

BAKER & HOSTETLER LLP

45 Rockefeller Plaza
New York, New York 10111
Telephone: (212) 589-4200
Facsimile: (212) 589-4201

Hearing Date & Time: To be determined by Court

Objection Deadline: February 26, 2019

Time: 4:00pm

*Attorneys for Irving H. Picard, Trustee for the
Substantively Consolidated SIPA Liquidation
of Bernard L. Madoff Investment Securities LLC
and the Chapter 7 Estate of Bernard L. Madoff*

**UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK**

SECURITIES INVESTOR PROTECTION
CORPORATION,

Plaintiff-Applicant,

v.

BERNARD L. MADOFF INVESTMENT
SECURITIES LLC,

Defendant.

Adv. Pro. No. 08-01789 (SMB)

SIPA Liquidation

(Substantively Consolidated)

In re:
BERNARD L. MADOFF,

Debtor.

IRVING H. PICARD, Trustee for the Liquidation
of Bernard L. Madoff Investment Securities LLC
and the Estate of Bernard L. Madoff,

Plaintiff,

v.

NATIXIS FINANCIAL PRODUCTS, LLC,

Defendant.

Adv. Pro. No. 10-05353 (SMB)

**DECLARATION OF CATHERINE E. WOLTERING IN SUPPORT OF THE
TRUSTEE'S MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE AN AMENDED COMPLAINT**

I, Catherine E. Woltering, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1746, declare as follows:

1. I am a member of the New York Bar and a partner at Baker & Hostetler LLP, counsel for plaintiff Irving H. Picard, as trustee (the “Trustee”) for the substantively consolidated liquidation of the business of Bernard L. Madoff Investment Securities LLC and the chapter 7 estate of Bernard L. Madoff, under the Securities Investor Protection Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78aaa, *et seq.*

2. As an attorney of record in these proceedings, I am fully familiar with the facts set forth herein based either upon my own personal knowledge or upon information conveyed to me.

3. I make this declaration to provide relevant information in connection with the Trustee’s Motion for Leave to File an Amended Complaint (the “Motion”).

4. On December 7, 2018, the Court so ordered a stipulation by which the parties agreed to a briefing schedule for the filing of the Trustee’s Motion. The parties stipulated and agreed that the Trustee would file his Motion on or before December 31, 2018; that defendant Natixis Financial Products LLC (“Defendant”) would file its opposition within 60 days of the Trustee filing his Motion; and that the Trustee would file a reply within 14 days of the Defendant filing its opposition.

5. Attached hereto as **Exhibit 1** is the Trustee’s proposed Amended Complaint (“PAC”) for review by the Court. The PAC alleges additional facts regarding the subsequent transfers sought to be recovered, as further discussed in the accompanying Memorandum of Law in Support of the Trustee’s Motion for Leave to File an Amended Complaint.

6. Attached hereto as **Exhibit 2** is the Trustee’s Proposed Order in connection with the Motion.

7. Attached to the Trustee’s PAC as **Exhibit A** is the Tensyr Rating Memo.

8. Attached to the Trustee's PAC as **Exhibit B** is the proffered amended complaint in the adversary proceeding *Picard v. UBS AG*, Adv. Pro. No. 10-04285 (SMB) (Bankr.

S.D.N.Y. June 26, 2015), ECF No. 210, also incorporated by reference in the Trustee's Motion.

9. Attached to the Trustee's PAC as **Exhibit C** is a chart setting forth the Initial Transfers.

10. Attached to the Trustee's PAC as **Exhibit D** are charts setting forth the Initial Transfers.

11. Attached to the Trustee's PAC as **Exhibit E** is a chart setting forth the presently known Subsequent Transfers.

12. No prior application or motion for similar relief has been made to this or any other court.

I hereby declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing statements made by me are true and correct.

Executed on the 28th day of December, 2018, at New York, New York.

/s/ Catherine E. Woltering

Catherine E. Woltering
Baker & Hostetler LLP
45 Rockefeller Plaza
New York, New York 10111
Telephone: (212) 589-4200
Facsimile: (212) 589-4201
Email: cwoltering@bakerlaw.com

*Attorney for Irving H. Picard, Trustee
for the Substantively Consolidated SIPA
Liquidation of Bernard L. Madoff
Investment Securities LLC and the Chapter
7 Estate of Bernard L. Madoff*

EXHIBIT 1

Baker & Hostetler LLP

45 Rockefeller Plaza
New York, New York 10111
Telephone: (212) 589-4200
Facsimile: (212) 589-4201
David J. Sheehan

*Attorneys for Irving H. Picard, Trustee
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**PROPOSED
AMENDED COMPLAINT**

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Irving H. Picard (the “**Trustee**”), as trustee for the liquidation of Bernard L. Madoff Investment Securities LLC (“**BLMIS**”) and the substantively consolidated estate of Bernard L. Madoff, individually, under the Securities Investor Protection Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78aaa *et seq.* (“**SIPA**”), by and through his undersigned counsel, for this Amended Complaint against Natixis Financial Products LLC (as successor-in-interest to Natixis Financial Products Inc., f/k/a IXIS Financial Products Inc., f/k/a CDC Financial Products Inc.) (“**Defendant**”) alleges the following:

NATURE OF THE ACTION

1. This adversary proceeding is part of the Trustee’s efforts to recover BLMIS customer property (as defined by SIPA § 78lll(4)) that Madoff stole through BLMIS’s investment advisory business (the “**IA Business**”). Madoff sustained his scheme with massive capital infusions largely from funds that solicited clients for BLMIS (the “**Feeder Funds**”). Defendant was an equity investor in several Feeder Funds. With this Amended Complaint, the Trustee seeks to recover \$148.1 million Defendant received in subsequent transfers of BLMIS customer property from Feeder Fund Groupement Financier Limited (“**Groupement**”).¹

2. Defendant and its affiliates employed options and equities experts who analyzed Madoff’s split-strike conversion strategy (the “**SSC Strategy**”). For years, in BLMIS’s monthly customer statements, trade tickets, and other sources, Defendant saw mounting evidence that BLMIS’s reported trades were fictitious.

¹ The Trustee reserves the right to amend this complaint to pursue the entities and claims dismissed by this Court’s extraterritoriality decision if it is overturned in whole or relevant part by the Trustee’s pending appeal. *See SIPC v. BLMIS (In re BLMIS)*, Adv. Pro. No. 08-01789 (SMB), 2016 WL 6900689 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Nov. 22, 2016) (dismissing transfers Natixis S.A., Tensyr Limited, and Bloom Asset Holdings Fund received from Fairfield Sentry Limited and Harley International (Cayman) Limited on international comity basis and dismissing transfers Bloom Asset Holdings Fund received from Groupement and Alpha Prime Fund Ltd. on extraterritoriality basis); *see also In re Irving H. Picard*, No. 17-02292 (2d Cir. Jan. 10, 2018), ECF Nos. 496, 497. The Trustee reserves the right to appeal the measure and burden of proof imposed on the Trustee in connection with his avoidance and recovery claims under 11 U.S.C. §§ 544(b)(1), 547, 548, 550, and 551, and applicable provisions of the New York Fraudulent Conveyance Act (N.Y. Debtor & Creditor Law §§ 270 *et seq.*).

3. When credit and risk departments required diligence on BLMIS for deal approval, Defendant's executives and senior employees, motivated by the allure of rising bonuses directly tied to Feeder Fund deals, pointed exclusively to a stale, facially self-serving marketing piece Groupement's manager, Access International Advisors ("**Access**"), had created in 2002 (the "**Access Madoff Deck**"). Defendant reviewed it and knew that as to fundamental questions about BLMIS's trades, the Access Madoff Deck internally contradicted itself, publicly available information, and Groupement trade tickets Defendant reviewed.

4. Reviewing BLMIS's public website (which contained absolutely no mention of the IA Business) and the Access Madoff Deck constituted the full measure of "diligence" Defendant undertook prior to entering numerous multimillion-dollar Feeder Fund deals. Defendant gave lip service to diligence, while deliberately ignoring facts, circumstances, and inconsistencies that revealed a high probability of fraud at BLMIS. These facts included, among others, the following:

5. *First*, Defendant knew Madoff purported to trade options in volumes that were impossible. For example, in a one-year period for just one Feeder Fund, Defendant knew more than 80% of Madoff's reported options trading exceeded the listed exchange's entire volume, in many instances by over 10,000% and in at least one instance, over 26,000%. During that same year, Defendant knew more than 95% of Madoff's reported options trades for another Feeder Fund exceeded the exchange's volume.

6. A Defendant managing director recognized this as obviously impossible. In response, he called his colleague at Defendant's parent company to question how this could be. He received a facially bogus answer but conducted no further investigations as to how BLMIS could be doing the impossible.

7. *Second*, Defendant knew BLMIS generated a risk/return profile that was virtually unmatched, including by managers using similar split-strike conversion strategies, such as Gateway Option Income Fund (“**Gateway Fund**”), an entity related to Defendant. Defendant knew that no financial measure designed to analyze risk and return could explain how Madoff generated BLMIS’s purported returns.

8. *Third*, Defendant knew BLMIS violated industry norms by serving as investment advisor, broker, and custodian for all IA Business assets. This structure eliminated all independent checks and created a fertile field for fraud.

9. *Fourth*, even though Madoff had custody of the IA Business assets, no contracts governing such custody existed, something Defendant’s parent company, Natixis S.A., individually and as successor-in-interest to IXIS Corporate & Investment Bank (together with Natixis S.A., “**IXIS-Paris**”), knew was “very bizarre.” As explained herein, the knowledge IXIS-Paris had about BLMIS’s fraud is imputed to Defendant.

10. *Fifth*, Defendant and IXIS-Paris received and reviewed contradictory information about BLMIS’s purported trading and operational structure, including that BLMIS: (i) materially misstated to the SEC its assets under management (“**AUM**”); (ii) told conflicting and bizarre stories about how it purported to earn money; and (iii) stated it did not use third-party fundraisers, when Defendant knew that raising money for BLMIS was the Feeder Funds’ sole purpose.

11. *Sixth*, by the fall of 2006, IXIS-Paris knew that BLMIS purportedly traded options over-the-counter (“**OTC**”). It also knew Madoff, though bound by federal securities laws and industry standards, refused to divulge any purported BLMIS trading counterparties’ names. Despite this, IXIS-Paris never attempted to verify a single trade BLMIS reported or confirm the identity of a single counterparty. Defendant and IXIS-Paris knew that whether BLMIS was

purportedly trading options OTC or on the exchange, neither provided BLMIS with sufficient volume to execute its purported trades. When Defendant questioned IXIS-Paris regarding this impossibility, IXIS-Paris could not provide a legitimate explanation, because none existed.

12. *Seventh*, IXIS-Paris conspired with Fairfield Greenwich Group (“**Fairfield**”), which operated the largest Feeder Fund, Fairfield Sentry Limited (“**Sentry**”), to shield Madoff from third-party investigations and to craft for the major rating agencies a false story about Madoff’s trading practices and operational structure. In return for shielding Madoff, IXIS-Paris was able to launch Tensyr Ltd. (“**Tensyr**”), an investment vehicle that invested entirely in Sentry, from which IXIS-Paris received millions of dollars in fees.

13. Defendant and IXIS-Paris realized significant profits and expanded their businesses by entering nearly \$1 billion in Feeder Fund deals. Whether BLMIS’s returns were real was irrelevant to their success, and these monies extended the length and depth of BLMIS’s fraud.

14. Defendant and IXIS-Paris acted with confidence, having calculated that there was practically no downside to their turning a blind eye to BLMIS’s fictitious trading. To eliminate most risk, Defendant structured its half-dozen Feeder Fund deals (the “**Defendant Deals**”) to avoid up to 50% of any losses it might incur due to BLMIS’s fraud. Defendant and IXIS-Paris also maintained insurance policies to cover civil liability for themselves and their officers and employees. These policies incentivized them to ignore indicia of fraud at BLMIS because the insurance would significantly reduce or even eliminate financial consequences they might face when BLMIS eventually imploded.

15. Rather than investigate to confirm or allay its suspicions, Defendant deliberately ignored the evidence of BLMIS’s fraud. In later years, without hesitation, IXIS-Paris’s executives resorted to lying to rating agencies about BLMIS and Madoff to profit from his scheme.

16. By willfully blinding themselves from the fraud, denying others the ability to independently investigate BLMIS, and delivering to Madoff hundreds of millions of dollars over the years, Defendant and IXIS-Paris significantly extended and deepened the Ponzi scheme.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Jurisdiction and Venue

17. This is an adversary proceeding commenced in this Court, in which the main underlying SIPA proceeding, Adv. Pro. No. 08-01789 (SMB) (the “**SIPA Proceeding**”), is pending. The SIPA Proceeding was originally brought in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York as *Securities & Exchange Commission v. BLMIS*, No. 08-cv-10791 (the “**District Court Proceeding**”) and has been referred to this Court. This Court has jurisdiction over this adversary proceeding under 28 U.S.C. § 1334(b) and (e)(1), and SIPA § 78eee(b)(2)(A) and (b)(4).

18. This is a core proceeding under 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(A), (F), (H), and (O). The Trustee consents to the entry of final orders or judgment by this Court if it is determined that consent of the parties is required for this Court to enter final orders or judgment consistent with Article III of the U.S. Constitution.

19. Venue in this judicial district is proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1409.

20. This adversary proceeding is brought under SIPA §§ 78fff(b) and 78fff-2(c)(3), Chapter 11 of Title 11 of the United States Code (the “**Bankruptcy Code**”) §§ 105(a), 502(d), 544(b), 548(a), 550(a) and 551, the New York Fraudulent Conveyance Act (N.Y. Debtor & Creditor Law (“**NYDCL**”) §§ 270 *et seq.*), the New York Civil Practice Law and Rules, and other applicable law.

B. Background, the Trustee, and Standing

21. On December 11, 2008 (the “**Filing Date**”), federal agents arrested Madoff for criminal violations of federal securities laws, including securities fraud, investment adviser fraud, and mail and wire fraud. Contemporaneously, the SEC commenced the District Court Proceeding.

22. On December 15, 2008, under SIPA § 78eee(a)(4)(A), the SEC consented to combining its action with an application by the Securities Investor Protection Corporation (“**SIPC**”). Thereafter, under SIPA § 78eee(a)(4)(B), SIPC filed an application in the District Court alleging, among other things, that BLMIS could not meet its obligations to securities customers as they came due and its customers needed the protections afforded by SIPA.

23. Also, on December 15, 2008, Judge Stanton granted SIPC’s application and entered an order pursuant to SIPA, which, in pertinent part:

- i. appointed the Trustee for the liquidation of the business of BLMIS pursuant to SIPA § 78eee(b)(3);
- ii. appointed Baker & Hostetler LLP as counsel to the Trustee pursuant to SIPA § 78eee(b)(3); and
- iii. removed the case to this Court pursuant to SIPA § 78eee(b)(4).

24. By orders dated December 23, 2008 and February 4, 2009, respectively, this Court approved the Trustee’s bond and found that the Trustee was a disinterested person. Accordingly, the Trustee is duly qualified to serve and act on behalf of the estate.

25. On April 13, 2009, an involuntary bankruptcy petition was filed against Madoff, and on June 9, 2009, this Court substantively consolidated the chapter 7 estate of Madoff into the SIPA Proceeding.

26. At a plea hearing on March 12, 2009, in the case captioned *United States v. Madoff*, No. 09-cr-213 (DC), Madoff pleaded guilty to an 11-count criminal information filed against him

by the United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York. At the plea hearing, Madoff admitted he “operated a Ponzi scheme through the investment advisory side of [BLMIS].”

27. At a plea hearing on August 11, 2009, in the case captioned *United States v. DiPascali*, No. 09-cr-764 (RJS), Frank DiPascali, a former BLMIS employee, pleaded guilty to a ten-count criminal information charging him with participating in and conspiring to perpetuate the Ponzi scheme. DiPascali admitted that no purchases or sales of securities took place in connection with BLMIS customer accounts and that the Ponzi scheme had been ongoing at BLMIS since at least the 1980s.

