matter. We're here today because the Bankruptcy Court Q. Also, in order for the reporter to 8 in New York City appointed my client, Mr. Irving H. accurately take down everything that is said, I ask 9 Picard, to trace and recover the billions of dollars that you wait until I finish asking my questions 10 that Madoff and his associates stole from tens of 10 before you start answering, and I will do my best to 11 thousands of investors. This is the largest financial 11 wait until you finish giving your answers before I ask 12 fraud in recorded history, and the Bankruptcy Court 12 another question. 13 has deemed that your testimony, Mr. Müller, is 13 A. Mmm-hmm. 14 necessary and important to aid Mr. Picard's efforts to Q. From time to time, you may hear Mr. Worby 15 recover the stolen assets so that he may return them 15 make an objection, which will be noted on the record. 16 to the victims. 16 After the objection is noted, you can proceed to In light of the foregoing, and 17 answer the question posed except if the answer would 18 notwithstanding the fact that you're being represented 18 implicate a legal privilege. 19 by the defendant's lawyers in this action, I want to And as we said earlier, if you need a 20 stress that the Bankruptcy Court summoned you here 20 break at any time, just let us all know. I only ask 21 today to provide helpful and truthful testimony. 21 that if I have a question pending, that you answer the 22 You're under oath and everyone in this room expects 22 question before we go on a break. 23 you to state the truth, the whole truth, and nothing 23 A. Sure. 24 Q. Okay. Mr. Müller, your first language is 24 but the truth. 25 French; is that right? 25 And I just want to confirm you have no 18 20 1 problem with being helpful and truthful today, A. It is correct. 1 Mr. Müller. Q. Are you able to read and understand 2 2 3 English? A. Absolutely not, no. Q. Okay. I'm going to be asking you a series A. Yes. of questions. If at any time --Q. Do you understand that your testimony 6 (Stenographer interruption.) you're about to give has the same force and effect as MR. MOLINA: Thank you. I apologize. though you were testifying in a courtroom? THE STENOGRAPHER: It's okay. 8 A. I do. BY MR. MOLINA: Q. Are you suffering from any medical 10 conditions, mental or physical, that would prevent you Q. I'm going to be asking you a series of 11 questions today. If at any time I ask you a question 11 from testifying fully, truthfully, and accurately 12 that you do not understand, please let me know and 12 today? 13 I will do my best to restate or repeat the question. 13 A. Not that I know of, no. 14 If you realize that an earlier answer you gave me was Q. Are you taking any medications or 15 inaccurate, or incomplete, just say that you want to 15 substances that would prevent you from testifying 16 correct or supplement your answer and you'll be 16 fully, truthfully and accurately today, or would 17 allowed to do so. 17 otherwise affect your recollection? If you answer a question, I will assume 18 A. No. 19 that you've heard it and understood it, and you've Q. Is there anything else we should be aware 20 given me your best recollection. And I understand a 20 of that would prevent you testifying fully, truthfully 21 great deal of time has passed since many of these 21 and accurately today? 22 conversations and correspondence took place, so I'll 22 A. Nothing. No, nothing comes to mind.

23

25

24 the record.

Q. Do you mind if you say your full name for

A. Sure. It's Jérôme Müller.

23 just ask that you do your best to recall what

As you can see, your testimony is being

24 occurred.

| | 1 Way 20, 2022 |
|---|--|
| Q. And what is your current home address? | Q. And if you read, in the middle of the |
| <u> </u> | Q. And if you read, in the middle of the first page, it explains that this order approves a |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| 5 Q. Have you ever given testimony in a 6 courtroom? | 5 States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of6 New York. |
| | |
| 7 A. I have. | 7 Do you see that? |
| 8 Q. Do you want to describe the circumstances | 8 A. Yes, I see. I do. |
| 9 behind that. | 9 Q. And you understand that the purpose of |
| 10 A. It was a wrongful termination case, | 10 that letter of request was to request the testimony |
| 11 I guess; a disgruntled employee suing Partners | 11 that you're about to give today? |
| 12 Advisers, in fact. | 12 A. Mmm-hmm. |
| Q. Who was the employee that was suing | MR. MOLINA: Can I get tab 2. Set that to |
| 14 Partners Advisers? | 14 the side. |
| 15 A. He was called Sella Yavin. | Ms. Court Reporter, I am handing you what |
| 16 Q. And in what capacity were you asked to | 16 is now tab 2 of the bundle. If you would be so kind |
| 17 testify? | 17 as to mark this as Trustee Exhibit No. 13. |
| 18 A. As a witness. Oh, you mean | 18 (Trustee Exhibit 13 marked for |
| 19 Q. As a thirdparty witness? | 19 identification.) |
| 20 A. Yes. | 20 BY MR. MOLINA: |
| Q. Were you a named party in that action? | Q. Mr. Müller, you have just been handed what |
| 22 A. No, I wasn't. | 22 has been marked as Trustee Exhibit No. 13, which is a |
| Q. Have you ever given testimony in an | 23 copy of the Litigation Protective Order and |
| 24 arbitration or mediation? | 24 undertaking entered on June 6, 2011, which governs, |
| 25 A. No, never. | 25 amongst other things, the confidentiality of the |
| 22 | 24 |
| Q. Have you ever been asked to provide | 1 testimony you're giving today. |
| 2 testimony to a government entity? | 2 Have you ever seen this document? |
| 3 A. No. | A. It was part of the bundle but I have to |
| 4 Q. Okay. | 4 admit I haven't read it. |
| 5 MR. MOLINA: If we go to tab 1. All | Q. If you may turn to paragraph 10f, which |
| 6 right. | 6 starts on page 5 of 17, if you look at the top of the |
| 7 Court Reporter, I am handing you tab 1 of | 7 document and go to page 5 of 17. |
| 8 the bundle. Can you please mark this as Trustee | 8 I'm going to give you an opportunity to |
| 9 Exhibit No. 12. | 9 read this paragraph, Mr. Müller. |
| 10 (Trustee Exhibit 12 marked for | 10 A. Mmm-hmm. |
| 11 identification.) | Q. But I just want to preview that you will |
| 12 BY MR. MOLINA: | 12 see that this paragraph provides that you, through |
| Q. Mr. Müller, I'm handing you what has been | 13 your attorneys, will have the ability to designate any |
| 14 marked as Trustee Exhibit No. 12. I'll represent to | 14 information you provide today as confidential, to the |
| 15 you that this is a copy of the order that was issued | 15 extent it falls within the purview of this order. If |
| 16 by the High Court of Justice on April 14, 2022. | 16 so designated, the Trustee would be required to |
| 17 Are you familiar with this document? | 17 provide notice to you and your counsel, prior to |
| 18 A. I have seen it, yes. | 18 disclosing that information to any third party. |
| Q. Do you see in the top part, top-left part | 19 Please review this paragraph closely and |
| 20 of the document, it shows that this document was | 20 let me know if you have any questions. |
| 21 issued by the High Court of Justice? | 21 A. No, no questions. |
| 22 A. Mmm-hmm. | 22 Q. Thank you, Mr. Müller. |
| Q. Do you see that, from the seal, it's dated | 23 A. Thank you. |
| 24 April 14, 2022? | Q. Mr. Müller, what did you do to prepare for |
| 25 A. Yes. | 25 this deposition? |
| | T DEDOC |

7 (25 to 28)

| Conducted on May 20, 2022 | | | | |
|--|---|--|--|--|
| 25 | 27 | | | |
| 1 A. I read well, I skimmed through the | 1 A. I didn't, no. | | | |
| 2 bundle of documents that I received. And I had a | Q. Mr. Müller, I'm going to ask you to just | | | |
| 3 meeting with Mr. Worby. | 3 give some background information about let's start | | | |
| 4 Q. Was the meeting here in London? | 4 with your education. If you don't mind just listing | | | |
| 5 A. Yes. | 5 the degrees that you have obtained in chronological | | | |
| 6 Q. And did you meet with US counsel as well? | 6 order, that would be useful. | | | |
| 7 A. No. | 7 A. Sure. I have a master's degree in | | | |
| 8 Q. Without discussing the contents, did your | 8 international relations from the University of Geneva | | | |
| 9 counsel give you any notes or information with respect | 9 that I received in 1970 sorry, 1997, and that's my | | | |
| 10 to your testimony today? | 10 only university degree. I also passed the CFA | | | |
| 11 A. No. | 11 examination, so I'm a CFA charterholder. That's a | | | |
| 12 Q. Aside from your counsel, did you speak | 12 professional degree, obviously. | | | |
| 13 with anyone else in preparation for your testimony | Q. What is a CFA degree? | | | |
| 14 today? | 14 A. It's a chartered financial analyst degree, | | | |
| 15 A. I did not, no. | 15 which is sort of the standard in my profession. | | | |
| 16 Q. You didn't speak to anyone from that | Q. What's the purpose of that degree? | | | |
| 17 was either that is either a current or former | 17 A. It's a degree to sort of well, it's | | | |
| 18 employee of Partners Advisers? | 18 sort of focused on financial analysis of securities, | | | |
| 19 A. I didn't. | 19 so it's basically to learn how to analyze securities, | | | |
| Q. Did you speak with Mr. Christophe Khaw? | 20 equities, fixed income. | | | |
| 21 A. I did not, no. | Q. And do you need that degree to do the job | | | |
| 22 Q. Mr. Albert Collette? | 22 that you're currently doing? | | | |
| 23 A. No. | A. No, I think it's good on a CV. It's, you | | | |
| Q. Other than the documents in the bundle, | 24 know, I guess, helpful at the margin. | | | |
| 25 did you review any other documents in preparation for | Q. And when did you obtain that CFA? | | | |
| 26 | 28 | | | |
| 1 your testimony today? | 1 A. That was in 2002. | | | |
| 2 A. I had a quick read through the complaint, | 2 Q. And where did you go to obtain that | | | |
| 3 actually, which I had a copy of. | 3 degree? | | | |
| 4 Q. When you say "the complaint," do you mean | 4 A. It's actually self-learning, so you don't | | | |
| 5 the amended complaint that was filed in the action in | 5 go anywhere but you have to pass three exams three | | | |
| 6 New York City? | 6 years in a row, so three levels. | | | |
| 7 A. I suppose so. It's the document that | 7 Q. And all those exams were passed in around | | | |
| 8 actually mentioned a number of sections of a due | 8 2002? | | | |
| 9 diligence officer, which is obviously me, and I guess | 9 A. Mmm, so it's three years, so I started in | | | |
| 10 the elements I supposedly had sort of disclosed to an | 10 2000, 2001, and 2002. | | | |
| 11 investigator, so I read that document. | Q. Do you have to do anything after 2002, | | | |
| Q. Other than the bundle of documents and | 12 have you had to do anything to keep that degree | | | |
| 13 this complaint, is there anything else that you read | 13 current? | | | |
| 14 in preparing for your testimony today? | 14 A. You have to commit to continuous learning | | | |
| 15 A. Nothing else. | 15 or, sort of yeah, but that's, I guess, just sort of | | | |
| Q. Did you select those documents yourself | 16 reading, you know, financial literature sort of | | | |
| 17 that you read or did someone tell you to read those | 17 qualifies for that. So it's not a big ask. | | | |
| 18 documents? | Q. You don't have to take any other | | | |
| 19 A. No, I selected them myself. | 19 examinations? | | | |
| Q. Did those documents help refresh your | 20 A. No. | | | |
| 21 recollection of the relevant facts related to your | Q. Other than the master's in international | | | |
| 22 testimony? | 22 relations and this CFA, do you have any other degrees? | | | |
| A. Yeah, it did. Yeah, I guess so. Yeah. | 23 A. I don't. | | | |
| Q. Did you bring any documents with you | Q. Do you have any publications? | | | |

25

A. I don't think so, no.

25 today?

dictators.

10 this position?

15 though.

17 auditors?

A. Yes.

24 you were at UBP?

11

16

18

19

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23

25

| Conducted on M | Iay 20, 2022 |
|----------------|--------------|
|----------------|--------------|

| | | | | 3 / |
|---|--|----|---|--|
| | | 29 | | 3 |
| 1 | Q. Any other professional licenses? | | 1 | searches to see if those people had indeed the |
| 2 | A. No. | | 2 | business they claimed they had, or things like this. |
| 3 | Q. Where have you had to register as part of | | 3 | We were also looking at the concept of |
| 4 | your profession? | | 4 | the concept of PEP, which is, sort of, politically |
| 5 | A. I don't think I had, actually. What I | | 5 | exposed person. Didn't exist back then but it was |

6 for a long time, my profession and the firms I was working at were unregulated, so -- and I don't think

8 when they became regulated I actually had to register.

When I moved to the UK, I, with my own 10 sort of consultancy firm, I became an appointed 11 representative of another firm that was regulated, so 12 I was sort of -- I had to fill in a number of 13 documents with the FCA, but I wasn't directly under 14 FCA regulation, it was through another firm. Q. Okay. Mr. Müller, you said that you

16 obtained your university degree in 1997. Correct? 17 A. That's correct.

18 Q. Did you take a job soon after finishing 19 that degree?

A. I did, yes. 20

2

6

8

21 Q. Where did you get that job?

22 A. It was at a Swiss private bank called UBP,

23 which stands for Union Bancaire Privée. Sorry for the 24 French spelling.

Q. And what was your role at UBP?

A. I was a junior internal auditor.

A. It's Union Bancaire Privée.

Q. I apologize. I mean what is the

A. Oh, it's a private bank.

Q. Just for the record, what is UBP again?

Q. And where did you go after you -- sorry, 1 let me retract that and start again.

A. That's the only role I held.

When did you leave UBP?

A. I left at the end of March 1999. 4

Q. So to roughly 1999?

A. Early '99, yes.

5 Q. What were the circumstances behind your departure?

A. A colleague from this internal audit

contacted me saying that they were looking for

department had left to join a family office, and she

also, sort of, intending to sort of see if any of the

Q. And who did you report to when you held

12 supervisor changed for every mission, so there was one

13 person. The head of that department was a Vietnamese 14 man called Ngyuen. I can't remember his first name,

A. So we were a team of 12. My direct

Q. So you were a team of 12, 12 internal

Q. And how long did you hold that role?

A. For slightly over a year and a half.

Q. And what other roles did you hold while

funds were sort of connected to politicians or

Q. And where were you located when you worked

30

10 Q. You said you were a junior -- I'm sorry,

11 could you repeat that?

at UBP?

institution? What is --

A. In Geneva.

12 A. Yeah. Internal auditor.

13 Q. And what did that job entail?

14 A. That job entailed going through the

15 onboarding documents of private wealth clients and

16 making sure that the funds they were depositing in the

17 bank were, sort of, had legal origins. So we were 18 sort of making sure that the bank wasn't, sort of, at

19 risk of being accused of money laundering, basically.

20 Q. How did you conduct that job?

A. So it was sort of evidence-based, I guess.

22 So we were, sort of, going through the documents that

23 these clients were providing the bank, showing their

24 proof of, sort of, funds, origins of funds, and just

25 making sure that they were real, doing internet

10 a junior analyst and so I applied for that role and

11 I was hired.

Q. Who was this colleague that told you

13 that -- who was this fellow junior auditor that left

14 and told you about this job?

15 A. She was actually a senior auditor, but she 16 was called Dorothée, with two e's at the end, and 17 I can't remember her last name.

Q. And you said that you applied for a job as 19 a junior analyst at a family office?

20 A. Yes.

21 Q. What's the name of the family office?

22 A. This is where it gets complicated. The

23 family office was called Parly Company, P-a-r-l-y, but


24 I was actually hired by Partners Advisers, who, at

25 the time, were sharing offices with that family

31

9 (33 to 36)

Conducted on May 20, 2022



Q. You mentioned Peter Fletcher. What was

37

39


| 1 | his role at Parly | Company? |
|---|-------------------|----------|
|---|-------------------|----------|

- 2 A. So he was managing the entire family
- 3 office, so his role was partly managing the people,
- 4 the, sort of, operations and administration of the
- 5 business, and partly overseeing all the portfolios
- 6 that were run within the family office.
- Q. So what did you do when you were at Parly
- 8 Company, specifically?
- 9 A. I was -- I mean, I was hired as a junior
- 10 analyst. I didn't know anything about the investment
- 11 world, so I think my role was to learn about it, to
- 12 begin with, and then potentially to sort of find
- 13 interesting investment opportunities, and, for the
- 14 most part, sort of spending time analyzing potential
- 15 investments that Philippe would find and pass on to me 16 to do work on.
- 17 Q. What sort of investments did this family
- 18 office invest in?
- 19 A. For the vast majority of the capital, it
- 20 was in hedge funds and in other thirdparty funds. So
- 21 they weren't actually investing in any equities or
- 22 fixed income directly, securities directly; they were
- 23 always using funds.
- Q. And, roughly, what was the size of the
- 25 portfolio that they were managing?
 - A. I think it was around 400 million.
- O. Dollars?
- 3 A. Dollars, yeah.
- 4 Q. Okay. So just to be clear, Parly Company
- 5 was sharing office space with Partners Advisers in
- 6 Geneva?
- 7 A. Yes.
- 8 Q. And where were they located in Geneva, do
- 9 you remember?
- 10 A. They were located rue François-Bonivard.
- 11 I can make it sound more English if you wanted.
- 12 Q. It's for the court reporter.
- 13 A. So it's -- do you want me to spell it?
- 14 THE STENOGRAPHER: Yes, please.
- 15 THE WITNESS: So r-u-e, other word
- 16 F-r-a-n-ç-o-i-s, other word B-o-n-i-v-a-r-d, number 17 12.
- 18 THE STENOGRAPHER: Thanks.
- 19 BY MR. MOLINA:
- Q. And how big was this office space that
- 21 they were sharing?
- A. It was on two floors. The lower floor
- 23 had, basically, all the operations, administrations
- 24 for the family. Those people I wouldn't -- sort of,
- 25 personal assistants, different family members. That

- 1 floor I would rarely go to. And then upper floor was
- 2 the investment team. It was basically one shared,
- 3 sort of, open-space office with four desks, on which
- 4 sat Philippe Hostettler, Luc Estenne, and myself.
- 5 There was a free desk, and then a meeting room.
- Q. What was the reason that they shared an office?
- 8 A. I think Luc was starting his business and
- he was looking to sort of minimize costs and Parly
- 10 offered him basically part of their office, or their
- 11 free space, for him to start his business from.
- 12 Q. When you say Luc, do you mean Mr. Luc
- 13 Estenne?
- 14 A. Yes.
- Q. How many people were in the upper floor?
- 16 A. So initially when I started, we were
- 17 three; so Philippe, Luc Estenne, and myself.
- Q. You said it was an open space?
- 19 A. Yes.
- Q. Would all three of you have free-flowing
- 21 conversations about the investments that you were
- 22 analyzing at the time?
- 23 A. Yes.

38

- Q. So now let's talk about Partners Advisers.
- 25 What was Partners Advisers when you were there?
- - A. So Partners Advisers was basically -I mean, when I started, it was just one person who was
 - 3 basically trying to set up an asset management firm.
 - 4 When I started, the firm had about 50 million in
 - 5 assets under management, although it wasn't really
 - 6 management, it was advisory. They were co-advising a
 - 7 Luxembourg-based bank on their hedge fund portfolio.
 - 8 The bank was called KBL.
 - 9 Q. Okay. You said there was one person. Was
 - 10 that Mr. Estenne?
 - 11 A. Yes.
 - 12 Q. And what was his role?
 - 13 A. Well, he founded the firm so I guess his
 - 14 role was everything, really.
 - Q. When did he found the firm?
 - 16 A. I don't know. Not long before I arrived,
 - 17 but I don't know exactly when.



Q. And you said it was at that time, in 1999,

43

44

it was just you and Mr. Estenne at Partners Advisers?

- Q. So what was the day-to-day
- responsibility -- what were the day-to-day
- responsibilities that you had at that time?
- A. It was very similar to the ones for Parly.
- In fact, my job, although I was working part time for
- 8 each of those firm, I wouldn't sort of make a
- difference in my day job, right; so what I was doing
- 10 for one I was doing for the other. So it was
- 11 basically, sort of, analyzing potential investment
- 12 opportunity, obviously, sort of attending meetings
- 13 with hedge fund managers that would come through the
- 14 office. Tried to learn as much as I could about this 15 business.
- Q. And you said that Partners Advisers was 17 also a family office?
- A. Well, it was -- it wasn't -- no, it
- 19 wasn't, really. Luc -- Luc's family had some sort of
- 20 wealth from Luc's father's -- Luc's father sold the
- 21 business and they had some wealth, but Luc's father
- 22 was very involved in running that and that wasn't run 23 by us.
- 24 So, if anything, we were sort of giving
- 25 Luc's father investment advice but it was pro bono.
 - O. Who was Luc's father?
- 2 A. I don't remember his first name. But he
- was -- I only met him twice. He was an executive who
- started a pharmaceutical business which he then sold.
- 5 But I don't have any more details than
- that. 6
- Q. Other than advising Luc's father on a
- pro bono basis, who were the clients of Partners
- Advisers at that time?
- 10 A. So there was only that one bank, KBL,
- 11 which we were co-advising actually with another firm
- 12 called Signet Capital.
- Q. So you said KBL was a bank? 13
- 14 A. Yes. Kredietbank Luxembourg is what it 15 stands for.
- Q. And what sort of investments did KBL vet,
- 17 or have you and Luc vet?
- A. So, yeah, so we were advising on their
- 19 hedge fund portfolios. There were two portfolios with
- 20 different sort of mandate, one more directional
- 21 or aggressive than the other; one was sort of supposed
- 22 to be an equity replacement, the other one a bond
- 23 replacement.
- 24 We were advising them so we had no
- 25 discretion. We were basically, sort of, recommending

- 1 investments and they would, you know, take these
- recommendations and implement them, or not.
- 3 As I mentioned, we were co-advising this
- mandate with another firm called Signet, and so every
- investment that was brought to KBL was first discussed
- with this other firm and we would sort of agree on
- which investments we would put forward.
 - Q. Okay. So what was Signet at that time?
- A. Signet was, I guess, an investment
- 10 advisory firm. I mean, I -- it was started by a
- 11 person called Bob Marquardt. They were based in
- 12 Lausanne, Switzerland. Bob used to be a sort of
- 13 placement agent and sort of reinvented himself as an
- 14 investor. I suppose -- I mean, that's sort of -- that
- 15 was sort of the message I received at the time.
- 16 I sort of never investigated who they were, what they
- 17 were doing, except that, sort of, common mandate.
- Q. So how did Partners Advisers make money
- 19 during that time? A. I have no idea. I was a junior person.
- 21 I mean, they were obviously paid for that KBL mandate,
- 22 but I didn't have any visibility into the finance of 23 the firm.
- 24 Q. How long were you a junior analyst at
- 25 Partners Advisers?

- A. Well, I mean, at some point I probably
 - moved from junior to, sort of, an analyst position or
 - senior analyst position but there was no title so
 - I don't exactly know when that happened. We did hire
 - another analyst that reported to me. I want to say in
 - 2001. 6
 - 7 Q. Who was that?
 - A. But I'm not sure about the date. He was
 - called Olivier Magnin. He's still at the firm today.
 - 10 Q. So he reported --
 - A. Shall I spell it. 11
 - 12 Q. Oh.
 - THE STENOGRAPHER: I've got it. 13
 - 14 BY MR. MOLINA:
 - 15 Q. He reported to you at that time, when he
 - 16 was hired?
 - **17** A. Yeah, he reported to Luc and I. I was his 18 senior, yes.
 - 19 Q. This is in 2001?
 - 20 A. I think so. I'm not exactly -- yeah, not
 - 21 a hundred percent sure of the dates.
 - Q. And as of around that time, around 2001,
 - 23 was Partners Advisers still focused on simply
 - 24 providing advice to KBL or were there other clients?
 - 25 A. So in 2001, we launched our own sort of

Transcript of Mr. Jerome Muller

| • | Conducted on May 20, 2022 | | | | | |
|--|---|--|--|--|--|--|
| | · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · | | | | | |
| 1 fund-of-fund product called ART. | 1 Q. And when did they become a client of | | | | | |
| 2 Q. What was ART? | 2 Partners Advisers? | | | | | |
| 3 A. So it was basically a fund a portfolio | 3 A. So well, I mean with the launch of this | | | | | |
| 4 hedge fund, a fund of fund. There were three | 4 ART Fund. | | | | | |
| 5 different classes of shares, three different sort of | 5 Q. So just so I understand, prior to the | | | | | |
| 6 type of products, labeled A, B, C; so ART-A, ART-B, | 6 launch of the fund, Partners Advisers focused almost | | | | | |
| 7 ART-C. Maybe there was a D as well, I can't remember. | 7 exclusively on advising KBL bank? | | | | | |
| 8 There was a D at some point but I can't remember if it | 8 A. Yes. | | | | | |
| 9 was there day one or not. I don't think so. | 9 Q. And it wasn't until the launch of the fund | | | | | |
| 10 Q. Where was the fund based? | 10 in you said it was around 2001? | | | | | |
| 11 A. In Luxembourg. | 11 A. Yes, January 2001, I think. | | | | | |
| 12 Q. What did the ART stand for? | 12 Q. And that's when they, Partners Advisers, | | | | | |
| 13 A. Absolute Return Target. | 13 brought on other investors? | | | | | |
| 14 Q. What was the portfolio of ART Fund, do you | 14 A. Yes. I think Partners Advisers actually | | | | | |
| 15 remember? | 15 initially let me correct that. I think and | | | | | |
| 16 A. So we what was in the portfolios or | 16 that's only I wasn't part of this conversation, but | | | | | |
| 17 Q. I apologize, yes. What was in | 17 I sort of understood that Partners Advisers was also | | | | | |
| 18 what sort of investments was ART Fund invested in? | 18 getting paid for advice by Parly. So part of they | | | | | |
| 19 A. So their older investments were hedge fund | 19 also had a contract with Parly, which is sort of | | | | | |
| 20 investments. ART-A was actually run for was a | 20 I was part of that, obviously, because I was also | | | | | |
| 21 specific vehicle that was run for another, sort of, | 21 working there for them, but I think Luc also got | | | | | |
| 22 wealth management firm. And ART-B was sort of a bond | | | | | | |
| 23 replacement program. ART-C was sort of an equity | 23 So, yeah, so KBL and Parly were those two | | | | | |
| 24 replacement program. For a range of investors, that | 24 clients, if you want, yeah. | | | | | |
| 25 was openended. Investors could subscribe into this. | 25 Q. Parly was paying Partners Advisers for | | | | | |
| 46 | 48 | | | | | |
| 1 Q. Okay. Let's break that down. | 1 investment advice? | | | | | |
| | 1 mrestment davice. | | | | | |
| 2 So you said ART-A was actually run for a | 2 A. Yes. Yeah. | | | | | |
| So you said ART-A was actually run for a specific vehicle that was another wealth management | | | | | | |
| | 2 A. Yes. Yeah. | | | | | |
| 3 specific vehicle that was another wealth management | 2 A. Yes. Yeah. 3 Q. I'm going to get back to the other classes | | | | | |
| 3 specific vehicle that was another wealth management4 firm. Could you expand on that a little bit. | 2 A. Yes. Yeah. 3 Q. I'm going to get back to the other classes 4 of the ART fund, but I just want to go back to the | | | | | |
| specific vehicle that was another wealth management firm. Could you expand on that a little bit. A. So it was sure. It was sort of similar | 2 A. Yes. Yeah. 3 Q. I'm going to get back to the other classes 4 of the ART fund, but I just want to go back to the 5 launch | | | | | |
| specific vehicle that was another wealth management firm. Could you expand on that a little bit. A. So it was sure. It was sort of similar to the KBL program in the sense that we were running | 2 A. Yes. Yeah. 3 Q. I'm going to get back to the other classes 4 of the ART fund, but I just want to go back to the 5 launch 6 A. Sure. | | | | | |
| specific vehicle that was another wealth management firm. Could you expand on that a little bit. A. So it was sure. It was sort of similar to the KBL program in the sense that we were running this portfolio specifically for one other entity that | 2 A. Yes. Yeah. 3 Q. I'm going to get back to the other classes 4 of the ART fund, but I just want to go back to the 5 launch 6 A. Sure. 7 Q of the fund. | | | | | |
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| specific vehicle that was another wealth management firm. Could you expand on that a little bit. A. So it was sure. It was sort of similar to the KBL program in the sense that we were running this portfolio specifically for one other entity that didn't have an internal expertise in hedge funds and so required another firm to run it for them. And then ART yeah. Whereas the other two, B and C, were sort of typical fund of funds that were open to other to any investors that I mean, any, I guess, sophisticated investor to invest in. It wasn't they weren't retail products. | 2 A. Yes. Yeah. 3 Q. I'm going to get back to the other classes 4 of the ART fund, but I just want to go back to the 5 launch 6 A. Sure. 7 Q of the fund. 8 What was the purpose what was the 9 reason, do you remember, why Partners Advisers decided 10 to create and launch this fund? 11 A. Yeah. I mean, I think Luc's ambition was 12 to create an asset management firm, so the goal was to 13 grow the assets under management of the firm and have 14 a product that we would sort of run ourselves in order | | | | | |

21 A. In Geneva.

18

19

20

22 Q. Managed by whom?

Q. Based where?

Q. What is Trendtrust?

A. At the time there were two partners: one

A. It was a wealth management firm.

24 called Hugues Janssens; the other one called Andrea 25 Manghi.

22 adviser to the ART Fund? 23 A. Yes.

20 and be profitable for the firm.

24 Q. Who were the directors of ART Fund, do you 25 remember?

But, ultimately, it was just basically

19 with the goal of creating a product that could grow

Q. Was Partners Advisers the investment

Transcript of Mr. Jerome Muller 13 (49 to 52)

Conducted on May 20, 2022

49 **1 A**

A. No. Well, I mean, Luc was one of the

2 directors and then there was a number of people from

3 Rothschild Bank, which was the custodian, the

4 administrator of that -- with the ART Fund. They had

5 a number of directors on the board as well but I can't

6 remember their names.

Q. You mentioned there was a Class B and

8 Class C, and potentially a Class D of ART Fund, right?

9 A. Mmm-hmm.

10 Q. And you mentioned that there were other

11 thirdparty investors other than Trendtrust could

12 invest through those classes?

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. What -- how many investors -- in the first

15 year, how many of those investors were there?

16 A. I have no idea. Can't remember. I'm

17 actually not sure I was part of that either. I was

18 sort of shielded from -- my job was making sure that,

19 you know, the investments we put in the portfolio made 20 sense.

21 I was not, sort of, very actively involved

22 in conversation with potential investors.

Q. When you say you were shielded, who

24 shielded you?

25 A. Well, Luc Estenne was sort of leading the

1

2

1 marketing efforts for the funds, so he did shield me

from that, initially at least. I was -- that sort of

3 changed over time, but, yeah, back in 2001 for sure.

Q. So your role with respect to the ART Fund

5 was, at that time, around the time of the launch, was

6 to simply select the investments that would be put in

7 the portfolio?

A. Yeah. I mean I wasn't -- I was two year

9 in the job, so my job was to help select the

10 investments, I would say, rather than selling them

11 myself.