28. At a plea hearing on November 21, 2011, in the case captioned *United States v. Kugel*, No. 10-cr-228 (LTS), David Kugel, a former BLMIS trader and manager, pleaded guilty to a six-count criminal information charging him with securities fraud, falsifying the records of BLMIS, conspiracy, and bank fraud. Kugel admitted to helping create false, backdated trades in BLMIS customer accounts beginning in the early 1970s.

29. On March 24, 2014, Daniel Bonventre, Annette Bongiorno, Jo Ann Crupi, George Perez, and Jerome O’Hara were convicted of fraud and other crimes in connection with their participation in the Ponzi scheme as employees of the IA Business.

30. As the Trustee appointed under SIPA, the Trustee is charged with assessing claims, recovering and distributing customer property to BLMIS’s customers holding allowed customer claims, and liquidating any remaining BLMIS assets for the benefit of the estate and its creditors. The Trustee is using his authority under SIPA and the Bankruptcy Code to avoid and recover payouts of fictitious profits and/or other transfers made by the Debtors to customers and others to the detriment of defrauded, innocent customers whose money was consumed by the Ponzi scheme.

Absent this and other recovery actions, the Trustee will be unable to satisfy the claims described in subparagraphs (A) through (D) of SIPA § 78fff-2(c)(1).

31. Pursuant to SIPA § 78fff-1(a), the Trustee has the general powers of a bankruptcy trustee in a case under the Bankruptcy Code in addition to the powers granted by SIPA pursuant to SIPA § 78fff(b). Chapters 1, 3, 5 and subchapters I and II of chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code apply to this proceeding to the extent consistent with SIPA pursuant to SIPA § 78fff(b).

32. The Trustee has standing to bring the avoidance and recovery claims under SIPA § 78fff-1(a) and applicable provisions of the Bankruptcy Code, including 11 U.S.C. §§ 323(b), 544, and 704(a)(1), because the Trustee has the power and authority to avoid and recover transfers under Bankruptcy Code §§ 544, 547, 548, 550(a), and 551, and SIPA §§ 78fff-1(a) and 78fff-2(c)(3).

C. BLMIS, the Ponzi Scheme, and Madoff's Investment Strategy

1. BLMIS

33. Madoff founded BLMIS in 1960 as a sole proprietorship. In 2001, Madoff registered BLMIS as a New York limited liability company. At all relevant times, Madoff controlled BLMIS first as its sole member and thereafter as its chairman and chief executive.

34. In compliance with 15 U.S.C. § 78o(b)(1) and SEC Rule 15b1-3, and regardless of its business form, BLMIS operated as a single broker-dealer from 1960 through 2008. Public records obtained from the Central Registration Depository of the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority Inc. reflect BLMIS's continuous registration as a securities broker-dealer from January 19, 1960 through December 31, 2008. At all times, BLMIS was assigned Central Registration Depository No. 2625. SIPC's Membership Management System database also reflects BLMIS's registration with the SEC as a securities broker-dealer from January 19, 1960 through December 31, 2008. On December 30, 1970, BLMIS became a member of SIPC and continued its

membership without any change in status until the Filing Date. SIPC membership is contingent on registration of the broker-dealer with the SEC.

35. For most of its existence, BLMIS's principal place of business was 885 Third Avenue in New York City, where Madoff operated three principal business units: a proprietary trading desk, a broker-dealer operation, and the IA Business.

36. BLMIS's website publicly boasted about the sophistication and success of its proprietary trading desk and broker-dealer operations, which were well known in the financial industry. BLMIS's website omitted the IA Business entirely. BLMIS did not register as an investment adviser with the SEC until 2006, following an investigation by the SEC, which forced Madoff to register.

37. For more than 20 years preceding that registration, the financial reports BLMIS filed with the SEC fraudulently omitted the existence of billions of dollars of customer funds BLMIS managed through its IA Business.

38. In 2006, BLMIS filed its first Form ADV (a required registered investment adviser filing) with the SEC, reporting that BLMIS had 23 customer accounts with total AUM of \$11.7 billion. BLMIS filed its last Form ADV in January 2008, reporting that its IA Business still had only 23 customer accounts with total AUM of \$17.1 billion. In reality, Madoff grossly understated these numbers. In 2008, BLMIS had over 4,900 active customer accounts with a purported value of approximately \$68 billion in AUM. At all times, BLMIS's Form ADVs were publicly available.

2. The Ponzi Scheme

39. At all relevant times, Madoff operated the IA Business as a Ponzi scheme using money deposited by customers that BLMIS claimed to invest in securities. The IA Business had no legitimate business operations and produced no profits or earnings. Madoff was assisted by several family members and a few employees, including Frank DiPascali, Irwin Lipkin, David

Kugel, Annette Bongiorno, Jo Ann Crupi, and others, who pleaded to, or were found guilty of, assisting Madoff in carrying out the fraud.

40. BLMIS's proprietary trading desk was also engaged in pervasive fraudulent activity. It was funded, in part, by money taken from the IA Business customer deposits, but fraudulently reported that funding as trading revenues and/or commissions on BLMIS's financial statements and other regulatory reports filed by BLMIS. The proprietary trading business was incurring significant net losses beginning in at least mid-2002 and thereafter, and thus required fraudulent infusions of cash from the IA Business to continue operating.

41. To provide cover for BLMIS's fraudulent IA Business, BLMIS employed Friehling & Horowitz, CPA, P.C. ("**Friehling & Horowitz**") as its auditor, which accepted BLMIS's fraudulently reported trading revenues and/or commissions on its financial statements and other regulatory reports that BLMIS filed. Friehling & Horowitz was a three-person accounting firm based out of a strip mall in Rockland County, New York. Of the three employees at the firm, one was a licensed CPA, one employee was an administrative assistant, and one was a semi-retired accountant living in Florida.

42. On or about November 3, 2009, David Friehling, the sole proprietor of Friehling & Horowitz, pleaded guilty to filing false audit reports for BLMIS and filing false tax returns for Madoff and others. BLMIS's publicly available SEC Form X-17A-5 included copies of these fictitious annual audited financial statements prepared by Friehling & Horowitz.

3. Madoff's Investment Strategy

43. BLMIS purported to execute two primary investment strategies for IA Business customers: the convertible arbitrage strategy and the SSC strategy. For a limited group of IA Business customers, primarily consisting of Madoff's close friends and their families, Madoff also purportedly purchased securities that were held for a certain time and then purportedly sold for a

profit. At all relevant times, Madoff conducted no legitimate business operations using any of these strategies.

44. The convertible arbitrage investment strategy was supposed to generate profits by taking advantage of the pricing mismatches that can occur between the equity and bond/preferred equity markets. Investors were told they would gain profits from a change in the expectations for the stock or convertible security over time. In the 1970s this strategy represented a significant portion of the total IA Business accounts, but by the early 1990s the strategy was purportedly used in only a small percentage of IA Business accounts.

45. From 1992 onward, Madoff claimed to employ the SSC Strategy for IA Business accounts, though in reality, BLMIS never traded any securities for its IA Business customers. All funds received from IA Business customers were commingled in a single BLMIS account maintained at JPMorgan Chase Bank. These commingled funds were not used to trade securities, but rather to make distributions to, or payments for, other customers, to benefit Madoff and his family personally, and to prop up Madoff's proprietary trading business.

46. BLMIS reported falsified trades using backdated trade data on monthly account statements sent to IA Business customers that typically reflected substantial gains on the customers' principal investments.

47. The SSC Strategy purported to involve: (i) the purchase of a group or basket of equities (the "**Basket**") intended to highly correlate to the S&P 100 Index; (ii) the purchase of out-of-the-money S&P 100 Index put options; and (iii) the sale of out-of-the-money S&P Index call options. Madoff purportedly made all these trades *pari passu* for his IA Business customers.

48. The put options were to control the downside risk of price changes in the Basket. The exercise of put options could not turn losses into gains, but rather could only put a floor on losses. By definition, the exercise of a put option would entail a loss for BLMIS.

49. The sale of call options would partially offset the costs associated with acquiring puts, but would have the detrimental effect of putting a ceiling on gains. The call options would make it difficult, if not impossible, for BLMIS to outperform the market, because in a rising market, calls would be exercised by the counterparty.

50. The simultaneous purchase of puts and calls to hedge a securities position is commonly referred to as a “collar.” The purpose of the collar is to limit exposure to volatility in the stock market and flatten out returns on investment.

51. For the SSC Strategy to be deployed as Madoff claimed, the total value of each of the puts and calls purchased for the Basket had to equal the notional value of the Basket. For example, to properly implement a collar to hedge the \$11.7 billion of AUM that Madoff publicly reported in 2006 would have required the purchase of call and put options with a notional value (for each) of \$11.7 billion. There are no records to substantiate Madoff’s purchase of call and put options in any amount, much less in billions of dollars.

52. For the SSC Strategy to be deployed as Madoff claimed, the total value of each of the puts and calls purchased for the Basket had to equal the notional value of the Basket. For example, to properly implement a collar to hedge the \$11.7 billion of AUM that Madoff publicly reported in 2006 would have required the purchase of call and put options, each with a notional value of \$11.7 billion. There are no records to substantiate Madoff’s purchase of call and put options in any amount, much less in billions of dollars.

53. At all times that BLMIS reported its total AUM, publicly available information about the volume of exchange-traded options showed that the volume of options contracts necessary to form the collar and implement the SSC Strategy exceeded the available options.

54. Sophisticated or professional investors like Defendant knew Madoff could not be using the SSC Strategy because his returns drastically outperformed the market. BLMIS showed (net of all BLMIS-level charges and Feeder Fund fees) only 12 months of negative returns over the course of Groupement's existence, compared to 45 months of negative returns in the S&P 100 Index over the same time, nearly four times as often. Such results were impossible if BLMIS was actually implementing the SSC Strategy.

4. BLMIS's Fee Structure

55. BLMIS charged commissions on purported equity trades rather than management and performance fees based on AUM; by using a commission-based structure, including not earning any commissions on purported options trades, Madoff inexplicably walked away from hundreds of millions of dollars in fees. Madoff also purported not to charge *anything* for executing the options trades, another inexplicably altruistic gesture.

5. BLMIS's Market Timing

56. Madoff also falsely told customers that he carefully timed securities purchases and sales to maximize value. Madoff explained that he achieved market timing by intermittently taking customer funds out of the market. During those times, Madoff purported to invest BLMIS customer funds in U.S. Treasury securities or mutual funds invested in those instruments.

57. BLMIS's market timing, as reported on its customer statements, showed an uncanny ability to buy low and sell high, an ability so superhuman that any professional investor, including Defendant, could see it was statistically impossible. BLMIS's customer statements also showed, without fail, a total withdrawal from the market at every quarter and year end.

58. As a registered broker-dealer, BLMIS was required, pursuant to § 240.17a-5 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, to file quarterly and annual reports with the SEC that showed, among other things, financial information on customer activity, cash on hand, and assets and liabilities at the time of reporting. BLMIS's reported quarterly and year-end exits were undertaken to avoid these SEC requirements. But these exits also meant that BLMIS was stuck with the then-prevailing market conditions. It would be impossible to automatically sell all positions at fixed times, independent of market conditions, and win every time. Yet this is precisely what BLMIS's customer statements reported.

59. BLMIS's practice of exiting the market at fixed times, regardless of market conditions, was completely at odds with the SSC Strategy, which relied on holding long positions rather than on short-term speculative trading.

60. There is no record of BLMIS clearing a single purchase or sale of securities in connection with the SSC Strategy at The Depository Trust & Clearing Corporation, the clearing house for such transactions, its predecessors, or any other trading platform on which BLMIS could have traded securities. There are no other BLMIS records that demonstrate that BLMIS traded securities using the SSC strategy.

61. All exchange-listed options relating to the companies within the S&P 100 Index, including options based upon the S&P 100 Index itself, clear through the Options Clearing Corporation. The Options Clearing Corporation has no records showing that BLMIS's IA Business cleared any trades in any exchange-listed options.

6. The Ponzi Scheme's Collapse

62. The Ponzi scheme collapsed in December 2008, when BLMIS customers' requests for redemptions overwhelmed the flow of new investments.

63. At their plea hearings, Madoff and DiPascali admitted that BLMIS purchased none of the securities listed on the IA Business customers' fraudulent statements, and that the IA Business operated as a Ponzi scheme.

64. At all relevant times, BLMIS was insolvent because (i) its assets were worth less than the value of its liabilities; (ii) it could not meet its obligations as they came due; and (iii) at the time of the transfers alleged herein, BLMIS was left with insufficient capital.

II. DEFENDANT, THE NATIXIS GROUP, AND RELEVANT DEALS

A. Relevant Entities

65. **Defendant** is a Delaware corporation and financial services company with a principal place of business in New York, New York.

66. **Non-party Natixis S.A.** (previously defined as IXIS-Paris individually and as successor-in-interest to IXIS Corporate & Investment Bank) is Defendant's ultimate parent company.

67. The Natixis Group's Corporate and Investment Banking Division (the "**CIB Division**") focused on advisory services, structured financing, capital markets, global transaction banking, and economic research. IXIS-Paris and Defendant were both part of the CIB Division and the integrated, global company that Natixis S.A. headed (the "**Natixis Group**").

68. **Non-party Natexis Bleichroeder Inc.** ("**Natexis**") is an IXIS-Paris subsidiary, a member of the CIB Division, a U.S.-registered broker-dealer, and an investment adviser.

69. **Non-party Fairfield** is a *de facto* partnership that operated from its headquarters in New York, New York. Fairfield-related companies and personnel, largely in New York, operated and managed Sentry, a hedge fund incorporated in the British Virgin Islands.

70. **Non-party Tensyr Ltd.** ("**Tensyr**") (an anagram for Sentry) is an investment vehicle formed as a limited company under the laws of Jersey. IXIS-Paris and Fairfield jointly

created and controlled Tensyr as an “orphan” entity with no employees. Tensyr issued certain notes that provided purchasers levered Sentry returns.

71. **Non-party Groupement** is an investment fund organized under the laws of the British Virgin Islands.

72. **Non-party Access** comprises several entities that operated and managed Groupement and other Feeder Funds from its New York headquarters.

B. Relevant Deals

73. Within the CIB Division, Defendant and IXIS-Paris specialized in developing structured financial products. Defendant had advanced financial engineering capabilities and infrastructure to evaluate, create, and monitor derivative products like the Defendant Deals. These Defendant Deals’ reference assets (*i.e.*, the instruments on which the deal’s leveraged returns were based) were various Feeder Funds.

74. In 2003, Defendant invested as an equity shareholder in Groupement (the “**Groupement Deal**”), its first Defendant Deal. Between 2003 and 2008, Defendant and its affiliate, non-party Bloom Asset Holdings Fund, received from Groupement approximately \$508.4 million in subsequent transfers of BLMIS customer property, of which the Trustee is seeking to recover \$148.1 million.

75. Defendant invested in other Feeder Funds, including Harley International (Cayman) Limited (“**Harley**”) and Alpha Prime Fund Ltd (“**Alpha Prime**”). In 2006, Defendant entered deals with Harley (the “**Harley Deal**”) and Alpha Prime (the “**Alpha Prime Deal**”), from

which Defendant and Bloom Asset Holdings Fund together received approximately \$142 million in BLMIS customer property.²

C. Imputation

76. IXIS-Paris's and Natexis's knowledge of indicia of fraud at BLMIS is imputed to Defendant. Defendant, IXIS-Paris, and Natexis were all CIB Division members.

77. CIB Division executives, employees, officers, and directors worked together on the Feeder Fund deals and in the ordinary course of business shared information on Madoff and BLMIS. The singular, global approach is highlighted by the role officers from both Defendant and IXIS-Paris served in creating, approving, and monitoring deals involving Madoff.

78. The CIB Division's role was to provide "clients with an extensive range of solutions encompassing loans, structured finance, capital markets products, cash management products, leasing, securitization, advisory services, financial engineering and research." Through its officers, directors, and other employees, the CIB Division controlled its members': (i) financial reporting; (ii) oversight responsibilities, including risk management; and (iii) committee structure for new product approval, including credit, risk, and operational approvals.

79. IXIS Corporate & Investment Bank's 2006 Annual Report said its control mechanisms involved the "use of a tight-knit system of committees designed to ensure the overall management of risks. Underpinned by collegial and horizontal analyses, these committees provide a framework for decision-making, [and] ensure standardized operational processes" and the CIB Division "controls risk through a unified Risk department, which comprises the credit, market and operational risk teams and oversees all of [its] activities in its Paris headquarters and offices

² Pursuant to the single satisfaction rule, this Amended Complaint does not seek to recover the approximately \$18 million in subsequent transfers that Defendant received from Alpha Prime. Order, *Picard v. HSBC Bank plc (In re BLMIS)*, Adv. Pro. No. 09-01364 (SMB), ECF No. 497 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Mar. 27, 2018).

abroad.” This ensured “consistent methods and controls [were] applied across all [the Natixis Group’s] activities with respect to market risk, counterparty credit risk and operational risk.”

80. In addition to the support provided by its CIB Division affiliates, Defendant further benefited from this structure because it marketed services and products as part of the larger AAA-rated Natixis Group, which it included in its marketing materials. Defendant’s business cards also stated that Defendant was “[a]n Affiliate of IXIS Corporate & Investment Bank,” and its employees’ email signature blocks made similar statements.

81. The IXIS Corporate & Investment Bank 2004 Annual Report stated that the credit risk department set lending limits based on use of company capital by the various business lines, not by the individual legal entities in them, and functioned across the entire Natixis Group, including “monitoring all risks to which [IXIS-Paris] and its operational subsidiaries are exposed.”

82. The report also stated that the credit risk department reported directly to Anthony Orsatelli, who was the Chairman of IXIS-Paris’s Executive Board, among other roles. And the “Credit Committee and other credit-risk bodies was [sic] enhanced in 2004, by involving senior bankers and taking steps to enable the Executive Board to devote itself to examining the most sensitive risks during the twice-weekly meeting of the Bank’s Credit Committee.” The credit risk department produced daily and weekly risk reports for Orsatelli’s review. As Chairman, Orsatelli made “decisions regarding the Bank’s principal commitments, monitors developments in loans outstanding, and conducts an annual revision of risk limits and ratings.”

83. The flow of information between the CIB Division entities was further supported by the significant overlap in their senior leadership. For example, Orsatelli served, among other roles, as: (i) Chairman of IXIS-Paris’s Executive Board; (ii) Defendant’s Chairman of the Board; and (iii) a member of Natexis’s Board. Nicolas Fourt simultaneously was, among other things: (i)

co-head of IXIS-Paris's front office; (ii) a member of IXIS-Paris's Executive Board; (iii) a member of Defendant's Board of Directors.; and (iv) head of the CIB Division's Capital Markets group.

84. Similarly, Luc de Clapiers served as the CEO and President of both Defendant and Natexis. In this role, he maintained direct oversight over all CIB Division functions instrumental to the Feeder Fund deals, including the credit and risk control departments.

85. As part of their unified transactional and risk management approach, CIB Division members entered into agreements for their mutual benefit. For example, IXIS-Paris guaranteed Defendant's payment obligations under all deals into which Defendant entered, including the Defendant Deals. Just days before the Groupement Deal closed, Orsatelli signed this guarantee in his capacity as IXIS-Paris's Executive Board Chairman.

86. The top-level authorized signatories who could contractually bind Defendant and sanction its fund transfers and payments included executives from Defendant and IXIS-Paris.

87. To fully integrate its risk and deal approval systems for structured products, the CIB Division established the Structured Fund Products Group (the "SFPG"). The SFPG was a global, cross-entity group responsible for comprehensive risk management for structured products the CIB Division created and sold, including all Feeder Fund deals.

88. Eric Raiten was the SFPG's U.S. head and IXIS-Paris's Laurent Dubois was the global head. In their CIB Division roles, Raiten and Dubois reported directly to Fourt, an IXIS-Paris Executive Committee member. SFPG member Emmanuel Lefort, an IXIS-Paris senior manager who reported directly to Dubois, was responsible for shepherding Tensyr into existence. Dubois was involved in the Tensyr deal from the beginning (signing the initial non-disclosure agreement with Fairfield) to the middle (staying informed through Lefort about the Tensyr rating

process) to the end (involved in the deal's final structure). While not directly involved, Raiten was aware that his IXIS-Paris SFPG colleagues launched Tensyr.

89. In the SFPG's ordinary course of business, Defendant and IXIS-Paris shared information regarding clients and transactions across offices. According to Raiten, "there were periodic contacts between New York and Paris ... generally organizing ourselves ... on a global basis." This included sharing information on transactions the SFPG committee considered and approved. For example, IXIS-Paris compliance vetted and granted approval for the Groupement Deal.

90. Defendant's SFPG representatives regularly assisted their IXIS-Paris counterparts on transactions, including those involving Madoff. For example, in 2001, a Defendant employee emailed Tremont founder Sandra Manzke about investing in a Feeder Fund, but lamented that things were not moving forward because of holdups in both New York and Paris.

91. In 2003, Defendant began working on a possible deal with Ascot Partners, L.P., a Feeder Fund run by J. Ezra Merkin. Defendant's Raiten coordinated the CIB Division's efforts to try to set up this deal. Among other things, Raiten organized a meeting at Merkin's offices and brought with him Sophie Souliac Deschamps, the CIB Division's co-head of Structured Alternative Investments (and, on information and belief, part of the SFPG), and others from CIB Division affiliates. Under the proposed structure, IXIS-Paris would have provided the leverage for the deal and then assigned its exposure to Defendant.

92. This potential deal contained nearly the same terms as Tensyr. Among other similarities: (i) a Natixis Group entity collaborated with a Feeder Fund to create a leveraged investment with a New York-based multibillion-dollar Feeder Fund as the underlying asset; (ii) a

Natixis Group entity would be the leverage provider; (iii) the deal size would be several hundred million dollars; and (iv) the proposed investment vehicle would sell both notes and equity.

93. The deal with Merkin ultimately did not move forward because Madoff would not bless it; two years later, however, as more fully explained below, when presented with nearly the same transaction, Madoff said yes to Tensyr. On information and belief, IXIS-Paris created Tensyr using the knowledge it gained when setting up the potential Merkin deal. This comports with IXIS-Paris's understanding that the Feeder Funds were fungible; in 2004, it told Fairfield that if it could not get capacity with Sentry, it would simply "try for other Madoff feeders."

94. In another example, in 2004, New York-based SFPG member Bernard Abdo used his relationship with Access to assist IXIS-Paris with a proposed Groupement transaction, separate from the already-existing Groupement Deal. Abdo was Access's point person and primary contact for all negotiations, diligence requests, and final deal approval. Under the proposed transaction, Natixis would issue a Groupement-linked note while Defendant would provide leverage. Abdo worked with Access to obtain information on BLMIS that was needed by "our Paris office for vetting." When issues arose coordinating the deal, Abdo emailed Access assuring it that New York "coordinate[s] with the Paris office."

95. Also in 2004, Defendant and IXIS-Paris had many conversations about a potential deal between them and Access. Souliac Deschamps reached out to Raiten to discuss a new potential deal involving an Access Feeder Fund. Raiten forwarded the communication to Abdo who communicated directly with a representative at Access to "see what [he] can find out."

96. In 2005, Souliac Deschamps emailed Access about reaching an agreement on a structured product. Souliac Deschamps referenced teams in New York assisting her with the product and stated that "everything is rolling." Dubois, Raiten, Abdo, Souliac Deschamps, and

others from IXIS-Paris and Defendant worked together on the potential deal with Access. Dubois later directed Souliac Deschamps to communicate with Access about a transaction with IXIS Corporate & Investment Bank.

97. In 2008, an Access employee attempted to get Defendant to invest more money, but Defendant rebuffed Access, claiming capacity constraints. In response, an Access representative said she would “harass” Dubois, whom she called the “boss.”

98. In October 2006, Raiten executed an ISDA confirmation on Defendant’s behalf, under which Defendant entered a transaction with a Fairfield fund-of-funds that invested in Sentry. The next month, during Tensyr’s creation, Dubois and Fourt met with Fairfield co-founder Andres Piedrahita for lunch. Following that meeting, Fourt spoke with Piedrahita about the possibility of IXIS-Paris purchasing a 25% stake in Fairfield.

99. Defendant’s larger deals required IXIS-Paris’s direct consent. For example, in exploring a potential deal with Fairfield, Defendant revealed that any such deals required it to “go back to the head office in Paris for approval.”

100. To gain funding approval for each Defendant Deal, Defendant drafted for the CIB Division’s review certain approval memoranda (the “**Approval Memos**”) that included information the Feeder Funds provided on the SSC Strategy, BLMIS’s track record and correlation with the S&P 100 Index, and BLMIS’s purported trades. The Approval Memos nominally allowed the CIB Division to assess Defendant’s and IXIS-Paris’s risk associated with BLMIS. For example, Defendant’s managing director Raiten prepared and sent the Groupement, Harley, and Alpha Prime Approval Memos to de Clapiers and Ramine Rouhani, to whom Raiten directly reported in Paris and who eventually became an IXIS-Paris Executive Committee member.

101. The CIB Division's consolidated approach to Feeder Fund investment approval provided its members, including Defendant, IXIS-Paris, and Natexis, with specific facts concerning qualitative and quantitative irregularities at BLMIS.

III. BEFORE ENTERING THE GROUPEMENT DEAL, DEFENDANT SUBJECTIVELY IDENTIFIED DISCREPANCIES AND INDICIA OF FRAUD CONCERNING BLMIS

102. In 2003, in addition to Groupement's BLMIS account opening documents and trade tickets, Access gave Defendant the Access Madoff Deck, a marketing piece about Madoff and BLMIS that included two background memoranda that Access's head of new product development prepared (the "**Dumbauld Memos**"); a brief legal opinion from Access's outside counsel solely based on information Access provided it; industry publications questioning Madoff's legitimacy; BLMIS's corporate filings; pertinent securities laws and regulations; and other publicly available reports on BLMIS and Madoff.

103. Defendant's Groupement Approval Memo indicated that it fully reviewed the Access Madoff Deck and Groupement's BLMIS account opening documents. This document reflected Defendant's awareness of obvious indicia of fraud at BLMIS.

A. Defendant Reviewed Conflicting Information About BLMIS Trading that It Never Clarified

104. The Access Madoff Deck and the BLMIS account opening documents contained blatantly inconsistent information. Defendant reviewed and saw those inconsistencies firsthand and was aware of other information that contradicted both sources.

105. *First*, the Access Madoff Deck's description of how BLMIS purported to make money facially made no sense. The Access Madoff Deck's legal opinion stated that BLMIS would "be earning only ordinary BD [broker-dealer] compensation on the trades conducted in the Account. Furthermore, the provision of investment advice should be viewed as 'solely

incidental.” This was obviously untrue: IA Business customers were paying for Madoff’s purported security selection and timing of the SSC Strategy trades, not their simple execution.

106. The Dumbauld Memos provided another obvious indication that BLMIS’s fee structure was highly unusual: BLMIS reportedly made “no money from the options executions” conducted for its IA Business customers. By not charging anything for the purported option trades, Madoff inexplicably gave up hundreds of millions in potential revenues for executing billions of dollars in notional trades.

107. The Access Madoff Deck was internally inconsistent regarding how BLMIS was compensated and further differed from external sources’ information on this issue. The Access Madoff Deck stated that BLMIS “is solely compensated by the bid/offer spread on each trade.” In a 1997 *Traders Magazine* article, “The Madoff Mystery,” attached as an exhibit to the Access Madoff Deck, Madoff stated that he was not charging commissions on trades but that BLMIS’s profits were also not solely derived from the bid/ask spread. In contrast, another Access Madoff Deck exhibit, an article from industry publication *MAR/Hedge* entitled, “Madoff Tops Charts; Skeptics Ask How” (the “**MAR/Hedge Article**”), quoted Madoff as saying that BLMIS’s “role ... is to provide the investment strategy and execute the trades, for which it generates commission revenue.” And some, but not all, of the option trade tickets Access provided to Defendant identified commissions.

108. Despite knowing that the Access Madoff Deck, two industry publications, and the trade tickets all conflicted, Defendant prepared and circulated an Approval Memo in January 2006 that asserted that Madoff “will earn a bid/offer spread on transactions.” Instead of seeking clarification on how Madoff was purporting to earn money, Defendant simply picked one of the conflicting answers.

109. *Second*, the Dumbauld Memos contained contradictory information related to BLMIS's purported trade execution for managed accounts. These memos first claimed BLMIS separated its IA Business from its trading business to prevent conflicts of interest or fraud. The Dumbauld Memos, however, contradicted that statement in the next sentence, which claimed that BLMIS "execute[d] the stock basket trades with [BLMIS]'s market making traders."

110. The Access Madoff Deck included further inconsistencies about BLMIS purported trade execution. The legal memo's first page explicitly stated that BLMIS traded "as principal," but the Dumbauld Memos claimed the opposite: BLMIS purportedly traded "as an agent and fiduciary." When entering the Defendant Deals, Defendant pointed to two sources in the same document that contradicted each other on this issue.

111. *Third*, Defendant knew that the SSC Strategy purportedly relied on purchasing and selling options whose notional value was at least 95% of the Basket's value. Groupement's BLMIS account opening documents required Madoff to make only listed trades and the Access Madoff Deck indicated that BLMIS only traded publicly and never in private, OTC transactions, yet the MAR/Hedge Article that Defendant reviewed stated, "[t]hroughout the entire period Madoff has managed the assets," he employed the SSC Strategy, as part of which he "claim[ed] to use OTC options almost entirely." As discussed below, Defendant knew it was impossible for BLMIS to be trading on either the exchange or OTC, given neither had sufficient capacity to allow Madoff to execute all his purported trades and Defendant knew Madoff only claimed to trade in one manner or another, not both.

112. In both 2003 and 2005, Access provided Defendant with the Access Madoff Deck, which Defendant reviewed and used to obtain CIB Division committee approval for at least three Defendant Deals. Without acknowledging (much less attempting to reconcile) the discrepancies,

Defendant used the Access Madoff Deck as “due diligence” and parroted in its Approval Memos whichever of the inconsistent facts seemed to best suit its needs.

B. Defendant Recognized the Opportunity for Fraud Created by BLMIS Simultaneously Serving as Broker, Custodian, and Investment Manager

113. From 2003 on, Defendant, IXIS-Paris, and the CIB Division knew that BLMIS simultaneously served as broker, custodian, and investment manager for all Feeder Fund assets, which, as a public rating agency described to IXIS-Paris, meant that “everything [was] on BLM[IS]’s shoulders” for Tensyr and each of the Defendant Deals.

114. The Access Madoff Deck unambiguously stated that BLMIS functioned as Groupement’s custodian, investment advisor, and executing broker. Defendant and the CIB Division’s compliance committee each reviewed the Access Madoff Deck and understood that Madoff’s overlapping roles created an environment ripe for misappropriation of customer funds.

115. Such a lack of operational independence is why the Autorité des Marchés Financiers (the “AMF”), a French financial regulatory body overseeing IXIS-Paris, requires investment managers to use an independent custodian. In 2006, IXIS-Paris raised this concern in an email to Fairfield, saying, “I have a problem concerning the AMF’s criteria[.]. My problem concerns the criterion n°4: ‘The responsibility for custody of the assets of the fund must be entrusted to one or more companies, separate from the portfolio management company, regulated for this purpose and identified in the prospectus.’”