Q. So how would you go about doing that?

13 A. So I would try to find investment

14 opportunities, mostly talking to other investors,

15 talking to a number of service providers that are sort

16 of active in our industry, traveling to the US on a

17 regular basis to meet with these potential

18 investments, conduct due diligence, which basically

19 meant meeting with the manager, with his or her team,

20 understanding the strategy, and then sort of,

21 you know, compare it to others that were doing similar

22 things, and then ultimately approve them for

23 investment.

Q. Okay. And we will go through the due

25 diligence process --

A. I'm sure.

Q. -- later, but I just want to go back to

3 the specific roles.

4 So when you said that you would -- you

5 would recommend investments for the ART Fund

6 portfolio, you mean you would recommend them to

7 Mr. Estenne?

A. Yes.

9 Q. And at that time he would be the one that

10 would ultimately decide what the fund would invest in?

11 A. Yeah, he would be very involved. He would

12 meet with the people I would, you know, recommend as

13 well, do his own sort of work, apply his own

14 experience. He was obviously ten years my senior and

15 much more experienced than I was.

Q. And so in 2001 -- you mentioned

17 Mr. Magnin. Am I pronouncing that correctly?

8 A. You're pronouncing it the American way,

19 which is fine.20 Q. I apologize. So Mr. Magnin was working

21 with you and Luc. Was there anyone else that joined

22 the team?

A. We had a team assistant, actually, or an

24 assistant, mostly to Luc. But she was helping with

25 the team as well. That was it. Yes.

50

O. Who was the assistant?

A. She was called Nathalie Mottier.

Q. And when you say she was an assistant, do

4 you mean an assistant to the entire team or to only

5 Luc?

6 A. Well, she was mostly doing work for Luc,

but she was -- she would sort of help the team as well

8 when it came to sort of booking hotels and flights,

9 stuff like that.

Q. And at that time you were still sharing

11 office space with Parly Company at that address in

12 Geneva?

13 A. We were, yes.

Q. She worked up on the second floor with

15 you --

16 A. Yes.

Q. -- and the rest of the analysts?

8 A. Yeah. She had sort of a reception desk

19 that was separate from the open space.

Q. Who else was at Partners Advisers around

21 that time in early 2001/2002?

22 A. That was the full team, I think.

Q. Who is Carole Müller?

24 A. Who? Sorry.

Q. Carole Müller.

52

| Conducted on | May 20, 2022 |
|--|---|
| 53 | 55 |
| 1 A. K-a-r-e-l-l? | 1 Q. But just when you would recommend |
| Q. C-a-r-o-l-e. | 2 investments to Mr. Estenne, would you share those |
| 3 A. Oh. | 3 recommendations or that work product with Parly |
| 4 Q. And I'm sorry if I'm mispronouncing that | 4 Company? |
| 5 name as well. | 5 A. Not directly, no. I think Luc had |
| 6 A. Same last name as mine? I don't know. | 6 meetings with Peter Fletcher on a regular basis but |
| 7 I don't know who she is. I mean, the way you | 7 I don't know what was discussed. Maybe it was |
| 8 pronounce it, sounded like my daughter, so, like so | 8 investments were discussed, but I wasn't sort of |
| 9 who is called Karell. But I don't know that | 9 discussing them directly. |
| 10 person. | 10 We were obviously sharing an office space |
| 11 Q. Okay. | 11 with and we were in an open space with Philippe |
| 12 A. Or I can't remember. | 12 Hostettler so he would be very aware of what was going |
| 13 Q. Who is Fabien Duteil? | 13 on. |
| 14 A. He was a person that was hired to the firm | Q. Would Parly Company have access to the |
| 15 as to lead the distribution effort, sales effort | 15 systems, the computer systems, that Partners Advisers |
| 16 for the firm later on. | 16 used? |
| Q. When you say "the firm," you mean Partners | 17 A. I honestly can't remember. |
| 18 Advisers? | 18 Q. So you had Mr. Duteil. Do you know when |
| 19 A. Yes. | 19 he joined the firm? |
| Q. Did he also work at Parly Company? | 20 A. I can't remember that, no. |
| 21 A. No. By that time we had separated. | 21 Q. Around 2002? |
| Q. When did you separate? | 22 A. No, I think it was later. I think it was |
| 23 A. Yeah, I knew that question was coming, but | 23 much later but I can't remember the exact day. |
| 24 I can't remember the date. Probably around 2002 or | Q. So as far as you could remember, in the |
| 25 2003. | 25 2002/2003 time frame, who was at Partners Advisers? |
| 54 | 56 |
| Q. Why did they separate? | A. 2002/2003 time frame? I think those four |
| A. We were growing as a firm and so I think | 2 people that I mentioned. At some point we did hire |
| 3 the relationship became sort of less useful for | 3 a salesperson. I think the first person we hired was |
| 4 Partners Advisers. Parly was moving in different | 4 Fabien Duteil. There was quite a bit of turnover on |
| 5 direction as well in terms of their own investments | 5 the sales team so there were multiple people that had |
| 6 away from hedge funds and so it made sense to | 6 that role over time. But I can't remember when he |
| 7 separate. We were outgrowing the space as well so we | 7 joined. |
| 8 needed new space. | Q. You said he was a salesperson? |
| 9 Q. So Partners Advisers moved to a different | 9 A. Yes. |
| 10 address? | Q. What did he do? |
| 11 A. Yes. | A. So his role was to, sort of, find |
| 12 Q. Where did they move? Partners Advisers, | 12 investors for our ART Fund. |
| 13 where did Partners Advisers move? | Q. And did he report to Luc? |
| 14 A. To which address, is that | 14 A. He did, yes. |
| 15 Q. Yeah, sorry, to which address? | Q. But he wasn't involved in what you were |
| 16 A. To 100 rue du Rhône. | 16 doing at that time? |
| 17 It's R-h-ô-n-e. | A. No. No, he was sort of outward facing. |
| 18 THE STENOGRAPHER: Thanks. | 18 He was not involved in the investment the |
| 19 BY MR. MOLINA: | 19 investment process. |
| Q. And just going back to the whole sharing | Q. And at that time it was you and Mr. Magnin |
| 21 office space, when you would recommend investments | 21 working together on due diligence and selecting |
| 22 and, again, we will go through the due diligence | 22 A. Yes. |
| 23 process in detail so I don't want to get too far into | 23 Q potential investments? |
| 24 that. | 24 A. Yes. And Luc was very involved, too. |
| 25 A. Yeah. | 25 I mean, Luc was driving that process, right. He was |

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|---|---|
| 57 | 59 |
| 1 again, he was the de facto CIO of the business, the | 1 through a special vehicle or |
| 2 chief investment officer. | A. Yes, they had their own fund. |
| Q. And your role your title at that time | Q. What was the name of the fund? |
| 4 was still analyst? | 4 A. I can't remember it. I think it was |
| 5 A. Well, again, we didn't have titles, right. | 5 called MeesPierson something, but I can't remember the |
| 6 I mean, ultimately, I guess my title at that time was | 6 exact name of the fund. |
| 7 probably senior analyst because I had one person | Q. And was Partners Advisers an investment |
| 8 reporting to me, right. | 8 adviser to that fund? |
| 9 We actually got to title later on. I can | 9 A. I can't remember the exact structure. |
| 10 expand on it if you want. | 10 Q. Okay. |
| 11 Q. We'll get there. Other at this time, | A. I think we were – I don't know if we were |
| 12 for the other than selecting potential investments | 12 officially the investment adviser to the fund or if we |
| 13 for the ART Fund, what else were you doing? | 13 were an adviser to Mees Pierson, who was then the |
| A. We also started running an investment | 14 investment adviser to the fund. |
| 15 program for a Geneva-based bank called MeesPierson | 15 Q. Okay. |
| 16 bank. It had two I can't remember when that | MR. MOLINA: Tab 157. |
| 17 started by my I think it started in 2003, Two | 17 (Trustee Exhibit 14 marked for |
| 18 Thousand maybe late 2002 or early 2003. There was | 18 identification.) |
| 19 two programs, one which was again, sort of bond | MR. MOLINA: Court reporter, sorry, I've |
| 20 replacement, the other one was an equity replacement. | 20 handed you what was tab 157 in the bundle, which I see |
| 21 It was hedge fund portfolios as well. | 21 now has been marked as Trustee Exhibit No. 14. |
| We call those "white labeled," which means | 22 BY MR. MOLINA: |
| 23 that we were running them but they had the name of the | Q. Mr. Müller, if you may open up this |
| 24 bank on them. | 24 document you'll see that the first thing you'll see |
| Q. For the record, do you want to explain | 25 is that there's an original cover email that's in |
| 58 | 1. Franch Da vay see that? |
| 1 what bond replacement means. | 1 French. Do you see that? |
| A. Yeah. It means that the return target we | A. Yes. |
| 3 were or the returns we were trying to generate by | Q. And you'll know, as you flip through this, |
| 4 investing in hedge funds was sort of similar to a bond | 4 that this email has been translated into English |
| 5 portfolio; so steady returns, not very not very | 5 A. Mmm. |
| 6 high, but steady returns. | Q through a certified translation by an |
| Q. And what's an equity replacement? | outside vendor. Do you see that? |
| 8 A. An equity replacement is, similarly, a | 8 A. I see that, yes. |
| 9 hedge fund portfolio that aims to mimic the return | Q. And you see that this the email in |
| 10 profile of an equity portfolio, so basically have some | 10 question was sent on May 26, 2004. Do you see that? |
| 11 upside to equity markets and also potentially capture | 11 A. Absolutely, yeah. |
| 12 some of the downside of equity markets. | Q. Have you ever do you remember are |
| Q. Was MeesPierson also an investor of the | 13 you familiar with this document? |
| 14 ART Fund at that time? | 14 A. I can't remember it. You mean the email |
| A. No. No, it was a separate program. It | 15 or the attached document? I mean |
| 16 was run in the same way, which means that the | 16 Q. Both. |
| 17 investments we were making in ART Fund B, which was | A. I don't remember that email, but I see I'm |
| 18 the bond replacement, were, in general, the same ones | 18 copied on it so I did receive it. |
| 19 as we would do in their bond replacement program, | Q. Right. So, just for the record, this |
| 20 which was called Arbitrage And the investments we | 20 amail was sant by Mr. Fabian Dutail. Do you san that? |

20 email was sent by Mr. Fabien Duteil. Do you see that?

21 would do in ART-D, which appeared later on, which was 21 A. Yes.

Q. This is the gentleman that we were

23 discussing who was the head of business --

24 A. Development, yeah.

Q. -- of marketing at Partners Advisers?

20 which was called Arbitrage. And the investments we

23 their equity replacement program, which was called

22 basically an equity replacement, would be done in

24 Investing. And -- yeah.

| Conducted | on | May | 20, | 2022 |
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| 1 A. Ves. 2 Q. And this email was sent to Mr. Luc Estenne 3 and to yourself; yes? 4 A. Yes. 5 Q. And the Subject line is "DD." Correct? 6 A. Ves. 7 Q. What does DD stand for? 8 A. Due diligence. 9 Q. And the statchment is "DDO Partners 10 Advisers." Do you see that? 11 A. Yes. 12 Q. Do you see that the body of the email says 13 that this is a — the document is being sent for your 14 review? 15 A. Yes. 16 Q. Yesh. Why don't we turn to the attachment 17 itself. Do you see that the first page of the 18 attachment that it's dated May 10, 2004? 19 A. Yes. 20 Q. Do you see that it's named — it's titled 21 "Lloyds TSB Bank PLC - Fund of Hedge Fund Due 2D Diligence Questiomaire"? 23 A. Yes. 24 Q. What's a due diligence questiomaire? 25 A. A due diligence questiomaire? 26 A. A due diligence questiomaire is a 1 document that firms fill in for the benefit of 2 potential investors; so basically going through what they do, so both on investment side and sort of how 4 the operational aspects of these investments are 5 structured. 6 Q. Are you familiar with this attachment? 7 A. I don't remember it. 8 Q. But you have no reason to believe that you 9 didn't receive it at that time? 10 A. Absolutely, yeah. 11 Q. Let's go to — let's go to the — and 12 I will be referring to — if you note a meading in 18135. 19 Actually, I'm sorry, first let's go to 10 and 14 letters. 15 A. Yes. 16 Q. Du going to be referring to those. So 17 let's go to the page that has the SQQ, and then the 18 letters — so the numbers ending in 18135. 19 Actually, I'm sorry, first let's go to 10 and 14 letters. 21 A. Yes. 22 Q. Do you see there's a chart at the top of 23 that page? 24 A. Yes. 25 Q. Do you see that the stream of the dead of research? 26 A. Yes. 27 Q. Well get into frose terms later, but is 64 and sort of how 4 the operational aspects of these investments are 5 structured. 28 A. The same thing as I was 15 doing before but with a louder voice. So 13 guess by 16 that time? Vel and time in experience and so I was basically having 18 more in-depth con | | | | |
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| 7 A. It is. 8 A. Due diligence. 9 Q. And the attachment is "DDQ Partners" 10 Advisers." Do you see that? 11 A. Yes. 13 that this is a the document is being sent for your 14 review? 14 review? 15 A. Yes. 16 Q. Yeah. Why don't we turn to the attachment 17 itself. Do you see that first page of the 18 attachment that it's dated May 10, 2004? 19 A. Yes. 20 Q. Do you see that it's named it's titled 21 "Lloyds TSB Bank PLC - Fund of Hedge Fund Due 22 Diligence Questionnaire" 23 A. Yes. 24 Q. What's a due diligence questionnaire is a 25 A. A due diligence questionnaire is a 26 Q. And do you see that at the first fill in for the benefit of 2 potential investors; so basically going through what 3 they do, so both on investment side and sort of how 4 the operational aspects of these investments are 5 structured. 6 Q. Are you familiar with this attachment? 7 A. I don't remember it. 9 Q. But you have no reason to believe that you 9 didn't receive it at that time? 10 A. Absolutely, yeah. 11 Q. Let's go tolet's go to theand 12 I will be referring toif you note at the bottom 13 righthand corner there's a series of numbers and 14 letters. 15 A. Yes. 16 Q. I'm going to be referring to those. So 17 let's go to the page that has the SQO, and then the 18 letters so the numbers ending in 18135. 16 A. Yes. 17 A. A Yes. 18 A. I don't remember it. 19 A. Austinally, I'm sorry, first let's go to 20 18130. Apologies. 20 Q. Do you see that at the top of 20 about the very meeting with Luc about investments are 5 the numbers ending in 18135. 21 A. Yes. 22 Q. Do you see that it's namedit's titled 21 that refers to you, it says, "Manager Selection & 2 Monitoring." 23 A. Yes. 24 A. Yes. 25 A. A due diligence questionnaire is 2 A. Yes. 26 Q. And do you see that at in this same box 2 Monitoring." 36 A. Mum-hum. 47 A. I don't remember it. 48 A. Yes. 49 A. Yes. 50 A. A with this intenting the first title was bead of research? 51 A. A. So what this import the theath it in early 2003. 51 I'm that was my first title; hence my c | | | | |
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| 10 A. Yes. 10 A. Yes. 11 That was my first title; hence my comment before, the 12 (titles came in later. Yes. 13 D. What did you do as head of research? 14 review? 14 A. The same thing — the same thing as I was 15 doing before but with a louder too. So I guess by 16 that time I'd been with the firm for three years. I'd 17 gained in experience and so I was basically having 18 more in-depth conversation with Luc about investments 18 more in-depth conversation with Luc about investment 20 decision process. 21 A. Yes. 22 D. What's a due diligence questionnaire? 23 A. Yes. 24 D. What's a due diligence questionnaire is a 25 D. A. A due diligence questionnaire is a 21 moverner that firms fill in for the benefit of 2 potential investors; so basically going through what a they do, so both on investment side and sort of how 4 the operational aspects of these investments are 5 structured. 6 D. A. Absolutely, yeah. 10 A. Absolutely, yeah. 11 D. A. Ayes. 10 A. Absolutely, yeah. 11 D. A. Left's go to left's go to the and 12 I will be referring to if you note at the bottom 13 righthand corner there's a series of numbers and 14 letters. 15 A. Yes. 16 D. I'm going to be referring to those. So 7 left's go to the page that has the SQO, and then the letters so the numbers ending in 18135. 19 Actually, I'm sorry, first left's go to 20 I sillado, A. Yes. 19 movied in the running of the firms of the going want for it. 19 movied in the running of the firms at that point, so where we cannot be the title in early ware done within a latechment 12 titles came in later. Yes. 13 D. What did you do as head of research? 14 A. The same thing —- the same thing a I was I was I had in experience and so I was basic of research? 18 more in-depth conversation with Luc about investment 20 decision process. 21 But I was also managing the investment 22 team, which, at that point, was one person. 23 D. A. Minmhinm 24 the trefire of the same thing at large | | The state of the s | | |
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| 18 attachment that it's dated May 10, 2004? 19 | | | | |
| 19 A. Yes. 20 Do you see that it's named it's titled 21 "Lloyds TSB Bank PLC - Fund of Hedge Fund Due 22 Diligence Questionnaire"? 23 A. Yes. 24 Q. What's a due diligence questionnaire is a 25 A. A due diligence questionnaire is a 26 Q. Man's a due diligence questionnaire is a 27 document that firms fill in for the benefit of 2 potential investors; so basically going through what 3 they do, so both on investment side and sort of how 4 the operational aspects of these investments are 5 structured. 6 Q. Are you familiar with this attachment? 7 A. I don't remember it. 8 Q. But you have no reason to believe that you 9 didn't receive it at that time? 10 A. Absolutely, yeah. 11 Q. Let's go to let's go to the and 12 I will be referring to if you note at the bottom 13 righthand corner there's a series of numbers and 14 letters. 15 A. Yes. 16 Q. I'm going to be referring to those. So 17 let's go to the page that has the SQO, and then the 18 letters so the numbers ending in 18135. 19 Actually, I'm sorry, first let's go to 20 18130. Apologies. 21 and my voice carried more weight in the investment 22 dedicision process. 22 dem, which, at that point, was one person. 23 Q. Mr. Magnin? 24 A. Yes. 25 Q. And do you see that at in this same box 1 that refers to you, it says, "Manager Selection & 2 Monitoring." 3 A. Mmm-hum. 4 Q. It also says, "Quantitative & Qualitative 5 Analysis." 6 A. Yes. 7 Q. We'll get into those terms later, but is 8 there anything else that I was doing? 12 Q. Yes. 13 A. So what this mentions is obviously the 14 manager selection, sort of, analysis part of it. 15 What's missing here is obviously, sort of, the more 16 managerial role of take – looking after Mr. Magnin. 17 And then I was also involved in – I was 18 more involved – not fully involved but I was more 19 involved in the running of the firm at that point, so 20 I would have maybe quartery meetings with Luc Esteme 21 A. Yes. 22 Q. Do you see there's a chart at the top of | 2 9 | | | |
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| 20 18130. Apologies. 21 A. Yes. 22 Q. Do you see there's a chart at the top of 20 I would have maybe quarterly meetings with Luc Estenne 21 about more the strategy of the firm, so where we 22 wanted to take it, which investors to try and convince | = | • | | |
| 21 A. Yes. 22 Q. Do you see there's a chart at the top of 23 about more the strategy of the firm, so where we 24 wanted to take it, which investors to try and convince | | | | |
| Q. Do you see there's a chart at the top of 22 wanted to take it, which investors to try and convince | | | | |
| | | | | |
| 25 to partie up with us, et cetera. | • | | | |
| 24 A. I can see that, yes. 24 Q. Yeah. Do you see on the right, the box to | | | | |
| 25 Q. Do you see at the top it says, "Chief 25 the right of where your name is mentioned | | | | |
| PI ANET DEPOS | | 1 | | |

17 (65 to 68)

| Conducted on May 20, 2022 | | | | |
|---|--|--|--|--|
| 65 67 | | | | |
| 1 A. Mmm-hmm. | 1 I think it's something that everybody does. | | | |
| 2 Q there's the Carole Müller I was | Q. Okay. So you said it's a requirement. Is | | | |
| 3 referencing earlier? | 3 this a legal requirement in Geneva? | | | |
| 4 A. Yeah. I honestly can't remember her. I | 4 A. No, it's a requirement for investors to | | | |
| 5 don't think she stayed with the firm for very long. | 5 invest in your fund. Basically, they want to see | | | |
| 6 Q. I'm going to draw your attention on the | 6 alignment of interest. | | | |
| 7 same page under section K. I'm going to read this | 7 Q. So it's a business | | | |
| 8 sentence into the record. It says: | 8 A. Requirement, yeah. | | | |
| 9 "Mr. Luc Estenne and Mr. Jérôme Müller are | 9 Q decision in order to appeal to | | | |
| 10 the two partners of Partners Advisers and both have | 10 investors? | | | |
| 11 70% of their liquid net worth invested in A.R.T | 11 A. Yes. | | | |
| 12 Absolute Return Target Fund." | Q. And when you said everybody was doing it, | | | |
| Do you see that? | 13 do you mean everybody in Geneva or do you mean | | | |
| 14 A. Yes, I see that. | 14 A. Everybody in this industry does it | | | |
| 15 Q. Let's break that down. It says here that | 15 actually, including so it's not geographically | | | |
| 16 you were you and Mr. Estenne were the two partners | 16 specific. Every manager of hedge funds or fund of | | | |
| 17 of Partners Advisers. When did you become a partner? | 17 funds do the same thing pretty much globally | | | |
| 18 A. I think when I became head of research in | 18 because I mean, it's not 70 percent is an | | | |
| 19 2003, although "partner" didn't mean that I was a | 19 arbitrary number, right. Sometimes it's 50, sometimes | | | |
| 20 shareholder of the firm. It was sort of more, | 20 it's 100. I mean it's just significant amounts of | | | |
| 21 I guess, a shadow equity-holder. I was getting a | 21 liquid net worth invested in the funds they run. | | | |
| 22 share of the profits of the firm. | You sort of I guess a business it's | | | |
| Q. Do you remember what share? | 23 sort of a business decision that most people do. | | | |
| 24 A. I ended up with 15 percent of the profits, | Q. How did you get to 70 percent? Who | | | |
| 25 but I don't know if I can't remember if that was | 25 decided the 70 percent figure? | | | |
| 66 | 68 | | | |
| 1 from the outset or if it grew over time. | 1 A. I have I don't know. | | | |
| 2 Q. And this was subject to a specific | Q. Approximately, how much would | | | |
| 3 agreement between you and Mr. Estenne? | 3 Mr. Estenne's liquid net worth or 70 percent of | | | |
| 4 A. Yes. | 4 Mr. Estenne's liquid net worth have represented around | | | |
| 5 Q. Okay. And it says that you had you and | 5 this time? | | | |
| 6 Mr. Estenne both had, at that time, 70 percent of your | 6 A. I don't know. He's always been very | | | |
| 7 liquid net worth invested in the ART Fund. | 7 guarded when it came to his finances. | | | |
| 8 A. Yes. | 8 Q. As head of research and as someone | | | |
| 9 Q. Do you see that? Is that accurate? | 9 involved in running the firm, would you have access to | | | |
| 10 A. It probably was but my liquid net worth | 10 that information? | | | |
| 11 was very tiny so it didn't represent a lot of money, | 11 A. No. | | | |
| 12 but yes. | Q. Would you assume it's more than 10,000 or | | | |
| Q. Roughly, how much money at that time would | 13 \$20,000? | | | |
| 14 70 percent of your liquid net worth have represented? | 14 A. It definitely was, yes. | | | |
| 15 A. 10 or \$20,000. | Q. Hundreds of thousands of dollars? | | | |
| 16 Q. And why did you invest 70 percent of your | 16 A. Probably, yeah. | | | |
| 17 liquid net worth at that time in the ART Fund? | Q. Millions of dollars, probably? | | | |
| 18 A. Well, I was involved in managing these | 18 A. Maybe. Maybe, yeah. | | | |
| 19 portfolios, so it was the best place to invest any | Q. Okay. If you could flip to the page that | | | |
| 20 capital I had, right, rather than actually giving it | 20 has the 18134 numbering. Do you see at the very | | | |
| 21 to someone else, so yes. | 21 bottom there's some biographical information for | | | |
| 22 But it was also a requirement, I think | 22 yourself? | | | |
| 23 in our industry it's a requirement that people running | 23 A. Mmm-hmm. | | | |
| 24 portfolios of financial assets invest in their own | Q. So just quickly, it says that you began at | | | |
| 25 in their own funds, right; so eating your own cooking. | 25 Partners Advisers in April 1999, that you were in | | | |
| | L DEDOG | | | |

| Conducted on May 20, 2022 | | | | |
|---|--|--|--|--|
| 69 | 71 | | | |
| 1 charge of selection, due diligence and monitoring of | 1 when I left the firm my base salary was around 250,000 | | | |
| 2 hedge fund managers, and also quantitative and | 2 Swiss francs. But that's later on. | | | |
| 3 qualitative analysis. | Q. You said that's when you left the firm? | | | |
| 4 Do you see that? | 4 A. Yeah, in 2011, but my base salary was | | | |
| 5 A. I do. | 5 pretty was at that level for quite a prolonged | | | |
| 6 Q. It also on the next page, it also | 6 period of time, so I don't know if that was the case | | | |
| 7 mentions your previous role at UBP? | 7 already back then. | | | |
| 8 A. Yes. | 8 Q. And so other than the base salary, your | | | |
| 9 Q. If you go to the middle of that page, and | 9 only other compensation at that time would have been | | | |
| 10 that ends in 18135, there's a section called | 10 this fixed percentage of the incentive fee? | | | |
| 11 "Compensation for key personnel" | 11 A. That's correct. | | | |
| Do you see that? | 12 Q. And the incentive fee is tied to the | | | |
| 13 A. Yes. | 13 performance of the ART Fund? | | | |
| 14 Q. So I'm just going to read this into the | 14 A. Of every fund we were running basically, | | | |
| 15 record: | 15 yes. So it was sort of the incentive fee earned by | | | |
| 16 "The Investment professionals, including | 16 the firm on every one of its investment programs. | | | |
| 17 Luc Estenne, Jérôme Müller and Olivier Magnin, get a | 17 Q. And remind me again. So you had the ART | | | |
| 18 base salary and a bonus which is a fixed percentage of | 18 Fund. You mentioned the MeesPierson | | | |
| 19 the incentive fees earned by the company." | 19 A. Yes. | | | |
| What's an incentive fee? | 20 Q they had two programs. What other | | | |
| 21 A. Incentive fee is a fee that is linked to | 21 funds were you was the firm advising at that time? | | | |
| 22 the performance of a of a fund or an investment | 22 A. So, again, when you say "at that time," | | | |
| 23 program. | 23 I don't have exact recollections of the dates, but we | | | |
| Q. And so if a fund does not perform well, | 24 were also running a small program called well, for | | | |
| 25 you would not be getting an incentive fee? | 25 another bank called Arab Bank, and then we were | | | |
| 70 | 72 | | | |
| 1 A. That's correct, yes. | 1 running a specific program for a wealth management | | | |
| Q. All right. So, by its name, it implies | 2 firm based in Hong Kong called Axiom Capital, or Axiom | | | |
| 3 that you have an economic incentive in the fund | 3 something. Those two were small. | | | |
| 4 performing well? | 4 And I can't remember from – you know, | | | |
| 5 A. Exactly, yes. | 5 when they started, but they were programs that were | | | |
| 6 Q. Do you remember what percentage, what | 6 run at the firm during its existence. | | | |
| 7 fixed percentage, you had of the incentive fees? | 7 Q. And those funds did similar investments as | | | |
| 8 A. So I think that's the 15 percent | 8 the ART Fund? | | | |
| 9 I referred to. Although I don't know if at that time | 9 A. Yeah. I mean, for the most part they were | | | |
| 10 it was 15 percent Londod up getting 15 percent | 10 run pari passu which means that avery investment that | | | |

10 it was 15 percent. I ended up getting 15 percent, 11 because that's -- I mentioned of the profits, but the 12 incentive fee is typically pure profit, right. You 13 get it; there's no costs associated with it. So these investment funds typically have a 15 management fee that is there to cover costs of the 16 business, and then an incentive fee that is, 17 basically, you get if you perform well, and it's sort 18 of there to compensate your team for, you know, the 19 hard work on the performance. Q. It also mentions here that you received

- 21 a base salary at that time.
- 22 A. Yes.
- 23 Q. Do you remember approximately how much
- 24 that would have been?
- 25 A. I don't at that time. I remember that

- 10 run pari passu, which means that every investment that 11 was made in one program was made in the others, if the
- 12 mandate was the same, right. We had these two 13 mandates; bond replacement, equity replacement.
- Q. Roughly, how many investments would be in
- 15 the portfolio that you were putting together?
- A. Between 20 and 30 per portfolio. 16
- 17 Q. And would you be involved in the selection 18 of all of those investments?
- A. Yes, after after 2003, when I became 19 20 head of research, for sure.
- 21 Q. So as head of research, starting in 2003,
- 22 if something was in the portfolio, you would be --
- 23 it would have to go through you at some point?
- A. Yeah. I would I would be involved in 25 that decision-making, but the ultimate decision stayed

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1 with Luc. I'm jumping around, but in 2006 I became 2 co-CIO, at which point every decision, investment

3 decision or divestment, was basically a common

decision between Luc and I.

Q. Prior to 2003, so before you became the 6 head of research, what was -- would you be aware or privy to the investments that would be placed in the ART Fund portfolio?

A. I would, yes.

10 Q. So, as you said earlier, it's -- your 11 roles with respect to these investments was more or 12 less similar but you just had a louder voice as head 13 of research?

14 A. Yes.

Q. And then when you became co-CIO, you said 15 16 in 2006, that's when that happened?

A. Yes.

18 Q. And the other CIO would have been?

19 A. Luc.

Q. Mr. Estenne? 20

21 A. Yes.

2.2. Q. So in 2006, you and Mr. Estenne became

23 co-CIOs. What's a CIO?

24 A. Chief investment officer.

Q. And what does that entail? 25

during that time. That wasn't only ART, though.

Obviously, the MeesPierson mandate also grew quite

large, probably 6, 700 million.

And so -- so, yeah, so -- but I -- the way from 50 million to 1.8 at the firm level, or probably

1,800 to 1 billion at ART in 2008, I don't know,

I can't remember what the path was to that, actually.

I think we had a lot of inflows in 2003

because the performance was very good, but, again, 10 that's just sort of -- I can't put numbers on it.

Q. And going back to the incentive fee, what

12 was -- do you remember what the percentage was of

13 the -- what the performance fee was at that time?

A. No. It's probably in that document 15 actually, but -- I mean, typical incentive fees for

16 fund-of-fund structures are usually about 10 percent

17 of the profits, so possibly around there.

18 THE EXAMINER: Mr. Molina, I'm conscious

19 of the time. I don't want to interrupt your line of

20 questioning but when you come to a natural break,

21 perhaps you can --

2.2. MR. MOLINA: About ten minutes, would that

23 work?

25

7

74

24 THE EXAMINER: Sure.

MR. MOLINA: Thank you.