116. The Access Madoff Deck highlighted BLMIS’s lack of operational independence by claiming that the “continual presence of six supervisors” controlled critical operational risk at BLMIS. But Defendant knew that three of those supervisors were Madoff family members. Defendant also knew that having family members in key compliance positions further

compromised, rather than enhanced, the independence required by AMF regulations (and common sense), thereby *increasing* operational risk at BLMIS.

117. BLMIS's lack of independent oversight created a gross conflict of interest and promoted an environment ripe for fraud. Instead of seeking independent verification of BLMIS's supposed trading, Defendant accepted Madoff family "control."

IV. FOLLOWING THE GROUPEMENT DEAL, DEFENDANT AMASSED ADDITIONAL EVIDENCE THAT BLMIS WAS NOT ENGAGED IN THE TRADING ACTIVITY IT REPORTED

A. Defendant Saw and Appreciated Evidence that BLMIS Was Not Trading the Options It Reported

118. It only took a few months after closing the Groupement Deal for Defendant to develop suspicions about options trading. In February 2004, a CIB Division representative responsible for regularly reviewing Groupement's BLMIS trades forwarded Access "the latest Access-Madoff risk report" which identified potential trading parameter violations in Groupement's account. This was not the last time Defendant and the CIB Division identified suspicious options trades that BLMIS reported.

119. Raiten, the SFPG's U.S. head, testified in a deposition taken in this case that CIB Division middle office personnel reviewed "each and every" trade reported on the Feeder Fund monthly statements and confirmations Defendant received. An email from SFPG member Abdo to Access stated that the middle office demanded all future risk reports include "the market value of the stock portfolio so that [we] can compare that to the notional value of the call options." Through these reviews, Defendant found BLMIS's customer statements reflected fictitious trades.

120. As explained below, through the above-described review process and its options expertise, Defendant knew it was facially impossible for anyone to trade options in volumes vastly

exceeding the total number of available options on the Chicago Board Options Exchange (the “CBOE”), the only exchange in the world that lists the options BLMIS purportedly traded.

121. Over time, the CIB Division’s middle office was increasingly concerned that BLMIS was not making the trades reported on its customer statements. For example, from May 2005 to May 2006, Groupement reported 42 option trades; for 40 of them (over 95%), Groupement’s account statements reflected BLMIS purported to trade options at a volume that exceeded those available on the entire exchange, including seven instances where Groupement’s statements reported Madoff traded more than 1,000% of the CBOE’s volume, and 15 where Madoff reported trading more than 200% of the CBOE’s volume.

122. The CIB Division’s middle office also reviewed all trades BLMIS reported on Harley’s customer statements from May 2005 to May 2006. For this period, BLMIS reported making 117 options trades on Harley’s behalf, of which 95 (over 81%) exceeded the CBOE’s volume. Of these 95 instances, 21 involved trading between 1,000% and 4,999% of the CBOE’s volume, 8 involved trading over 5,000% of the listed volume, 3 involved trading more than 10,000% of the exchange’s volume, and on December 16, 2005, BLMIS reported trading options for Harley that exceeded 26,000% of the CBOE’s available volume.

123. Therefore, in a one-year period, Defendant knew that each of these 135 of 159 trades it reviewed (85%) could not have been made, was therefore impossible, and did not exist.

124. With concerns about the available volume and size of the options market, Raiten called an asset management colleague at IXIS-Paris, who told Raiten that Madoff was trading OTC. Raiten, however, testified at his deposition that both he and “most market participants” would agree that there is “more liquidity in the exchange instrument than in the OTC instrument.”

125. While Raiten claimed at his deposition that this call with IXIS-Paris provided “satisfaction” to his concerns, this is blatantly inconsistent and illogical given Raiten knew there is more volume on the CBOE than the OTC market and BLMIS never claimed to use a combination of OTC and exchange traded options—just one or the other. Accordingly, Raiten’s supposed “satisfaction,” on Defendant’s behalf, was illogical and insincere: he knew it was impossible for BLMIS to trade such volumes on either the CBOE (because Madoff’s reported volumes, even for individual accounts greatly exceeded the reported listed volume) or OTC (because the OTC market’s volume does not exceed the CBOE’s), meaning the trades could never have taken place as reported.

126. As Defendant’s counsel represented at a February 8, 2018 hearing before this Court, Raiten was not just “any employee; [he] was the employee who was the head of the [SPFG] that designed the financial products at issue; [he] was the employee who did the due diligence; and [he] was the employee who did the monitoring of the feeder funds after the hedging funds were purchased.”³

127. Raiten, ultimately responsible for Defendant’s Groupement and Harley Deals, knew that the story his colleague told him was wrong and his questions remained unanswered. Raiten and Defendant, however, did not take any action to end Defendant’s involvement with BLMIS’s increasingly suspicious activities or actually “satisfy” their concerns.

128. Defendant understood that BLMIS required an impossibly large volume of options to hedge a single IA Business account, meaning that BLMIS did not—and could not—make the trades it reported on BLMIS customer statements.

³ See Hr’g Tr., at 40:3–8, *SIPC v. BLMIS (In re BLMIS)*, Adv. Pro. No. 08-01789, ECF No. 17438 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Feb. 8, 2018).

129. By late 2006, after the impossible Groupement and Harley options trades purportedly took place, were reported, and were reviewed by Defendant, IXIS-Paris understood that Madoff claimed to trade options OTC instead of on the CBOE. Unlike with OTC options trading, the Options Clearing Corporation guarantees fulfillment of exchange-traded options. Partly because of this, industry practice holds that OTC option counterparties are listed on trade tickets so that the customer can assess its counterparty risk. Federal security regulations require a client's broker-dealer to provide the counterparties' identities at the client's request. OTC option counterparties' identities became an issue when Madoff began purportedly trading OTC.

130. Not knowing the counterparties' identities meant customers were exposed to unquantifiable and potentially significant risk. As more fully described below, while creating Tensyr, IXIS-Paris knew Madoff refused to reveal his purported counterparties. Instead of attempting to find out the counterparties' identities, IXIS-Paris crafted a fictionalized narrative about who they were and then told this story to the public rating agencies as if it were the truth.

131. From 2003 to 2008, Defendant and IXIS-Paris reviewed and analyzed Feeder Funds' BLMIS trade tickets and account statements, including Groupement. None of these documents identified any BLMIS option counterparties.

132. Defendant, moreover, reviewed BLMIS's obviously illegitimate OTC option trade tickets. As a sophisticated financial company, Defendant knew exchange-traded options receive a Committee on Uniform Security Identification Procedures ("CUSIP") identification number, which provides a common reference point for anyone seeking to trade that security. In contrast, OTC options are almost never assigned CUSIP numbers because the parties would be required to request a CUSIP number for each trade made, which would be slow, expensive, and unnecessary: only parties to those specific contracts need to identify the instrument being traded. Yet each

BLMIS option trade ticket Defendant and IXIS-Paris reviewed contained a CUSIP number. Neither Defendant nor IXIS-Paris ever raised this issue with BLMIS or anyone else.

133. Regardless of whether BLMIS was purportedly trading options OTC or on the CBOE, Defendant and IXIS-Paris identified irregularities and irreconcilable inconsistencies suggesting fraud or falsification in the options transactions BLMIS reported.

B. Defendant Reviewed Standard Industry Performance Measures Indicating BLMIS Was Not Employing the SSC Strategy

134. By reviewing BLMIS's monthly account statements and trade information for Groupement, Harley, and Alpha Prime and by applying industry-standard statistical analyses like correlation and the Sharpe ratio, Defendant and IXIS-Paris saw that BLMIS's returns were objectively inconsistent with the stated SSC Strategy. But Defendant turned a blind eye to *how* BLMIS was able to avoid virtually any volatility or downturn in the market.

135. Beyond these statistical measures, in 2004, the CIB Division's suspicions surrounding Madoff were discussed at Fairfield. Internal Fairfield emails between its Chief Risk Officer and a sales agent reveal that the agent just had "another conversation with my friend at Natexis," who told her he had "two fundamental problems that bother him" about Sentry:

1) Why has the performance been declining over the past few years. I have shown him the LIBOR analysis and he does not buy it. Can you think of any other explanation. 2) Why is Sentry making so much money on the options when it is supposed to be a hedge. He had two PhD quants from [Natexis] at the meeting and they are of the opinion that something else is going on that they don't understand. Apparently the theory was raised that Sentry is providing liquidity to Madoff's securities business and getting compensated for it.

136. This reflects that the CIB Division identified that BLMIS's reported returns were not the result of its reported trading, and instead hypothesized to be from Sentry's providing BLMIS with liquidity in exchange for favorable returns. Defendant did nothing to further determine whether BLMIS's returns were fictionalized as these analysts had determined.

1. Correlation

137. In the finance industry, correlation is used to measure how closely an investment's performance mirrors a benchmark. In the case of BLMIS, Defendant used correlation to measure how closely BLMIS's returns mirrored the S&P 100 Index, or the very similar S&P 500 Index.

138. By 2003, Defendant understood that the SSC Strategy involved buying a Basket containing 30–50 of the largest S&P 100 Index stocks (that were required to be highly correlated to the index). For example, the first Dumbauld Memo in the Access Madoff Deck stated that the SSC Strategy's Basket was "chosen to closely replicate the payoff patterns of the S&P100" Index, meaning the stocks would be highly correlated to that index.

139. Defendant also understood the SSC Strategy purportedly involved putting on an options collar. Defendant knew the collar was purportedly designed to reduce volatility but was revenue-neutral, meaning it should not have reduced the correlation between BLMIS's returns and the S&P 100 Index's returns.

140. As noted above, the CIB Division had personnel dedicated to verifying BLMIS's compliance with the SSC Strategy's trading parameters. As such, Defendant regularly (at least monthly) reviewed all trades BLMIS reported on customer statements for at least Groupement, Harley, and Alpha Prime, and saw that BLMIS purported to generate improbably consistent, positive returns that were uncorrelated with the S&P 100 Index, especially when the market dropped strongly.

141. Defendant knew in real time from its review of the Access Madoff Deck (and all Feeder Fund marketing materials it subsequently reviewed) that BLMIS's returns were not correlated to the S&P 100 Index. IXIS-Paris also knew from a Tensyr investor presentation in November 2006 that since inception, Sentry had "[l]ow correlation to the S&P 100 Index."

142. Defendant’s January 2006 Harley Deal Approval Memo reported that Harley had a 6-year track record, during which its “average return was nearly 1% per month, with ~13% per year since its inception. The maximum drawdown [*i.e.*, the largest drop from peak to trough] was -0.35% for 2 months.” This greatly differed from the S&P 100 and 500 Indices’ returns, which are widely reported and known to Wall Street professionals like Defendant. The Tensyr investor presentation stated that since inception, Sentry’s maximum drawdown was “-0.64% vs. -49.37% for the S&P 100 Index.”

143. Defendant also received and reviewed the April 2007 performance summary for Feeder Fund Herald USA Segregated Portfolio (“**Herald**”), which included several metrics demonstrating the SSC Strategy did not correlate to the S&P 500 Index. This included highlighting the striking contrast between Herald’s worst drawdown at -0.71%, and the S&P 500 Index’s -44.72% drawdown during the same period. The summary also featured a chart showing that even when Herald posted negative returns, those declines were minuscule compared to the decline the S&P 500 Index experienced:

03/1996 - 03/2007	%Yr. Avg.	%Months Up	Best Month	Worst Month	Drawdown (Max.Loss)
HERALD USA	10,95%	92,48%	3,66%	-0,53%	-0,71%
Hedge Funds					
HFR Equity Mket Neutral	7,49%	81,20%	3,59%	-1,67%	-2,72%
USA					
Government Bills (T-bills)	3,82%	100,00%	0,53%	0,07%	0,00%
Stocks (S&P 500)	8,93%	63,16%	9,78%	-14,44%	-44,72%

144. The performance summary also detailed Herald’s lifetime monthly returns:


Performance*												
	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007
January		3,22%	0,93%	2,54%	2,71%	2,64%	-0,17%	-0,53%	0,89%	0,48%	0,74%	0,26%
February		0,58%	1,52%	0,06%	0,05%	0,00%	0,47%	-0,14%	0,39%	0,13%	-0,01%	-0,37%
March	1,49%	1,15%	2,42%	2,99%	2,19%	1,25%	0,59%	2,42%	0,00%	0,51%	1,45%	1,87%
April	0,57%	2,97%	0,40%	0,23%	0,25%	1,46%	0,86%	-0,07%	0,29%	0,07%	0,95%	0,97%
May	1,99%	1,20%	2,19%	1,89%	1,44%	0,22%	2,89%	0,78%	0,56%	0,70%	0,64%	
June	0,29%	1,75%	1,34%	2,20%	0,80%	0,13%	0,16%	1,01%	1,26%	0,37%	0,58%	
July	2,20%	0,61%	0,76%	0,33%	0,59%	0,31%	3,66%	1,57%	-0,05%	0,07%	1,18%	
August	0,12%	0,06%	0,06%	0,71%	1,52%	1,03%	0,31%	0,09%	1,42%	0,11%	0,71%	
September	1,28%	1,69%	0,83%	0,54%	0,10%	0,66%	0,04%	1,01%	0,97%	0,86%	0,69%	
October	2,08%	0,28%	1,91%	0,89%	0,67%	1,45%	0,66%	1,42%	-0,05%	1,91%	0,42%	
November	1,40%	1,48%	0,61%	1,49%	0,48%	1,05%	0,00%	-0,30%	0,71%	0,60%	0,73%	
December	0,24%	0,21%	0,18%	0,21%	0,28%	0,11%	-0,04%	0,28%	0,19%	0,56%	0,87%	
Yearly Return	12,25%	16,26%	13,95%	14,97%	11,61%	10,79%	9,76%	7,76%	6,77%	6,55%	9,30%	2,74%

145. Herald’s April 2007 performance summary showed that fund went 70 months, from inception until 2002, without a single negative monthly return. In comparison, during the same 70-month period, the S&P 100 Index experienced 30 down months, or approximately 48% of the time. Defendant knew it was a virtual impossibility for any fund—let alone one designed to correlate to the market—to generate such returns.

146. This was not new information: Defendant had reviewed monthly BLMIS account statements since at least 2003 each reflecting positive months, one after the other. Defendant analyzed Herald marketing materials touting Madoff’s purported ability to generate “exceptional consistency even during severe down markets.” Defendant knew the S&P 100 Index experienced approximately 51 down months during the period covered by Herald’s April 2007 monthly performance summary, meaning the index generated positive monthly returns just 58% of the time. Defendant understood no Feeder Fund—inclusive of fees—ever reported a negative quarter.

147. Defendant also knew that when the S&P 100 Index experienced returns worse than -13%, -14%, and -23% in 2000, 2001, and 2002, respectively, Herald reported gains of nearly 11%, 10%, and 8%, respectively. Aggregating these returns, the SSC Strategy—which, by definition, was designed to correlate to the S&P 100 Index—outperformed the S&P 100 Index by almost 80 percentage points in just three years.

148. Herald also praised Madoff’s apparent imperviousness to market turmoil:




149. This showed Defendant that during the S&P 500 Index’s ten worst-performing months, Herald (and by extension, Madoff) never lost money but outperformed the S&P 500 Index by over 91 percentage points.

150. Defendant and IXIS-Paris knew that other funds employing similar strategies could not come close to duplicating Madoff’s results. IXIS-Paris owned (and still owns) the manager of one such fund, Gateway Fund, and Defendant and IXIS-Paris were familiar with its operations. In


fact, as early as 2003, both received and reviewed the MAR/Hedge Article that highlighted the incongruity of Gateway Fund’s returns compared BLMIS’s, stating that Gateway Fund “has experienced far greater volatility and lower returns during the same period” than the Feeder Funds.

151. The charts below compare key performance metrics for Gateway Fund and Groupement from April 2003 through November 2008. When viewed together, they reveal inexplicable discrepancies:



152. Gateway Fund’s metrics reflect actual trading and returns, revealing a portfolio that moved in tandem with its benchmark, the S&P 100 Index, with a 0.91 correlation coefficient, which is a very high, approaching “perfect” correlation. By comparison, Groupement’s correlation coefficient was 0.11, meaning it bore virtually no relation to the S&P 100 Index.

153. The chart below compares Gateway Fund’s returns (the bottom line) and the returns BLMIS purported to generate for Sentry (the top line):



154. While Gateway Fund’s performance reflects periods of significant volatility that corresponded with broader market volatility, especially from 2000 to 2002, BLMIS’s performance reflects impossibly consistent growth, immune to market fluctuations. From its industry experience and review of the MAR/Hedge Article (and because IXIS-Paris owns Gateway Fund’s manager) IXIS-Paris was aware of Sentry’s conspicuous deviation from Gateway Fund, and that Sentry’s returns could not have been achieved using the SSC Strategy.

2. Sharpe Ratio

155. The Sharpe ratio measures how well a trading strategy compensates an investor for risk taken. A positive Sharpe ratio indicates that an investment is producing positive returns relative to risk; the higher the Sharpe ratio, the better the returns are relative to the risk.

156. Because the Basket was supposed to be 95% correlated to the S&P 100 Index (and the options collar was supposed to be revenue-neutral), the strategy should have produced Sharpe ratios like those the S&P 100 Index generated.

157. Based on their review of the Access Madoff Deck and their understanding that Gateway Fund executed a virtually identical investment strategy, IXIS-Paris and Defendant knew that BLMIS's and Gateway Fund's Sharpe ratios should have mirrored both the S&P 100 and S&P 500 Indices' Sharpe ratios and each other's. But that was not the case: Gateway Fund produced a Sharpe ratio of 0.2, the S&P 500 Index a Sharpe ratio of 0.55 (meaning Gateway Fund's was slightly worse than the Index); and the SSC Strategy produced a 2.73 Sharpe ratio.

158. Inexplicably, the SSC Strategy produced a Sharpe ratio five times better than the S&P 100 Index (something not reasonably possible if Madoff had traded as he purported to) further demonstrating to Defendant the fictitious nature of BLMIS's trades.

159. Defendant was aware of the Sharpe ratio abnormality before investing in Harley (if not before) and not only acknowledged but used it in the Harley Approval Memo as a significant metric and basis for the Harley Deal's approval.

160. Defendant also received Herald's April 2007 tear sheet that lauded its incredible Sharpe ratio of 2.90 since inception, compared to 0.59 over the same approximate period for the S&P 500 Index. The Tensyr investor presentation from November 2006 stated that since inception, Sentry's Sharpe ratio was 2.80, compared to the S&P 100 Index's 0.51.

161. Defendant knew from several sources that BLMIS's could not achieve its inexplicable Sharpe ratio through the equity-heavy trading strategy Madoff purported to use.

C. After the Groupement Deal, Defendant Performed No Due Diligence

162. Despite its subjective identification of mounting facts and circumstances suggesting fraud in the IA Business and fictitious trades BLMIS reported on its customer statements, Defendant submitted Approval Memos in January 2006 and entered the Harley Deal with Harley's manager, Fix Asset Management. Defendant did so without conducting any further investigation of the indicia of fraud it had already identified.

163. These Approval Memos stated the scope of Defendant's credit department's due diligence was limited to an inquiry on Fix Asset Management rather than BLMIS. An Approval Memo noted that "[t]he Credit Department, in particular, did not investigate and offers no opinion on the past or expected future performance of" BLMIS, "an entity that Credit *is not uncomfortable with* based on the information available. However, the available information for Madoff was limited to information from Madoff's website" and the Access Madoff Deck. (Emphasis added). A closer inspection of the credit department's information sources reveals it conducted no actual diligence: by this time, the Access Madoff Deck was over three years stale and Madoff's website excluded even a mention of the IA Business and the SSC Strategy. The credit department let Defendant go ahead with the Harley Deal, regardless.

164. Defendant's effort to limit diligence hit a snag when Fix Asset Management later requested an increase the Harley Deal's size. Because this would increase the deal size beyond the pre-approved CIB Division limits, Raiten, the executive in charge of the Defendant Deals and responsible for ordering due diligence and obtaining committee approval, knew an increase would be denied if he was unable to secure a meeting with Madoff at BLMIS's offices.

165. Raiten obtained a one-hour meeting with Madoff in or around 2006. Raiten met with no one else from BLMIS and asked Madoff no questions about BLMIS's impossible returns, trading anomalies, or inconsistencies that Defendant had identified over the years. In fact, Raiten requested no documentation from Madoff whatsoever. Raiten made no report of the meeting, but merely checked the box that the meeting occurred, a successful exercise to obtain approval to expand the size of the Harley Deal and the fees it would generate for the CIB Division.

166. When Defendant decided to invest in Alpha Prime, the CIB Division's credit department admitted again, as with the Harley Deal, that the only "diligence" it conducted on

BLMIS was a review of BLMIS's website and the Access Madoff Deck, but the credit department gave Defendant the green light anyway.

167. In its 2009 production to FINRA in response to the regulator's BLMIS investigation, Defendant confirmed it did not conduct any other diligence beyond reviewing the Access Madoff Deck and the BLMIS website. Defendant told FINRA that it produced "all files concerning due diligence conducted by [Defendant] of funds directly or indirectly invested in B[L]MIS accounts, including ... all memoranda or reports concerning the results of the review."

168. The FINRA production contains no evidence Defendant performed any independent due diligence on BLMIS, Madoff, or the SSC Strategy. Rather, the FINRA production confirms that Defendant entered the Defendant Deals while relying on the same recycled, and facially inaccurate, information it received from Access in 2003.

V. DEFENDANT DELIBERATELY HID ITS SUSPICIONS TO REALIZE FINANCIAL INCENTIVES

A. Defendant and its Executives Were Motivated to Ignore Evidence of Fraud

169. Incentivized by financial gain received from closing hundreds of millions of dollars' worth of BLMIS-related deals and aware that the CIB Division would bear any downside risk long after it paid annual bonuses, Defendant's executives knowingly ignored the high probability of fraud at BLMIS.

170. For example, in 2004, Fourt, the global head of the CIB Division's Capital Markets Group and a member of Defendant's board, was paid just over €1.03 million. With a 45% increase from 2004 to 2005 in IXIS-Paris's revenue from structured products on hedge funds (like the Feeder Funds), Fourt saw a commensurate 47% increase in his compensation, rising to almost €1.52 million. The CIB Division also guaranteed his compensation for 2007 and 2008, meaning if Madoff's scheme imploded, Fourt would still be paid. Defendant and IXIS-Paris each carried

insurance policies that covered their executives, shielding them from civil liability for allowing the entities to invest in fraudulent investments.

171. These financial awards and protections provided ample reason for Defendant, operated by its executives and senior employees, to turn a blind eye to Madoff's fraud.

B. Defendant Structured the Defendant Deals and Took Other Measures to Minimize Any Potential Loss

172. Beyond financial incentives for themselves and their executives, Defendant and IXIS-Paris believed they could comfortably ignore the indicia of fraud because they structured their Feeder Fund deals so clients bore the first risk of loss, and because Defendant and IXIS-Paris each had fraud insurance policies that would, respectively, cover up to \$75 million and \$100 million in losses.

173. Defendant structured the Defendant Deals so it would avoid loss unless the underlying Feeder Funds' net asset values rapidly and precipitously fell. For example, Groupement's net asset value would have had to drop by more than 50% before any Defendant money was exposed to loss under the Groupement Deal. Defendant also negotiated provisions with each Feeder Fund that allowed it to redeem its investments ahead of other equity shareholders.

174. IXIS Corporate & Investment Bank declared in its 2006 Annual Report that "risk of theft and fraud are [] covered by two blanket policies ... for the entire" Natixis Group. This provided Defendant with comfort that in the event of fraud or theft, it could avoid most or all potential losses.

175. Through their Feeder Fund deal structures and fraud insurance policies, Defendant and IXIS-Paris created a likelihood that they would not lose money, regardless of Madoff's fraud.

C. Defendant Calculated that Even Before It Cashed in its Insurance, It Was Exceptionally Unlikely to Lose Money with Madoff

176. Defendant calculated using standard deviation that it would be highly unlikely to lose money on the Defendant Deals and highlighted this fact in an Approval Memo.

177. In the financial industry, standard deviation is a measure of volatility and, thus, risk. The more unpredictable the price of a security, index, or portfolio, the greater the risk. Financial professionals routinely use standard deviation to predict how likely a given price or outcome is.

178. In the Alpha Prime Approval Memo from January 2006, Defendant determined that based on standard deviation, its loss risk was a 19-standard deviation event; it also calculated that a “knockout” (*i.e.*, where Alpha Prime’s net asset value dropped so much that Defendant could immediately cancel the Alpha Prime Deal without penalty) required a 24-standard deviation event.

179. Defendant, therefore, calculated that based on BLMIS’s purported returns and how it structured the Alpha Prime Deal, the chance it would lose money was significantly less than one in one septillion or, put numerically, less than 1 in 1,000,000,000,000,000,000,000. As to a knockout, the chance a 25-standard deviation event occurs is about the same as a person winning the lottery 21 or 22 times *in a row*.

180. The standard deviation analysis was important to Defendant, making it a deal point in the Alpha Prime Approval Memo—twice. Defendant capitalized on the math showing the chance of losing money on a Defendant Deal was so improbable that its investment was statistically risk-free, ignoring that the same calculation showed the Feeder Funds’ stability was so improbable that it was statistically virtually impossible.

181. By its nature, equity investing (even hedged investing), like Madoff purported to do, carries risk. Defendant knew that it was inconceivable to invest in equities without any risk, yet did nothing to investigate how the SSC Strategy was reporting to do just that. As such,

Defendant recognized that BLMIS's standard deviation demonstrated a high probability of fraud at BLMIS or that the trades reported on BLMIS's monthly customer statements were fictitious.

VI. IXIS-PARIS SUBJECTIVELY IDENTIFIED INDICIA OF FRAUD, WILLFULLY BLINDED ITSELF, AND PREVENTED THE RATING AGENCIES FROM LEARNING THE TRUTH

182. Defendant's and the CIB Division's intention to ignore indicia of fraud and put profit ahead of investors is reflected in IXIS-Paris's creating and selling interests in Tensyr. As explained above, IXIS-Paris's knowledge is imputed to Defendant.

183. Lefort, a senior IXIS-Paris employee working in tandem with Dubois (the SFPG's global head) and under Orsatelli (IXIS-Paris's Chairman), was primarily responsible for structuring the Tensyr deal.

184. IXIS-Paris and Fairfield agreed in April 2006 to create and manage Tensyr. Fairfield indemnified IXIS-Paris for any losses incurred in connection with the Tensyr deal. In this way, IXIS-Paris minimized its financial risk in the event its subjective fears of fraud at BLMIS were realized.

185. As part of creating Tensyr, IXIS-Paris worked to obtain the highest possible investment rating for Tensyr from the major rating agencies, Moody's Investor Services ("**Moody's**"), Fitch Group Inc. ("**Fitch**"), and Standard and Poor's ("**S&P**") and, together with Moody's and Fitch, the "**Rating Agencies**"). IXIS-Paris and Fairfield each understood such a rating was necessary to maximize the profits flowing to both entities.

186. From the start, the Rating Agencies confronted IXIS-Paris with questions about IA Business operations irregularities and trading impossibilities. This presented IXIS-Paris with a problem, in that it either could not obtain answers to these questions or knew that honestly answering them would result in the Rating Agencies denying Tensyr a rating.

187. IXIS-Paris solved this dilemma by crafting a believable, yet wholly false story to mollify the Rating Agencies and divert others from confirming Madoff's fraud. IXIS-Paris did so by drafting and submitting to the Rating Agencies responses to their questions concerning the Tensyr deal in a memorandum (the "**Tensyr Rating Memo**"), a copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit A. IXIS-Paris made many knowing, material misstatements in the Tensyr Rating Memo regarding Madoff and BLMIS.

A. **Rating Agency Inquiries Highlighted Facts and Circumstances Suggesting a High Probability of Fraud at BLMIS**

188. The Rating Agencies focused their diligence inquiries on BLMIS's SSC Strategy and the IA Business's operations. To respond to these queries, IXIS-Paris gathered information, including what Defendant had acquired from earlier Defendant Deals.

189. The CIB Division's compliance department knew Fairfield could supply some of the formal documentation needed to satisfy the Rating Agencies' questions. Just prior to Tensyr's closing (and after funding began) in December 2006, Lefort sought documents from Fairfield. His email stated that if BLMIS were to be vetted before closing, "he would need basic corporate documents about BLMIS "for our compliance department," but Lefort also commented that such a review was "a mere formality." Thus, three years after closing the first Defendant Deal, the CIB Division's compliance department still had not actually investigated BLMIS; and given this was just "a mere formality," it had no intention of doing so before authorizing IXIS-Paris to give Madoff another several hundred million dollars.

190. Fairfield provided IXIS-Paris with access to people and information. This included Sentry's BLMIS account opening papers and internal documents about BLMIS and Madoff, which went far beyond what Fairfield shared with other Sentry investors. Defendant provided more information about BLMIS and Madoff, which IXIS-Paris requested.

191. Fairfield also provided to IXIS-Paris BLMIS's 2006 Form ADV. IXIS-Paris knew from its review of other information it received from Fairfield, including Sentry's BLMIS account documents, that the Form ADV made material misrepresentations (which, according to the bold type at the top of the form, subjected BLMIS to civil and criminal liability for making such misstatements). The misrepresentations included the following:

192. *First*, the Form ADV stated BLMIS had no discretion to choose the broker-dealer through which trades were executed or the commissions the broker-dealer charged. IXIS-Paris knew this was false because Madoff's contracts with the Feeder Funds dictated that BLMIS serve as broker-dealer, in addition to being custodian and advisor. If they did not agree to those terms, Madoff would not open an account. IXIS-Paris also knew there was no contractual provision or regulatory explanation compelling Madoff to charge \$0.04 per share (or, as some trade tickets reflected, the bid/offer spread).

193. *Second*, the Form ADV said no firms or persons solicited advisory clients on BLMIS's behalf. IXIS-Paris knew this was false because it was then engaging with Sentry (and had previously considered investing in several other Feeder Funds), each designed and operated to solicit clients for BLMIS. The MAR/Hedge Article also explicitly contradicted the Form ADV, stating that "feeder funds ... provide all the ... marketing for [BLMIS], raise the capital and deal with investors, says Madoff." IXIS-Paris itself contradicted the Form ADV, writing in the Tensyr Rating Memo that Madoff "has teamed up with a dozen management companies ... and family offices" to bring in investors and raise capital for BLMIS.

194. *Third*, page 6 of the Form ADV reported that BLMIS provided investment advisory services to zero customers. IXIS-Paris knew that was false because on page 7 of the same report, BLMIS reported it had 23 IA Business accounts to which, by definition, Madoff provided advisory

services. Only those providing advisory services, moreover, must file a Form ADV; if Madoff was not providing advisory services to any customers, he would not have filed it.

195. *Fourth*, BLMIS's 2006 Form ADV Part II explicitly stated that BLMIS "and its employees have no access to the advisory accounts' activity. An independent system is used for advisory clients' trading strategies as well as the execution of those clients' transactions." In contrast, in January 2006, Defendant submitted an Approval Memo, in which it represented that BLMIS "execute[d] the stock basket trades with [Madoff's] market making traders."

196. *Fifth*, BLMIS's 2006 Form ADV stated BLMIS had \$11.7 billion in AUM. Between them, IXIS-Paris and Defendant knew that just from the Feeder Funds through which they invested or considered investing, BLMIS had at least \$14 billion in AUM.