A. It entails -- it entails running the

2 investment program entirely, so making all the

3 investment decisions, not only -- we're only talking

4 about investment decisions here but it also -- there's

5 also a component of portfolio construction, trying to

6 build portfolios that are as, sort of, robust as

7 possible with, sort of, different type of strategies

8 leading to diversification and sort of, I guess,

9 trying to get the best possible return with the least 10 amount of risk.

So portfolio construction was part of it

12 as well for a CIO, right, and then obviously running 13 the investment team as well.

Q. How many assets under management was in --15 was the ART --

(Stenographer clarification.) 16

17 MR. MOLINA: Sure.

18 BY MR. MOLINA:

Q. How many assets under management did the

20 ART Fund have around this time?

A. So it grew. I don't have, sort of, very

22 precise recollection. I think when we started in

23 2001, it had about 50 million. When we -- assets

24 under management at the firm peaked in 2008, at

25 something around 1.78 billion, so it grew tremendously 25 bonuses being deferred over a number of years and

BY MR. MOLINA:

Q. So 10 percent and you said the fund was

performing -- between 2003, when you became head of

research, to 2008, when you hit this peak in assets

under management, the fund was performing well; that's

what you said?

A. Yes.

8 Q. So your incentive fees for the fund would

9 have been significant?

10 A. There were -- I mean, they -- I guess so,

11 yes.

Q. And your net worth would have increased

13 over this time?

A. Yeah. I mean, I did get bonuses that were

15 quite comfortable, yes.

Q. Yeah. And you were still -- between 2003

17 and 2008, you were still investing 70 percent of your

18 liquid net worth in the ART Fund?

A. Yes, but I think it was by -- it was by --

20 it might not have been 70 percent. That, I don't

21 know. But it was by design because I think part of my

22 compensation was deferred and reinvested in the funds.

23 That's also, sort of, a typical sort of

24 structure, to retain employees, is to have their

| Conducted on May 20, 2022 | | | | |
|---|--|--|--|--|
| 77 | 79 | | | |
| 1 re-invested in the funds that they run. | 1 I was self-employed. | | | |
| 2 Q. Did Mr. Estenne have the same percentage | 2 Q. You say you work now at Stable Asset | | | |
| 3 just like we see in this document? Did the same | 3 Management? | | | |
| 4 did both of you maintain the same level of | 4 A. Yes. | | | |
| 5 co-investing over this time? | 5 Q. What's Stable Asset Management? | | | |
| 6 A. I don't know. Again, Mr. Estenne was very | 6 A. It's an asset management firm specializing | | | |
| 7 guarded when it came to his finances. | 7 investing in hedge funds at an emerging stage; so when | | | |
| 8 Q. After 2006, when you became the co-CIO | 8 they start, basically. | | | |
| 9 sorry, let me retract that. | 9 Q. You said you hold the role of CIO? | | | |
| You said you left the firm when? Partners | 10 A. I do. | | | |
| 11 Advisers. | Q. When did you start working at Stable Asset | | | |
| 12 A. 2011. | 12 Management? | | | |
| 13 Q. 2011? | 13 A. In January '17. | | | |
| 14 A. Yeah, end of 2011. | 14 Q. Have you always been the CIO since you | | | |
| Q. And so between 2006, when you became the | 15 started working there? | | | |
| 16 co-CIO, and when you left the firm in 2011, what other | 16 A. I have, yes. | | | |
| 17 roles did you hold at Partners Advisers? | 17 Q. How many people report to you? | | | |
| 18 A. No other roles. Co-CIO was sort of my | 18 A. There's been quite a bit of turnover at | | | |
| 19 last role. | 19 Stable. So at the moment, three, four. Four. | | | |
| Q. You never became the sole CIO? | Q. And you report to the CEO? | | | |
| 21 A. No. | 21 A. I do. | | | |
| Q. Why did you leave the firm in 2011? | Q. This firm is based here in the UK? | | | |
| 23 A. Because I was getting divorced, which sort | 23 A. It has offices here in the UK and the US. | | | |
| 24 of triggered a sort of broader reflection about my | Q. Do you travel a lot to the US? | | | |
| 25 life, and I decided that I wanted to move on. It was, | 25 A. I used to pre-Covid, yes. | | | |
| 78 | 80 | | | |
| 1 you know, I'd been with the firm for 13 years, so it | Q. Mainly to New York? | | | |
| 2 was time to move on. | 2 A. Mainly to New York. | | | |
| Q. And just, if you could just quickly we | Q. And when you were with Partners Advisers, | | | |
| 4 will be taking a break soon, but quickly just go | 4 you also traveled frequently to the United States, you | | | |
| 5 through the other jobs that you've had since you left | 5 mentioned? | | | |
| 6 Partners Advisers. | 6 A. I did, yes. | | | |
| 7 A. Sure. So I left with no job, actually. | 7 Q. To New York? | | | |
| 8 I just decided to leave. And I then started my own | 8 A. Yeah, New York. Not only. But New York | | | |
| 9 business, my own investment advisory business, which | 9 principally, yes, and to Asia as well. | | | |
| 10 I started with one client, a family office that I knew | 10 Q. Just going back to something you said at | | | |
| 11 well, and ran that business until early 2017 when | 11 the outset of today, you mentioned that you were | | | |
| 12 I joined Stable Asset Management, where I'm at | 12 called as a witness in a dispute between Mr | | | |
| 13 currently, as their CIO. | 13 I think you said Sella Yavin? | | | |
| 14 Q. When you say you created your own | 14 A. Yes. | | | |
| 15 business, what was the name of that business? | 15 Q. Who is Sella Yavin? | | | |
| 16 A. So it had a number of names. Initially, | 16 A. He was a person at the firm hired as an | | | |
| 17 it was called J. Müller Capital. But I was and | 17 operational due diligence analyst, I want to say | | | |
| 18 then I set up a limited liability company called | 18 around 2006. | | | |
| 19 Aspheric in Switzerland. When I moved to the UK, | Q. So he would have worked underneath you? | | | |
| 20 I then set up an LLP here in the UK called Aspheric as | 20 A. He was reporting to me, yes. | | | |
| 21 well but obviously they were different legal entities. | Q. And you mentioned that he brought a | | | |
| 22 But I was self-employed. I mean, I was the only | 22 lawsuit for wrongful termination against the company? | | | |
| 23 employee. So the name of the firm was sort of just | 23 A. It wasn't actually wrongful termination. | | | |
| 24 you know, just to it was a decoration. It | 24 It was he left himself but he left with a grudge, | | | |
| 25 wasn't you know, for all intents and purposes, | 25 I think. So I can't remember what exactly he sued the | | | |
| | | | | |

25 talk was?

| Conducted on May 20, 2022 | | | | |
|--|--|--|--|--|
| 81 83 | | | | |
| 1 company for, but, yeah, he was unhappy. | 1 A. I was asked by a client of Stable to speak | | | |
| 2 Q. What was he unhappy about, do you recall? | 2 at that conference, and the purpose of the | | | |
| 3 A. No. I mean, he was reporting to me. | 3 presentation was to sort of present to a number of | | | |
| 4 I found him extremely hard to manage. At some point | 4 family offices that were present, the interest in | | | |
| 5 I basically told Mr. Estenne that I didn't want to | 5 investing in absolute return investments. Absolute | | | |
| 6 deal with him anymore and we should terminate him, and | 6 return investments sort of include hedge funds and | | | |
| 7 Mr. Estenne was reluctant to terminate him so I told | 7 private equity and real estate, typically. | | | |
| 8 him that he should just manage him himself. | 8 Q. And do you remember do you remember | | | |
| 9 That didn't go very well either, so he | 9 what you said during this conference? | | | |
| 10 ended up leaving. But I think he was very unhappy | 10 A. Yes. Yes, I do. Yes. | | | |
| 11 about the way he had been handled. | 11 Q. What were your conclusions? | | | |
| MR. MOLINA: I think this would be a good | 12 A. The conclusions were that it was a good | | | |
| 13 time for a break. | 13 area for investment if it was done the right way. | | | |
| 14 THE EXAMINER: Thank you, Mr. Molina. | 14 Q. I have a couple quotes. | | | |
| THE VIDEOGRAPHER: We are going off the | 15 A. Sure. | | | |
| 16 record. The time is 11:27. | Q. I would have a you know, it's a video. | | | |
| 17 (Break taken.) | 17 I would have a video of it but I don't think | | | |
| 18 THE VIDEOGRAPHER: We are back on the | 18 A. Yeah. I wasn't expecting it to be that | | | |
| 19 record. The time is 11:45. | 19 public. | | | |
| 20 MR. MOLINA: Thank you. | Q. So I'm just going to read some quotes and | | | |
| 21 BY MR. MOLINA: | 21 you can tell me if you remember saying that | | | |
| Q. Mr. Müller, so I know you mentioned that | 22 A. Sure. | | | |
| 23 you were sort of learning on the job when you started | 23 Q and, if so, what you meant by the | | | |
| 24 with Partners Advisers and Parky Company back in 1999 | Partners Advisers and Parly Company back in 1999, 24 quote. | | | |
| | 2 1 440 00. | | | |
| 25 but now you've had more than 20 years of investment | 25 A. Mmm-hmm. | | | |
| 25 but now you've had more than 20 years of investment 82 | 25 A. Mmm-hmm. | | | |
| 25 but now you've had more than 20 years of investment 1 due diligence experience. | 25 A. Mmm-hmm. 1 Q. So you said: | | | |
| 25 but now you've had more than 20 years of investment 1 due diligence experience. 2 A. Yes. | 25 A. Mmm-hmm. 1 Q. So you said: 2 "Every time I'm looking at an investment, | | | |
| 25 but now you've had more than 20 years of investment 1 due diligence experience. 2 A. Yes. 3 Q. Would you consider yourself to be good at | 25 A. Mmm-hmm. R4 1 Q. So you said: 2 "Every time I'm looking at an investment, 3 I'm sort of thinking, okay, so what's the downside | | | |
| 25 but now you've had more than 20 years of investment 1 due diligence experience. 2 A. Yes. 3 Q. Would you consider yourself to be good at 4 what you do? | 25 A. Mmm-hmm. 1 Q. So you said: 2 "Every time I'm looking at an investment, 3 I'm sort of thinking, okay, so what's the downside 4 here. And a few lessons learned over the years is if | | | |
| 25 but now you've had more than 20 years of investment 1 due diligence experience. 2 A. Yes. 3 Q. Would you consider yourself to be good at 4 what you do? 5 A. I'm my biggest critic, so I don't know. | 25 A. Mmm-hmm. 1 Q. So you said: 2 "Every time I'm looking at an investment, 3 I'm sort of thinking, okay, so what's the downside 4 here. And a few lessons learned over the years is if 5 you have really good returns you will have big | | | |
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Q. Right. So that was a metaphor?

22 (85 to 88)

Transcript of Mr. Jerome Muller

Conducted on May 20, 2022 85 87 A. Yes. mirror." Q. The steamroller is the downturn in a 2 Do you remember saying that? A. I did. market, or the loss? 3 A. Right, exactly. Yeah. Q. What does that mean? Q. What's a drawdown? Do you want to explain 5 A. That means that a lot of investors focus overly on past investment performance of their -- of for the record? A. Yeah. A drawdown is a loss of capital. the funds they invest in. But that's obviously past Q. So your conclusion -- just tell me if what information and it rarely gives a fair view of what's I'm saying is fair and feel free to correct me if I going to happen in the future with that performance. 10 have misstated or mischaracterized. 10 Q. Why is that? So your conclusion was that if you're A. Because the market conditions that led to 11 12 involved in these sort of strategies that, while you 12 that performance are going to be different because the 13 might make some shortterm gains, you're exposing 13 mindset of the manager who is running that fund will 14 yourself to a potential major loss down the road? 14 probably be different if he's been successful and has A. Yes. 15 raised a lot of assets. He might actually have an ego 15 16 Q. And you said this is part of a shorting 16 and hubris and things that actually will potentially 17 volatility strategy? 17 lead to more difficult returns. 18 A. That's one of the -- that's one -- that's Q. So other than past history, what else 19 the main strategy that actually leads to that type of 19 would you recommend investors should review? 20 return profile. There's others. A. Well, what investors are better off 21 Q. What are the others? 21 reviewing, the strategy itself, spending time with A. Excessive use of leverage, coupled with --22 that manager, trying to figure out if they're 23 coupled with potential illiquidity of the underlying 23 committed, what are the real risk they're taking, 24 what's the opportunity set in that strategy today 24 assets is another one. 25 versus in the past, and so on; so actually make an Q. Any more? 86 A. Yeah, those are the two main, actually, assessment of how good that investment is in today's market condition or with today's knowledge rather than 2 ones, yeah. Q. Those are the ones you are referencing in focusing on what happened in the past. this talk? Q. How do investors obtain that information A. Yes. Yes. Sometimes -- I would add that to be able to make those assessments? sometimes shorting volatility is implicit not A. By engaging with the manager, typically. explicit, so sometimes it's actually not the fact of Q. What if the manager does not want to give 8 shorting volatility but certain types of investments him that information? 9 have that kind of characteristics. MR. WORBY: Objection; speculation --10 Like, buying credit instruments above par, 10 asking for speculation. 11 for instance, has that characteristic. It has very THE WITNESS: Well, in this case, that 12 limited upside but you're getting the coupon from an 12 assessment is impossible to make. 13 investment, it has a sizable amount of downside if 13 BY MR. MOLINA: 14 things turn bad for the company or the market. 14 Q. You also had another quote. It says --15 Q. You mentioned earlier buying options. 15 you said: 16 What are options? "If an opportunity is too good to be true, 16 A. Options are a contract that allow you to 17 it's probably not true." 18 buy a security at a given date at a given price, or Do you remember saying that?

25 That's like driving your car looking in the rearview 25 what other managers do in the same strategy, in which PLANET DEPOS

19 sell a security at a given date at a given price.

21 thing, just tell me if you remember saying it --

Q. -- and, if so, what you meant:

A. Sure.

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23

24

Q. I'm going to tell you another quote. Same

"Don't focus so much on track record.

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19

20

Q. What did you mean by that?

A. I'm trying to find other words to say

23 profile just looks too -- just looks too good and is

22 again, but, I mean, it means that sometimes the return

24 unexplainable by the opportunity set in the market or

1 case there's something about it that is a source of

- 2 risk, right, which is potentially hidden. So it
- 3 might be that they're taking a lot more leverage or
- 4 concentration risk in their portfolios than others
- 5 and, therefore, it is like a risk that's present but
- 6 not always disclosed.
 - Q. When you gave this talk, were you just
- limiting it to undisclosed risk, such as leverage, or
- were you also referencing potential things like fraud?
- 10 A. I mean, it's sort of implicit, I guess,
- 11 in that comment, right, but fraud, in our industry, is
- 12 actually very rare, and so it's not the main risk
- 13 I'm focused on typically.
- The other thing is that the industry's
- 15 evolved dramatically since the early 2000s, with a
- 16 specific role that's been created which didn't exist
- 17 back then which is operational due diligence analysts, 18 right, and those people -- those people's role is
- 19 actually to make sure that the risk of fraud is
- 20 very limited.

24 20 years.

- 21 So these people typically -- so, as a
- 22 result, I think the overall risk of fraud in our
- 23 industry has decreased dramatically over the last
- 25 Q. So I'm going to ask you just some basic --
- 1 you just mentioned a few minutes ago that you hold
- 2 yourself out as an expert in investing in hedge funds.
- So I'm just going to mention some terms and you can
- 4 tell me what your understanding is of those terms.
 - A. Mmm-hmm.
- 6 Q. Qualitative due diligence.
- A. Yeah. That's the assessment of the
- 8 strategy, spending time with the manager,
- 9 understanding what he's doing, going through the
- 10 portfolio; so it's, sort of, typically not number
- 11 based.
- 12 Q. When you say 'not number based," what do
- 13 you mean?
- A. Well, it's typically, sort of, background
- 15 information on how they invest, and what resources are
- 16 required to invest that way successfully.
- 17 Q. How do you assess that?
- 18 A. Well, it's very dependent on which
- 19 strategy, right. So, again, it's sort of a body of
- 20 knowledge that has been sort of built over the years
- 21 that, you know, you can't invest with in an
- 22 algorithmic way if you only have two people because it
- 23 requires a huge amount of resources, for instance.
- 24 That's just an example.
- 25 Q. Why would you do qualitative due

diligence?

- A. Well, that links back to your question
- around past track record, and the reason why you do

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- qualitative due diligence is to sort of assess if the
- opportunity set and the strategy make sense today in
- the current environment.
- Q. When you were at Partners Advisers, were
- you conducting or overseeing qualitative due
- diligence?
- 10 A. So I was, after 2003. I mean, I was
- 11 always involved in it but I was responsible for it
- 12 after 2003, yes.
- Q. What does operational due diligence mean
- 14 to you?
- A. So that's what I described just earlier, 15
- 16 which is it's the assessment of the risk of fraud or
- 17 misbehavior in a manager. So qualitative due
- 18 diligence actually focuses on the investment side, you
- 19 know; are these people good at investing and
- 20 generating returns, performance, investment
- 21 performance. Operational due diligence is, is there a
- 22 risk of fraud or manipulation or misbehavior.
- 23 Q. How do you conduct operational due 24 diligence?
- 25 A. You basically check that there is a number

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- 1 of procedures in place, and checks and balances of the
- firm, that there is independence between certain
- functions of the firm, that there is service providers
- that are used for certain functions that are
- independent from the manager.
- Q. You said you check to see if there are a
- number of procedures in place.
- 8 A. Mmm-hmm.

- Q. What do you mean by that?
- 10 A. Well, I mean it's very vast. I'm
- 11 struggling to sort of answer that question in a
- 12 reasonable amount of words. It's basically making
- 13 sure that there's segregation of duties and that
- 14 there's operational procedures that are followed by
- 15 people that are independent from the people investing
- 16 the capital, because that minimizes the risk of 17 manipulation.
- Q. So you check to see if there are third
- 19 parties that are overseeing what the manager is doing?
- 20 A. Yeah, I mean, that's one element of it. 21 The other element is just that internally, within the
- 22 firm itself, there's a COO who is independent from the
- 23 investment team, with a team underneath him that
- 24 reports to him, not to the investment team.
- 25 So it's segregation of duties internally

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as well.

Q. So independence -- what do you mean by independent?

4 A. Independent meaning they're not part of

- 5 the same family. They're -- yeah, they're not linked
- 6 to one another in some way, shape or form, yeah. They
- 7 report typically to the board of directors
- 8 independently as well.
- 9 Q. As part of operational due diligence, 10 would you -- do you -- or, first, let me take a step 11 back.
- Did you conduct operational due diligence 13 at Partners Advisers?
- 14 A. I did not, actually. We hired people to 15 do it.
- 16 Q. Who did you hire?
- 17 A. So we hired Sella Yavin in 2006, and then
- 18 after he left we hired another gentleman, called
- 19 Nicolas Janson. He joined in 2010, so that was
- 20 shortly before I left, but I did hire him.
- Q. So prior to 2006, who was conducting
- 22 operational due diligence?
- A. No one. That was, sort of, a new -- that
- 24 was a new area of our industry. Nobody really had any
- 25 operational due diligence function pre mid-2000s.
 - Q. So --
- 2 A. So let me rephrase that. I guess the
- 3 investment team was doing it but at a very high level,
- 4 right. There was no, sort of, real sort of expertise
- 5 or practice in that space before that time.
- Q. But prior to 2006, you were checking to
- 7 see if there were checks and balances on the
- 8 management?
- A. Yeah. At a far less detailed level, yes.
- Q. So could you describe the level -- this
- 11 high level, could you describe what that entailed?
- 12 A. That entailed -- so we weren't -- I guess
- 13 that entailed more checks on external service
- 14 providers rather than internal procedures. So we were
- 15 checking that there was an administrator that was
- 16 valuing the accounts independently and valuing
- 17 securities independently; that there was a custodian
- 18 holding securities; that there was an auditor that was
- 19 independent, auditing the books and records.
- 20 Q. What's an administrator?
- 21 A. An administrator is basically an
- 22 accounting firm that provides services to investment
- 23 funds.
- Q. And you said that the administrator is
- 25 responsible for valuing the fund?

- A. Yeah, they're calculating an NAV, net
- 2 asset value, usually, which is basically the value of
- 3 each unit of a fund.
- Q. And then you mentioned also a custodian.
 - A. Yes.
- O. What's a custodian?
- A. Custodian is a bank that holds the
- 8 securities of a fund.
- Q. Are custodians typical in the industry?
- 10 Thirdparty custodian, sorry.
- 11 A. Yeah. They're -- they are, although they
- 12 are usually not called custodians, they're called
- 13 prime brokers. But, yes, they are.
- Q. And you said these are typically banks?
- 15 A. Yes.
- 16 Q. And what's their primary role as
- 17 custodian?
- 18 A. So it gets technical. The -- so if the
- 19 custodian is a prime broker, the main role is actually
- 20 to facilitate trading for the investment fund, and
- 21 then one of the side, sort of, responsibilities is
- 22 holding the assets as well. And then if the custodian
- 23 is just a custodian, then, actually, it's just holding
- 24 securities and cash for the fund.
 - Q. Why is it important to have a custodian?
 - A. Well, I mean, it's segregation of duties.
- 2 Q. Do you recommend investments that do not
- 3 have a thirdparty custodian?
- 4 A. No.

1

- Q. Why not?
- 6 A. Well, because in this case the manager
- 7 controls the assets and there's no checks and balances 8 in place.
- 9 O. An
 - Q. And what's wrong with that?
- 10 A. Well, it opens -- back to your due
- 11 diligence, operational due diligence, question
- 12 I guess, it opens the possibility for, sort of,
- 13 manipulation, right.
- 14 Q. What do you mean by manipulation?
- 15 A. Well, I mean, I guess -- which means that
- 16 -- I mean, if the manager controls the securities,
- 17 then you -- then they can basically say they trade
- 18 when they don't, and they can price -- they can price
- 10 also accomition the massless as a subsections that are made
- 19 also securities themselves, so valuations that are not
- 20 in line with the market, et cetera.
- 21 Q. You also mentioned auditors. What's an 22 auditor?
- A. An auditor is a firm that verifies, each
- 24 yearend, that the books and record of the investment
- 25 fund are correct.

- Q. And why is it important to have an 2 auditor?
- 3 A. I think it's a legal requirement,
- actually, to have an auditor for most companies. It's
- important because that gives assurance to the
- 6 investors that, indeed, the company or the investment
- fund is doing what they say they do in holding the
- securities they say they hold, and a valuation that
- they claim those securities are worth.
- 10 Q. Do you know how auditors conduct this 11 review?
- A. I do, yes. Well, I mean, at a high level 12 13 I do.
- 14 Q. Please.
- A. Sure. So they either sample securities 15
- 16 from statements they get from the custodian or the
- 17 administrator, or both, and they verify that the
- 18 numbers of shares held are indeed the ones that are
- 19 reported by these entities and that the pricing of
- 20 these instruments is, indeed, in line with the pricing
- 21 of the securities in the market to a certain pricing
- 22 service, like a Bloomberg terminal. They verify
- 23 presence of assets and they usually also verify that
- 24 there is sort of checks and balances in place, both at
- 25 the administrator and at the management entity level.
 - Q. And when you said that you, at a high
- 2 level, were conducting this operational due diligence
- at Partners Advisers, that entailed meeting or
- 4 speaking with the auditors of the funds that you were
- 5 looking into?
- A. No. No, because auditors do not speak to 6
- 7 investors, actually. That's not something that
- they -- auditors are hired by the board of directors
- of investment funds and they don't speak directly with 10 the investors in funds.
- Q. Would you review the audit reports that 11
- 12 were --
- A. We review the audit reports, yes. 13
- 14 Q. What about with custodians, would you meet 15 with them?
- A. We would meet with them. Well, we would 17 talk to them, yes.
- 18 Q. What would you talk about?
- A. We would talk about -- well, we would not
- 20 necessarily speak specifically about -- for the same
- 21 reason as the auditors, custodians actually are not
- 22 going to be super transparent with investors about the
- 23 specifics of the assets they hold, so they're unlikely
- 24 to give you any information. But because custodians,
- 25 in a lot of cases, are actually prime brokers, we

- 1 would talk to them, in general terms, about managers
- they had on their books and what they were doing.
- Q. I think you've mentioned this briefly, but could you just explain for the record just what a
- prime broker is.
- A. Yeah. A prime broker is a bank that holds
- securities and cash for funds but also facilitates
- trading, which means they're executing trades for the
- investment funds. They typically offer financing or
- 10 leverage to investment funds as well, borrowing
- 11 basically, and also facilitate short selling,
- 12 basically helping funds to borrow securities to be
- 13 sold in the market.
- 14 Q. What is quantitative due diligence?
- 15 A. Quantitative due diligence is part of the
- 16 investment due diligence and revolves around looking
- 17 at the past track record, trying to analyze that past
- 18 track record and reconciling it with the strategy.
- 19 Yeah.
- 20 Q. And what does that entail?
- 21 A. That entails, typically, sort of looking
- 22 under the hood of just the numbers, asking the manager
- 23 for what we call attribution numbers, which is
- 24 basically what has generated returns, what kind of
- 25 position, which sector or geography, fits the long and
 - 100
- the short side of their investment portfolios, et
- cetera; so asking for, sort of, numbers, historical
- numbers, and then running some analysis on these
- 5 Q. Do you have experience conducting
- quantitative due diligence?
 - A. I do, yes.
- Q. You conducted quantitative due diligence
- at Partners Advisers? 9
- 10 A. I did.
- 11 MR. WORBY: Objection.
- What sort of time period do you mean? 12
- MR. MOLINA: When he was at Partners 13
- 14 Advisers.
- 15 BY MR. MOLINA:
- 16 Q. What's correlation analysis?
- A. Correlation analysis is the analysis of
- 18 the -- now I need to find a synonym of "correlation."
- 19 Is the analysis of how similar an investment is to
- 20 another, or to a market index.
- 21 Q. What's the utility of a correlation
- 22 analysis?
- 23 A. It shows how diversifying a fund will be
- 24 in a portfolio. If its correlation to other
- 25 investments in that portfolio is low, then it will be

Conducted on May 20, 2022

| | 101 | 103 |
|------|---|---|
| 100 | a good addition because it's likely that it will, sort | 1 (Stenographer clarification.) |
| 2 | of, benefit the portfolio as a whole. | 2 THE WITNESS: A Sharpe ratio is a measure |
| 3 | Q. Is there any other reason that you would | 3 of risk reward. |
| 4 | conduct a correlation analysis? | 4 BY MR. MOLINA: |
| 5 | A. Yes. You would conduct a correlation | 5 Q. What's its utility? |
| | analysis versus a market index to understand how much | 6 A. It helps understand how much units of |
| 7 | value-add does a manager bring versus just investing | 7 performance you get per unit of risk, and so the |
| 8 | in a market index. | 8 higher the number, the better the risk reward of that |
| 9 | Q. And how do you conduct a correlation | 9 strategy. |
| 10 | analysis? | 10 Q. How do you come up with a Sharpe ratio? |
| 11 | A. Well, there's an Excel function for it | 11 A. You're taking the return, the return of |
| | which you basically there's a mathematical formula, | 12 the strategy minus the risk-free rate, and you divide |
| 13 | the details of which I can't remember right now, but | 13 it by its standard deviation, which is a measure of |
| 14 | basically you compare a return stream to another | 14 volatility. |
| 15 | return stream and that formula, sort of, you know, | 15 Q. I take it you have experience with |
| 16 | looks at how similar they are or how one return stream | 16 conducting these sort of analyses? |
| 17 | reacts when the other reacts a certain way. | 17 A. I do. |
| 18 | Q. Going back a couple minutes when we were | 18 Q. Did you conduct these analyses when you |
| 19 | talking about quantitative due diligence, you | 19 were at Partners Advisers? |
| 20 | mentioned well, let me ask you: Do you have | 20 A. I did. |
| 21 | experience with reverse engineering a strategy? | 21 Q. What's a Sortino ratio? |
| 22 | A. I do not. No, I never did that. | 22 A. A Sortino ratio is the same measure as a |
| 23 | Q. What is reverse engineering? | 23 Sharpe ratio, but you divide instead of dividing it |
| 24 | A. Reverse engineering is looking at a return | 24 by the standard deviation of the returns, you divide |
| 25 | stream or performance stream of a fund and trying to | 25 it by the downside deviation, which is the standard |
| | 102 | 104 |
| 1 | figure out what strategy they're doing based on that | 1 deviation but only of the negative months or the |
| 2 | return stream. | 2 negative observation in that return stream. |
| 3 | Q. And you just said that you don't have | 3 Q. Why is that analysis useful? |
| 4 | experience doing that? | 4 A. Well, it's useful because standard |
| 5 | A. I never did it, no. | 5 deviation is a bit of a blunt tool. If you have very |
| 6 | Q. Why not? | 6 strong positive performance, very low negative |
| 7 | A. Because I'd usually start with the | 7 performance, actually your Sharpe ratio will suffer |
| | qualitative part of the due diligence, which is trying | 8 because your overall standard deviation will be high |
| | to understand what the strategy is like. So I'm using | 9 because of your positive months; whereas the downside |
| | the numbers more to confirm what I've discovered in | 10 deviation, by only measuring the negative observation, |
| 11 | the qualitative analysis rather than the reverse. | 11 is basically a fair assessment of what the real |
| 12 | Q. Is it fair to say you think qualitative | 12 downside of that return stream is, right, and so the |
| 13 | due diligence is more important than quantitative due | 13 Sortino ratio is actually probably a better measure of |
| 14 | diligence? | 14 the quality of the risk reward. |
| 15 | A. Overall, yes, but it's not always possible | 15 It's disputed, though. I mean, I'm giving |
| 16 | to do it in an appropriate way. | 16 you a view that is not necessarily sort of industry |
| 17 | I'll give you an example. For algorithmic | 17 standard. |
| | strategies or quantitative strategies, the level of | 18 Q. The higher the Sortino ratio, the better |
| | disclosure you get is very low because there's a | 19 the investment? |
| | trade secret component to it and so what you are going | 20 A. Yeah. The less downside there is per unit |
| 21 1 | to get in the qualitative due diligence is going to be | 21 of return, historically. |
| 22 | quite limited, so you will actually require to do | Q. What's a typical threshold for a Sortino |
| | quite a bit of work on a quantitative due diligence to | 23 ratio that you would be looking for when vetting |
| 24 | understand what they're doing. | 24 investments? |
| 25 | Q. What is a Sharpe ratio? | 25 A. I actually don't really look at Sortino |