197. IXIS-Paris reviewed the Form ADV and saw these internally incongruous statements and unexplainable contradictions but ignored this evidence indicating a high probability of fraud at BLMIS.

1. The Rating Agencies Highlighted Operational Risks at BLMIS that Strongly Suggested Fraud at BLMIS

198. The Rating Agencies expressed reservations about providing Tensyr with any credit rating based on, among other things, the lack of transparency into BLMIS's operations. To the Rating Agencies, this prevented verification that BLMIS actually held the IA Business customers' assets or was trading as it reported.

199. The Rating Agencies expressed concerns to IXIS-Paris about BLMIS's operations and lack of transparency, including: its refusal to identify its purported OTC option counterparties or even their risk profiles; its serving as prime broker, investment advisor, and custodian; the lack of contract between Sentry's nominal custodian and BLMIS as its sub-custodian; and Madoff's "suspicious" refusal to meet the Rating Agencies.

200. While IXIS-Paris was already aware of at least some of these issues, the Rating Agencies' inquiries corroborated IXIS-Paris's suspicions that BLMIS was reporting fictitious trades, among other self-evident badges of fraud.

201. Not willing to risk an inferior (or no) rating, IXIS-Paris knew it had to come up with answers adequate to overcome the Rating Agencies' "serious risk concerns."

2. BLMIS Did Not Follow Industry Standards to Safeguard Assets

202. As noted above, finance industry standards call for having separate entities take on the distinct custodian and executing broker roles. Without this, it is impossible to conduct independent asset and trade verification. Industry standards also provide that when delegating custodial duties, the parties enter into a contract outlining the scope of their respective duties for safeguarding assets.

203. Sentry reported that its custodian was Citco Bank Nederland, NV ("**Citco**"), which would purportedly provide an independent check on BLMIS as the funds' broker. While Sentry said BLMIS was their sub-custodian, Citco ultimately did not custody any assets and BLMIS custodied them all.

204. In August 2006, to satisfy the Rating Agencies' questions, IXIS-Paris requested from Fairfield copies of Sentry's contracts with BLMIS to verify how Madoff purportedly segregated customer assets.

205. Fairfield failed to forward Sentry's contracts by mid-September. Lefort then narrowed his request for a copy of the sub-custody agreement between BLMIS and Citco. Instead, Fairfield Chief Risk Officer and partner Amit Vijayvergiya provided a Sentry-Citco agreement. Lefort reiterated the inquiry: "we are looking for the sub-custody agreement between Citco and [BLMIS]. Is there any such document?"

206. After not receiving an answer, IXIS-Paris's Patrick Mabilie emailed Vijayvergiya, asking, "isn't there any agreement between BLM[IS] and Citco or BLM[IS] and Fairfield (other than the 'Customer Agreement' you already have sent us?)"

207. Just prior to launching Tensyr, Fairfield informed IXIS-Paris that no such agreement existed. Lefort followed up, saying to Vijayvergiya that Citco and BLMIS not having a sub-custody agreement was "very bizarre as in numerous examples with CITCO we always saw a sub-custody agreement if there w[as] a sub-custodian."

208. With BLMIS, and not Citco, serving as the custodian, IXIS-Paris knew it could not (and no third party could) verify (i) how BLMIS maintained custody, (ii) how the assets would be handled if BLMIS became insolvent, or (iii) whether the assets even existed.

209. Knowing in advance of investing that BLMIS presented "very bizarre" operational risk, IXIS-Paris turned a blind eye and directed at least \$432 million to Sentry through Tensyr.

3. IXIS-Paris Knew BLMIS's Refusal to Disclose Counterparties Violated Securities Laws and BLMIS's own Terms and Conditions

210. In October 2006, IXIS-Paris emailed Fairfield explaining that because IXIS-Paris was seeking a top, "AAA" rating for Tensyr, the Rating Agencies needed to assess the credit risk associated with BLMIS and its purported options counterparties. Multiple times, the Rating Agencies "challenged" IXIS-Paris on the obvious "counterparty risk."

211. IXIS-Paris emailed Fairfield to confirm its understanding "that you don't have [the counterparties'] names," and to remind Fairfield that in order to obtain a AAA rating, the Rating Agencies would need to have a "written answer to some legal issues," including about the counterparties' identities. IXIS-Paris explained the "way this risk is handled in other AAA-rated transaction[s] is simply by monitoring the rating of the counterparties and not letting them go below a certain level (usually 'A') without being replaced within 30 days." This meant the Rating

Agencies would not give a AAA rating to Tensyr without knowing BLMIS's purported counterparties were at least A-rated. IXIS-Paris then conceded, "here we cannot apply this technique as Madoff is not rated (and not even listed). Same thing for the put counterparties as we understand that you don't have their names." Because of this, IXIS-Paris had multiple concerns.

212. *First*, having reviewed BLMIS trade tickets, IXIS-Paris knew that each BLMIS trade ticket explicitly stated that BLMIS acted as agent and that it would reveal its counterparties' names if asked. IXIS-Paris knew that Madoff, regardless, did not divulge their identities.

213. *Second*, based in part from its review of the Access Madoff Deck, IXIS-Paris understood federal securities law requires broker-dealers to disclose counterparty names. Again, IXIS-Paris could not square this requirement with the fact that BLMIS would not give this information to Fairfield.

214. *Third*, IXIS-Paris understood that if an OTC put counterparty failed to perform, Sentry would be unable to exercise its rights under the option contract and its assets would be exposed to downside risk. This would eliminate the protection of the collar and could lead to devastating losses. Fairfield, nonetheless, did not have any information about the counterparties.

215. Despite knowing BLMIS's refusal to disclose this information violated applicable securities laws and BLMIS's terms and conditions and that it could not assess the counterparty risk, IXIS-Paris ignored the danger and moved forward with the Tensyr deal.

4. IXIS-Paris Knew BLMIS's Fee Structure Was Suspicious

216. As noted, BLMIS's fee structure was highly unusual and suggested illegitimacy, as BLMIS only collected commissions as executing broker and did not charge for its purported investment advisory services, a far more significant role with respect to the SSC Strategy. By not charging advisory fees, BLMIS allowed the Feeder Funds to collect billions of dollars in management and performance fees without providing any advisory services.

217. In the Tensyr Rating Memo, Natixis acknowledged that in 2006, Fairfield received over \$130 million in management and performance fees simply by shuttling Sentry's funds to BLMIS, which was 20% more revenue than BLMIS generated from Sentry.

218. The Tensyr Rating Memo calculated Madoff collected commissions equivalent to a fee between 0.90% to 1.00% of AUM. If Madoff charged a standard 2% management fee instead, Madoff could have realized \$132 million per year in additional revenue on the \$12 billion in AUM the Tensyr Rating Memo stated BLMIS managed.

219. By not charging a standard performance fee, Madoff also waived collecting hundreds of millions of dollars in revenue each year. Again, the Access Madoff Deck, which IXIS-Paris reviewed and later gave to Fairfield, confirmed BLMIS did not charge anything for its purported options trades, amounting to many more millions in forfeited income.

220. As such, IXIS-Paris knew BLMIS walked away from industry-standard fees (and millions in waived option commissions) to which it would normally be entitled, amounting to several billion dollars over time. This is something no legitimate money manager would do.

B. IXIS-Paris Turned a Blind Eye to Facts and Circumstances It Subjectively Understood Created a High Probability of Fraud at BLMIS While Blocking Access to Madoff and Lying to the Rating Agencies

1. IXIS-Paris Hid BLMIS's Relationship to Tensyr

221. IXIS-Paris faced an early hurdle in getting Tensyr off the ground: Madoff's blessing. It knew Madoff threatened to close clients' accounts if he found out they used leverage, so IXIS-Paris could not risk moving forward without Madoff's express approval, and Madoff had previously rejected a similar deal the CIB Division tried to launch with Merkin in 2003.

222. Fairfield scheduled a meeting with Madoff in October 2006 to try to reassure him that no Rating Agency would conduct any independent due diligence on him or BLMIS. Prior to this meeting, IXIS-Paris drafted and sent Fairfield a list of "[non-leakage] arguments about how

to use [Tensyr's Sentry] capacity without the market knowing it." This included assuring Madoff that there would be "no public information," that any rating "won't be published or announced," and that BLMIS itself would not be rated.

223. IXIS-Paris undertook these efforts to ensure Madoff's secrecy demands were met, which ensured no third party would learn the same facts and circumstances IXIS-Paris had already identified that indicated a high probability of fraud at BLMIS, further helping his fraud.

224. Eventually, Madoff was convinced his secrecy would be preserved. Fairfield co-founder Andres Piedrahita emailed all Fairfield partners exclaiming, "Absolutely fantastic news! ... Uncle Bernie has given us the OK to go forward" with Tensyr.

2. IXIS-Paris and Fairfield Blocked Access to BLMIS and Madoff

225. Once Madoff was convinced no Rating Agencies would bother him, IXIS-Paris then faced the challenge of keeping that promise while persuading the Rating Agencies to issue a rating. Time and again, the Rating Agencies demanded a meeting with Madoff at his offices; Fitch called this a "sine qua non condition" to rate Tensyr. IXIS-Paris, remembering its vow to Madoff, rejected each request.

226. When Fitch's repeated meeting requests were denied, it told IXIS-Paris that Madoff's refusal to meet was "suspicious." As a result, Fitch told Lefort that it would not rate Tensyr or, at a minimum, would not grant Tensyr the AAA rating IXIS-Paris and Fairfield sought.

227. To quell Fitch's concerns, Fairfield offered to have Fitch come to its offices for a meeting. Fairfield warned IXIS-Paris, however, that it would rebuff Fitch's demand to see Sentry's BLMIS contracts. Fairfield also told IXIS-Paris that Fitch was unlikely to rate Tensyr without meeting Madoff. Lefort said that Fairfield might change Fitch's mind but would have to be "convincing enough on your own due dil[igence]/relationship with" BLMIS. Lefort also noted that "[n]either Moody's nor S&P will visit [BLMIS]."

228. On multiple occasions over the next several months, Fitch demanded a Madoff meeting and IXIS-Paris countered with a Fairfield meeting instead. After IXIS-Paris's many refusals to arrange a Madoff meeting, Fitch told IXIS-Paris that it would not rate the deal "due to 'non-measurable risk at Madoff level,'" which Lefort attributed to Fitch's not being able to visit BLMIS. Instead of following up on Fitch's concerns and facilitating a meeting Madoff, IXIS-Paris told Fairfield, "we have fired Fitch." Lefort warned that because Fitch refused to rate Tensyr, an upcoming meeting between S&P and Fairfield "needs to be convincing."

229. Though Fitch later agreed to restart its rating process, IXIS-Paris never allowed Fitch to meet Madoff or see Sentry's BLMIS account documents and Fitch refused to publicly rate Tensyr. In mid-December 2006, Fitch instead issued a private "shadow rating," which "does not constitute a credit rating by Fitch and is not intended for publication or distribution." This rating expressly excluded BLMIS's operational and bankruptcy risks.

230. IXIS-Paris successfully prevented the Rating Agencies from interacting with Madoff and helped conceal the ongoing fraud. Instead of following up on Fitch's concerns and acquiring additional information about BLMIS's operations, IXIS-Paris fired Fitch to protect Tensyr and its profits. To IXIS-Paris, these financial incentives were more important than confirming or allaying its suspicions of fraud at BLMIS.

3. IXIS-Paris Made False Statements and Material Misrepresentations to the Rating Agencies

231. Having blocked the Rating Agencies and their independent diligence, IXIS-Paris was free to paint its own picture of BLMIS. To secure a top rating for Tensyr, IXIS-Paris prepared and submitted to the Rating Agencies the Tensyr Rating Memo, replete with intentional misrepresentations and materially false information about Madoff and BLMIS.

232. Among other things, IXIS-Paris knew it had to craft a plausible story to get the Rating Agencies to ignore the critical issue of Madoff's refusal to name any of his purported counterparties. IXIS-Paris, therefore fabricated a story about them.

233. IXIS-Paris knew it was the Rating Agencies' standard procedure to only give top ratings to entities whose counterparties maintained a minimum "A" rating. At the same time, IXIS-Paris did not know who BLMIS's purported counterparties were and knew Sentry's BLMIS options agreement contained no minimum counterparty rating provision. To "get around" the counterparty issue and give false comfort to the Rating Agencies, IXIS-Paris drummed up a total falsehood.

234. IXIS-Paris submitted the Tensyr Rating Memo with the false representations that BLMIS's "internal credit policy is to only deal with A or above rated counterparties on the OTC American put options" and that it purportedly purchased put options "from various major global banks (8 to 12)." IXIS-Paris knew it had no basis in fact to tell this to the Rating Agencies.

235. IXIS-Paris also lied about BLMIS's discretion over the IA Business accounts. IXIS-Paris knew from Fairfield that this was a Rating Agency concern and IXIS-Paris deceived them on this issue.

236. The Tensyr Rating Memo misrepresented that BLMIS only had "time and price" discretion (*i.e.*, BLMIS merely had the right to choose when and at what value it traded those securities its clients pre-selected), which IXIS-Paris and Fairfield described as "almost 100% computerized." IXIS-Paris made this representation under the guise that BLMIS was obligated to adhere to specific conditions described in a power of attorney Sentry granted to BLMIS. The Tensyr Rating Memo indicated that this power of attorney "unambiguously sets forth which stock or option must be purchased and their respective amount," a total falsehood IXIS-Paris created.

237. IXIS-Paris knew the statements about BLMIS's "limited discretion" were false because Sentry had no input as to BLMIS's purported investment decisions, including security selection and position size, and the timing of any trades, and Fairfield stated many times that BLMIS's trading decisions were not computer-driven.

238. To better sell the ruse, the Tensyr Rating Memo defined Fairfield as the "Fund Manager" and BLMIS as the "Execution Agent," making it appear that Fairfield had significant responsibility and there was independent oversight. The Tensyr Rating Memo then said that this division of labor diminished "the management risk customarily associated with single-manager funds." Fairfield's "Fund Manager" title was in name only; as IXIS-Paris knew, Fairfield provided zero management services but simply gave money to BLMIS.

239. The Rating Agencies were also concerned with Sentry's custodial arrangement. IXIS-Paris hid behind technicalities and titles to mislead the Rating Agencies about this issue. The Tensyr Rating Memo said Citco was Sentry's "independent custodian," which IXIS-Paris knew was untrue: BLMIS was the actual custodian and no independent custodian existed.

240. IXIS-Paris misled the Rating Agencies to prevent them from learning that Citco never custodied Sentry's assets and that BLMIS was not an "independent" sub-custodian because it also simultaneously served as broker and investment advisor.

241. IXIS-Paris also knowingly made false statements regarding trade verification. Before writing the Tensyr Rating Memo, IXIS-Paris reviewed paper trade tickets that BLMIS mailed to Sentry. IXIS-Paris therefore knew that Fairfield could not review purported trades until days after Madoff said the transactions occurred or even settled. Instead of revealing this to Rating Agencies, IXIS-Paris told them something more assuring, but decidedly false.

242. Two weeks before finalizing the Tensyr Rating Memo, Lefort sent Fairfield a draft, which stated Fairfield verified BLMIS's trades within a few hours. Fairfield replied that there were errors in the draft, including that trades were not "post-verified" by a trustee (*i.e.*, Fairfield or Citco) within a "few hours" of their execution and that BLMIS did not report trades daily.

243. IXIS-Paris, however, ignored Fairfield's proposed revisions and submitted the Tensyr Rating Memo with both blatant fabrications, knowing they were false.

244. IXIS-Paris submitted the Tensyr Rating Memo with a further misrepresentation about trade verification: "Citco and [a Fairfield affiliate] have notification of the trades at the end of each trading day on which a trade occurs (under SEC Rule 10b-10, [BLMIS] is required to provide written confirmation of any transaction on or before completion of such transaction.)" Again, based on its review of Sentry's trade tickets and what Fairfield explicitly told it, IXIS-Paris knew this was wholly false.