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|---|--|--|--|
| 105 | 107 | | |
| 1 ratio. I'm actually mostly looking at Sharpe ratio. | 1 market return. And the alpha is basically the excess | | |
| 2 But the typical threshold of Sharpe ratio would be 1. | 2 return over that beta. | | |
| Q. So if it's greater than 1, then that's a | Q. I'm sorry. Could you explain again what | | |
| 4 favorable potentially a favorable investment? | 4 beta is, for the record? | | |
| 5 A. Yes. | 5 A. Yes. Beta is in mathematical terms, | | |
| 6 Q. That's for Sortino ratio? | 6 beta is the variance of a it's the variance of | | |
| 7 A. That's for Sharpe ratio, actually. | 7 a return stream multiplied by the co-variance between | | |
| 8 Q. Oh, I'm sorry. | 8 that return stream and the market benchmark divided by | | |
| 9 A. Yeah. Sortino ratio should be higher, I | 9 the variance of that market benchmark. | | |
| 10 guess, but I'm rarely looking at Sortino ratio. | 10 What it means is that it measures how much | | |
| 11 Q. How much higher would the threshold be for | 11 of the return a fund is generating is linked to is | | |
| 12 Sortino ratio? | 12 explained by the market or is linked to the return of | | |
| 13 A. Maybe 1.2. | 13 the market. | | |
| 14 Q. So for a Sharpe ratio, if it's greater | 14 Q. Is it typical, when conducting due | | |
| 15 than 1, it could be a favorable investment? | 15 diligence, for you to run these numbers for alpha and | | |
| 16 A. Yes. | 16 beta? | | |
| 17 Q. And for Sortino ratio, if it's greater | 17 A. Yeah. I mean they typically you're | | |
| 18 than 1.2, it could be a favorable investment? | 18 testing my mathematical skills here because they | | |
| 19 A. Yes. | 19 typically we typically have softwares for that so | | |
| Q. But if it's lower than those thresholds, | 20 we actually don't run these calculations on a | | |
| 21 the investment may not be as favorable? | 21 standalone basis. | | |
| 22 A. Yeah. It's a bit of an | Q. I don't mean that you manually are doing | | |
| 23 oversimplification. But, I mean, yeah, from a | 23 the mathematical. But I guess my question is, more | | |
| 24 quantitative analysis, yes. Although, we also take | 24 generally, when you are conducting the due diligence | | |
| 25 into account the diverse the correlation or the | 25 that you conduct | | |
| 106 | 108 | | |
| 1 diversification that that investment brings. So you | 1 A. You look at those numbers, yes. Yes. | | |
| 2 can have an investment with a very low Sharpe ratio, | 2 And, generally, they're actually provided to you by | | |
| 3 but just because it is very uncorrelated that it | 3 the manager themselves because they know it's a | | |
| 4 brings return when other investments are suffering, | 4 standard request. | | |
| 5 it's actually a really good investment. | 5 Q. But you would double-check what the | | |
| 6 So Sharpe ratio is not something that you | 6 manager tells you? | | |
| 7 look at in a vacuum. It's a component of a | 7 A. Yeah. | | |
| 8 quantitative analysis. | 8 Q. And the inputs for this calculation, | | |
| 9 Q. What is alpha? | 9 largely, is the past performance? | | |
| 10 A. Alpha is a measure of outperformance of | 10 A. Yes, it is. Entirely, yes. | | |
| 11 a return stream versus a benchmark. | 11 Q. What's an R-squared coefficient? | | |
| 12 Q. Why is that useful? | 12 A. R-squared is actually the R is the | | |
| 13 A. That actually measures how much value-add | 13 correlation; so R-squared is basically the | | |
| 14 a manager adds versus just investing in a benchmark, | 14 correlation-squared. It's another measure of how | | |
| 15 in a market instrument. | 15 diversifying an investment is compared to another. | | |
| 16 Q. What's the range? | 16 It's very similar to correlation. It's basically the | | |
| 17 A. What's the range of alpha? | 17 same measure. | | |
| 18 Q. Mmm-hmm. | 18 I mean, it gives you the same information. | | |
| 19 A. Well, it goes from negative to, I don't | 19 They're different numbers but it gives you exactly the | | |
| 20 know, 15 percent alpha is a very big number. | 20 same information as correlation. | | |
| Q. How do you conduct how do you come up | Q. What's a range for R-squared coefficient? | | |
| 22 with an alpha number? | 22 A1 to +1. | | |
| 23 A. So the alpha number actually involves | Q. What does it mean if the R-squared | | |
| 24 another calculation, which is beta, beta being beta | 24 coefficient is -1? | | |
| 25 being what part of a return stream is explained by the | 25 A. It means that it's perfectly un it's | | |

| | 1 Way 20, 2022 | | |
|---|--|--|--|
| 109 1 perfectly inversely correlated, which means that if an | 1 are definitely measures that we look at, yes. | | |
| 2 index or an instrument goes up 1 percent, the other | Q. Could you give me some examples? | | |
| 3 one goes down 1 percent. It's basically perfect | 3 A. Well, standard deviation is a measure we | | |
| 4 inverse correlation. | 4 look at. That's the volatility of an investment. | | |
| Q. What does it mean if the figure is 1? | 5 Q. And how do you conduct a standard | | |
| 6 A. It means perfect correlation, which means | 6 deviation? | | |
| 7 that if one goes up 1, the other one goes up 1. | 7 A. Well, that's basically the it's an | | |
| 8 Q. And what does it mean if it's 0? | 8 Excel formula but it basically, sort of, measures the | | |
| A. It means that there is no correlation at | 9 dispersion of return around the mean of that return | | |
| 10 all, which means that if one is up 1 or down 1, the | 10 stream, and it's a measure of, like, how risky an | | |
| 11 other one will have a completely random number that is | | | |
| 12 different from that, | 12 Q. Is there a range that you would expect to | | |
| 13 Q. And you said the R-squared coefficient is | 13 see for a standard deviation? | | |
| 14 the same as the the same figure that you would | 14 A. Not really. The standard deviation is | | |
| 15 obtain using a correlation analysis? | 15 very dependent on the type of strategy or the yeah, | | |
| 16 A. Well, it's just it's the correlation | 16 the type of strategy. Certain strategies have lower | | |
| 17 number squared, right, so it's basically it gives | 17 standard deviation than others. | | |
| 18 you the same information. If correlation is -1 or +1, | 18 Q. Any other metrics that are relevant to | | |
| 19 that number squared actually, it's only a positive | 19 your to quantitative due diligence? | | |
| 20 number. That number squared will actually be 1, | 20 A. I think those are the main ones, yes. | | |
| 21 right, and then, if it's 0, it's going to be 0. | 21 MR. MOLINA: If we have tab sorry, | | |
| 22 So it's basically a range of 0 to 1, not -1/+1 as I | 22 tab 157, which I think is Exhibit No. 14. | | |
| 23 told you before. | 23 Does he still have that? | | |
| 24 (Stenographer clarification.) | 24 MS. STORK: Yes. | | |
| 25 THE WITNESS: Sorry, sorry. So R-squared | 25 MR. MOLINA: Oh, you still have that. All | | |
| 110 | 112 | | |
| 1 is the correlation number squared, to the power of 2. | 1 right. Mr. Müller, we're going to be on this document | | |
| 2 BY MR. MOLINA: | 2 for some time. And I think that just for the | | |
| Q. What is a T-statistic? | 3 record, I think that if we at 1:00 p.m. or | | |
| 4 A. I don't know that actually. | 4 thereabouts we could probably break for lunch. And so | | |
| Q. You've never heard of a T-statistic? | 5 I don't know if we'll be finished with this | | |
| 6 A. I've heard of that term but I don't know | 6 document but I think it makes sense to feed people, | | |
| 7 what it is. I wouldn't have paid any attention to it. | 7 so | | |
| Q. Is it something that you've come across in | 8 THE EXAMINER: Sure, Mr. Molina. | | |
| 9 your work? | 9 MR. MOLINA: Yeah. | | |
| 10 A. Very rarely, yes. | 10 THE EXAMINER: If you're close to | | |
| Q. It's not part of what you do on a regular | 11 finishing up around 1:00, we can go over slightly, or | | |
| 12 basis when you do quantitative due diligence? | 12 if you're | | |
| 13 A. No. | 13 MR. MOLINA: I think 1:00 p.m. would be a | | |
| 14 Q. The other numbers, though the other | 14 good metric, so someone should just let me know. | | |
| 15 figures that we've discussed, R-squared coefficient, | 15 MS. STORK: I'll let you know. | | |
| 16 beta, alpha | 16 MR. MOLINA: Give me a second. Okay. | | |
| 17 A. Yes. | 17 BY MR. MOLINA: | | |
| 18 Q Sharpe ratio, Sortino ratio, those are | 18 Q. Okay. If you can go to the in that | | |
| 19 figures that you do come across when you conduct | 19 this is, by the way, for the record, we are looking | | |
| 20 quantitative due diligence? | 20 again at what has been marked as Trustee | | |
| 21 A. I do, yes. | 21 Exhibit No. 14, specifically the attachment to the | | |
| Q. Are there any other metrics that are | 22 email which we've already established is a due | | |
| 23 relevant to your quantitative due diligence? | 23 diligence questionnaire for Lloyds Bank. | | |
| 24 A. Yes. Yes, there are. I mean, there's an | 24 THE STENOGRAPHER: Sorry. | | |
| 25 unlimited number of metrics you can look at. There | 25 MR. MOLINA: Oh. I'll repeat that. | | |

29 (113 to 116)

| 113 | 1 May 20, 2022 | | |
|---|---|--|--|
| 1 BY MR. MOLINA: | 1 mark it as Trustee Exhibit No. 15. | | |
| 2 Q. For the record, we are going back to the | 2 (Trustee Exhibit 15 marked for | | |
| document that has been marked as Trustee | 3 identification.) | | |
| 4 Exhibit No. 14, and this is the attachment to the | 4 BY MR. MOLINA: | | |
| 5 email that was dated May 2004. | | | |
| 6 Do you have that document in front of you, | Q. Mr. Müller, you've now been handed a document that has been marked Trustee Exhibit No. 15 | | |
| 7 Mr. Müller? | 7 If you turn to the first page, again you will notice | | |
| 8 A. Ido. | 8 there is a cover email that is in the original French | | |
| 9 Q. If you could go to the page that has the | 9 language. Do you see that? | | |
| 10 number ending in 18138. If you look at the bottom of | 10 A. Yes. | | |
| 11 that page, there's a header titled "Investment | 11 Q. Have you seen this document before? | | |
| 12 Philosophy and Process." | 12 A. I can't remember it. | | |
| 13 A. Yes. | 13 Q. Do you see that it's dated May 19, 2004? | | |
| 14 Q. Just taking a step back, I just want to | 14 A. Yes. | | |
| 15 confirm, is it your understanding that the information | 15 Q. And it was sent it's an email sent by | | |
| 16 in this document was inputted by you and other members | 16 you? | | |
| 17 of Partners Advisers? | 17 A. Yes. | | |
| 18 A. I'm not sure I was involved in putting any | 18 Q. And it was sent to Mr. Fabien Duteil and | | |
| 19 information in the document, but it was definitely | 19 Mr. Luc Estenne? | | |
| 20 inputted by members of the team at Partners Advisers. | 20 A. Yes. | | |
| 21 For the most part, Mr. Duteil And probably input from | 21 Q. The Subject line is "DD Lloyds"? | | |
| 22 Mr. Estenne as well. | 22 A. Yes. | | |
| 23 Q. We'll get back to that. So just to go | 23 Q. And the attachment is DDQ Partners | | |
| 24 back, you mentioned earlier what a due diligence | 24 Advisers Final? | | |
| 25 questionnaire was. This is from Lloyds Bank. Is it | 25 A. Yes. | | |
| 23 questionnaire was. This is from Eloyus Bank. Is it | 116 | | |
| 1 fair to say tell me if you disagree and explain | 1 Q. Is it fair to say that in this document | | |
| 2 what you mean, but is it fair to say that this | 2 you are attaching a version of this questionnaire with | | |
| 3 questionnaire was sent to you by Lloyds Bank to obtain | 3 your comments, and after you have after | | |
| 4 information about Partners Advisers' due diligence | 4 reviewing after you had a chance to review this | | |
| 5 processes? | 5 document? | | |
| 6 A. Correct, yes. | 6 A. Yes. | | |
| 7 Q. That's fair? | 7 Q. Does that refresh your recollection as to | | |
| Q A Ves | 8 whether you would have been involved in the | | |
| 9 Q. And it's typical for a firm like Partners | 9 A. I was involved in reading it and | | |
| 10 Advisers to receive questionnaires from third parties? | 10 commenting it, yes. I probably wasn't involved in | | |
| 11 A. That were interested in potentially | 11 inputting any information initially, and I think the | | |
| 12 investing, yes. | 12 document says I'm sorry, I got the French version | | |
| 13 Q. So the purpose of a questionnaire is to | 13 here that I skimmed through it, which is probably a | | |
| 14 learn more about Partners Advisers so that this | 14 fair assessment of what I did. | | |
| 15 third party, in this case Lloyds Bank, could make an | 15 Q. So if you could go back to Trustee | | |
| 16 assessment as to whether to invest in the portfolio | 16 Exhibit No. 14. Thank you. | | |
| 17 that Partners Advisers was | 17 A. I might just add one element. | | |
| 18 A. That's correct. | 18 Q. Sure. | | |
| 19 Q. Let me just finish the question. | 19 A. No, I don't need the document. | | |
| 20 A. Oh, sorry. | 20 Which is, as I mentioned, I tended to be | | |
| 21 Q that Partners Advisers was promoting? | 21 shielded from the sales effort. That was actually | | |
| 22 A. Yes. | 22 part of the sales effort, to fill in a due diligence | | |
| 23 Q. One second. | 23 questionnaire for a prospective client. Because my | | |
| 24 MR. MOLINA: Ms. Court Reporter, I am | 24 role was actually on the investment side, I was | | |
| 25 handing you what is tab 162 of the bundle. Please | 25 typically not involved in that in a lot of detail, | | |
| ACTOR THE LONG TO SELECT AND COUNTY AND ACTOR | T DEPOS | | |

| 117 | 4 4 20 10 20 10 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 | 119 |
|---|--|-----|
| 1 right. I was involved in it as to review it, in | 1 investments to be made, so | |
| 2 order to comment if there was any sort of erroneous | 2 MR. MOLINA: Why don't we go to we're | |
| 3 information. But I was not involved in the production | 3 going to take a quick detour to what is tab 135 of | |
| 4 of it. | 4 the bundle. | |
| Q. But you were involved in conducting due | 5 Tori. | |
| 6 diligence for Partners Advisers? | 6 MS. STORK: Sorry. | |
| 7 A. I was involved I mean, I was involved | 7 MR. MOLINA: No worries. | |
| 8 in making sure the information that was sent out to | 8 Ms. Court Reporter, I'm going to be | |
| 9 potential investors was correct when it came to the | 9 handing you, again, what is included as tab 135 in the | |
| 10 investment side of things, because that was my area of | 10 bundle. Please mark it as Trustee Exhibit No. 16. | |
| 11 responsibility, yes. | 11 (Trustee Exhibit 16 marked for | |
| 12 Q. Okay. So if you look at the bottom of | 12 identification.) | |
| 13 back to Trustee Exhibit No. 14. | 13 BY MR. MOLINA: | |
| 14 A. Yes. | 14 Q. Mr. Müller, you've just been handed what | |
| 15 Q. Back to the page ending in 18138. | 15 is Trustee Exhibit No. 16. I'll represent to you that | |
| 16 A. Yes.17 Q. Okay. You see at the bottom it has | 16 this is an email containing various attachments. The | |
| | 17 email is dated April 5, 2004, and it was sent by 18 Mr. Luc Estenne to a Robert Kosowski. | |
| 18 a graphic | | |
| 19 A. Yeah. | 19 Are you familiar with this document? 20 A. No. | |
| Q at the bottom of the page? | | |
| 21 That supposedly displays the what was | Q. Do you know who Robert Kosowski is?A. No. | |
| 22 at that time the due diligence process for Partners 23 Advisers? | | |
| | Q. Do you see in the Attachments lineA. Yes. | |
| A. That's yeah, the investment process, | | |
| 25 yes. | 25 Q there are various attachments. But do | 120 |
| Q. It's a six-step process? | 1 you see in the last document, or one of the yeah, | 120 |
| 2 A. Mmm-hmm. | 2 the last thing that is attached is titled 'PASA | |
| Q. Just for the record, I'm going to read the | 3 presentation 2004"? | |
| 4 six steps. | 4 A. Yes. | |
| 5 A. Sure. | 5 Q. I'm going to be taking you to that | |
| 6 Q. Screening; due diligence; portfolio | 6 document, which starts in the page sorry, it starts | |
| 7 structuring; placement; ongoing monitoring; reporting | 7 on the page that has the number 15955 in the bottom | |
| 8 and sharing. | 8 righthand corner. | |
| 9 Is that right? | 9 Do you see that this particular attachment | |
| 10 A. That's right, | 10 is titled "Partners Advisers: An Introduction to the | |
| 11 Q. So what did screening entail? | 11 Company" and it's dated February 2004? | |
| 12 A. Screening was sourcing of investment | 12 Do you see that? | |
| 13 ideas; basically, screening the market for potential | 13 A. Yes. | |
| 14 interesting investments. | 14 Q. Are you familiar with this presentation? | |
| 15 Q. And you were involved in the screening | 15 A. I've probably seen it. I can't really | |
| 16 process? | 16 remember it, but yeah. | |
| 17 A. Iwas. | 17 Q. Okay. If we could turn to 15960, which is | |
| 18 Q. Who else was involved? | 18 a few pages in to the presentation. | |
| 19 A. Let me rephrase that. I was involved in | 19 A. 159? | |
| 20 that process very heavily after '03, when I became | 20 Q. 6-0. | |
| 21 head of research. I was involved more marginally | 21 A. 6-0, yes. | |
| 22 before that. | 22 Q. Okay. Do you see that on this page there | |
| 23 Q. Why is it important to do screening? | 23 is a slide titled "Investment Process"? | |
| Company to an account | | |
| 24 A. Well, that's identification of potential | 24 A. Yes. | |

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| 121 | 123 |
| 1 same six-step process that we just saw in Trustee | 1 100 percent it takes a huge amount of time. So there |
| 2 Exhibit No. 14? | 2 was, like, some balance between getting to the nth |
| 3 A. Yes. | 3 degree of information and getting information that was |
| Q. And, again, for the record, it says: | 4 useful. |
| 5 screening; due diligence; portfolio structuring; | 5 And transparency means, in this case, I |
| 6 placement; ongoing monitoring; and reporting and | 6 think wait a minute. |
| 7 sharing? | 7 So this comment, actually, to me, refers |
| 8 A. Mmm-hmm. | 8 to a I'm going to take a step back. |
| Q. Do you see that, under the slide, there | 9 This comment, to me, refers to the |
| 10 are various notes? | 10 portfolio construction because it comes after the |
| 11 A. Mmm-hmm. | 11 portfolio construction a sentence about portfolio |
| 12 Q. I'm just going to ask you some questions | 12 construction. |
| 13 about some of these notes. | 13 So what this means is there is |
| 14 A. Sure. | 14 effectiveness in the portfolio construction, which |
| 15 Q. One of the notes says: | 15 I sort of referred to, and transparency, meaning that |
| 16 "Predominance of Qualitative." | 16 we were actually very transparent with our investors |
| 17 A. Yes. | 17 about what was in the portfolio. |
| 18 Q. What does that mean to you? | 18 Q. You've mentioned a couple times that these |
| 19 A. That means that most of the due diligence | 19 are not your words. Do you know who was involved in |
| 20 is qualitative rather than quantitative. That would | 20 drafting this, these notes? |
| 21 basically put more importance on the qualitative due | A. Well, that was either the head of sales, |
| 22 diligence. | 22 so Mr. Duteil, or Mr. Estenne. |
| Q. And this is for the same reasons that | Q. You don't have any specific recollection |
| 24 we've already discussed today? 25 A. Yes. | 24 of them drafting this presentation? 25 A. No. I would put these words into the I |
| 25 A. Yes. | 25 A. No. I would put these words into the I |
| Q. Underneath that, there's a note that says: | 1 would think that they were Mr. Duteil's because he was |
| 2 'Equilibrium between rigorous and | 2 not as good an English speaker and it doesn't sound me |
| 3 systematic process." | 3 as, sort of, very clear messaging. |
| What does that mean to you? | 4 Q. If you turn |
| 5 A. I didn't come up with that, for sure. It | 5 A. I don't have any recollection of it, no. |
| 6 means that the process we were trying to build was | 6 Q. If you turn the page to the next page, |
| 7 repeatable and followed a certain structure in the due | 7 which, for the record, is 15961, do you see that at |
| 8 diligence. I mean the due diligence process, yes. | 8 the top there's another slide titled "Screening |
| Q. A few notes down, there's a note that | 9 Principles"? |
| 10 reads: | 10 A. Mmm-hmm. |
| 11 "High level of process effectiveness and | 11 Q. So we were just beginning to talk about |
| 12 transparency." | 12 the screening process. |
| What does that note mean to you? | 13 A. Yes. |
| 14 A. Again, these are not my words, so this is | 14 Q. And then, just for the record, the slide |
| 15 going to be more of me guessing than giving you, sort | 15 reads that screening is: |
| 16 of, a definitive answer. | 16 "An alternative to market timing; 90% of |
| 17 Q. If I may, I'm only asking what it means to | 17 funds are not worth looking at; 100% control is not |
| 18 you. | 18 achievable; past performance has no predictive power; |
| 19 A. To me, okay, yeah. Well, I think that | 19 best managers are hard to find." |
| 20 means that there was effectiveness, to me, means | 20 Do you agree with those statements? |
| 21 that there was a balance between the depth of the work | 21 A. Ido. |
| 22 and what we were getting out of it, right. I think it | Q. What do you mean by well, what do you |
| 23 means that we were sort of following the rule of | 23 think what does the phrase "an alternative to |
| 24 80/20, right, which means that 80 percent of the work | 24 market timing" mean to you? |
| 25 takes 20 percent of the time, and if you want to go to | 25 A. That means that we were trying to identify |

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| 1 | investments | that would | workin | most market | t |
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- 2 environments. That would be an all-weather strategy
- 3 rather than relying on trying to time market regimes.
- Q. Could you explain what it means to time market regimes?
- A. That means trying to sort of second-guess what the market's going to do and position your portfolio accordingly.
- Q. So Partners Advisers, at least at this 10 time, was looking for investments that were -- whose
- 11 strategies were not focused on market timing?
- A. Yeah, overly dependent on market
- 13 direction, yes, which is actually something that hedge
- 14 funds are meant to do, in general. So it's sort of an
- 15 underpinning of that industry. Q. I'm sorry, what is it that hedge funds are
- 17 meant to do? A. They are supposed to not be dependent on
- 19 market environments, basically sort of protect you 20 from market direction.
- 21 Q. Why is that important?
- A. I don't know if it's important, but
- 23 I think people that invest in hedge funds are seeking
- 24 to avoid being exposed to markets and potentially
- 25 having losses of capital when markets go down.

- 1 managers to be trying to time the market, because
- obviously if you do that successfully your returns are
- going to be much better. And so what this says is
- avoiding investing in managers that are trying to time the market.
- Q. A few notes down, there's a note that 6
- 7 reads:
- 'Know concern about manager strength and 8
- blowup risk."
- 10 Do you see that?
- 11 A. Yes.
- 12 Q. What does that note mean to you?
- A. I think that is very similar to the 13
- 14 question you asked about picking pennies in front of a
- 15 steamroller. So there's certain types of strategies
- 16 that offer extremely consistent returns but have the
- 17 risk of a very large loss of capital in the wrong
- 18 market environment; that's the blowup risk.
- Q. That was my next question. So blowup 20 risk, that's the steamroller in the metaphor?
- 21 A. Yeah. I mean, it's just knowing what the
- 22 downside profile of a strategy looks like, basically, 23 yes.
- Q. And when it says 'know concern," how can
- 25 you know of this concern? I mean, it might be the

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- Q. Okay. So you see there's notes on the
- bottom of that slide --
- A. Yes.
- Q. -- similar to the last page.
- The first note says:
- "Marketing timing doesn't work." 6
- A. Right.
- Q. What does that mean to you?
- A. That means impossible to forecast where
- 10 the market is going, repeatedly.
- Q. Why is it impossible? 11
- 12 A. Well, I mean, it's like -- it's impossible
- 13 because of factors that determine if markets go up and
- 14 down are impossible to forecast.
- Q. Have you ever seen a manager who was
- 16 successful in predicting what the markets would do on
- 17 a regular basis?
- 18 A. No.
- 19 Q. Do you see on the bottom of that there's 20 a note that says:
- 21 "Avoid the request for timing."
- 22 Is that similar to what we just discussed?
- A. Yeah. What that means, I think -- again,
- 24 it's a bit of broken English, really. I think what
- 25 this means is that a lot of investors want their

1 English, but...

- A. Yeah, yeah. I mean, I think this just
- means like not walking into investments blindly; just
- being cognizant of what the risks are, right, the
- strength and the risks of that manager.
- O. Underneath that note, there's a note that 6
- 7 reads: 'Diversification and best detection
- 9 manager principles."
- What does that note mean to you? 10
- A. I have no idea. 11
- 12 Q. What's diversification?
- 13 A. I think I know what, actually, this means.
- 14 Diversification meaning, sort of, having an
- 15 appropriate number of underlying investments or
- 16 managers so that, you know, you're not relying too
- 17 much on one being -- bringing, sort of, returns, but
- 18 you have a diversified set of return drivers and risk
- 19 drivers in your portfolio. That's diversification.
- 20 Diversification is, sort of, the
- 21 underpinning of the investment industry, right.
- 22 Everybody that invests in the market typically doesn't
- 23 hold just one security or one fund because you're sort
- 24 of extremely exposed to that, and so you have a
- 25 diversified number of investments.

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| 1 And I think what the "best detection 2 manager principle" means is like that we had | 1 managers, right, because you can actually have several 2 managers in the same strategy. So just to clarify |
| 3 principles around trying to find the best managers to | 3 that. |
| 4 invest in, and that mostly revolves around doing what | 4 But, typically, you would sort of have at |
| 5 we call peer group analysis, so you don't decide in a | 5 least five or six different strategies and probably at |
| 6 vacuum. You just you don't look at a manager and | 6 least 10 to 15 managers. |
| 7 say, well, I want to invest with him or her. You look | 7 Q. And this, you followed this principle with |
| 8 at a manager and say how does he compare he or she | 8 the ART Fund? |
| 9 compare to other managers with similar strategies and | 9 A. We did, yes. |
| 10 are we picking the best horse in that race. | 10 Q. And the other funds that you mentioned |
| 11 Q. Going back to diversification, you said | 11 Partners Advisers was managing at that time? |
| 12 well, let me just ask you again: Is it standard | 12 A. Yeah. They were run the exact same way, |
| 13 practice for a company such as the ones you've worked | 13 yes. |
| 14 for to seek a diversified portfolio? | Q. A couple notes down, there's a note that |
| 15 A. Yes. | 15 reads: |
| 16 Q. And, again, could you explain the purpose, | 16 "No bet, no gambling but investing." |
| 17 or what you understand to be the purpose for that? | 17 A. Mmm-hmm. |
| 18 A. Well, the there is two purposes. The | 18 Q. What does that mean to you? |
| 19 first is not take not over-concentrate your | 19 A. Well, it means that certain types of |
| 20 investments in just one manager because if that | 20 strategies or certain managers have a tendency to view |
| 21 manager doesn't do well, you're very exposed to it. | 21 their fund, like going to the casino and taking very |
| 22 So that's one element. | 22 big, concentrated risks on bets, instead of doing, |
| 23 The second element is if you're running an | 23 sort of — investing, in that sense, means being |
| 24 all-weather strategy, which I mentioned before, then | 24 diligent about the way you put capital to work, doing, |
| 25 you have to have a diversified set of managers because | 25 you know, the fundamental work that's required. |
| | 23 you know, the fundamental work that s required. |
| 1 not all of them will do well all the time. So the | 1 Q. If you go to the next page, do you see at |
| 2 only way you get to an all-weather strategy is by | 2 the top there's another slide for related to the |
| 3 having a diversified number of manager having a | 3 screening process? |
| 4 certain number of manager in different strategies that | 4 A. Yes. |
| 5 are trying to exploit different sets of opportunities. | 5 Q. And underneath the slide there are more |
| 6 Q. In your career, have you ever made an | 6 notes? |
| 7 exception to that general principle of having a | 7 A. Yes. |
| 8 diversified investment portfolio? | 8 Q. There's a note. The first note reads: |
| 9 A. With – I did with my PA, yes. | 9 "Managers only motivated by 2/20%." |
| 10 Q. What's PA? | 10 A. Yes. |
| 11 A. My personal account. | 11 Q. What does 2/20 percent mean to you? |
| 12 Q. Oh. | 12 A. That's the fee structure for most hedge |
| 13 A. But never with investors' capital. | 13 funds, which means a 2 percent management fee and a |
| 14 Q. So in your career, you would never | 14 20 percent incentive fee. |
| 15 recommend to your clients, your investors, to put | 15 Q. Could you explain what 2 percent |
| 16 their investments in only one under one strategy? | |
| | 16 management fee means? |
| 17 A. No, never. | 17 A. Yes, sure. So most well, that's |
| 18 Q. You would always have them diversify among | 18 changed today, but back in the day most managers would |
| 19 different strategies? | 19 charge 2 percent of the assets under management as a |
| 20 A. Yes. | 20 management fee, so they would charge that to cover |
| 21 Q. Typically, how many strategies would you | 21 their cost of running the capital. And then they |
| 22 consider are necessary to have a diversified | 22 would charge 20 percent of the profits they generate, |
| 23 portfolio? | 23 the incentive fee we talked about earlier. |
| 24 A. So I'm going to answer your question | Q. This is the same incentive fee that you |
| 25 specifically. Strategies is not being the same as | 25 were receiving when you were at Partners Advisers? |