245. IXIS-Paris and Tensyr also knew that Fairfield and Citco were incapable of providing "independent" verification of BLMIS's purported trades because BLMIS fully controlled Sentry's assets, including by purportedly: (i) maintaining custody of Sentry's cash; (ii) selecting stocks that would be purchased; (iii) effecting the purchase; (iv) settling the trades; and (v) maintaining the custody of the stock. No third party could independently verify anything BLMIS reported, as IXIS-Paris knew, but it made and stood by these false representations in its Tensyr Rating Memo.

246. IXIS-Paris also made false statements about account segregation and refused to correct them. On December 10, 2006, IXIS-Paris submitted the Tensyr Rating Memo that falsely stated Sentry maintained accounts at BLMIS that were "segregated from [the BLMIS] bankruptcy

estate.” After this submission and just hours before Tensyr was due to receive its ratings and initial funding, Lefort told Fairfield that this was a misrepresentation, but he did not want to correct it:

It would furthermore be extremely risky as probably catching Moody’s and S&P eyes back on these bankruptcy issues. The memo we sent states the accounts are segregated and that the risk incurred by the Sentry fund is only a delivery risk and not a credit risk[, but] we think that this is a misrep.

247. Lefort elected to not correct the lies in the Tensyr Rating Memo. Instead, in that same email, Lefort pressed Fairfield to sell the remaining capacity in Tensyr’s lowest note tranche, knowing those investors would be the first to face losses in the event of BLMIS’s insolvency.

248. After Tensyr’s launch, IXIS-Paris remained silent about the likelihood of fraud at BLMIS, but rather continued investing Tensyr’s assets with BLMIS through Sentry. IXIS-Paris kept this up even when in September 2008, Fitch dropped its Tensyr shadow rating from AAA to BBB, a sudden drop of three rating levels. According to Fairfield, Fitch “complained they don’t have enough data, they don’t understand the floors and collars, they are not comfortable at AAA, at best BBB based on the information they have now.” Lefort’s reaction was to tell Fairfield that Tensyr’s existing investors were simply “stuck with the paper” (*i.e.*, had no recourse) and any rating change would not impact Tensyr’s structure. This development also did not cause IXIS-Paris to conduct any further investigation or convince Fitch to change its mind.

249. IXIS-Paris’s campaign to shield Madoff and then create and deliver to the Rating Agencies the convincing, yet wholly false Tensyr Rating Memo paid off: IXIS-Paris collected millions in fees directly connected to Tensyr’s launch and ongoing management. Tensyr’s launch was so significant to the Natixis Group’s brand that IXIS-Paris touted this new venture in its 2006 Annual Registration Statement.

VII. DOMESTICITY OF THE TRANSFERS

250. The Trustee alleges the facts in the following paragraphs from his Proffered Allegations Pertaining to the Extraterritoriality Issue as if fully set forth herein (Adv. Pro. No. 10-05353 (SMB), ECF No. 102 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. June 27, 2015):

<u>Subpart to ¶ 250</u>	<u>Proffer Allegation ¶</u>
(a)	1
(b)	2
(c)	3
(d)	10
(e)	11
(f)	12
(g)	13
(h)	14
(i)	15
(j)	16
(k)	17
(l)	18
(m)	19
(n)	20
(o)	21
(p)	22
(q)	23
(r)	24
(s)	40
(t)	41
(u)	42
(v)	43

<u>Subpart to ¶ 250</u>	<u>Proffer Allegation ¶</u>
(w)	44
(x)	50
(y)	59
(z)	60
(aa)	62
(bb)	63
(cc)	64
(dd)	65
(ee)	68
(ff)	69
(gg)	70
(hh)	71
(ii)	72
(jj)	73
(kk)	74
(ll)	75
(mm)	76
(nn)	77
(oo)	78
(pp)	79
(qq)	80
(rr)	81

<u>Subpart to ¶ 250</u>	<u>Proffer Allegation ¶</u>
(ss)	82
(tt)	83
(uu)	84
(vv)	85
(ww)	86
(xx)	87
(yy)	88
(zz)	89
(aaa)	90
(bbb)	91
(ccc)	92
(ddd)	93
(eee)	94
(fff)	95
(ggg)	96
(hhh)	116
(iii)	117
(jjj)	118
(kkk)	144
(lll)	145
(mmm)	146

VIII. THE TRUSTEE MAY AVOID AND RECOVER THE TRANSFERS

A. Initial Transfers from BLMIS to Groupement

251. The Trustee commenced an adversary proceeding against Groupement, its primary service providers, a variety of entities run as Access and UBS, and others (the “**UBS Avoidance Action**”) to avoid and recover initial transfers of customer property from BLMIS to Groupement

in the approximate amount of \$356 million (the “**Initial Transfers**”).⁴ The Trustee filed a Proffered Amended Complaint in the UBS Avoidance Action (the “**Proffered UBS Amended Complaint**”),⁵ a copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit B. The Trustee incorporates by reference the Proffered UBS Amended Complaint, which contains irrefutable allegations that the initial transfers BLMIS made to Groupement are avoidable.

252. Of the Initial Transfers, BLMIS transferred to Groupement approximately \$356 million during the six years prior to the Filing Date (the “**Six Year Initial Transfers**”). Each Six Year Initial Transfer is avoidable under Bankruptcy Code § 544 and applicable NYDCL provisions, particularly §§ 273-279, and of SIPA, particularly § 78fff-2(c)(3).

253. Of the Six Year Initial Transfers, BLMIS transferred to Groupement approximately \$277 million during the two years prior to the Filing Date (the “**Two Year Initial Transfers**”). Each Two Year Initial Transfer is avoidable under Bankruptcy Code § 548 and applicable provisions of SIPA, particularly § 78fff(c)(3).

254. Of the Two Year Initial Transfers, BLMIS transferred to Groupement approximately \$260 million during the 90 days prior to the Filing Date (the “**Preference Period Initial Transfers**”). Each Preference Period Initial Transfer is avoidable under Bankruptcy Code § 547, and applicable provisions of SIPA, particularly § 78fff(c)(3).

255. Groupement received each Initial Transfer with knowledge of fraud at BLMIS, or with willful blindness to circumstances suggesting a high probability of fraud at BLMIS.

256. Charts setting forth the Initial Transfers are included as Exhibits C and D. The Initial Transfers were and continue to be customer property within the meaning of SIPA § 78III(4).

⁴ *Picard v. UBS AG*, Adv. Pro. No. 10-04285 (SMB) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.).

⁵ *Id.*, ECF No. 210 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. June 26, 2015).

B. Subsequent Transfers from Groupement To Defendant

257. Prior to the Filing Date, Groupement subsequently transferred a portion of the Groupement Initial Transfers, directly or indirectly, to Defendant (the “**Subsequent Transfers**”). Based on the Trustee’s investigation to date, the Subsequent Transfers total approximately \$148.1 million. A chart setting forth the presently known Subsequent Transfers is attached as Exhibit E.

258. The Subsequent Transfers are recoverable from Defendant under Bankruptcy Code § 550(a) and applicable provisions of SIPA, particularly § 78fff-2(c)(3).

259. Defendant received each Subsequent Transfer while willfully blind to circumstances suggesting a high probability of fraud at BLMIS.

**COUNT ONE: RECOVERY OF GROUPEMENT SUBSEQUENT TRANSFERS
11 U.S.C. §§ 105(a) AND 550(a)**

260. The Trustee incorporates by reference the allegations contained in the previous paragraphs of this Amended Complaint as if fully rewritten herein.

261. Each of the Subsequent Transfers is recoverable from Defendant under Bankruptcy Code § 550(a) and SIPA § 78fff-2(c)(3).

262. Defendant is an immediate or mediate transferee of the Subsequent Transfers from Groupement.

263. Defendant received each Subsequent Transfer when it was willfully blind to circumstances suggesting a high probability of fraud at BLMIS.

264. As a result of the foregoing, pursuant to Bankruptcy Code §§ 105(a) and 550(a) and SIPA § 78fff-2(c)(3), the Trustee is entitled to a judgment against Defendant: (a) recovering the Subsequent Transfers, or the value thereof, from Defendant for the benefit of the estate of BLMIS; (b) directing Defendant to disgorge to the Trustee all profits, including any and all retrocession

fees, incentive fees, or other compensation and/or remuneration received by Defendant related to, arising from, or concerning the Subsequent Transfers; (c) recovering attorneys' fees and costs from Defendant; and (d) awarding any other relief as the Court deems appropriate.

265. If any of the recovery counts are inconsistent with each other, they are to be treated as being pleaded in the alternative.

266. The Trustee's discovery and investigation is ongoing and the Trustee reserves the right to: (i) supplement the information on the initial and subsequent transfers discussed above, and any additional transfers; and (ii) seek avoidance and recovery of such transfers.

WHEREFORE, the Trustee respectfully requests that this Court enter judgment on Count One and in favor of the Trustee and against Defendant as follows:

a) Recovering the Subsequent Transfers, or the value thereof, from Defendant for the benefit of the estate, and directing Defendant to disgorge to the Trustee all profits, including any and all retrocession fees, incentive fees or other compensation and/or remuneration received by Defendant related to, arising from, or concerning the Subsequent Transfers;

b) If Defendant challenges the avoidability of the Initial Transfers, the Trustee seeks a judgment under Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7001(1) and (9) declaring that such Initial Transfers are avoidable pursuant to SIPA § 78fff-2(c)(3), Bankruptcy Code §§ 105(a), 544(b), 547(b), 548(a), and 551, and NYDCL §§ 273-279, as applicable, and as necessary to recover the Subsequent Transfers pursuant to Bankruptcy Code § 550(a) and (b) and SIPA § 78fff-2(c)(3);

c) Awarding the Trustee attorneys' fees and all applicable interest, costs, and disbursements of this proceeding;

d) Awarding the Trustee prejudgment interest from the date on which Defendant received the Subsequent Transfers; and

e) Granting the Trustee such other, further, and different relief as the Court deems just, proper, and equitable.

Dated: December 28, 2018
New York, New York

/s/ Catherine E. Woltering
Baker & Hostetler LLP
45 Rockefeller Plaza
New York, New York 10111
Telephone: (212) 589-4200
Facsimile: (212) 589-4201
David J. Sheehan
Catherine E. Woltering
Jonathan D. Blattmachr
Matthew B. Friedman

Baker & Hostetler LLP
200 Civic Center Drive, Suite 1200
Columbus, Ohio 43215
Telephone: (614) 228-1541
Facsimile: (614) 462-2616
Douglas A. Vonderhaar

*Attorneys for Irving H. Picard, Trustee
for the substantively consolidated SIPA
Liquidation of Bernard L. Madoff
Investment Securities LLC and the Estate
of Bernard L. Madoff*

EXHIBIT A

From: Lefort, Emmanuel [elefort@ixis-cib.com]
Sent: 12/1/2006 9:25:39 AM
To: Amit Vijayvergiya [amit@fggus.com]
CC:
Subject: Tensyr memorandum for Rating Agencies 20061130

Amit, final version.
Thanks
Emmanuel

<>

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Attachment: Tensyr memorandum for Rating Agencies 20061130.doc

TENSYR LTD

HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL

FOR THE EXCLUSIVE USE OF MOODY'S¹,
FITCH² AND S&P³ AND MOODY'S', FITCH's and
S&P's EMPLOYEES INVOLVED IN THE
RATING OF THE TENSYR TRANSACTION.

**This memorandum has been prepared by IXIS CIB on the
basis of public information or information provided to it by
third parties. It does not purport to be true, accurate or
complete in any respect.**

¹ Moody's Investors Services Limited.

² Fitch Ratings Ltd.

³ Standard & Poors Rating Services a division of the McGraw Hill Companies, Inc.

In the late 80's, Bernard L. Madoff Investment Securities LLC ("BMI"), a major broker-dealer on the NYSE, developed a proprietary model-based strategy intended to capture short-term (5 to 10 business days) upward movements of highly liquid stocks of the largest U.S. companies. The strategy, known as split-strike conversion ("SSC"), consists in simultaneously purchasing stocks and hedging the downside risk of the portfolio by purchasing put options. The puts are then financed by the sale of call options thus creating a collar around those stocks. The strategy is not always in place and a typical year will consist in 6 to 8 successions of the actual strategy and stand-by periods invested in T-Bills.

Since 1989, BMI has teamed up with a dozen management companies (including Fairfield Greenwich Group) and family offices to execute the strategy. The set-up is always the same: a fund is created by the company which distributes it and liaises with the investors. Limited discretionary accounts are then opened in the name of the fund at BMI and BMI implements the strategy under a limited power of attorney (PoA) signed with the fund. As a registered broker-dealer, the ONLY discretion that BMI has under the PoA is the "time and the price" to enter into the strategy. In other words, the stocks BMI can purchase, their amounts, the way they are hedged and how the hedge has to be constructed are unambiguously described in the PoA. The timing decisions as well as the purchase of the stocks are almost 100% computerized. The hedging is done manually on the OTC market. The total amount of these accounts implementing the SSC is estimated today to be around 12 Bn\$.

BMI's role is that of "Execution Agent" of the strategy, and its discretion is limited to choosing the time and price at which to enter the strategy, rolling the collar and exiting the strategy.

The fund manager is responsible for reviewing and approving the trading parameters of the SSC, monitoring the trade activity of the Fund, monitoring the compliance with risk limits and trading parameters, and communicating with shareholders.

This particular set-up (independent "Execution Agent" / independent "Fund Manager") is advantageous in the hedge-fund world as it reduces the management risk customarily associated with single-manager funds.

The present memorandum seeks to describe the role of each party and how the various risks of the structure can be analyzed and mitigated. All statements made on this page should be qualified as being based on information provided by third-party sources, to the extent not actually known.

<<AUTODATE>> TENSYSR LTD. MEMORANDUM FOR RATING AGENCIES
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{ PAGE }

A. The “Single Manager” risk is very limited

i. Three independent parties

The Investment Manager

The **Fairfield Sentry Fund** (the “**Fund**”) was incorporated in 1990 as an International Business Company in the British Virgin Island (BVI). Its Investment Manager is **Fairfield Greenwich (Bermuda) Ltd. (“FGB”)**, a Bermuda company wholly owned by **Fairfield Greenwich Limited (“FGL”)**, a Cayman Islands limited company who serves as placement agent. These two companies are member companies of the **Fairfield Greenwich Group** which is headquartered in New York. FGB is regulated by the SEC.

FGB is from a legal stand-point the Investment Manager of the Fund, but could also be described as a Risk Operator. Its role includes risk-management and risk-control:

Risk Management:

- They review and approve the strategy with BMI on a periodic basis;
- They have an ongoing relationship with BMI for more than 17 years, with weekly contacts and at least quarterly on-site visits (the offices are distant by less than 200 meters) during which FGG CFO conducts its own due diligence, and produces internal reports; during those visits, BMI is requested to show reports of existence of all the trades from Sentry books down to DTCC;
- PWC the auditor of the Sentry Fund conducts every two years its own evaluation of BMI systems;
- Frehling and Horowitz (auditors of BMI) produces an annual report on BMI, the strategy and the conformity of BMI with the various rules;
- They receive the audited financial statements of BMI (SEC form X-17a-5).

Risk Control:

- Once a trade occurs, FGB receives the corresponding trade tickets that have been executed during the day and verify that this is in compliance with the guidelines agreed between FGB and BMI;
- They measure and monitor the risk profile of the Fund and calculate a number of risk statistics, exposure measures, stress tests, scenario analyses, and VaR metrics. This is done using in-house and third party risk tools, including RiskMetrics.

The Execution Agent

Bernard L. Madoff Investment Securities LLC (“**BMI**”) serves both as Broker/Dealer and Sub-Custodian for the Fund.