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| 1 A. So I think a fund of fund, which is what | 1 A. (Nonverbal response.) |
| 2 ART was, would actually charge an additional | 2 Q. Yes? |
| management fee and incentive fee on top of that | 3 A. Yes. |
| 4 charged by the managers, right. So we would I see | 4 Q. The slide at the top again pertains to |
| 5 you're lost. | 5 the screening process? |
| 6 We would invest in hedge funds that would | 6 A. Mmm-hmm. |
| 7 charge something like 2 and 20, and then Partners | Q. There's a note, the first note, that |
| 8 Advisers, on top of that, would charge, typically, | 8 reads: |
| 9 1 and 10, I think would probably sort of be the | 9 "No selection nor understanding without |
| 10 typical sort of fee structure, on top of that. | 10 market news and info." |
| Q. This is implicit in what we've been | 11 And in parentheses, it says: |
| 12 discussing today, but just for the record, can you | 12 "Bloom & Market watch." |
| 13 just explain the difference between a fund of fund and | 13 A. Mmm-hmm. |
| 14 a hedge fund? | 14 Q. Do you see that? |
| 15 A. Sure. A hedge fund is an investment | 15 A. Yes. |
| 16 vehicle that invests in marketable securities. A fund | 16 Q. What does that mean to you? |
| 17 of fund is an investment vehicle that invests in hedge | 17 A. That means you can't select hedge funds |
| 18 funds. | 18 without understanding what is happening in the market |
| 19 Q. A few notes down, there's a note that | 19 And Bloom means Bloomberg, and Market watch was |
| 20 says: | 20 a document that was basically an extraction of market |
| 21 'Deep understanding of the performance | 21 data that I developed at Partners Advisers that we |
| 22 engine." | 22 would sort of get every week, a sort of recap of what |
| 23 Do you see that? | 23 different markets were doing. |
| 24 A. Yes. | 24 Q. The next note on the same page reads: |
| 25 Q. What does that note mean to you? | 25 "Referencing in the network." |
| 134 | 136 |
| 1 A. Well, that goes back to qualitative due | 1 A. Yes. |
| 2 diligence, which is understanding how the returns are | 2 Q. What does that mean to you? |
| 3 generated, what are the attributes of that strategy, | 3 A. That means we were very actively engaged |
| 4 and the investment style that generates the return. | 4 with other investors. And, by the way, investors in |
| Q. So going back in time to 2004 when this | 5 hedge funds are called allocators. I might refer to |
| 6 presentation was created, is it fair to say that | 6 allocators as being investors in hedge funds. That's |
| 7 Partners Advisers was focused on understanding was | 7 the way that they're sort of called in our industry. |
| 8 very focused on understanding the strategy of the | 8 So this was basically meaning talking to |
| 9 various investments that were in the ART Fund | 9 our network of allocators about certain managers and |
| 10 portfolio? | 10 reference-checking them with that network. |
| 11 A. Yes. | 11 Q. So how many allocators would you have in |
| 12 Q. And, to you personally, it was an | 12 your network? |
| 13 important part of the process? | 13 A. Dozens. |
| 14 A. It was, yes. | 14 Q. This is at Partners Advisers at this time? |
| Q. A few lines down, there's a note that has | 15 A. Yes. We each had different types of |
| 16 a typographical error, but I'm going to read it into | 16 networks, but I was talking to dozens of persons, yes. |
| 17 the record: | 17 Q. Okay. Just on the next page, this is the |
| 18 "Example = plane and car paradigm." | 18 page ending in 15964, again there's a slide at the |
| 19 Do you see that? | 19 top, notes on the bottom. |
| 20 A. Yes. | 20 A. Mmm-hmm. |
| Q. Do you have any sense of what that means? | 21 Q. The slide, again, pertains to the |
| 22 A. Absolutely not. | 22 screening process. Yes? |
| 23 Q. If you turn the page, this is now the | 1 DA 3 COUNT OF BELL SOUND AND SOUND |
| 24 page ending with 15963, again, it's another slide at | 23 A. Yes. 24 Q. There is only one note here. It says: |
| 25 the top with notes on the bottom. | 25 "Style drift." |
| 25 the top with notes on the bottom. PI ANE | The state of the s |

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| 137 A. Yes. | 1 BY MR. MOLINA: |
| Q. What does style drift mean to you? | |
| A. Style drift means that a manager that | Q. Hello, Mr. Müller. 3 A. Hello. |
| invests in a certain way with a certain strategy | |
| [H ANT T 12 ANT T AN | |
| suddenly starts to change the strategy they're investing in so their style of investing drifts. It's | 5 marked Trustee Exhibit No. 14. Sorry, number no, |
| investing in so their style of investing drifts. It's | 6 this is 16, this is the presentation. |
| typically early signals of a problem. Q. Why would that be an early signal of a | 7 MS. STORK: Oh yes. |
| | 8 BY MR. MOLINA: |
| problem? | 9 Q. Number 16. |
| 0 A. Because there is the reason to drift | 10 A. Yep. |
| 1 into other investment styles are linked to either, | 11 Q. It has the number in the bottom 15965. |
| 2 sort of, the belief that they can manage outside of | 12 A. Mmm-hmm. |
| 3 assets outside of their specific area of expertise, | 13 Q. This is the page that we left off. You'll |
| 4 which typically is wrong, but most people are not very | 14 see on the top there's a slide titled 'Due Diligence - |
| 5 good at managing strategies that they're not experts | 15 Objectives." |
| 6 in, or that their assets under management have reached | 16 A. Mmm-hmm. |
| 7 a level where they're becoming too large to express | 17 Q. And at the bottom there are notes under |
| 8 their original strategy and so they need to, sort of, | 18 the slide. |
| 9 look elsewhere. | 19 A. Yes. |
| 0 Both those things tend to lead to poor | 20 Q. You'll recall that we looked earlier at |
| 1 performance. | 21 this graphic that had the six components of the |
| Q. So when you said there's early signs of | 22 investment process? |
| 3 a problem, the problem in this case is potential | 23 A. Yes. |
| 4 losses? | Q. And after screening, which was the first |
| 5 A. Yeah. Underperformance or losses, yes. | 25 component, there was a due diligence. Do you recall |
| 138 | 140 |
| Not always losses, but it could be underperformance. | 1 that? |
| Q. Anything else? | 2 A. Yes. |
| A. No. I mean, that style drift doesn't | 3 Q. So this is the second component of this |
| belong in screening. It sort of belongs in due | 4 process? |
| | 5 A. Absolutely, yes. |
| that, no. | 6 Q. On the slide, you will see that it appears |
| | 7 that there's a it shows a flowchart, correct? |
| Q. Okay. | |
| MR. MOLINA: I have just quickly, | 8 A. Yes. |
| I have a few more slides to go through here. We will | 9 Q. The flowchart shows that there are boxes |
| 0 likely not be able to do it in 3 minutes, so | 10 for information network, public information, and |
| 1 I recommend that we it's a good time to take a | 11 market information, that then all flow to the |
| 2 pause, have a lunch break and then we can resume. | 12 screening process. Do you see that? |
| 3 THE EXAMINER: In your hands, Mr. Molina. | 13 A. Yes. |
| 4 So, yes, we can pause now. | 14 Q. And then after the screening process, |
| 5 THE VIDEOGRAPHER: We are going off the | 15 there's a flow to what's called radar screen. Do you |
| 6 record. The time is 12:57. | 16 see that? |
| 7 (Lunch break taken.) | 17 A. Mmm-hmm. |
| 8 THE VIDEOGRAPHER: For the record, we have | 18 Q. What's radar screen? |
| 9 been on the record for 2 hours and 35 minutes. | 19 A. A shortlist of potential investments. |
| 0 We are now back on record. The time is | 20 Q. So can you just explain briefly what this |
| 1 1:45. | 21 flowchart means to you? |
| 2 MR. MOLINA: May I resume questioning? | 22 A. Yeah, sure. So the three boxes to the |
| THE EXAMINER: Yes, please. Please | 23 left, information network, public information, and |
| 4 continue, Mr. Molina. | 24 market information, are basically ways to source |
| 5 /// | 25 potential investments: information network meaning our |
| | |

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- 1 own network of people, allocators, service providers,
- 2 in the hedge fund ecosystem, like prime brokers;
- 3 public information being sort of newspapers,
- 4 publications, databases; and then market information
- 5 is more sort of linked to market data, so equity
- 6 markets, FX income market data, and how that informs
- 7 potential investments.
- 8 So, anyway, those three sources were sort
- 9 of used to source investments. These investments that
- 10 were sourced would go into a screening process where
- 11 we would sort of weed out the investments that made
- 12 no sense or were unattractive or didn't compare very
- 13 well to others, et cetera, and that led to a short
- 14 list of potential investments called the radar screen,
- 15 which we would then pick from to conduct due diligence 15
- 16 pre-investment.
- 17 Q. Okay. When you said that "we" would use
- 18 the screening process to weed out, we just covered in
- 19 the -- before the break we were talking about the
- 20 different components of the screening process.
- 21 Do you remember that?
- 22 A. Yes.
- Q. When you said just now "we," who are you
- 24 referencing to when you say that "we" would weed out
- 25 investments at this stage?
 - A. Yeah, the investment team at Partners
- 2 Advisers, so that would be the analysts, myself and
- 3 Mr. Estenne. Yeah. Typically, after 2003, that would
- 4 sort of -- I would be the lead on that with my
- 5 analysts and then Mr. Estenne would be brought in at a
- 6 later stage, probably at the stage of the radar screen
- 7 when we already had a short list.
- 8 Q. In the notes under the slide, if you look
- 9 to first note, it says:
- 10 "Due diligence qualitative process."
- 11 Is this the process that we discussed
- 12 earlier when we discussed qualitative due diligence?
- 13 A. Yes.
- 14 Q. And the next note, when it says
- 15 'Quantitative tools," is this the same as the
- 16 quantitative due diligence process that we discussed
- 17 earlier today?
- 18 A. Yes.
- 19 Q. When it says -- in the bottom, or in the
- 20 middle of those notes, it says 'Proprietary analysis
- 21 program" --
- 22 A. Yes.
- Q. -- what does that mean to you?
- 24 A. This was the quantitative analysis tool
- 25 that we used. There was two of them: one was for

- 1 single funds and it was a five-page, sort of,
- 2 quantitative analysis document which, actually, I've
- 3 seen in the documents that I was provided with, so
- 4 there's example of that and it was sort of -- it was a
- 5 tool that was automated; and then the second one was
- 6 actually to perform peer group analysis, so it was
- 7 actually for multiple funds to be compared to one
- 8 another, which I think is also in that pack of
- 9 documents, at least an example of it.
 - Q. Do these programs have names?
- 11 A. They had, but I struggle to remember. It
- 12 was called SMART something, which was a play on the
- 13 word with ART but I can't remember the something.
 - Q. Okay. A couple notes down, it says:
 - "Index and Peer comparison."
- 16 A. Mmm-hmm.
- 17 Q. Can you just explain what that means to
- 18 you?
- 19 A. Yeah. So that's what I meant by comparing
- 20 an investment to other similar investments in that
- 21 universe and to market indices.
- Q. Okay. On the next page, which has the
- 23 numbers 15966 on the bottom righthand corner, it's
- 24 another slide with notes on the bottom.
 - A. Mmm-hmm.

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- Q. The slide is titled 'Due Diligence Risk
- Management."
- A. Mmm-hmm.
- Q. Now, some of these, the text here is small
- 5 and we'll do our best to see if we can read some of
- 6 this text. So I'm just going to ask you to briefly
- 7 explain what these different risks mean to you.
- So let's start with credit risk. Could
- 9 you briefly describe what that means to you.
- 0 A. Yeah. So this is a chart that is taken
- 11 from a chapter of a book that Luc Estenne actually
- 12 wrote; not the book but that specific chapter. So he
- 13 came up with that or took it from somewhere. I never
- 14 paid much attention to this chart specifically, but
- 15 I'll tell you what it means to me.
- 16 So credit risk is actually linked to the
- 17 credit of counterparties, so it's sort of linked to 18 counterparty risk. It's basically being exposed to
- 10 the anality outhings of the second way trade on
- 19 the creditworthiness of the people you trade or 20 interact with.
- Q. And there's -- in this chart, at least, it
- 22 shows that there's various other risks that are spawns
- 23 of the credit risk.
- 24 Do you see that?
- 25 A. Yes. Transaction risk, portfolio

A. Yes.

Transcript of Mr. Jerome Muller

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|--|---|
| 145 | 147 |
| 1 concentration risk. | 1 Q. What does human factor risk mean to you? |
| Q. Counterparty risk? | 2 A. Well, human factor risk is the risk of |
| 3 A. Yeah. And then I can't read the other. | 3 human mistake or human misbehavior within a firm. |
| Q. Nor can I. What do you first of all, | 4 There was a previous slide that mentioned 100 percent |
| 5 is this chart something that you do you agree with | 5 control is not possible, which is sort of something |
| 6 the order of the risks, the way they're structured in | 6 that I strongly believe now, and believed then, which |
| 7 this chart? | 7 is obviously you can conduct as much due diligence you |
| 8 A. I don't know about the order but those | 8 want; ultimately, you're still exposed to human factor |
| 9 three types of risk are basically the risks that you | 9 risk. |
| 10 have to manage when you're investing in hedge funds. | 10 Q. How do you mitigate human factor risk? |
| 11 So I agree with the types. They're risk | 11 A. Well, you mitigate it by conducting |
| 12 typologies. | 12 operational due diligence and making sure there is all |
| 13 Q. What's counterparty risk? | 13 the sort of checks and balances in place, including |
| 14 A. Counterparty risk is the risk of your | 14 having, you know, thirdparty service providers and |
| 15 counterparty, the entity that holds your assets, | 15 so on. |
| 16 defaulting or going bankrupt, in which case you might | 16 But, ultimately, even so, I mean, you're |
| 17 lose your assets because they're deposed there, so | 17 mitigating it, right; you're never eliminating it, |
| 18 I guess deposited there. So Lehman going bankrupt | 18 I think. |
| 19 is a perfect example of counterparty risk. | 19 Q. Do you see at the bottom there are notes |
| Q. How do you assess counterparty risk? | 20 under the slide? |
| 21 A. You assess it by making sure that the | 21 A. Yes. |
| 22 funds you're investing in typically use multiple | Q. There's a note at the end that says: |
| 23 counterparties and have their assets in separate | 23 "No risk no perf?" |
| 24 in, sort of, a number of different sort of entities. | 24 A. Yes. |
| 25 You basically assess it by making sure it's spread | Q. What does that mean to you? |
| 146 | 148 |
| 1 the risk is spread out instead of being concentrated. | 1 A. That means you can't generate any |
| Q. On the same chart in the slide, there's | 2 performance if you don't take any risks. |
| 3 a category called market risk. Do you see that? | 3 Q. And you agree with that statement? |
| 4 A. Yes. | 4 A. Yeah. I mean, there's a notion of |
| 5 Q. What's market risk? | 5 risk-free rate, which is basically the rate offered to |
| 6 A. Well, market risk is the risk of being | 6 you by US government bonds, right, because there you |
| 7 exposed to certain markets and their behavior, right. | 7 actually don't take any risks. Well, you take the |
| 8 So there's equity risk in there, interest rate risk, | 8 risk that the US defaults but that's a very remote |
| 9 currency risk, commodity risk, and I guess one is | 9 risk. But it's called risk-free rate for that reason, |
| 10 called liquidity risk, which is the risk of being | 10 right. Everything that's - other investments contain |
| 11 exposed to illiquid assets. | 11 risk because you're trying to generate better returns |
| 12 Q. And then underneath that, there's another | 12 than the US Treasury, so |
| 13 category of risk called operational risk. Do you see | Q. So when you were at Partners Advisers, |
| 14 that? | 14 let's say this time frame in 2004, did you invest |
| 15 A. Yes. | 15 A. You just changed page, right? |
| 16 Q. What's operational risk? | 16 Q. Oh, sorry. I'm just asking separate from |
| 17 A. So that's what we covered before, which is | 17 this document. |
| 18 the risks that are linked to the operational structure | 18 A. Okay. |
| 19 of the managers and the funds. So that's typically | 19 Q. When you were at Partners Advisers in |
| 20 what would be covered by the operational due diligence | |
| 21 analyst. | 21 recommend investments that were risk-free? |
| 22 Q. There's a sub-component of operational | 22 A. No. No, we – I mean, that would have |
| 23 risk in this chart that's titled "Human factor risk." | 23 come – that would have meant recommending investments |
| 24 All the way at the bottom. | 24 that – in US treasuries, which we didn't do. |
| 25 A Voc | 25 O Do you are the most many which has the |

25

Q. Do you see the next page, which has the

| Conducted on May 20, 2022 | |
|--|--|
| 149 | 151 |
| 1 number 15967? Again, same thing | 1 this first face-to-face meeting with the manager? |
| A. Yeah. | 2 A. No. |
| Q slide/notes. I'm going to look at the | Q. There's another note, that says: |
| notes. There's a note at the bottom that says: | 4 "Networking importance." |
| 5 "HF strategy, Prime broker and | 5 Could you explain what that means to you? |
| 6 positioning." | 6 A. Yeah. That's linked to what we were |
| What does that note mean to you? | 7 discussing before, which is checking out investment |
| 8 A. Give me a minute just to review this. | 8 ideas with people from our network. |
| That means analyzing the hedge fund | 9 Q. I know earlier you mentioned that there |
| 10 strategy, who the prime broker is, or are if they're | 10 were dozens of people that would be part of your |
| 11 multiple, and how the fund's positioned, so the | 11 network; is that right? |
| 12 positioning of the portfolio of that investment. | 12 A. Yes. |
| 13 Q. And you see on the slide here there's a | 13 Q. I'm going to go through some names |
| 14 reference to two different questionnaires; one's | 14 A. Sure. |
| 15 a first contact questionnaire and the other is a due | 15 Q and I'm going to ask you to tell me if |
| 16 diligence questionnaire? | 16 you can recall whether these individuals or entities |
| 17 A. Yes. | 17 were part of your network. Is that fair? |
| 18 Q. If you look at the next page, there is a | 18 A. Sure. |
| 19 breakdown under there's sort of a focus on the | 19 Q. Okay. There's an entity by the name of |
| 20 first contact questionnaire. Do you see that? | 20 Calibria? |
| 21 A. Yes. | 21 A. Yes. |
| Q. This is the page ending in 15968. | 22 Q. Are you familiar with that entity? |
| 23 A. Yes. | 23 A. Yes. |
| Q. Briefly, could you explain what a first | Q. What is that entity? |
| 25 contact questionnaire is? | 25 A. It was a competitor of ours in Geneva, so |
| 150 | 152 |
| 1 A. That would be the meeting notes or it | 1 they were a fund of fund as well, people that came out |
| 2 would be sort of a template we would fill in during | 2 of JPMorgan. |
| 3 the first a first meeting, physical face-to-face | 3 Q. I'm going to list some names and you'll |
| 4 meeting with a manager. | 4 tell me if you recall whether these people were with |
| Q. This would be pre-investment? | 5 Calibria at the time that you were liaising with this |
| 6 A. Yes. | 6 network. |
| Q. Would you always have face-to-face | 7 A. Yes, mmm-hmm. |
| 8 meetings with a manager pre-investment? | 8 Q. Christophe Khaw? |
| 9 A. Yes. | 9 A. Yes, I know him. |
| 10 Q. Why? | 10 Q. Who was Christophe Khaw? |
| 11 A. Because it was part of our investment | 11 A. Christophe Khaw was one of the partners of |
| 12 process, to visit managers in their own office and | 12 Calibria and he was in a similar role to mine, |
| 13 spend time with them face to face. | 13 conducting due diligence on managers. |
| 14 Q. Why was that part of your process? | 14 Q. How often would you speak with Mr. Khaw |
| 15 A. Because it allowed to meet the team, it | 15 during while you were at Partners Advisers? |
| 16 allowed to sort of read body language and get | 16 A. On a monthly basis. |
| 17 comfortable with the manager, his team, the setup, you | 17 Q. And when you say that you would discuss |
| 18 know, seeing that there's an office, servers, things | 18 your these potential investments, could you just |
| 19 like this. | 19 explain briefly what that what those discussions |
| Q. Do you see at the bottom here, it says: | 20 entailed? |
| 21 "Know and meet the managers." | 21 A. Yeah, of course. It entailed discussing |
| Is this what you're referring to? | 22 the reputation of a manager, his background, the firm |
| 23 A. Yes. | 23 he came out of, how - what was the reputation of that |
| Q. Would there be a scenario where you would | 24 firm, what was the manager's reputation within that |
| 25 recommend an investment where you would not have had | 25 firm, with peers and other people from our network. |

| Conducted on May 20, 2022 | |
|---|--|
| 1 Mr. Khaw might have had a different network to mine, 2 he most certainly did actually, and so he might have 3 information, potentially, that I didn't have. 4 We were discussing the soundness of the 5 investment strategy, how sustainable we thought that 6 strategy was. You know, all the points in the due 7 diligence around, sort of, the market opportunity, and 8 how the treasury was likely to do in the current 9 market condition we would sort of compare notes on as 10 well. 11 So, basically, it was he and others, but 12 I was quite close to Mr. Khaw as a sounding board, and 13 I was to him. 14 Q. Would these discussions occur in person? 15 A. Yeah, we were both in Geneva, so, for the 16 most part, yes. 17 Q. Would you trade emails or written 18 correspondences about these investments? 19 A. Probably. I think most of the 20 communication was oral, in person, but we might have 21 exchanged emails as well. 22 Q. Would you is it fair to say that most 23 of the people in this network were located in Geneva | There was people that were working for prime brokers I would talk to very frequently. There was a person called Trudi Usher, who actually we then hired at Partners Advisers, I would speak to frequently. She was at Morgan Stanley. There was a person called Marlin Naidoo who was working for a prime broker, Deutsche Bank, I think, in Asia and he would be a good source of information for Asian manager investments. So those are the ones who sort of come up top of my head but there were multiple others, yeah. Q. I'm going to name other names and you can just A. Sure. Q tell me similar with Mr. Khaw, just tell me if they were in your network and, if so, who they were A. Sure. Q and how often you spoke to them. Albert Collette? A. Yeah, I mean, he was a colleague of Mr. Khaw. I did not interact with him much but I know him and, you know, if I were to see him on the street, |
| 24 at the time? | 24 we would sort of chat for ten minutes. But I was not |
| 25 A. No. No, I mean there was people in Geneva | 25 very close with him. |
| 1 but I was exchanging with people in London, New York. 2 I was traveling a fair bit. I was going to 3 conferences, meeting people from across the globe, so 4 it was a very global network, actually, yeah. 5 Q. And you mentioned Mr. Khaw is somebody who 6 was a significant part of this of these let me 7 restate that. 8 You mentioned earlier Mr. Khaw is somebody 9 you would speak to regularly within this network? 10 A. Yes. 11 Q. Are there other people with whom you spoke 12 to regularly, similar to how often you spoke to 13 Mr. Khaw? 14 A. Yes, there were. Yes. 15 Q. Can you do you remember their names? 16 A. I mean, it's a lot of them. Yeah, sure. | 1 Q. So you would not consider him to be part 2 of your network? 3 A. He was not someone I was bumping ideas 4 off, no. 5 Q. Philippe Baumann? 6 A. He was also part of Calibria. I was very 7 limited interaction with him. 8 Q. He was not part of your network? 9 A. Not really, no. 10 Q. Tanvir Ghani. 11 And, Ms. Court Reporter, I will provide 12 you with the spelling for these names at the break. 13 A. Yes, I would speak to Tanvir. Tanvir was 14 at Goldman Sachs and I was quite close to him. 15 Q. He was part of your network? 16 A. Yes. |
| 16 A. I mean, it's a lot of them. Yeah, sure. 17 I remember some of them, for sure, yeah. 18 Q. Can you give us some names? 19 A. Yeah, there was a person called Karim 20 Leugel who was the CIO of a fund of fund that was 21 attached to a Italian bank called Rasini. He's now 22 with JPMorgan. I would compare notes with him. There 23 was a person called John Patton who was running the 24 portfolio, a hedge fund portfolio, for an insurance 25 company. | 17 Q. And he was at Goldman Sachs during 18 the time that he was part of your network? 19 A. Yes. 20 Q. Peter Fletcher? 21 A. Yes. I mean, he was my he was much 22 he was my boss for a while and I didn't speak to him 23 about investment much, but I respect him and we would 24 sort of speak from time to time. 25 Q. And we mentioned earlier Philippe |

| 150 |
|---|
| 1 note that says: |
| 2 "Bonus to bottom up." |
| 3 Do you see that? |
| 4 A. I don't. Where is that? |
| 5 Q. It's the second note |
| 6 A. Oh, yeah, yeah, of course. Yeah, sorry, |
| 7 sorry. I was looking at the flowchart. Yeah. |
| 8 Q. What does that note mean to you? |
| 9 A. Well, it means something similar, which is |
| 10 there's – it makes more sense to focus on investments |
| 11 bottom up, which means finding managers we really sort |
| 12 of believe are strong, and then worry about the |
| 13 strategy, rather than top down, which is worry about |
| 14 the strategy first and then trying to find the manager |
| 15 in there. |
| 16 Q. If you turn the page, so this is now the |
| 17 page that has the number 15971 in the bottom |
| 18 righthand corner. |
| 19 A. Yes. |
| 20 Q. Do you see in this slide at the top of |
| 21 that page there's a reference to this bottom-up and |
| 22 top-down approach? |
| 23 A. Mnun-hnun. |
| 24 Q. Does this refer to what you just stated on |
| 25 the record? |
| 160 |
| 1 A. Yes. So that's actually slightly |
| 2 different because it refers to portfolio structuring, |
| 3 whereas I think this one well, actually, it refers |
| 4 to structuring, too, but |
| 5 So yes. I mean, it basically refers to |
| 6 the fact that we need to find managers that are high |
| 7 quality, which is bottom up, and then make sure that |
| 8 the portfolio structure overall, so the collection of |
| 9 these managers, makes sense from a market perspective. |
| 10 Q. And then underneath that in the slide, the |
| 11 second bullet, it reads: |
| 12 "Farm team, Intermediate & Senior |
| 13 Structure." |
| 14 A. Mmm-hmm. |
| 15 Q. What does that mean to you? |
| 16 A. Means that each investment that we had in |
| 17 the portfolio was in one of these three buckets: farm |
| 18 team being, sort of, test positions, smaller, more |
| 19 risky, more uncertain; intermediate being, sort of, |
| 20 you know, mid-level positions in terms of sizing and |
| |
| 21 conviction level; and senior being the biggest |
| 22 position in which we had high conviction. |
| |
| 22 position in which we had high conviction. |
| |

(Part 1) Pg 43 of 65 Transcript of Mr. Jerome Muller

| 1 the allocation? | 163 1 one was most important to you when deciding whether to |
|---|--|
| 2 A. 1 to 2 percent. | 2 divest from an investment? |
| Q. 1 to 2 percent? | 3 MR. WORBY: Objection. |
| A. Yes. | 4 Can we specify when during Mr. Müller's |
| Q. What about an intermediate position? | 5 time |
| A. 3 to 5. | 6 MR. MOLINA: When he was at |
| Q. What about a senior position? | 7 THE STENOGRAPHER: Sorry. I didn't hear |
| A. Usually around 7. 6, 7. | 8 what you said. |
| Q. Would it be abnormal for Partners Advisers | 9 MR. WORBY: Can we specify when during |
| 0 to have an investment in the portfolio that would have | 10 Mr. Müller's time at Partners Advisers. |
| 11 an allocation greater than 7 percent? | 11 MR. MOLINA: During the time of this |
| 12 A. It was, yes. | 12 presentation, 2004. |
| 13 Q. And this is because of the diversification | 13 THE WITNESS: So the most important was |
| 14 principle that we discussed earlier? | 14 linked to people and process. Again, I think if we |
| 15 A. Yes. | 15 redeem just for performance reasons, that basically |
| Q. If you look in the notes, there's a bolded | 16 meant that, you know, I felt I had done a bad job at |
| 17 note. Do you see that? | 17 picking this manager because I obviously, sort of, was |
| 18 A. Mmm-hmm. | 18 wrong on the ability of that manager to generate good |
| Q. And I'm going to read it for the record. | 19 performance. |
| 20 It's got it says, "PPP." The three letter Ps. | 20 Process and people were not something we |
| 21 A. Mmm-hmm. | 21 could forecast and when they changed, then it was |
| Q. An equal sign, and then it says: | 22 a good enough reason to divest, and typically these |
| 2 Control - | 23 changes occurred before there was an impact on |
| | 24 performance, so we were sort of getting ahead of |
| A. Yes. Q. Underneath that, in bold, it reads: | 25 deterioration in performance. |
| 25 Q. Chaerneam mar, in bord, it reads. | 2 2 2 2 10 10 10 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 |
| 1 "A decision solely based on Performance | 1 BY MR. MOLINA: |
| 2 is not complete guidance must also come from Team and | 2 Q. You just stated you just said around |
| 3 Process misleading." | 3 the time of 2004. Would this principle apply equally |
| So there's some grammatical issues there. | 4 before 2004 or did it evolve over time, your opinion |
| 5 A. Mmm-hmm. | 5 that you just stated on the record? |
| | 6 A. I think the process, the PPP rule, was |
| Q. But what does that note mean to you? A. So I will tell you what it means to me, | 7 formalized probably around that time, so we didn't |
| | |
| 8 which is maybe not what it's meant to say here. Our 9 divestment process revolved around that sort of PPP | 8 have a specific rule or a specific process around this 9 before that. And then before 2003, I was obviously |
| 10 sort of rule, which was when we divested from an | 10 not in charge of that decisionmaking, right. I mean, |
| 11 investment, typically, sort of well, it sort of | 11 I was part of a team. The decisionmaking, right. Theat, |
| | The Control of the Co |
| 12 we had to sort of explain it either by a disappointing | 12 was solely with Mr. Estenne. |
| 13 performance of that manager, a change in the 14 process we mentioned style drift, sort of, would | Q. So prior to 2003 and before the 14 implementation of this rule, this PPP rule, the |
| [20] 전 [20] [20] [20] [20] [20] [20] [20] [20] | |
| 15 fall in that bucket or changing people, so senior | 15 decision whether to divest from a position in the |
| 16 people departing the firm or a hire that we sort of | 16 portfolio was done exclusively by Mr. Estenne? |
| 17 didn't feel was appropriate. | 17 A. Prior to 2003, it was. Divestment and |
| 18 And usually usually, we sort of we | 18 investments, for that matter, yes. |
| 19 felt we or at least I felt I was doing a bad job if | 19 Q. And what do you recall was the process |
| 20 the reason to exit a position was actually just solely | 20 that he followed when making those decisions? |
| 21 due to performance because that meant we had picked | A. I think, ultimately, the process was |
| 22 the wrong manager. | 22 probably similar but it wasn't formalized, so it was |
| Q. So between of these three Ps, which, | 23 sort of implicit rather than explicit. |
| 24 again, are People, Process and Performance, which one | Q. A couple notes down, there's a note that |
| 25 did you when you were at Partners Advisers, which | 25 reads: |

| Conducted or | n May 20, 2022 |
|---|--|
| 165 | 167 |
| 1 "Family invested allow to defend an ideal | 1 for the other meetings that we talked about |
| 2 strategy." | 2 pre-investment. |
| 3 Do you see that? | 3 A. Yes. |
| 4 A. Yes. | 4 Q. Would there be reports that would be |
| Q. What does that note mean to you? | 5 generated as a result of these meetings |
| 6 A. That is very unclear. It's - I think | 6 A. Yes. |
| 7 what it probably means is that the Estenne family was | 7 Q by Partners Advisers? |
| 8 invested alongside other investors, but why I don't | 8 A. Yes. |
| 9 know what "defend an ideal strategy" means. | 9 MR. WORBY: Objection again. |
| 10 Well, I guess well, sorry, let me take | 10 When do you mean in Mr. Müller's time at |
| 11 that back. It probably means that there's alignment | 11 Partners Advisers, please? |
| 12 of interest and that we wouldn't invest in managers | 12 BY MR. MOLINA: |
| 13 that the family didn't want to have exposure to | 13 Q. Well, let me ask you, Mr. Müller. During |
| 14 themselves. | 14 your time at Partners Advisers, your entire time |
| 15 Q. You just stated then Mr. Estenne's family | 15 there, so 1999 to 2011, during the entire time, would |
| 16 invested. When you say that they invested, do you | 16 you meet with managers or someone from your team meet |
| 17 mean in the ART Fund? | 17 with managers? |
| 18 A. I don't think Luc's family had investments | 18 A. Yes. |
| 19 in the ART Fund, to be honest, but they probably | 19 Q. Would there be reports that were generated |
| 20 invested in the same managers themselves. That's what | 20 as a result of those meetings? |
| 21 it means, probably. We were not running or | 21 A. Yes, although let me qualify that |
| 22 advising we were not officially running or advising | 22 somewhat. There were reports written for each meeting |
| 23 the Estenne's family assets. | 23 that the investment team had with managers. That |
| Q. Did anyone in your family invest in the | 24 might not apply to Mr. Estenne specifically, though, |
| 25 ART Fund? | 25 because, I mean, he was running the firm, he was |
| 166 | 168 |
| 1 A. No. No, I do come from a pretty modest | 1 obviously the founder and nobody was there to control |
| 2 family, actually, so they didn't have the money to do | 2 that he was writing reports. |
| 3 so. | 3 So I don't think I don't think he would |
| Q. Let's go to the page that has the number | 4 actually write reports most of the time, but for all |
| 5 15974 on the bottom righthand corner. | 5 the other meetings, involving other team members, |
| 6 A. Yes. | 6 there would be reports written, yes. |
| Q. Again, it has a slide at the top, notes at | 7 Q. What's the purpose of having a report |
| 8 the bottom. Do you see that? | 8 written? |
| | |

A. Yes.

Q. Okay. This slide is titled 'On Going

11 Monitoring." Do you see that?

A. Yes.

Q. What does ongoing monitoring mean to you? 13

A. That meant the monitoring on a regular

15 basis of the active investments in the portfolio. So

16 when we invested in the manager, we would then make

17 sure that we were tracking what that manager was

18 doing, and that involved a number of things, most

20 send, like shareholder letters, risk reports, et

21 cetera, and then also meeting with them on site on a

22 regular basis, right, twice a year.

Q. When you mention these meetings -- and

24 I'm going to ask specifically for the ongoing

25 monitoring meetings but also, later, I will ask you

A. I mean, the main reason to have a report

10 written is obviously to have sort of a -- to have a 11 means to sort of go back to see what information

12 managers gave you and how coherent it is with what

13 they're telling you today. So there's a reason, sort

14 of, from an investment perspective, just sort of

15 to make sure that the manager's not doing something

16 that he said he wouldn't, so it's linked to that.

The other reason, which was very crucial 18 as well, was more commercial. So we would have

19 importantly reading any communication that they would 19 investors coming to the office and wanting to see the

20 reports we were writing on managers, and I think it

21 was practice across the industry to actually have

22 reports when you had meetings, and making those

23 available to investors.

Q. Who would write these reports? 24

25 A. Usually the person who was having the

25 co-CIO?

Conducted on May 20, 2022

| | 1 May 20, 2022 |
|--|--|
| 1 meeting. | 171 A. No, she probably started before that. |
| 2 Q. How many people would be in these meetings | 2 I don't know. 2005/6. |
| 3 from Partners Advisers? Again, I'm asking over the | 3 Q. Back to the reports. When you met with |
| 4 and let me just state, just so we can pre-empt this | 4 managers on behalf of Partners Advisers, how would you |
| 5 MR. WORBY: Yes. | 5 record what was communicated during those meetings? |
| 6 BY MR. MOLINA: | 6 A. I would type notes. |
| 7 Q that if there's an evolution | 7 Q. And then would you immediately circulate |
| 8 A. Yeah, I mean there | 8 those notes to anyone else at Partners Advisers? |
| 9 Q just, you know, please go ahead and | 9 A. No. I would clean them up, put them into |
| 10 explain if the policy or process changed over time. | 10 a template and then circulate them. |
| 11 A. Yeah, I mean, there obviously was | 11 Q. To whom would you circulate your notes? |
| 12 evolution. Again, I started as a junior person, | 12 A. To the team, so to Luc and any of the |
| 13 right. I mean, initially I would only have meetings | 13 analysts usually. I think most of the time, though, |
| 14 in Geneva in our office, I would not travel. And | 14 they were — most of the time, our debriefing from |
| 15 those meetings I would never have by myself. There | 15 trips would actually be oral because it was more |
| 16 would always be a senior person in that meeting. | 16 efficient than actually asking people to read through |
| 17 Over time, as I started to travel, most of | 17 pages and pages of reports. So we would have an oral |
| 18 the time these meetings would be held with just one | 18 debriefing and the notes were just archived somewhere |
| 19 person in the meeting room because it was that person | 19 on the server. |
| 20 who was traveling, right. So I did travel — I did a | 20 So there was not a lot of distribution of |
| 21 lot of traveling alone. Probably my entire time at | 21 notes happening, really. |
| 22 Partners Advisers, I traveled with Mr. Estenne maybe | 22 Q. And if you could just give me a basic |
| 23 three or four times, and that's in the context of | 23 rundown of how long these meetings took and what would |
| 24 traveling probably between six to eight times every | 24 occur during these meetings? |
| 25 year. And then I was sometimes traveling with my | 25 A. Sure. So the meeting typically took |
| 25 year. And then I was sometimes travering with my | 25 Az Surer So the meeting typicarly took |
| 1 analyst but obviously but only for just, like, from | 1 between an hour and an hour and a half. If it was an |
| 2 a costs perspective we sort of tried to avoid having | 2 initial meeting where there was no prior knowledge or |
| 3 multiple people travel at the same time because it | 3 very little prior knowledge and therefore a lot to |
| 4 just sort of increased the cost of that travel without | 4 cover, it would sort of be 90 minutes. |
| 5 sort of necessarily bringing anything to the table | 5 For monitoring meetings with managers |
| 6 because one person in a meeting was enough, really. | 6 where we had already a position, typically they would |
| 7 Q. When you had these meetings with managers, | 7 be shorter, 60 minutes, because we obviously |
| 8 would there always need to be either Mr. Estenne or | 8 (Stenographer interruption.) |
| 9 yourself with would every meeting need to have at | 9 THE WITNESS: Oh sorry. |
| 10 least one of you two present? | 10 Yes. It would typically take 60 |
| 11 A. No. No. Mr. Magnin would travel by | 11 minutes |
| 12 himself and meet with manager by himself. We actually | |
| 13 had Mrs. Usher as well and – yeah, those were, sort | 13 THE WITNESS: because we had prior |
| 14 of, the senior analysts. They had strategy | 14 knowledge of what they were doing, so it was just to |
| 15 responsibilities so they were focused on different | 15 refresh on what happened since we last met them. |
| 16 types of strategies and therefore different types of | 16 The coverage was basically I mean, it |
| 17 managers, and they would travel by themselves, both | 17 depended on what type of meetings, but if it was an |
| 18 meeting with managers and to conferences to meet with | 그 마다가 되어야 되었습니다. 이 전 보고 있는데 되었다. 이 경기 때문에 되었습니다. 그리고 있는데 그리고 있는데 그리고 있는데 그리고 있는데 그리고 있다. |
| 19 the managers that were under their coverage. | 19 background, their team, what strategy they were |
| 20 Q. When you said Mrs. Usher, you mean Trudi | 20 running, a little bit on, sort of, the business setup, |
| 21 Usher? | 21 you know, assets under management, and that was, sort |
| 22 A. Yes. | 22 of, most of the content of a first meeting. |
| 23 Q. And you mentioned that she began working | 23 If it was, sort of, subsequent due |
| 24 at Partners Advisers sometime after you became the | 24 diligence meeting, it would be the same areas but we |
| 24 at Partners Advisers sometime after you became the | 24 difference meeting, it would be the same areas but we |

25 like more depth and focus on these various areas.

| Conducted on May 20, 2022 | | |
|---|--|--|
| 173 | 175 | |
| Usually, at least post '06 when Mr. Yavin | 1 Q. Back to the page that we were just on. | |
| 2 joined, he would have separate operational due | 2 A. Yes. | |
| diligence meeting with, typically, the COO of that | Q. There's a note at the bottom that says: | |
| firm, and those were typically, like, three-, | 4 "Correlation analysis and Back testing." | |
| fourhour meetings to cover everything. | 5 Do you see that? | |
| And yeah, and then monitoring meeting, | 6 A. Yes. | |
| 7 it would be, sort of, on the current portfolio, the | 7 Q. What does that mean to you? | |
| 3 opportunities set, how the fund was positioned. | 8 A. So that means the same thing we discussed | |
| We would talk about attribution, what worked, what | 9 before but for existing positions. So we would sort | |
| 0 didn't, what contributed to return, what attracted. | 10 of do the same quantitative analysis on existing | |
| 11 If the manager was in a rough patch and having | 11 positions to see how they stacked up to their | |
| 12 a drawdown, so losing money, we would sort of spend | 12 competitors and how their correlation to the market | |
| 3 more time on what that was, if it was something that | 13 had evolved over time. | |
| 4 was concerning or structural or last longer, or if it | 14 Q. If you could turn the page, please. This | |
| 15 was just a moment in time and it would correct. Sort | 15 is the page that has the number 15975 in the bottom | |
| 16 of focusing on whatever area was a concern at that | 16 righthand corner. | |
| 17 time. | 17 A. Yes. | |
| 8 BY MR. MOLINA: | 18 Q. Do you see on the slide that there's five | |
| Q. You mentioned earlier that it was very | 19 bullets that are still under the topic of 'On Going | |
| 20 important to you at that time to have face-to-face | 20 Monitoring"? Do you see that? | |
| 21 meetings prior to investing with the manager. | 21 A. Yes. | |
| 22 A. Yes. | Q. And in the first bullet, it talks about | |
| Q. Do you remember telling me that? | 23 having, on average, one call and one visit per | |
| 24 A. Yes. | 24 quarter. | |
| Q. Why was it equally or why would you | 25 Do you see that? | |
| 174 | 176 | |
| 1 have face-to-face meetings with a manager after you | 1 A. Yes. I see that, yes. | |
| decided to invest with him or her? | 2 Q. Who were you having one call and one visit | |
| A. Same thing; first-off things, just like | 3 per quarter with? | |
| noticing that the manager might be uncomfortable in | 4 A. Well, that was the managers that we were | |
| a meeting, body language, that he might be, you know, | 5 invested in. So what that means is probably two | |
| 6 reluctant to bring his team in. | 6 visits a year and two calls a year, right? | |
| And the other thing is, don't forget, | 7 Q. A year or per quarter? | |
| there was no Zoom, right. I mean, virtual meetings | 8 A. Well, probably one quarter we had a call, | |
| didn't exist. So it was either having a phone call, | 9 then a visit, then a call | |
| 10 which was actually quite expensive because Voice over | 10 THE STENOGRAPHER: Sorry. Can you say | |
| 1 IP didn't exist either, so it was sort of | 11 that again, please. I didn't | |
| 2 international communication or it was taking a plane | 12 THE WITNESS: Yeah, we had two calls and | |
| 3 and going to visit them, right, so and since we | 13 two visits per year, but they were, sort of, every | |
| | 14 quarter; so we would have one call, and then the next | |
| 4 were traveling to meet with potential new investments | 15 quarter a visit | |
| 5 anyway, we were basically in these cities already so | 16 BY MR. MOLINA: | |
| 6 it made total sense to go see them face to face. | | |
| Q. Is it fair to say that what you were doing | 17 Q. Mmm. | |
| 8 at that time at Partners Advisers was above and beyond | 18 A then the next quarter a call and then | |
| 9 the industry standard? | 19 the next quarter a visit, although that was | |
| 20 A. I think it was very typical. I wouldn't | 20 aspirational because it was sort of dependent on the | |
| 1 say it was above and beyond; I think it was very | 21 schedules of our traveling and, therefore, it wasn't | |
| 2 typical of other investors. I think you mentioned | 22 always perfect. | |
| 23 Calibria, but I think the people at Calibria certainly | Q. For the bullet, it says "Weekly | |
| 24 did the same type of work that we did, and others | 24 Estimates." What does that mean to you? | |
| 25 similarly. | 25 A. That means we were asking the managers we | |

| | Widy 20, 2022 |
|--|---|
| were invested in to provide us with weekly performance estimates. Q. Why would you do that? A. Because it allowed us to track their performance on a more regular basis than the official performance which came out monthly. Q. And the next bullet, where it says "Monthly or Quarterly Manager Report," do you see that? A. Yes. Q. What does that mean to you? A. Means that the managers would typically send us either monthly or quarterly reports, which were basically shareholder letters explaining their performance, their portfolios, and so on. | 179 1 Sharing" and then there's some notes underneath the slide. 3 Do you see that? 4 A. Mmm-hmm, yes. 5 Q. Okay. Under the notes, there's five notes. Do you see those notes? 7 A. Yes. Yes. 8 Q. In particular, there's a note that says: 9 "Daily feed back and communication 10 availability." 11 What does that mean to you? 12 A. I think what it means is that the 13 investment team was available any time to discuss with 14 the investors of Partners Advisers. 15 Q. Would you have daily feedback within your |
| 16 Q. Would you have a chance to edit or modify 17 these reports before they were let me retract that. 18 Were these reports being sent by the 19 manager to you, Partners Advisers, or were they being 20 sent by the manager to the customers of Partners 21 Advisers? 22 A. No, they were sent by the managers in our 23 portfolios to us and other and their other 24 investors, right. So, yeah, so that would be the 25 manager's communication with their LPs. | 16 team? 17 A. Yeah. We were working in an open space, 18 so, yes, we were talking, right, on a constant basis. 19 Q. So in the circumstances where Mr. Magnin 20 would have a visit and come back to Geneva, you would 21 have open discussions with him about the visits that 22 he undertook? 23 A. Yes. We would have sort of actually, 24 it was that was actually not informal. That was 25 formal. If it was after a trip, we would, sort of, |
| 1 Q. And you and what would you do with 2 these reports? 3 A. We would read them and we would use them 4 as the basis for questioning when we had a call with 5 them or a meeting. 6 Q. And, again, when you say "we," you mean 7 you and your investment team 8 A. Yes. 9 Q at Partners Advisers? 10 A. Exactly, and Luc Estenne as well, yes. 11 Q. Last bullet on this slide says: 12 "Quantitative Review, Peer Group 13 Comparison." 14 A. Yes. 15 Q. What does that mean to you? 16 A. So that's the same thing I mentioned for 17 prospective investments, we did for existing 18 investments as well. So we would sort of see how they 19 track compared to their competitors, or peers, and see 20 how they tracked versus indices as well. | 1 all sit together in a conference room and go through 2 a formal sort of debriefing. 3 Q. Why don't you just if you briefly just 4 walk us through from the moment that you have that 5 debriefing after a meeting to the moment where there's 6 a final decision made on whether to invest or maintain 7 the investment. 8 MR. WORBY: Objection. 9 What time period during Mr. Müller's 10 BY MR. MOLINA: 11 Q. It's the same comment I made earlier where 12 I'm asking generally, and if there's been an 13 evolution, please let us know. 14 A. Yeah. So, I mean, just as a general 15 comment, you have to make a big difference between 16 pre-2003 and after 2003, right, because my 17 responsibilities changed dramatically when I became 18 head of research. I was basically, then, officially 19 running that team and I was running the process that 20 led to investments. Mr. Estenne picked the managers |
| 21 So we would use the same two quantitative 22 reports that I mentioned to track our existing 23 managers as well. 24 Q. If you go to the next page, ending in 25 15976, there's a slide that goes through "Reporting & | 21 and approved the managers, but the managers we were 22 picking was that process of sourcing and finding, and 23 due diligence then was very much, sort of, under my 24 purview, so — whereas that's not the case pre-2003. 25 Where it was actually — pre-2003, you |

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- 1 have to think of myself as like being an Olivier 2 Magnin to Mr. Estenne, right. I was basically an
- 3 analyst. He was driving my area focus much more and
- 4 I was basically, you know, conducting due diligence
- 5 work under his guidance and review.
- Q. So --
- A. So, with that said, I'll answer your
- 8 question. So -- and there's no -- I mean, I wish
- 9 there was, sort of, anything sort of formal. Every
- 10 case was slightly different, so there was no sort
- 11 of -- I can answer your question by, sort of, what was
- 12 typical but it wasn't -- not everything was like this.
- So, typically, when one of us would come
- 14 back from a trip and had, sort of, a number of
- 15 meetings to debrief about, we would sit in a
- 16 conference room for a couple of hours and go through
- 17 each of the meetings and talk about what we had sort
- 18 of discussed/uncovered, and then very quickly sort of
- 19 weeded out things that we felt were of no interest and 20 focused on the ones that were potentially interesting.
- 21 From there, we would request -- if it was
- 22 interesting, we would request material from the
- 23 manager, and that sort of typically involved a
- 24 presentation and a due diligence questionnaire, their
- 25 offering memorandum, probably -- that was sort of a
- 1 start. And then if it was still of interest, we would
- 2 sort of start to talk to our network about that
- 3 manager and try to find out, you know, what was the
- 4 reputation of that manager with our network. We would
- 5 then sort of ask for further documents, including past
- 6 audit reports.
 - We would run a quantitative analysis
- 8 looking at that manager in isolation to a market index
- 9 and then look at that manager compared to competitors
- 10 and peers, as I mentioned. And then if all of those
- 11 were sort of, you know, green lights, we would then
- 12 sort of spend probably, I'd say, two to three hours
- 13 with the manager on a call typically at that point in
- 14 time, to go through our due diligence reports our 15 own due diligence report, not the one that the manager
- 16 sent out and sort of answer any unanswered question
- 17 and write a pretty thorough, lengthy due diligence
- 18 report on that manager, which would be the basis of an
- 19 approval.
- With respect to the caveat that you gave,
- 21 just so I understand, it's your testimony that prior
- 22 to you becoming the head of research at Partners
- 23 Advisers in 2003, Partners Advisers was not following
- 24 the process that you just laid out?
- 25 A. It was, but I wasn't leading it. So I was

- 1 basically just a contributor. I was -- I started
- traveling -- my first -- I think my first ever trip
- professionally at Partners Advisers was actually --
- I can remember the date because of what had happened
- before. It was in November of '01.
- So that was my first ever trip. It was a
- trip that I did with Mr. Estenne. And then,
- 8 thereafter, I started traveling by myself but it was
- basically a year before I became head of research,
- 10 right. Before that, I was only taking meetings in 11 Geneva.
- 12 And so during that year I would sort of
- 13 travel, come back, discuss my ideas and my take-aways
- 14 from my meetings, but I was just the analyst sort of
- 15 feeding information to Luc, right. Whereas after '03,
- 16 I was sort of in that seat and the analysts feeding
- 17 information to me.
- 18 Obviously, Mr. Estenne was in those
- 19 meetings as well, and we would sort of discuss -- if
- 20 he was excited about an investment and I wasn't, we'd
- 21 sort of discuss it and so on. But he was finally --
- 22 he was the final decision-maker, but that's just more
- 23 weight in that process.
- Q. I think we're clear on the distinction of
- 25 you being a junior analyst, or an analyst and then
- 182
- 1 being the head of research and what that meant
- vis-à-vis you and your responsibilities or your
- authority within Partners Advisers.
 - My question's a little bit different.
- Understanding that it wasn't you running the -- or
- even having a significant role in the investment
- decisionmaking process prior to 2003 --
 - A. Yeah.
- Q. -- my question is: The process that you
- 10 laid out just a few minutes ago of all the different
- 11 steps that were taken under your tenure, either as
- 12 head of research --
- 13 A. Yeah.
- Q. -- or as CIO, were those processes
- 15 undertaken, prior to 2003, under Mr. Estenne's
- 16 tutelage?
- 17 A. Yeah. I mean, for the most part, yes.
- 18 Although he was a smaller firm, he was the only senior
- 19 member of the team and it might well be that some
- 20 investments were put into the portfolio without much
- 21 discussion, right, because he was ultimately the
- 22 decision-maker and it was his firm, right, so that
- 23 might have happened.
- 24 Q. You told me a few -- I'm sorry, go ahead.
- 25 A. No. But, in general, the process was

19 quite rapidly into something that actually became much

20 more institutional, where there were outside investors

21 outside of family offices that actually had a need for

22 reporting and information and so on, which actually

25 that, you know, weren't too risky and so on and, along

23 sort of led to that entire process of due diligence

24 and making sure that you were investing in things

Exhibit 27

| Conducted on May 20, 2022 | | |
|--|--|--|
| 185 | 187 | |
| 1 that, you know, things were discussed let's put it | 1 the way, making mistakes, right, and sometimes | |
| 2 that way. If I had an investment idea, it would be | 2 investing with the wrong people. | |
| 3 discussed in depth and there would be debate around | 3 But so I wouldn't sort of qualify what | |
| 4 it. If Luc had an idea, it would be discussed very | 4 happened at the firm pre in the early days of me | |
| 5 briefly because it was his idea, he was the | 5 joining as, sort of, being sub industry standard. | |
| 6 decision-maker and he didn't have to justify it | 6 I think, actually, there was no industry standard. It | |
| 7 towards his junior guy, and so there was the | 7 was the Wild West. | |
| 8 process was, like, accelerated and sped up quite a | 8 And, yes, so the fact that, you know, in | |
| 9 bit. | 9 the firm where there was three investment | |
| Q. Do you remember a couple minutes ago, | 10 professional, one guy who was 26, that was me, and | |
| 11 Mr. Müller, I asked you if what you were doing at | 11 Olivier Magnin who was actually, he's a year older | |
| 12 Partners Advisers when you were the head of research | 12 than me so he was 27, and then the founder, who was 36 | |
| 13 and CIO, if that was above and beyond the industry | 13 at the time and much more experienced, him sort of | |
| 14 standard and you said this was pretty standard across | 14 making decisions without much consulting his two | |
| 15 the industry? Do you remember telling me that? | 15 junior guys, sort of makes sense. I mean, I wouldn't | |
| 16 A. Yes. | 16 sort of think that it was surprising. | |
| 17 Q. I guess my question is: Why wasn't | 17 BY MR. MOLINA: | |
| 18 Mr. Estenne following what was standard across the | 18 Q. Just so we get the timeline clear and the | |
| 19 industry under | 19 record's clear, is it your testimony that prior to you | |
| 20 MR. WORBY: Objection; that calls for | 20 becoming head of research in 2003, it was the the | |
| 21 speculation. | 21 industry standard for due diligence was the Wild, Wild | |
| 22 THE WITNESS: Shall I answer? | 22 West? | |
| 23 MR. MOLINA: You can answer. | 23 A. Well, it changed gradually, right. | |
| 24 THE WITNESS: There's one thing, I want to | 24 I think when I joined in '99, it definitely it was | |
| 25 put some context here. The hedge fund industry has | 25 very all of that process was very embryonic. | |
| 186 | 188 | |
| 1 massively evolved over the last 20 years, and when | 1 Again, I mean, the information that you would get from | |
| 2 I started, back in '99, it was mostly dominated by | 2 managers was very - was very sparse. And then that | |
| 3 family offices. The concept of due diligence wasn't | 3 evolved, right. | |
| 4 really existing. It was very secretive. There was | 4 I think by the time – by the time 2002, | |
| 5 most managers, including very successful ones that are | 5 Two Thousand - well, I mean, by the time I became | |
| 6 today billionaires, Paul Tudor Jones and so on, they | 6 head of research, it had changed already. I'm not | |
| 7 were very, very opaque about what they were doing. | 7 saying I became head of research and I changed | |
| 8 They were actually not communicating to the concept | 8 everything. That's definitely not what happened. So | |
| 9 of shareholder letters didn't exist. | 9 it had changed already. Because it was an interest | |
| 10 I remember when I started, we would get an | 10 from wealth management firms and banks and | |
| 11 NAV through a fax machine from SAC, right, which | 11 institutions to invest in that type of assets, and | |
| 12 became a monster, and that was it, and if we were | 12 they had sort of forced those changes on the industry, | |
| 13 lucky we can meet Steve Cohen, like, once every two | 13 right, by actually being – requesting more | |
| 14 years. I mean, that was the state of the hedge fund | 14 information. | |
| 15 industry back then. It was not institutional, and | 15 And I think the managers themselves were | |
| 16 most of the capital came from family offices. | 16 slow to adapt, certain ones, while others sort of felt | |
| 17 So, from there, it evolved into something | 17 the opportunity of, like, if I'm more transparent and | |
| 18 that today or even sort of back in '04, it evolved | 18 I'm communicating more and I'm giving more information | |
| 10 mm roddy of oron sort of odok in or, it croived | to a medianament in the mind i | |

19 out, then actually I'll build a bigger business

23 actually didn't evolve that much.

20 because the money will flow. Whereas others, like

22 firms, still today, are super opaque, right, so some

Q. So, again, just to put timing on this, we

21 SAC, Renaissance Technologies, Two Sigma, I mean these

| Conducted of | on May 20, 2022 |
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| 189 | 191 |
| 1 You just said a few minutes ago that it didn't | 1 probably have to come back at some point to this but |
| everything didn't change the moment you became head of | 2 I think I'm going to go for another 12 minutes and |
| research; it likely changed before you became head of | 3 then if we can take a break, that'd be good. 12, |
| research. | 4 15 minutes? |
| 5 A. Yes. | 5 THE EXAMINER: Yeah, I think try and take |
| Q. So can you just put a time frame, when did | 6 a break about every hour now in the afternoon, |
| 7 the diligence processes that you mentioned a few | 7 for Leah to |
| 3 minutes ago that were industry standard, when did that | 8 MR. MOLINA: We can take a quick break now |
| standard, in your opinion, come into place? | 9 or |
| 10 A. Well, it was gradual. So I can't really | 10 THE STENOGRAPHER: No, it's fine. |
| 11 tell you when because things changed gradually. They | 11 MR. MOLINA: Okay. |
| 2 were probably already changing at the margin when | 12 BY MR. MOLINA: |
| 3 I started in '99. Partially, it was the result of '98 | 13 Q. If you go back to what is Trustee Exhibit |
| 4 and LTCM blowing up which sort of made people realize | 14 No. 14. This was at tab 157 in the bundle but, again, |
| 15 that there were risks in that industry that were not | 15 it's been marked No. 14. |
| | |
| 6 well controlled, and so when I joined – but I joined | 16 A. Mmm-hmm. |
| 7 straight after LTCM blowing up and those changes were | 17 Q. This is the due diligence questionnaire. |
| 8 sort of embryonically sort of happening. | 18 A. Mmm-hmm. |
| 9 But there was no sort of, like, one day to | 19 Q. If you could go to give me a second. |
| 0 the next change. It was a very gradual process. | 20 If you go to the page with the number |
| Q. You mentioned a few now hours ago, that | 21 18152 in the bottom righthand corner. A lot of this |
| 22 Mr. Estenne had authored a book chapter. Do you | 22 is stuff we already covered and we're going to move |
| 23 remember telling me that? | 23 through this somewhat rapidly. |
| 24 A. Yes. | 24 A. Mmm-hmm. |
| Q. I believe you said you're aware of it but | Q. But do you see at the bottom of this page, |
| 190 | 192 |
| 1 you may not have read the whole chapter. | 1 there's a paragraph that starts: |
| A. I have not read it, no. | 2 "The due diligence process includes the |
| Q. Yeah. Are you generally aware since we | 3 following steps" |
| saw the chart earlier with the risks, do you remember? | 4 A. Yes. |
| 5 A. Yes. | Q. Do you see the first bullet, it says, and |
| Q. Are you generally aware that the book | 6 I'm going to read it into the record: |
| chapter discusses due diligence and investment due | 7 "Meetings with managers by the two |
| diligence? Is that something you're generally aware | 8 partners. At least 1 and preferably 2 onsite |
| of? | 9 visits." |
| 10 A. I think the book was I think the book | 10 Do you see that? |
| 1 was I seem to remember, although I wouldn't be | 11 A. Yes. |
| | |
| 2 certain, the book was about risk in general and that | 12 Q. This is what we were referring to earlier |
| 3 one chapter was about risk, I guess, in hedge fund | 13 with respect to having a face-to-face meeting with |
| 4 investments. I think. But I'm not entirely sure. | 14 managers? |
| Q. I'm sorry, that wasn't clear. Are you | 15 A. Mmm-hmm. |
| 6 aware just yes or no. Are you aware whether that | 16 Q. And, again, this questionnaire was |
| 7 chapter discusses due diligence from Mr. Estenne's | 17 completed by Partners Advisers in May 2004, correct? |
| 8 perspective? | 18 A. Yes. |
| 9 A. I don't think it discusses due diligence. | 19 Q. There's a notation here about in-depth |
| 0 I think it discusses the risk management of investing | 20 reference checks. Do you see that? |
| 21 in hedge funds. | 21 A. Yes. |
| 22 Q. But you have not read the chapter? | 22 Q. What is an indepth reference check? |
| 23 A. No. | 23 A. That means reference checks with a number |
| 24 Q. Okay. | 24 of people sort of I mean, we would just, sort of, |
| MR. MOLINA: I'm going to go to we'll | 25 call that a 360 sort of reference check today. |
| | ET DEPOS |

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| Conducted | on | May | 20, | 2022 |
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| | Conducted o |
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| | 193 |
| 1 | That's how I would call it. So basically checking |
| 2 | references not only with ex-bosses but also people |
| 3 | from the from these people would interact with, |
| 4 | so people from brokers and potential peers or |
| 5 | ex-colleagues, and then obviously from investors as |
| 6 | well that we knew. |
| 7 | So it was basically it meant sort of |
| 8 | doing extensive in-depth means extensive reference |
| 9 | checks. |

- Q. Okay. If you go to the page that has
- 11 number 18154 at the bottom.
- A. Mmm-hmm.
- Q. Do you see there's a section titled 13
- 14 'Ongoing Manager Monitoring'?'
- A. Yes.
- Q. So this is similar to what we were just 16
- 17 discussing?
- 18 A. Mmm-hmm.
- Q. But you see at the bottom of this
- 20 page there are several bullets?
- 21 A. Yes.
- 22 Q. Is this an exclusive list of the types of
- 23 items that you would be monitoring?
- A. Well, it's probably not comprehensive but 25 it's sort of -- it's what I refer to as, you know,

- Q. But there were instances where you would share information in writing?
 - A. I suppose so, yes.
- Q. This whole process that we just spent the
- 5 last hour or so discussing, I know your lawyer has 6 made various objections about the timing and you
- yourself have made various distinctions.
 - So now I'm just going to ask you: Prior
- 9 -- between 1999 and 2003, so just before you became
- 10 head of research, during that four- or fiveyear
- 11 period, what do you remember the process to be?
- 12 A. The investment process?
- 13 That's correct.
- 14 A. So for the most part, it was -- so for the
- 15 most part, it was Luc Estenne traveling, meeting with
- 16 managers, and then he would sort of find managers he
- 17 liked. We would sort of discuss them, he would factor
- 18 in my point of view, in general, and then we would
- 19 sort of conduct a due diligence. Because I was a
- 20 junior analyst, I was usually in charge of writing
- 21 that paper, due diligence report, and -- me or
- 22 Mr. Magnin, right. And then that paper, that due
- 23 diligence report, would sort of serve as a basis for
- 24 investment which Luc would then use to invest in the
- 25 funds.

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1 sort of, having an update on the organization of the

- 2 firm, then the portfolio, what's in the portfolio,
- 3 what the outlook of the manager is and then sort of
- 4 understanding what drove the performance.
- So when I mentioned that, I sort of referred to these various bullet points.
- Q. And just for the record, the bullets
- continue into the next page.
- A. Yes.
- 10 Q. On the page ending in 18156 --
- A. Mmm-hmm. 11
- Q. -- on what is paragraph number 6, there's 12
- 13 a note that says:
- "After monitoring meetings Partners
- 15 Advisers usually shares its conclusion with members of
- 16 its contact network who are also investors in order to
- 17 confront point of views and conclusions."
- 18 A. Yes.
- Q. Is this what we were discussing earlier
- 20 with respect to your network where you would have --
- 21 bounce ideas off one another?
- 22 A. Yes.
- Q. And, again, just to be clear, these
- 24 conversations were largely oral in nature?
- A. Yes, they were. 25

- I would -- we would also discuss the
 - portfolio construction, composition, and we would --
 - he would sort of, again, take my and Mr. Magnin's
 - opinion onboard when it came to, sort of, how to
 - structure the portfolio, which investment we should
 - add and why, and why it made sense in the portfolio
 - context, and which investment we should divest and why
 - as well.
 - So the process was very much driven by
 - 10 him, with usually some discussion with Mr. Magnin and
 - 11 myself about the merits of an investment.
 - Q. With respect specifically to ongoing
 - 13 manager monitoring, do you remember we discussed a lot
 - 14 about --
 - 15 A. Yeah.
 - Q. -- that particular part of the investment 16
 - 17 process?
 - 18 A. Mmm-hmm.
 - Q. Could you just drill down specifically on
 - 20 what you remember prior to 2003 to be the ongoing
 - 21 manager monitoring process at Partners Advisers?
 - A. Yes. Well, I mean, it involved -- it
 - 23 involves the same thing, although it wasn't as
 - 24 formalized. So I think, as a team, we met with
 - 25 managers that we had investments with as well, and

| 197 | n May 20, 2022 |
|---|---|
| 1 these meetings were initially mostly held by | 1 he was also traveling. |
| 2 Mr. Estenne, who was the only one traveling, and then, | 2 So, yes, there was a bunch of us traveling |
| 3 over time, myself and Mr. Magnin would actually meet | 3 which made hotel bills quite expensive. |
| 4 with these managers as well. We probably didn't meet | 4 Q. But Mr. Estenne would go approximately |
| 5 them twice a year. It was probably more infrequent | 5 three times a year in or around 2006? |
| 6 and less sort of well-organized. It was sort of more | 6 A. Yeah. That's my by my recollection, |
| 7 - it would be more reactive, right. If a manager | 7 yeah. |
| 8 had, sort of, a negative performance, we would | Q. Would that number, ballpark number, be |
| 9 prioritize seeing him or her. On the flip side, if | 9 similar in 2007? |
| 10 performance was exceptionally good and out of the | 10 A. Probably, yes. |
| 11 norm, we would also prioritize seeing them. | 11 Q. 2008? |
| 12 The process became gradually more | 12 A. Probably as well, yes. |
| 13 formalized as the firm grew, took in outside | 13 Q. What about 2005? |
| 14 investors, and the industry was itself evolving | 14 A. Yeah, 2005 he probably traveled more, so |
| 15 towards something that was more institutional. | 15 maybe might have looked like four or five times, |
| Q. When you traveled to New York again, | 16 maybe six. I don't know. |
| 17 same caveat as before, where, if it changed over time, | 17 Q. Okay. Last question before we probably |
| 18 please let me know. When you or anyone at Partners | 18 can break. And this is my last question for now on |
| 19 Advisers and your team traveled to New York to meet | 19 this document. If you go to the tab sorry, the |
| 20 with managers, where would they stay? | 20 page that ends in 18158 |
| 21 A. In a hotel. | 21 A. Yes. |
| 22 Q. Did Partners Advisers have an apartment in | 22 Q do you see under paragraph 2 |
| 23 New York City to | 23 A. Mmm-hmm. |
| 24 A. Yes. | 24 Q there's a question that's posed to |
| 25 Q where analysts could stay? | 25 Partners Advisers that says, "What risk management |
| 198 | 200 |
| 1 A. It had, later. We the firm did rent an | 1 systems are used?" |
| 2 apartment for a few years to limit the cost of staying | 2 A. Mmm-hmm. |
| 3 in New York, yes. But I can't remember the dates, but | 3 Q. Do you see that? |
| 4 it definitely wasn't the case in '04. It came | 4 A. Yes. |
| Q. It definitely was not the case in '04? | Q. And do you see that one of the responses |
| 6 A. Yeah. I think it came later. | 6 is that these systems consist in a mix of Cogendi, and |
| 7 Q. Would you say it came around 2006? | 7 that's spelled C-o-g-e-n-d-i. |
| 8 A. Probably, yeah. | 8 And then in parenthesis it says: |
| 9 Q. When you were the co-CIO? | 9 'Software for hedge fund portfolio |
| 10 A. Yeah. | 10 management." |
| 11 Q. And you said it was to limit the cost. Is | 11 End of the parenthesis. And then it says: |
| 12 that because there were so many visits to New York | 12 " and Excel programming?" |
| 13 City that the hotel costs would have been significant? | 13 Do you see that? |
| 14 A. Yes. | 14 A. Yes. |
| 15 Q. How often were you or members of your team | 15 Q. What do you recall Cogendi to be? |
| 16 traveling to New York City around that time? | 16 A. Cogendi actually still exists. It's a |
| 17 A. Istruggle to remember. So this is going | 17 software that allows input of quantitative data on, |
| 18 to be a ballpark number. I would probably go six | 18 like, any investments, really, and market index, and |
| 19 times a year, maybe every two months. Luc, by then, | 19 also qualitative information. So it was used as a |
| 20 was traveling less, so maybe three times. And then | 20 database basically that we can then extract into |
| 21 the and the analysts, Olivier and Trudi, maybe four | 21 Excel, which I think is why the "Excel programming" is |
| 22 times. The other thing is we had, by then, hired an | 22 there. We would basically use Cogendi as a store of |
| 23 operational due diligence person who was also doing | 23 information and then have Excel extractions on it and |
| 24 onsite visits for operational due diligence and so he | 24 Excel calculations on it. |
| 25 was also traveling. I don't know what frequency, but | |
| 25 was also travelling. I don't know what frequency, but | 25 Q. When you say store information, would this |

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|--------------|---------|------|
|--------------|---------|------|

| 1 be electronically stored? | 203 1 it would have been Luc Estenne, Olivier Magnin and |
|--|--|
| 2 A. Yes. | 2 myself. As the team grew, they were part of the |
| Q. Would this be electronically stored in the | 3 committee as well, including the operational due |
| 4 computers of Partners Advisers? | 4 diligence person. |
| 5 A. On the server, yes. | 5 Q. And how often would the committee meet? |
| Q. And was the server do you know who | 6 A. Monthly. |
| 7 controlled the server at that time? | 7 Q. Pre-2003, were there committee meetings? |
| 8 A. I don't know, no. I wasn't involved in | 8 A. I actually can't remember. Actually, |
| 9 the IT system actually when it was set up. | 9 there were. There were but I don't know when they |
| 10 MR. MOLINA: I think, for now, it would be | 10 started. That, I don't know. |
| 11 a good time to take a break. | 11 Q. And those meetings were similar to the |
| 12 THE EXAMINER: Thank you. | 12 meetings you just described that happened after 2003? |
| 13 THE VIDEOGRAPHER: We are going off the | 13 A. So in terms of the things that were |
| 14 record. The time is 3:01. | 14 discussed, they were, yes. Again, I mean, with, like, |
| 15 (Break taken.) | 15 various levels of responsibilities from people, right, |
| 16 THE VIDEOGRAPHER: The time on the record | 16 but, yes, the content was the same. |
| 17 so far is 3 hours and 51 minutes. | 17 Q. And the members would have still included |
| 18 We are back on the record. The time is | 18 you, Mr. Estenne, and Mr. Magnin? |
| 19 3:13. | 19 A. Yes. |
| 20 BY MR. MOLINA: | 20 Q. Mr. Müller, what's a red flag? |
| 21 Q. Mr. Müller, we were just talking about the | 21 A. In the context of an investment, it's not |
| 22 due diligence process. I just have one question, and | 22 a word we would use at Partners Advisers. It's not |
| 23 I'm sorry if you've already explained it but I don't | 23 a word that I'm using today but I can tell you what |
| 24 think it was in the record. | |
| | 24 I understand by it, which is that there is a problem |
| 25 Did Partners Advisers and, again, | 25 with an investment that warrants a redemption or an |
| 1. The paint to sale the Matter de it this ways I at le | 204 |
| 1 I'm going to ask the let's do it this way: Let's | 1 exit, a sale. |
| 2 talk about after 2003 and then pre-2003, to make it | Q. What word would you use for that? You |
| 3 easy. | 3 said that it's not you wouldn't use "red flag," so |
| 4 A. Okay. | 4 what would be the word they would use to refer to a |
| 5 Q. After 2003, did Partners Advisers hold | 5 problem with an investment that warrants a redemption |
| 6 monthly investment committee meetings to assess the | 6 or an exit? |
| 7 underlying positions? | 7 MR. WORBY: Objection. "They" would or |
| 8 A. We did. | 8 Mr |
| Q. Could you explain about could you give | 9 (Stenographer clarification.) |
| 10 a little bit of description of what those meetings | 10 MR. WORBY: It's my fault. |
| 11 entailed. | 11 Objection. |
| 12 A. Yes. These meetings entailed going | 12 You had two questions. What would |
| 13 through each of the portfolios we were running, line | 13 Mr. Müller say or what "they" would. Who are "they"? |
| 14 by line, talking about each of the managers, any view | 14 BY MR. MOLINA: |
| 15 we would have on those managers post a meeting or a | 15 Q. If you understand the question, you can |
| 16 call or reading a letter. Then we would look at those | 16 answer. |
| 17 managers in the context of the portfolio, using our | 17 A. So there was no specific terminology, |
| 18 peer group analysis tool, and basically comparing the | 18 I think. I mean, we alluded to the PPP rule, so we |
| 19 manager to one another, typically zooming in and | 19 would typically after that rule has been was |
| | The state of the s |
| 20 focusing on the bottom managers or the ones that were | 20 formalized, we sort of typically referred to what |
| | 20 formalized, we sort of typically referred to what 21 P was triggered the decision to exit that position. |
| | |
| | 21 P was triggered the decision to exit that position. |
| 21 performing the worst, and sort of discussing and 22 potentially deciding what to do with these | 21 P was triggered the decision to exit that position. 22 But there wasn't, sort of, necessarily a terminology |

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| | 20: |
|----|--|
| 1 | sort of specific wording. |
| 2 | Later on, when we started having an |
| 3 | operational due diligence process, which was basical |
| 4 | post '06, there was a number of I think there |
| 5 | was I can't remember the details but there was a |
| 6 | ranking that was used, and if the ranking was not good |
| 7 | enough, that basically sort of prevented an investment |
| 8 | or warranted an exit, from an operational standpoint. |
| 9 | But I don't think the concept of red flag was used |
| 10 | either. It was basically sort of a level-type of |
| 11 | approach. |
| 12 | Q. When you say there was a ranking that was |
| 13 | used, what did that ranking entail? |
| | |

- A. So operational best practice for the best 15 score and, sort of, issues that were serious enough to 16 prevent an investment or redeem from investment for 17 the worst score, but I can't remember how the scoring 18 mechanism worked.
- Q. Do you still have handy what was marked 20 as Trustee Exhibit No. 14?
- 21 A. Yes.
- Q. If you could turn to the page that has the
- 23 number 18145 at the bottom.
- 24 A. Yes.
- 25 Q. Yes. Do you see at the top, or near the

- 1 abnormal, given the strategy, either too good,
- 2 abnormally good, or abnormally poor, given our
- 3 understanding of what the manager was doing in terms
- 4 of strategy, or what other managers in the same type
- 5 of strategy were doing, right. So if he was sort of
- 6 deviating too much from peers, it would also sort of
- be, sort of, an abnormal performance that we would
- 8 investigate.
- Q. Do you recall, when you were at Partners 10 Advisers, again, at any point, coming across
- 11 investments where the performance did not match the
- 12 strategy?

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- 13 A. Not as – I mean – let me try to phrase
- 14 that the best possible way.
- It happened frequently that the
- 16 performance was abnormal, right, and so any trigger,
- 17 it sort of warranted investigation. Usually, the
- 18 performance, that could be explained by either, what
- 19 I mentioned before, style drift, the manager venturing
- 20 into something else, another strategy, or an
- 21 over-concentration of the portfolio, or sometimes just
- 22 doubling down on risk because the performance had been
- 23 poor and the manager was trying to get back to even.
- 24 So there's - there was multiple
- 25 occurrences. Like, every year there were sort of

top of the page, there's a question that's --

- A. Mmm.
- Q. -- posed to Partners Advisers? It says:
- "What types of 'alert' factors are used in
- monitoring single managers?"
- A. Mmm-hmm.
- Q. Do you see that Partners Advisers responds
- with:
- 'There are three types of alerts used in 10 monitoring"?
- A. Mmm-hmm. 11
- 12 Q. And then I'm not going to read the three
- 13 paragraphs into the record --
- A. Mmm-hmm.
- Q. -- but is it fair to say that the three 15
- 16 that were -- alert factors that were identified here
- 17 are: (1) unusual performance; (2) stop loss; and (3)
- 18 a sudden increase of risk factors?
- A. Yes. 19
- 20 Q. Is that fair?
- So why don't we go one at a time. What's
- 22 your understanding of the alert related to unusual
- 23 performance?
- A. Yeah, sure, I think I alluded to it
- 25 before. But, typically, the performance could be

- occurrences of, like, performance being abnormal to our understanding of the strategy and warranting sort of a deeper dive.
 - I mean -- yeah. The -- yeah, that's --
- your question was with regards to strategy. There was
- a number of cases -- and, obviously, I mean, we can
- 7 address the elephant in the room. There was a number
- 8 of cases where the strategy was very unclear or it was
- 9 very hard to sort of understand what the manager was
- 10 doing, which wasn't sort of necessarily a reason for
- 11 not investing if the risk -- if -- and I can expand on
- 12 this, but in those cases, the only way we could assess
- 13 the manager was doing, what, you know, we thought he
- 14 was doing, was to look at the numbers, right.
- 15 And so any abnormal numbers with regards 16 to that would sort of warrant an investigation.
- Q. You've used the word "warranting" or
- 18 a variation of that word several times in your answer.
- 20 Q. Why would an unusual performance warrant
- 21 a deeper dive or an investigation? I believe you used
- 22 several of those terms.
- A. Well, because we had a fundamental or a
- 24 qualitative understanding of what the strategy was and
- 25 the type of risk that the manager was taking was, and

Q. I'm asking you your -- as of today, if you

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| Conducted on May 20, 2022 | | |
|---|--|--|
| 1 so if the performance wasn't coherent with our | 1 could state for the record what your understanding is | |
| 2 understanding, there was something we were missing, | 2 of who was Bernard L. Madoff? | |
| 3 and so — and so if we're missing something, we had to | 3 A. So he was a financier who pretended to be | |
| 4 sort of understand what it was in trying to get on top | 4 running a strategy that obviously was a Ponzi scheme, | |
| 5 of it. | 5 and he was a fraudster. | |
| 6 Q. The second bullet on this page refers to | 6 Q. If I say the name "DiPascali," I'm going | |
| 7 a stop loss. What's a stop loss? | 7 to be referring to Frank DiPascali. | |
| 8 A. So when we were conducting due diligence | 8 A. Mmm-hmm. | |
| 9 on managers, we will ask them what they felt the worse | 9 Q. Sitting here today, do you know who was | |
| 10 possible loss could be for their strategy and their | 10 Frank DiPascali? | |
| 11 style, and then we would use that number as sort of | 11 A. Yeah. He was Madoff's righthand man. | |
| 12 a what we called a stop loss, which basically means | 12 Q. What do you mean by righthand man? | |
| 13 that if they got to that level of loss, then we | 13 A. I guess the person who sort of helped him | |
| 14 that would sort of trigger an alert, as it's written | 14 perpetrate that Ponzi scheme. | |
| 15 here, and we would sort of understand, try to | 15 Q. If I use the term "Madoff feeder fund" | |
| 16 understand why the loss was less severe or more severe | 16 A. Mmm-hmm. | |
| 17 than what the manager thought could be the worst-case | 17 Q I'm going to be referring to investment | |
| 18 scenario. | 18 vehicles that invested with BLMIS. | |
| 19 At that point, again, sort of, we would | 19 A. Mmm-hmm. | |
| 20 have a meeting with the manager, go through that loss, | Q. Is that fair? Do you understand that? | |
| 21 try to understand what happened and then decide if | 21 A. Yes. | |
| 22 we wanted to exit that investment or stay invested, | Q. What was the first time you heard of | |
| 23 depending of the reasoning behind it. | 23 BLMIS? | |
| Q. Okay. You made a reference a second ago | 24 A. I can't remember, but probably sometime in | |
| 25 to "the elephant in the room." I assume you were | 25 '99 or 2000. | |
| 210 | 212 | |
| 1 mentioning Bernard L. Madoff Investment Securities? | Q. When you were at Partners Advisers? | |
| A. Yes. | 2 A. Yes. | |
| Q. We are going to be asking you some | Q. You didn't have any recollection of BLMIS | |
| 4 questions about this entity. I'm going to be | 4 of knowing about BLMIS when you were at UBP? | |
| 5 referring to it as "BLMIS." | 5 A. No. No, I wasn't involved with hedge | |
| 6 A. Yes. 7 O. But do you understand that if I say | 6 funds back then, so no. | |
| | 7 Q. Can you describe the circumstances of how | |
| 8 "BLMIS" that I'm referring to BLM Investment 9 Securities? | 8 you came to understand or know about BLMIS? 9 A. Lactually don't recall how I heard about | |
| | 9 A. I actually don't recall how I heard about 10 it. Obviously you mentioned the feeder funds and | |
| | 11 I think they were sort of actively raising capital in | |
| 11 Q. What is or what was BLM Investment 12 Securities? | 12 Switzerland, so I probably had meetings with them | |
| 13 A. Well, my knowledge of it is very limited, | 13 initially, learning about what they were doing and | |
| 14 to be honest. It was obviously an investment house or | 14 what product they were offering. | |
| 15 at least it pretended to be an investment house that | 15 Q. What was your understanding of what BLMIS | |
| 16 was both, sort of, having a market-making business in | 16 was doing, as of 1999 or 2000 when you first learned | |
| 17 options and an asset management business, I suppose. | 17 about BLMIS? | |
| 17 options and an asset management business, I suppose. 18 Q. If I use the word "Madoff," I'm going to | 18 A. So my understanding is that they were sort | |
| 19 be referring to Bernard L. Madoff. Is that fair? | 19 of applying a strategy that was called split-strike | |
| 20 A. Yes. | 20 conversion, which actually is not a terminology that's | |
| 21 Q. Who was Bernard L. Madoff? | 21 used by anyone else and so it's not a strategy that, | |
| 22 A. So are you asking me that question with my | 22 you know, people recognize unless you sort of get some | |
| 22 A. So are you asking me that question with my 23 knowledge today or back in the day, which is obviously | 23 explanation of what it is, which involved buying | |
| 24 different, but | 24 equities and selling and buying options around that | |
| 25 O. B. Aliano C. 1. 16 | 24 equities and serring and buying options around that | |

25 equity position to generate a return profile that

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|---|---|
| 213 | 215 |
| 1 looked very attractive. | 1 Q. Okay. What's a summary confidential |
| 2 MR. MOLINA: If we could do tab 21. | 2 memorandum, generally? |
| 3 Ms. Court Reporter, I'm going to be | 3 A. It's, again, not a term that is very |
| 4 handing you tab 21 in the bundle, which should be | 4 commonly used in our industry. In general, what this |
| 5 marked as Trustee Exhibit No. 17. | 5 is is an offering memorandum which is not a summary |
| 6 (Trustee Exhibit 17 marked for | 6 but is like a more, sort of, comprehensive document, |
| 7 identification.) | 7 which is basically sort of the basis of the legal |
| 8 BY MR. MOLINA: | 8 basis on which an investment is offered to investors. |
| 9 Q. Mr. Müller | 9 This is obviously a summary of it, so |
| 10 A. Thank you. | 10 that's not something I've seen before. |
| 11 Q you've just been handed what has now | 11 Q. If you turn to in this document, if you |
| 12 been marked as Trustee Exhibit No. 17. | 12 turn to the page that has the number 5917 in the |
| 13 A. Yes. Sorry. | 13 bottom righthand corner. At the top of that |
| 14 Q. The name of this document is called | 14 document, do you see that it says "Exhibit A - Split |
| 15 'Square One Fund, Ltd - Summary Confidential | 15 Strike Strategy"? |
| 16 Memorandum." | 16 A. Yes. |
| 17 A. Yes. | 17 Q. Do you see in the first paragraph it says, |
| 18 Q. Do you see that? | 18 and I'm going to read this into the record: |
| 19 A. I do. | 19 "Bernard L. Madoff Investment Securities |
| Q. Are you familiar with this document? | 20 offers investors access through different funds to |
| 21 A. No. | 21 a non traditional investment strategy which is often |
| Q. Just quickly for the record, what's your | 22 described as a split-strike conversion." |
| 23 understanding of what Square One Fund Ltd. is? | Do you see that? |
| 24 A. It's a feeder fund to Madoff. | 24 A. Yes. |
| Q. It's a Madoff feeder fund? | Q. Do you agree, based on your understanding |
| 214 | 216 |
| 1 A. Yes. | 1 sitting here today, that the split-strike conversion |
| Q. Do you know who run who ran Square One | 2 was a non-traditional investment strategy? |
| 3 feeder Square One Fund? | 3 A. Yeah. I mean, nobody else was doing this, |
| 4 MR. WORBY: Objection. | 4 so, yes, I suppose it's non-traditional. |
| 5 At what point in time are you asking for | Q. If you look in the second paragraph, it |
| 6 Mr. Müller's | 6 lists four components of this supposed strategy. |
| 7 MR. MOLINA: Right now. | 7 A. Mmm-hmm. |
| 8 MR. WORBY: Right now. | 8 Q. Do you see in the first component is that |
| 9 THE WITNESS: I mean, I don't know what | 9 the manager in this case, BLMIS, purported to be |
| 10 you mean by 'ran." I mean, in effect, Madoff ran that | 10 purchasing equity shares? Do you see that? |
| 11 fund, right, so but I do you mean who | 11 A. Yes. |
| 12 BY MR. MOLINA: | Q. Does that comport with your understanding, |
| 13 Q. Who created Square One Fund? | 13 sitting here today, of the strategy? |
| 14 A. I actually don't know. I'm pretty sure | 14 A. Yes. |
| 15 Luc Estenne didn't create it but he obviously sort of | 15 Q. Do you see the second component, it talks |
| 16 took it over at some point. | 16 about selling out-of-the-money call options? Do you |
| Q. So your understanding, sitting here today, | 17 see that? |
| 18 is that Mr. Estenne | 18 A. Yes. |
| 19 A. Yes. | 19 Q. Does that comport with your current |
| 20 Q managed Square One Fund | 20 understanding of what that strategy was supposed to be |
| 21 A. Yes. | 21 doing? |
| 22 Q is that fair? | 22 A. Yes. |
| 23 If you turn the page, you see that this | 23 Q. Same questions for number 3, which talks |
| | |
| 24 document is dated June 1, 1999. Do you see that? | 24 about buying related out-of-the-money or at-the-money |

25

Do you see that?

A. Yes.

Transcript of Mr. Jerome Muller

| Conducted of | on May 20, 2022 |
|---|--|
| 217 | |
| A. Yes. | 1 Q. And do you see that, within that, there's |
| Q. That comports with your understanding of | 2 another line that goes: |
| 3 your current understanding of what the strategy was | 3 "The manager utilizes strategy which |
| purported to do? | 4 entails" |
| 5 A. Yes. | 5 Do you see that portion? |
| Q. Lastly, what is at romanette (iv), this | 6 A. Yes. |
| 7 talks about how BLMIS purported to remain in cash or | 7 Q. And, again, this is similar to what I just |
| 8 USTB when he believed the market was due to weaken. | 8 did with you a few minutes ago but let's try again. |
| Do you see that? | 9 Now there's three romanettes. |
| 10 A. I see that, yes. | 10 So the first romanette talks about |
| 11 Q. Does that comport with your current | 11 purchasing a basket of 30 to 35 S&P 100 Index stocks. |
| 12 understanding of what the strategy's supposed to do? | Do you see that? |
| 13 A. It does. | 13 A. Yes. |
| Q. What is USTB? What does that mean to you? | 14 Q. What's the S&P 100 Index? |
| 15 A. US treasury bills. | 15 A. It's the index of the 30 largest sorry, |
| 16 Q. What are US treasury bills? | 16 the 100 most largest companies in publicly listed |
| 17 A. They're obligation to the US government. | 17 companies in the US. |
| Q. What does it mean to hold US treasury | 18 Q. What does it mean to purchase a basket? |
| 19 bills? | 19 A. It means buying a subset of those hundred |
| 20 A. Well, it basically I mean, I mention | 20 names. |
| 21 the fact that they're a risk-free investment, so it | Q. Do you see that after the after that |
| 22 basically involves holding bonds of the US government | t 22 part or do you see at the end of this romanette, |
| 23 and basically holding risk-free investments. | 23 it says that at the time the purchases are made, this |
| Q. Would you expect, if you were holding | 24 basket presents a high degree of correlation with the |
| 25 USTB, that you would be making a sizable return on | 25 general market? |
| 218 | The state of the s |
| 1 your investment? | 1 A. Yes. |
| A. No. Back in the day, that was probably a | Q. Okay. Do you understand what this |
| 3 5 percent return or something. That was probably the | |
| 4 rate, the interest rate, on a US treasury bill. Yes. | 4 A. Yes. |
| 5 Today it's much lower than that. | 5 Q. What's your understanding? |
| 6 Q. When you say "back in the day," what | 6 A. My understanding is that he was buying a |
| 7 time frame are you referring to? | 7 subset of the hundred most largest companies, publicly |
| 8 A. Well, '99 to 2002. | 8 listed companies, in the US, so that this given subset |
| 9 Q. What does it mean to remain in cash? | 9 was as close as possible the behavior of that |
| 10 A. That means holding cash in the fund rather | 10 subset would be as close as possible to the behavior |
| 11 than any other investments. | 11 of the market. |
| 12 Q. Is it fair to say is it your | Q. So it was the intention, at least as |
| 13 understanding that what this romanette's referring to | 13 purported by BLMIS at the time, that Madoff, through |
| 14 is if the market was doing poorly, Madoff purported to | 14 his firm, would be purchasing S&P 100 stocks in order |
| 15 be removing his positions in the stock market and | 15 to more or less track the performance of that index? |
| 16 simply converting those positions into cash or US | 16 A. Yes, which is something that actually is |
| 17 treasury bills? | 17 still done by certain types of strategies today. Yes. |
| 18 A. That's my understanding, yes. | 18 Q. Then the second romanette, it says that |
| Q. If you look at further down this page, | 19 Mr. Madoff purported to sell out-of-the-money OEX |
| 20 there's a sentence that starts: | 20 index call options. |
| 21 "A properly executed strategy along these | 21 A. Yes. |
| 22 lines will limit losses at the price of the stocks | Q. What does OEX stand for? |
| 23 decline." | 23 A. It's the S&P 100 Index. It's probably the |
| 0.4 D | 24 tiplion for that index although I'm not antique aven |

25

24 ticker for that index, although I'm not entirely sure.

Q. Okay. What does it mean to sell

5

224

1 out-of-the-money call options?

- 2 A. That means selling the right to buy that
- 3 index at a price that's above the current price; so
- 4 basically allowing the buyer of these options to
- 5 purchase that index from you at a price that's
- 6 predetermined but higher than the current price.
- 7 That's what "out of the money" means.
- 8 Q. Right. Just so I understand and just so
- 9 it's clear on the record, if a stock -- if an equity
- 10 position is at \$50, there could be a call option
- 11 where, if that security reaches \$52, that option
- 12 would be triggered and you would sell your position in
- 13 that equity. Is that fair?
- 14 A. Yeah. Yeah, you're basically committing
- 15 to sell it at that level, yes.
- 16 Q. Okay. (iii) talks about purchasing
- 17 out-of-the-money or at-the-money OEX index puts.
- 18 Do you see that?
- 19 A. Yes.
- Q. Do you understand what that means?

4 an equity position at \$50, you're essentially

dips to a predetermined amount under \$50?

9 Why would that option -- let me retract. Let me

15 It's to protect your downside. So if you buy a put

16 option against one of your position, you're absolutely

17 certain of how much you can lose. If the price goes

Q. It's essentially an insurance policy --

Q. -- in case the equity price falls?

18 to the level of that option, you basically have the

19 right to sell it at that price. So you basically

- 21 A. Yes.
- Q. Could you please explain to us what your
- 23 understanding is.

A. Yes.

20 limit your downside.

A. It is.

A. Yes, exactly.

21 BY MR. MOLINA:

10 restate that.

12 option?

11

13

22

23

24

25

- 24 A. So that means purchasing the right to sell
- 25 your index position, either at a lower price than the

a price at which it is today, which is "at the money."

Q. So, again, using my example of if you have

Q. Why would you set up that sort of option?

Why would a manager purport to have a put

MR. WORBY: Objection; that's speculation.

THE WITNESS: I'm happy to answer it.

reserving the right to sell that security if the price

- 1 Q. And in this particular case, Mr. Madoff,
- or BLMIS, is purporting to be purchasing those options
- 3 and presumably funding those purchases with the sale
- 4 of the call options, is that --
 - A. That's correct.
- 6 Q. And that's pretty typical -- is that
- 7 typical in your industry?
- 8 A. It's actually a pretty common strategy,
- 9 yes.
- 10 Q. But when you -- by doing this -- by
- 11 performing this strategy that Mr. Madoff was at least
- 12 purporting to be doing is essentially limiting the
- 13 upside --
- 14 A. Mmm-hmm.
- 15 Q. -- in order to protect the downside; is
- 16 that fair?
- 17 A. Yes.
- 18 Q. And could you just expand on what your
- 19 understanding is on that particular component of the 20 strategy.
- 21 A. I'm not sure what you mean by that.
- 22 Q. Is it your understanding that Mr. Madoff
- 23 was capping his upside, at least if he performed to
- 24 what he said he was doing here?
- 25 A. Yes.

current price today, that's "out of the money"; or at

- 1 Q. Why? Why is that your understanding?
 - A. Because he was selling calls, which
 - 3 basically means that he would be bought out of his
 - 4 position at the strike price of that call.
 - Q. So in the scenario that I raised a few
 - 6 minutes ago, if he had a call option to sell the
 - 7 position at 52 and the price went up to 60, Mr. Madoff
 - 8 would not be enjoying the upside of the full \$60 value
 - 9 because he would be selling his position at the \$52
 - 10 price --
 - 11 A. Correct.
 - 12 Q. -- is that fair?
 - 13 A. Yes.
 - 14 Q. Okay. And, again, the reason you would --
 - 15 or any manager would be capping that upside is to
 - 16 protect the downside?
 - 17 A. No. Some managers would do that because
 - 18 they have a view that a company's share price will
 - 19 move, to take your example, from 50 to 52 over the
 - 20 next month or so, but unlikely to move much higher, in
 - 21 which case selling a call at 52 is basically a way to
 - 22 express a fundamental view that that stock will move
 - 23 to 52 but because they don't have the belief that it
 - 24 won't move much higher, they can actually get an
 - 25 additional income from selling call options, right.
- PLANET DEPOS

57 (225 to 228)

| 225 | 227 |
|--|---|
| 1 I mean, they might get \$1 or \$2 out of that sale, so | 1 understanding. I mean, they were basically just |
| 2 instead of gaining \$2 from 50 to 52, they'll gain 3 or | 2 selling the track record, right. |
| 4 because, on top of moving to 52, they've sold calls | 3 So I can't remember much of all those |
| against it. | 4 meetings, to be honest, other than they were |
| Q. If you turn to the next page, the one with | 5 aggressive salespeople. |
| 5 5918 in the | 6 Q. Okay. Well, let's try to unpack this and |
| (Stenographer clarification.) | 7 maybe we can try to refresh your memory. |
| BY MR. MOLINA: | 8 When you say that you met with Madoff |
| Q. If you turn to the next page, with the | 9 feeder fund salespeople |
| 0 number 5918 on the bottom right-hand corner | 10 A. Mmm-hmm. |
| 1 A. Yes. | 11 Q was this in the context of your work as |
| 2 Q. do you see the paragraph near the front | 12 an analyst at Partners Advisers? |
| 3 of the the top of the page that starts with and | 13 A. Yes. |
| 4 I'm just going to read this sentence into the record: | 14 Q. So this would have been earlier when we |
| 5 "This attractive level of downside | 15 discussed how part of your job entailed meeting with |
| 6 protection, though, has its counterpart in the fact | 16 managers? |
| 7 that the upside potential is limited to an S&P 100 | 17 A. Yes. |
| 8 Index." | 18 Q. This was part of that process? |
| 9 Do you see that? | 19 A. Yes. |
| 0 A. Yes. | Q. And do you recall the names of the feeder |
| Q. Could you explain do you understand | 21 funds, the Madoff feeder funds, that you were meeting |
| 22 what that sentence means? | 22 with at that time? |
| 23 A. Yes. | 23 A. I'm pretty sure I met with Fairfield |
| Q. Could you explain what your understanding | 24 Sentry. They were very active in Geneva. I think |
| 25 is. | 25 I met with a guy called Santiago Reyes |
| A. I think it's what we discussed before, | 1 Q. Okay. |
| which is he's protecting the downside through the | 2 A which was a salesperson for Fairfield. |
| sale sorry, through the purchase of a put, but that | 3 And then I met — I think I met with |
| comes at the expense of the upside, which is capped as | 4 Kingate as well, although I can't remember who I met |
| well because he sells the call to fund the purchase of | 5 there. |
| | 6 Q. Okay. Let's start with Fairfield since |
| 6 the 7 (Stenographer clarification.) | 7 that's the first one you mentioned. You said |
| THE WITNESS: He sells the call to cover | |
| the cost of the put. | 8 Fairfield Sentry? 9 A. Yes. |
| 0 THE STENOGRAPHER: Thanks. | 10 Q. What is Fairfield Sentry? |
| 11 BY MR. MOLINA: | |
| 12 Q. Okay. Okay. Back to your first | A. It's a Madoff feeder fund. Q. Okay. And your understanding at that time |
| 3 understanding of Mr. Madoff. You mentioned a few | 13 was that Fairfield Sentry was a Madoff feeder fund? |
| 4 minutes ago, when I first asked you when you first | |
| 15 learned of BLMIS, you mentioned that you might have | 14 A. Well, I mean, I basically was told it, 15 right, during one of these meetings. To me, Madoff |
| | |
| 6 had meetings with Madoff via fund managers? A. I am pretty sure I did, yes. | 16 wasn't a known quantity before that, so, yes. |
| 사람이 보고 있는 것이 없는 것이 없는 것이 되었습니다. 그런 사람이 있는 것이 없는 것이다. 그런 것이 없는 것이었다면 없는 것이 없는 것이었다면 없는 것이 없는 것이 없는 것이었다면 없어요. | 17 Q. So the marketing angle that these |
| 8 Q. Let's walk through that. What do you | 18 salespeople took at that time, from what you can |
| 9 recall? | 19 recall, is that they gave you access, or they would |
| 20 A. Very little, to be honest. It was very | 20 give Partners Advisers access to Madoff? |
| 21 I mean, it was 22 years ago, 3 years ago. | 21 A. Yes. |
| 22 So I remember very little. And, on top of it, the | 22 Q. And your understanding was that Fairfield |
| 23 meetings I would have would actually be with sales | 23 Sentry had investment accounts at BLMIS? |
| 24 representative of the feeder funds, so they were not | 24 A. Yes. I mean, I never spent much time sort |
| 25 the people that, you know, had a really sort of good | 25 of digging into it, but yes. Yes. |

| 1 0 | Do you remember if anyone else from | 1 Sentry people? |
|--|--|--|
| | rs Advisers went with you to these meetings? | |
| | No, I don't remember. There were meetings | |
| | | |
| | n Geneva, so in Geneva I would often have | 4 Q. I'm going to name some names. You tell me |
| | ngs by myself. Sometimes Mr. Estenne was in | 5 if they ring a bell. |
| | meetings, too, but I couldn't tell you with | 6 A. Sure. |
| | ds to Fairfield Sentry specifically. | 7 THE STENOGRAPHER: Sorry. Just one |
| | And I know you said it was sometime ago | 8 second, please. |
| | u don't remember much, but let's see if we | 9 Thanks. |
| | would this meeting have occurred around 2001? | 10 MR. MOLINA: Sorry. |
| | I have no idea, to be honest. Probably. | 11 THE STENOGRAPHER: It's okay. |
| | n, yeah. My recollection is that they were in | 12 MR. MOLINA: I'll slow down. |
| | va very often, right. I didn't meet with them | 13 BY MR. MOLINA: |
| 12 | ften but they were there all the time; so when a | 14 Q. Walter Noel. |
| | ng occurred, I don't really know. | 15 A. No, doesn't ring a bell. |
| | Well, using the 2003 threshold that we've | MR. MOLINA: And I'm going to give you the |
| 17 been u | sing all day | 17 spelling of these names afterwards. |
| 18 A. | Yeah. | 18 BY MR. MOLINA: |
| 19 Q. | would it have been after 2003 or before | 19 Q. Amit Vijayvergiya. |
| 20 2003? | | 20 A. No. |
| 21 A. | It would have been before 2003, although | Q. Corina Noel Piedrahita. |
| | neet with them post-2003 as well, at least once, | 22 A. No. |
| | don't know if you want me to go into the details | 23 Q. Jeffrey Tucker? |
| | ey were or you tell me. | 24 A. No. |
| | Well, let's finish your answer. | 25 Q. Was the meeting in person? |
| | 230 | 233 |
| 1 A. | Because they were basically claiming they | 1 A. Yes. |
| | capacity in Madoff anymore and they were sort | Q. Was it at your at Partners Advisers' |
| | king for a manager that could potentially offer | 3 offices? |
| | me type of return target and they basically came | 4 A. Yes. |
| | hat manager to visit. So I met with them | 5 Q. Did they present give their |
| | 03 to review that investment opportunity and | 6 presentation orally? |
| and the second | ther manager, which I decided to pass on. | 7 A. Yes, they probably handed out a |
| F 4. A. W. | Going back to the initial meeting you had, | 8 presentation, too, which was typical during these |
| - | id it likely occurred before 2003? | 9 meetings. |
| the second secon | Yes. | The state of the s |
| | | 10 Q. Did the presentation include the 11 performance of the fund? |
| ~ | Would it have been around 2002? | |
| | Yeah. I mean, I I think it was earlier | 12 A. I have no recollection but I'm pretty sure |
| | and that, again, sort of is I don't have | 13 it did. Usually, these presentations did, right, so, |
| | f a precise recollection but I think it would | 14 yes, but I can't remember specifically in this case. |
| | been before 2002. I think it would have been | 15 THE EXAMINER: Sorry, just one moment. |
| 7 | bly pretty soon after I joined. So my gut feel | MR. MOLINA: Shall we go off the record? |
| | e, end of '99 or 2000. | 17 THE VIDEOGRAPHER: We are going off the |
| F. 132 | Okay. And you remember meeting what | 18 record. The time is 3:51. |
| | ? Santiago Reyes | 19 (Off the record.) |
| 20 A. | Yeah. | 20 THE VIDEOGRAPHER: We are back on the |
| 20 7. | is that the name you said? | 21 record. The time is 3:52. |
| | The state of the s | The same and the same and a supplier of the same and the |
| 21 Q. | Yes. | 22 BY MR. MOLINA: |
| 21 Q. 22 A. | | 22 BY MR. MOLINA:23 Q. Do you remember that you and I, |
| 21 Q. 22 A. 23 Q. | Yes. | |

| Conducted | on | May | 20, | 2022 |
|-----------|----|-----|-----|------|
|-----------|----|-----|-----|------|

| 233 | 235 |
|---|--|
| 1 Yes, I remember it. | 1 benefit of a hundred percent hindsight, but it wasn't |
| Q. What do you remember from that | 2 necessarily something that was unusual back in the |
| 3 conversation? | 3 day. Again, I as I mentioned, there was hedge |
| 4 A. I remember – I actually didn't realize it | 4 funds were very secretive and being cagey about an |
| 5 was you. I remember being asked questions about my | 5 investment strategy was something that often happened |
| 6 knowledge of Madoff/Square One and questions about the | 6 because people felt that they had trade secrets, they |
| 7 fact, you know, if Square One had been held in | 7 had a way of doing things that if it was getting into |
| 8 Partners Advisers' portfolio at any one time, I think | 8 the market it would be taken away or arbitraged away. |
| 20 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 | 9 So it wasn't uncommon. And it still is |
| | |
| 10 suspicions about Madoff. That's pretty much what 11 I remember. | 10 pretty common for certain types of strategy today. |
| | 11 Q. You also mentioned you had a meeting with |
| 12 Q. Do you remember we discussed these | 12 Kingate. |
| 13 meetings that you had with Fairfield Sentry? | 13 A. Yes. |
| 14 A. So I read that in the complaint. | 14 Q. And you say you did not remember |
| 15 I remember we discussed it. Yes, I do, but I don't | 15 specifically |
| 16 remember these meetings well, though. Maybe | 16 A. I don't remember who specifically I met |
| 17 I remember them better in 2016. Today, I don't | 17 with, yes. |
| 18 remember them that well. | 18 Q. I'll give you some names. |
| 19 Q. I'm going to tell you I'm going to give | 19 A. Sure. |
| 20 you statements from my recollection of that | Q. You'll tell me if that jogs your memory. |
| 21 discussion | 21 A. Okay. |
| 22 A. Sure. | Q. And if that person was in your meeting. |
| Q and you'll tell me if it refreshes your | 23 A. Sure, sure. |
| 24 memory. | 24 Q. Federico Ceretti. |
| 25 A. Sure. | 25 A. No. |
| 234 | 236 |
| 1 Q. Is that fair? | 1 Q. Carlo Grosso. |
| 2 A. Sure. | 2 A. Doesn't ring a bell. |
| 3 MR. WORBY: Objection. | 3 MR. MOLINA: And first name? |
| 4 Are you going to give that document to | 4 MS. STORK: Shazieh Salahuddin. |
| 5 Mr. Müller? | 5 MR. MOLINA: And, again, I'm going to give |
| 6 MR. MOLINA: No. I don't have to. It's | 6 you the spelling. |
| 7 my work product. | 7 THE STENOGRAPHER: I have that one. |
| 8 BY MR. MOLINA: | 8 MR. MOLINA: Oh, you have them already? |
| 9 Q. Mr. Müller, you mentioned that during that | 9 You're ahead of me because I had to ask her. |
| 10 call during the meeting with Fairfield Sentry, that | 10 BY MR. MOLINA: |
| 11 you came away without any clear indication of how | 11 Q. Shazieh Salahuddin. |
| [마양지: 1. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1. | 12 A. No. |
| 12 Mr. Madoff was performing the returns for Fairfield | |
| 13 Sentry that were being displayed to you during that | Q. Okay. Do you recall you just said that |
| 14 presentation. | 14 your meeting with Fairfield likely occurred soon after |
| Does that refresh your memory? | 15 you started at Partners Advisers, sometime in 1999 or |
| 16 A. Yeah, that's correct. I mean, I can't | 16 2000? |
| 17 tell you if it was specific to meetings with Fairfield | 17 A. Yes. Probably, yes. |
| 18 Sentry, but I think those meetings with Fairfield | 18 Q. Is this the same is the Kingate meeting |
| 19 Sentry and my discussions with other investment | 19 also in the same time frame? |
| 20 professionals from my network and so on, and some | 20 A. Yeah, it's the Kingate meeting is even |
| 21 hedge fund managers, led me to led me to the | 21 more hazy so I might really struggle to sort of |
| | |
| 22 conclusion that I couldn't sort of understand how | 22 pinpoint it to a specific date, but yes. |
| 23 these returns were generated, that's correct. | 22 pinpoint it to a specific date, but yes.Q. Okay. |
| 22 conclusion that I couldn't sort of understand how 23 these returns were generated, that's correct. 24 I want to add one thing, just quickly, | [|

| 227 | 220 |
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| 237 1 if you don't mind marking as Trustee Exhibit No. 18. | 1 was running a strategy, the strategy was this, right, |
| 2 (Trustee Exhibit 18 marked for | 2 which we actually just covered it, and the return |
| identification.) | 3 stream, you know, was extraordinary, right. |
| BY MR, MOLINA: | 4 And then and that was information which |
| Q. Mr. Müller, you've just been handed what | 5 I couldn't question or whatever. I didn't have any, |
| is now Trustee Exhibit No. 18. I'll get to it myself. | 6 sort of, enough information about it. I probably |
| 7 Are you familiar with this document? | 7 and I can't remember it but I probably had a |
| 8 A. Not at all. | 8 conversation with not only Luc but also probably |
| Q. Do you see it's a onepage document? Do | 9 Philippe Hostettler about it and, you know and they |
| 10 you see that? | 10 probably gave me context, right. And I think Philippe |
| 11 A. Yes. | 11 Hostettler specifically was quite skeptical about the |
| 12 Q. At the very top, it says 'Partners | 12 strategy, so he probably sort of told me about this as |
| 13 Advisers S.A." | 13 well. |
| 14 A. Yes. | 14 And so, with him, and then discussing with |
| 15 Q. That's obviously the company you were | 15 others, I probably formed, you know, an opinion that |
| 16 working for at this time? | 16 I couldn't understand how the returns were generated. |
| 17 A. Yeah. | 17 But I that wasn't a secret. I certainly |
| 18 Q. Do you see that it's dated 20 December | 18 communicated that with Luc, for sure. |
| 19 2001? | 19 So yeah, I mean, Philippe probably did |
| 20 A. It is, yes. | 20 the same, right. So he was quite skeptical about it, |
| 21 Q. And there's a From line | 21 too. |
| 22 A. Mmm-hmm. | 22 Q. We just went over, not long ago, the |
| 23 Q from an individual named Tamsin Mann? | 23 strategy that Madoff purported to be using. |
| 24 A. Yes. | 24 A. Yes. |
| Q. Do you recognize that name? | 25 Q. So when you say you did not understand how |
| 238 | 240 |
| 1 A. No. | 1 the performance could be achieved, you're not |
| Q. Do you see next to that name there's a | 2 referring to you did not understand the strategy, |
| series of words and symbols? | 3 because it's clear that you understood it. Correct? |
| 4 A. Yes. | 4 A. Well, I understood the strategy |
| Q. Included in that series is the name | 5 conceptually but that's about it. And I guess in |
| Fim Limited? | 6 order to justify the returns I think the narrative |
| 7 A. Yes. | 7 was you explain the strategy conceptually. I think |
| | |
| Q. Do you understand do you have any understanding of what Fim Limited is? | The state of the s |
| | 9 might buy more puts or less puts, and buy more calls 10 or sell more calls, less calls and so on, and so that |
| | |
| 11 it was a Madoff feeder but I'm not sure about it. | 11 immediately sort of creates, like, a scenario where he |
| 12 Q. Okay. After you audited these meetings | 12 could do anything, right, with that basis of, like, |
| 13 and I understand it's been 20 years and that your | 13 selling calls and buying puts, and that, like, doing |
| 14 memory is hazy, but after you audited these meetings, | 14 anything, including being in treasuries when he felt |
| 15 did you discuss the content of those meetings with | 15 the market was going down, was actually hard it was |
| 6 anybody at Partners Advisers? | 16 hard to explain the consistency of the returns, given |
| A. I mean, I'm pretty sure I did because we | 17 the fact that, you know, he was basically doing |
| 18 discussed every meeting, right, so, yes. Probably, | 18 whatever he wanted, right, buying less calls sorry, |
| 19 yes. | 19 less puts or more puts, or selling less calls or more |
| Q. And what do you remember your reactions to | 20 calls, or being in treasuries. |
| 21 the presentations of those meetings to be? | 21 So I think that's what I couldn't |
| 22 A. So, again, I think initially these | 22 understand, is how were these returns so consistent |
| 23 meetings were what I was the information I was | 23 given the fact that it felt like he was market-timing. |
| 24 getting fed was new to me and so I was basically told | Q. So other than Mr. Hostettler well, let |
| 25 that there was, you know, someone called Madoff that | 25 me back up. |

61 (241 to 244)

| | on May 20, 2022 |
|--|--|
| 1 You mentioned you spoke to Mr. Hostettler | 243 |
| | front-running, yes. Q. And you understand front-running to be |
| 2 and he was skeptical. Could you expand on what that 3 means? | Q. And you understand front-running to be3 illegal? |
| A. Well, I think he was – he had the same | 4 A. Yes. |
| questions, right, which were sort of how can a return | 5 Q. But you said it was the common |
| stream like this be generated with such a simple | 6 understanding amongst Geneva investment community, and |
| 7 strategy. And I think the belief – and I'm sure you | 7 I understand the caveat that they weren't sure, this |
| know that because I read Albert Collette's deposition | 8 is just what their suspicion was. Is that fair? |
| in the document. But the belief in Geneva was that he | 9 A. Yes. |
| 0 was using information from his market-making business, | 10 Q. And how do you know that that was the |
| 11 option market-making business, to take position in the | 11 common suspicion amongst the Geneva investment |
| 2 hedge fund with, sort of, the knowledge of where the | 12 community? |
| 3 market was going because he saw the volume in the | 13 A. Because people would mention it during |
| 4 option business, right. So that was sort of the | 14 conversations. |
| 5 common belief in Geneva back in the day, and everybody | 15 Q. Like Mr. Collette? |
| 16 was sort of pretty much sort of thinking that this was | 16 A. Yeah. Although that 2003 conversation, |
| 17 the case. | 17 I can't remember, but I have no doubt I have no |
| 8 Q. Okay. And when you say that he was using | 18 reason to doubt it, yes. |
| 19 the other business to get a preview of how the market | 19 Q. Okay. Why don't we just turn to that |
| 20 may move, are you referring to the term of | 20 A. Sure. |
| 1 front-running? | 21 Q to make it clear for the record. |
| 2 A. Well, yeah. I mean, if – yeah. There | 22 MR. MOLINA: Ms. Court Reporter, I'm going |
| 3 should have been Chinese walls, I guess, yes, between | 23 to be handing you what has been previously marked as |
| 24 these businesses. | 24 Trustee Exhibit No. 11. So if you don't mind |
| Q. So just to unpack what you said, when you | 25 re-marking it as 11, as Trustee Exhibit No. 11. |
| 242 | 244 |
| said it was a common understanding amongst Geneva | 1 (Trustee Exhibit 11 previously marked |
| 2 managers, is it that he was that Madoff was | 2 for identification.) |
| front-running and that's how he was achieving these | THE EXAMINER: Would that be a good time? |
| returns? Was that the common understanding that | 4 MR. MOLINA: This is a good time to stop. |
| you're referring to? | 5 Thank you for reminding me. |
| A. Well, I mean, it wasn't certainty. It was | 6 THE VIDEOGRAPHER: We are going off the |
| sort of what people assumed would explain these | 7 record. The time is 4:05. |
| 3 super consistent returns, yes. | 8 (Break taken.) |
| Q. Front-running? | 9 THE VIDEOGRAPHER: Total time on the |
| 0 A. Yeah. | 10 record is 4 hours and 42 minutes. |
| Q. Just so I just want to make sure | 11 We are back on the record. The time is |
| 2 A. I mean, I didn't go into the specifics of, | 12 4:16. |
| 3 like, you know, is it legal or not, or I didn't, sort | 13 BY MR. MOLINA: |
| 4 of, you know, read the US financial regulations to | 14 Q. Mr. Müller, I think you were just handed |
| 5 know if it was legal or not. It didn't sound | 15 what is now or has been already marked Trustee |
| 6 you know, it didn't sound very well, it didn't | 16 Exhibit No. 11. |
| 7 sound very clean, yes. | 17 A. Yes. |
| 8 Q. You're now 20-some years in this industry, | 18 Q. I will represent to you that this is an |
| 9 right? | 19 English-language translation of the examination of |
| 20 A. Yes. | 20 Mr. Albert Collette. I think you said earlier that |
| Q. So, sitting here today, what do you know | 21 you had read this document, so I assume you're |
| 22 about front-running? | 22 familiar with it? |
| A. Yeah. I mean today, obviously, obviously what he was doing, or what I thought he was doing, | 23 A. Yes, although I it's a pretty lengthy 24 document, so I but I did read it. |
| 25 because obviously that's not what he was doing, was | 25 Q. If you turn to I'm going to refer to |
| | FT DEPOS |

| 245 | 247 | | |
|---|---|--|--|
| the bundle page that's in the bottom page number | 1 The presiding judge said: | | |
| 2 that's in the bottom righthand part of the document. | 2 " 'I promise.'" | | |
| 3 Turn to page 156. | 3 Mr. Collette responded: | | |
| 4 Just so it's in the record, this | 4 'I promise to tell the truth, the whole | | |
| 5 examination occurred in October of last year. Is that | 5 truth and nothing but the truth." | | |
| 6 correct? It should be on the first page of the | 6 Do you see that? | | |
| 7 A. Yes. | 7 A. Yes. | | |
| Q. And you've already established you | 8 Q. So you're aware that similar to your | | |
| 9 already mentioned his name but just, again, to be | 9 examination today, Mr. Collette was summoned and asked | | |
| 10 clear on the record, who was Albert Collette? | 10 to provide testimony, you know, with the understanding | | |
| 11 A. Albert Collette was one of the partners of | 11 that he would swear to tell the truth, the whole truth | | |
| 12 Calibria, which was an asset management firm in Geneva | 12 and nothing but the truth. Correct? | | |
| 13 that was, sort of, friendly competitors of Partners | 13 A. Yes. | | |
| 14 Advisers. | 14 Q. If you go to page 159, lines 9 and 10, | | |
| Q. And after, since you've read this | 15 this exchange references a meeting. Mr. Collette is | | |
| 16 document, you're aware that Mr. Collette gave this | 16 being asked about a meeting between himself and | | |
| 17 testimony pursuant to a discovery request from the US | 17 yourself in or around 2003 in a conference in Miami, | | |
| 18 Bankruptcy Court presiding over this litigation | 18 Florida. | | |
| 19 between Mr. Picard and Square One Fund? | 19 A. Yes. | | |
| 20 A. That was my understanding, yes. | 20 Q. Do you see that? | | |
| 21 Q. Similar to the procedure that we have here | 21 A. I can see that, yes. | | |
| 22 today? | 22 Q. Do you have any recollection of this | | |
| | | | |
| | 23 meeting? | | |
| Q. And you understand that this examination 25 took place in Switzerland? | 24 A. No. No. Conferences were busy events | | |
| 20-2 (4-0.00) (4-1.00) (4-1.00) (4-1.00) (4-1.00) (4-1.00) | 25 where we would typically meet lots of people, so | | |
| 1 A. Yes. | I I don't remember that encounter specifically. | | |
| | | | |
| Q. If you look at the top of the page, it | Q. But you said earlier on the record that | | |
| 3 says "Nyon, Switzerland." | 3 A. I have no yeah, I mean, I have no | | |
| 4 A. Yes. | 4 reason to doubt that this happened. | | |
| Q. That's near Geneva? | 5 Q. Okay. So what I'm going to do now is, | | |
| A. Yeah. That's where I grew up, actually. | 6 just quickly, we'll go through some relevant passages | | |
| 7 Q. Nice. | 7 in this transcript. | | |
| 8 And this is a transcript that of the | 8 A. Sure. | | |
| 9 formal court transcript of that proceeding, correct? | 9 Q. And you can just give me your impression | | |
| 10 A. Yes. | 10 of whether that comports with what you understand, | | |
| Q. And, again, it's an English-language | 11 sitting here today. | | |
| 12 translation. The original's in French. | 12 A. Sure. | | |
| 13 A. Mmm-hmm. | 13 Q. Looking at lines 19 through 22, | | |
| 14 Q. You understand that? | 14 Mr. Collette recalls that at some point during that | | |
| 15 A. Yes. | 15 conference that he came to understand that you had | | |
| 16 Q. If you look at this page 156, at the very | 16 reasons to doubt Madoff, and that's those are his | | |
| 17 bottom, the presiding judge, I'm going to read this | 17 words. | | |
| 18 question into the record: | 18 Do you see that? | | |
| 19 "So, I am going to ask you to swear or | 19 A. Yes. | | |
| 20 solemnly promise that the testimony you are about to | 20 Q. Does that comport with your understanding? | | |
| 21 give shall be the truth, the whole truth and nothing | 21 A. Is your question did I say that or | | |
| 22 but the truth." | 22 Q. Yeah, I'm sorry, let me strike that. Let | | |
| 23 I'm now turning the page to page 157. | 23 me try again. | | |
| 24 Mr. Collette responds with: | 24 Is his characterization of your opinion | | |
| (4) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1 | 25 with respect to BLMIS and Madoff accurate? | | |
| 25 "Yes, yes, OK." | 25 with respect to DEIVIIS and Madoff accurate: | | |

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|---|--|-----|---|
| 1 | A. Well, I - it's a bit vague, right, "doubt | | |
| 2 | Madoff," but I did definitely I did definitely not | | |
| 3 | like that investment, yes. | | |
| | O Andrew American district | | |

- Q. And you -- turns out that you proved to be correct in your hunch, correct?
- 6 A. Yes, although I wasn't suspecting -- and 7 that's something else that Mr. Collette said; I wasn't
- 8 suspecting any Ponzi scheme, but I -- I was -- I mean,
- 9 I couldn't explain the returns and so it was something 10 that I just didn't want to deal with.
- 11 Q. All right. But at the time, it wasn't --
- 12 when you were looking at Madoff in the early 2000s, it
- 13 wasn't your job to get to the bottom of what Madoff
- 14 was doing, correct?
- 15 A. No, because we didn't have a position 16 actually in our portfolios.
- Q. Your job was to simply assess whether or18 not it made sense for this investment to be added to
- 19 the portfolio?
- 20 A. Yes. I have a -- I have an investment
- 21 philosophy to this day which is to find reasons not to
- 22 invest in things rather than finding reasons to invest
- 23 in things. And so that immediately sort of fell into
- 24 the "I don't understand it. I won't do it."
- Q. Going to turn now to lines 30 to 37 on

- 1 sort of have-nots camp, so that's not something -
- 2 that's not a pressure I felt, really.
- Q. What about his allusion to the idea that managers in Geneva believed that if you invested with
- 5 Madoff, it's as if you -- it's akin to doping in the
- Tour de France?
- A. Yeah, it's a good analogy, I guess, but
- 8 obviously, I mean, the returns were what they were,
- 9 right, and I think ultimately ultimately, people
- 10 felt like they needed that position in their portfolio
- 11 in order to boost their returns.
- 12 The one thing I would mention, though,
- 13 is the returns weren't that I mean, they were
- 14 extremely consistent but they weren't that incredible
- 15 in the sense that our own portfolios had a return
- 16 target of, like, 10 to 12 percent, and so adding a
- 17 position in Madoff in that portfolio didn't actually
- 18 add any value because once you take out the fees that
- 19 we were charging you would get something that was also
- 20 10 percent. So it wasn't actually sort of boosting
- 21 your returns, it was basically just generating your
- 22 return target.

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- 23 And so that's maybe one of the reasons why
- 24 I didn't feel under pressure to add it in our
- 25 portfolio, or, you know yeah.

- that same page.
- 2 A. Yes.
- Q. I'll give you a chance to read it and I'll
- 4 ask you a question about it. So let me know when
- 5 you're ready.
- 6 A. Yeah. I've read that part, so I'm ready, 7 actually.
- 8 Q. Okay. You mentioned to me earlier on the
- 9 record that there was this -- there was talk about
- 10 Madoff in Geneva, and I think he's referencing some of
- 11 those opinions that --
- 12 A. Mmm-hmm.
- 13 Q. -- in this passage.
- 14 Do you share -- or, sitting here today,
- 15 does this comport with what your understanding was of
- 16 that time, of being in Geneva at that time and being
- 17 an investor manager specifically vetting Madoff at
- 18 that time?
- 19 A. Yeah, I mean I -- this paragraph, and in
- 20 general, Mr. Collette's testimony seems to imply that
- 21 he was under tremendous pressure himself, or Calibria
- 22 as a firm, to add Madoff to their portfolio. I never
- 23 felt that way. I never felt under pressure or I never
- 24 sort of felt like we should have it in our portfolio
- 25 because otherwise we would sort of be in the have-not,

- 1 Q. If you look at page 160, lines 19 through
 - 2 28. Again, I'll give you a chance to review that
 - 3 paragraph, then I'll ask you a question.
 - A. Mmm-hmm.
 - Yes.

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- 6 Q. Do you see that line, the concluding line
- 7 in that paragraph --
 - A. Yes.
- Q. -- which I'm going to read into the
- 10 record? It says:
- 11 "You couldn't talk about Madoff without
- 12 talking about the risks that were associated with
- 13 Madoff."
- 14 Do you see that?
- 15 A. Yes.
- 16 Q. Does that comport with your recollection
- 17 of that time period?
- 18 A. It does, although I would also, sort of,
- 19 have a slightly different view to Mr. Collette's when
- 20 it came to Madoff in Geneva. I was, at that time, the
- 21 head of research of a firm that had something like 50
- 22 to 70 investments, active investments, in the
- 23 portfolio. I would very rarely talk about Madoff with
- 24 people because it was not in my portfolio and I didn't
- 25 have much interest in it. So when people brought it