BMI is a Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) and National Association of Securities Dealers (“NASD”) regulated broker dealer as well as an SEC registered Investment Adviser.⁴ BMI engages in two business activities:

1.) **Market Maker & Execution Broker.** BMI makes markets in over 1,000 over-the-counter, listed, unlisted, and convertible securities. The firm executes the trades of more than 600 banks, securities firms, and institutional investors as clients from the United States and around the world. BMI is one of the largest providers of order flow for New York Stock Exchange listed securities (15%-20% of the market estimated) and is believed to be one of the larger operators of after hours or “third market” marketplaces. It is believed that BMI executes in excess of 300,000 transactions per day, representing an estimated \$1,400 billion of market value per year, and manages a book in excess of 350,000 limit orders.

2.) **Limited Discretionary Accounts.** BMI executes limited discretionary trades, through a power of attorney, on behalf of certain of its customer-investors as an agent and fiduciary. For these accounts, BMI regularly employs a systematic and standardized trading program, described below. The assets in these accounts are estimated to exceed \$12 billion in the aggregate.

In support of these activities the firm has approximately 300 employees (275 in Manhattan), approximately 112 of whom are traders.

As of October 31st 2005, BMI had a company capital of 550 M\$ and 360 M\$ of short term debt. This capitalization is massive compared to the industry standard. By comparison, the NYSE has 835 M\$ of company capital and reserves, 685 M\$ of long-term debt and 685 M\$ of short-term debt.

BMI functions as the Execution Agent for the Fund. The Fund has opened two accounts with BMI, a cash account to hold the equity stocks and the treasury bills, and a margin account to hold the OTC long put and short call options. A “limited trading authority power of attorney” contract (“POA”) has been concluded between the Fund and BMI. It constitutes a trade secret of the fund. The document is written in accordance with SEC rules and is subject to SEC audit. The document codifies the arrangement between the broker/dealer and the customer investor and provides protections for the customer investor. Because the only discretion BMI can have is on the time and the price of the securities to be traded, the document unambiguously sets forth which stock or option must be purchased and their respective amount. Any breach of the agreement constitutes both a contractual breach and a breach of fiduciary duty by BMI.

Although the POA cannot be disclosed, we believe that the following guidelines are sufficient to stress-test the strategy:

Investments that can be done in the cash account:

- The cash account can either hold short-term U.S. Treasury Bills, equity stocks, rated Money Market Fund.
- Only stocks that are part of the S&P 100 Index can be purchased; these stocks form the “**Portfolio**”;

⁴ See Appendix D

- The sole purpose of the creation of the Portfolio is to closely replicate the S&P100 Index (there are no futures on the index);
- The market cap of a given company in the Portfolio must be consistent with the market cap of that company in the S&P100;
- The Portfolio must be closely correlated to the S&P100 (in the 95%-100% range on a 20-trading day basis);
- If the correlation falls below 95%, immediate corrective action must be taken (strategy unwound or change in the basket of stocks).

Implementation of the hedge strategy:

- BMI is acting as agent for the fund in purchasing put options and selling call options on the S&P 100; the legal owner of the options is the Fund;
- OTC American put options on the S&P 100 are purchased from various major global banks (8 to 12);
- BMI's internal credit policy is to only deal with A or above rated counterparties on the OTC American put options;
- The sole purpose of the put options is to hedge the downside risk of the Portfolio;
- The ability to purchase the put options must be verified BEFORE the Portfolio is purchased;
- The strike price of the put options should be only slightly out of the money (one or two strikes out-of-the money of the spot price of the S&P 100 at the time the option is purchased). The choice of the strike price is driven by liquidity in the options;
- The notional value of the put options must closely reflect the market value of the Portfolio (98-100%) at the time of trade completion;
- The maturity of the put options when entering the strategy must be on the next expiration cycle (3rd Friday of the month); when rolling the put options, the puts can either be traded on the next expiration day or on the following one. This means that the maximum length of a put option is 2 months if the trade is made to roll the collar on the Monday following the third Friday of a month and expiring on the 3rd Friday of the second following month;
- To partially finance the price of the put, BMI sells American call options on the S&P 100;
- The notional of the calls must reflect the notional of the puts;
- BMI cannot over-sell call options;
- The strike price of the calls must be only slightly out-of-the money (one or two strikes OTM);
- This builds an approximate collar around the Portfolio, limiting both the downside and the upside potential of the strategy.

The timing to enter into the strategy (i.e. liquidate the T-Bills to purchase the stocks) is driven by a computer system analyzing various market signals; when all the market signals are aligned, the final decision is taken by BMI. Given the amount of stocks to be purchased and to prevent any adverse market movement, the portfolio of stocks and the hedge are typically purchased over several trading days.

BMI has been implementing the strategy for more than 17 years now and each individual in the 12-people team dedicated to this business has over 21 years of experience. Operational risk is controlled through extensive automation of trade execution procedures and oversight by six supervisors.

The Fund Administrator

Citco Fund Services (Europe) B.V. is the fund administrator. Its role is to independently compute the NAV. It is anticipated that Citco Fund Services will also serve the role of Verification Agent and, in this role, would verify the guidelines of the Fund on the basis of the information sent by the Custodian of the Fund. The Custodian of the Fund is Citco Global Custody N.V. a Netherlands SPV created under Netherlands regulation for sole custody purpose. Citco Fund Services and Citco Global Custody have an approximate 25% market share in the hedge fund industry. Citco Global Custody has appointed BMI as sub-custodian for the Fund and all the assets (except for temporary cash from subscription or redemptions) are held at BMI. Therefore, the information chain is totally independent from Fairfield.

ii. Only regulated parties

Fairfield Greenwich (Bermuda) Ltd. is registered with the SEC.

This requires, for a hedge fund manager, prominent disclosure on its shareholding, activities, equality of treatment between shareholders, no side-letters issues etc.

BMI is a broker/dealer registered with the SEC and the NASD, is an SEC registered Investment Adviser and is a member of the SIPC.

This means that BMI must act within a very tight framework that protects investors' assets. For example, BMI must report on a daily basis the position of each of the accounts it holds for its customers so that, in case of bankruptcy, the SIPC trustee can transfer within a few days these accounts to a safe broker/dealer. BMI also confirms any transaction they do on behalf of the Fund.


iii. Alignment of interests

The Fund represents approximately 50% of the assets under management of the Fairfield Greenwich Group. FGG collects a 1% management fee *plus* a 20% performance fee on the Fund. Based on recent year's performance around 8%, the annual earning of FGG is around 130,000,000 US\$ per year.

The Fund accounts held at BMI represent approximately 40% of the accounts on which BMI executes the SSC strategy. BMI's only income is a brokerage fee of 4cts per share of stock and \$1 per option contract, resulting in estimated annual revenues derived from trade

execution of SSC transactions of about 0.90% to 1.00% of assets held in these accounts. BMI annual income from the strategy is approximately 108,000,000 US\$. This represents around 40% of BMI total annual income.

FGB, BMI and Citco all serve as independent parties to this transaction and do not share in the revenues or profitability of the others. BMI has no direct incentive in the performance of the Fund. FGG has no economic interest in BMI nor does it participate or share in the brokerage fees earned by BMI.



Conclusion: There are two independent entities (BMI and FGG) whose motivations with respect to the SSC strategy are aligned (creating stable income). Together with the regulated framework within which BMI and FGG must operate, we feel that there is limited operational risk at both firms. Banks which serve as a counterparty to the short call options (representing 12 Bn\$ in aggregate) also have an incentive to monitor BMI's financial health.

iv. Comparison with rated cash CFO/CDO/CLO managed transactions.

Cash CDO/CLO Transaction

A typical standalone CDO or CLO has the same framework:

- an independent SPV set up for the transaction (here, it is the Fund)
- an independent Collateral Administrator (here, it is Citco and FGB)
- an independent Custodian (here, it is BMI)
- an independent Execution Agent (here, it is BMI)

The independence of BMI, FGB and Citco is clear.

In the cash CDO or CLO world, the Investment Manager is contractually bound by guidelines with the SPV. The Collateral Administrator confirms that the trade is Ok with these guidelines. In that respect, the way the Fund works is exactly the same except that the trades are not pre-confirmed but post-confirmed.

This risk is however mitigated by the following factors:

- The supervision rules imposed by NASD and SEC⁵ to BMI are generally more conservative than any rule imposed on CDO managers or Collateral Administrators.
- By taking limited discretion, BMI is treated as a fiduciary, which means that BMI has duties of care and loyalty to its customers. As a fiduciary, BMI must place its customer's interests ahead of its own or become liable to its customers for breaching those duties.
- Citco and FGB have notification of the trades at the end of each trading day on which a trade occurs (under SEC Rule 10b-10, BMI is required to provide written confirmation of any transaction on or before completion of such transaction⁶). If there is an issue with the guidelines, FGB can request a corrective action on the day following receipt of such notification.
- Not respecting the guidelines will be both a contractual breach and a regulatory breach by BMI which makes BMI liable for any loss incurred from that breach, and would expose them to be disciplined by the SEC. BMI is extremely well capitalized as compared to a lot of investment boutiques that manage cash CDOs. It would also ruin BMI which is entirely held by Bernard L. Madoff himself.
- An Investment Manager would usually have an incentive in the performance of the CDO/CLO and would not have to take care about keeping his investors in the deal (as the money is blocked). In this instance, BMI, as the Execution Agent implementing the SSC strategy, does not participate in the performance of the deal and, if the SSC strategy was not effectively implemented, investors would likely redeem and BMI would generate less income from commissions.

⁵ See Appendix E

⁶ See Appendix C

The operational risk can also be analyzed in economical terms: a worst case scenario would be that the portfolio is purchased but un-hedged (BMI bizarrely “forgot” to purchase the put options) and there is a market crash:

- The Portfolio is typically ramped up over 4 days, i.e. the un-hedged portion would represent 25% of the Fund’s assets;
- The remainder of the Portfolio would be hedged otherwise FGB would have noticed it on upon receiving the trade confirmation; FGB receives copies of the confirmations of the options once they have been traded;
- Assuming that we have a 1987 style crash with a 30% drop in the equities market, the resulting loss would be about $-30\% * 25\% = -7.5\%$ which is still sustainable by the structure;
- BMI has implemented the strategy over the last 17 years without any significant operational issues;
- BMI has a clear incentive to efficiently and orderly implement the SSC strategy;
- BMI’s operations, procedures and controls are periodically subject to inspection by regulatory authorities. The Fund’s independent public accountant also periodically reviews the operations of BMI.

Cash CFO transactions

In these transactions, the SPV purchases shares of the Fund of Hedge Funds and verifies the guidelines ex-post. The fund manager has unlimited discretion on the manipulation of the underlying funds.

This situation is less controlled than in the present case where BMI has limited discretion over disposition of the Fund assets and where there is oversight, risk monitoring, and verification of trading activity against guidelines. However, it is usually appreciated as a “good faith” situation by the Rating Agencies.

Transaction based on a single manager Hedge Fund with an ordinary set-up

The contemplated transaction differs with a transaction that would be structured on a single hedge fund without the BMI/FGB set-up. In such a transaction the manager, even with guidelines, would have full discretion with respect to the assets without any verification on a short-term basis. Therefore, style-drifting or even fraud risk could possibly exist undetected in those transactions.

In the Tensyr transaction, the coexistence of BMI and FGB would result in the prompt detection of any deviation from operating guidelines or style-drift. The regulatory framework tightly frames BMI behavior while FGB and BMI income from the strategy is a clear incentive to active monitoring.

Comparison summary

The following table summarizes the comparison between managed CDOs, CFOs backed by existing fund of funds and the Sentry fund:

	Sentry Fund	CDOs/CLOs	Fund of Fund
Manager / Execution Agent (example)	Madoff (Execution Agent)	NBSAM⁷	RMF IM⁸
is regulated	YES (extremely)	YES (lightly)	NO
is experienced	YES (17 years)	YES	YES
is well capitalized	YES (600 M\$)	NO (2 M\$)	NO
Trustee (example)	Fairfield / Citco	BONY	Citco
Trustee is regulated	YES	YES	NO
Trading activity and verification			
Contractual trading guidelines	YES	YES	NO
Independent trustee	YES (FGG / Citco)	YES (1)	NO
Trades are pre-verified by trustee	NO	YES	NO
Trades are post-verified by trustee	YES (few hours)	YES	YES (monthly basis)
Portfolio composition is independently reported	YES, daily	YES	NO
Assets	Stocks + Options	CDS/ABS	Shares of HF
Assets are segregated	YES	YES	YES
Assets are liquid	YES	NO	NO
Assets are easily priced	YES	NO	YES/NO
Incentive			
Manager income derives from performance	NO	Partially	Partially
Manager has direct incentive to investor satisfaction	YES	NO	YES
Trustee income derives from performance	YES	NO	NO
Trustee has direct incentive to investor satisfaction	YES	NO	NO
Trustee and Manager are independent	YES	YES	YES

⁷ New Bond Street Asset Management

⁸ RMF Investment Management

B. The Strategy risk is bounded

i. Static analysis

The loss that one can incur with a perfect hedge (put option hedging the S&P 100) is bound by the strike of the put options, i.e. around 1.5%.

Moreover, if the put notional is not exactly equal to the Portfolio notional, there is an additional downside risk: in the strategy, the put notional must cover at least 98% of the portfolio. In a scenario where the portfolio loses 30%, the 2% un-hedged portion can create an additional loss of 0.6%.

In this strategy, the hedge is not perfect as the portfolio has to replicate the S&P100. This is done by:

- Purchasing a large portion of the market cap of the S&P100 (more than 75%)
- Weighting each stock in the Portfolio as closely as possible to its weight in the S&P100
- Tracking on a real-time basis the correlation of the movements of the Portfolio and the movements of the S&P100, such correlation being maintained over 95%

In some circumstances, even with correlations higher than 95%, the S&P100 and the Portfolio can deviate and the real loss can exceed the maximum theoretical loss.

ii. Historical analysis

To estimate the additional downside risk due to tracking error between the S&P100 and the Portfolio, the strategy has been simulated using historical data of the index and the underlying stocks:

- Data range: 10 Sept 1989 to 25 august 2006
- Put strike: 98.5% of the Index
- Call Strike: 102% of the Index
- Put and Call notional: 98% of Portfolio
- Deviation of the weight of stock vs. market cap in S&P100 : +/-1.5% randomly
- Options maturity: 2 months
- Collar rolled systematically at options expiration
- Strategy observation over 60 BD
- Strategy entry correlation: minimum 95% over the previous 20 BD


The value of the strategy is measured using intrinsic value of the options (excluding their time value). This conservative view allows not taking into account the potential illiquidity of the options market by simply assuming that the holder of the put will exercise its option (cash settlement) rather than sell it.

The maximum loss distribution (initial purchase price of portfolio *minus* minimum value of the strategy during the 60 BD of observation) for these assumptions is shown in Chart 1a and 1b below. In chart 1a, the computation is done assuming that the Portfolio and the S&P100 have a correlation greater than 95% when entering into the strategy but does not unwind the

strategy if the correlation falls below 95% during the 60 BD of observation. In chart 1b, the computation is done assuming that the Portfolio and the S&P100 have a correlation greater than 95% when entering into the strategy and the strategy is unwound if the correlation falls below 95%.


We believe that this view is conservative as the strategy would likely be unwound before such level of loss was reached.

Chart 1a : Maximum loss over 60 business day. Correlation greater than 95% at entry only. 1,000,000 simulations.



Cluster	Proba	Cumulative	Cluster	Proba	Density	Cluster	Proba	Density			
>0	0.0000%	100.00000%	-4.10%	-4.20%	0.7076%	7.71955%	-8.30%	-8.40%	0.0064%	0.02371%	
0.00%	-0.10%	1.6492%	98.35085%	-4.20%	-4.30%	0.6671%	7.05249%	-8.40%	-8.50%	0.0042%	0.01948%
-0.10%	-0.20%	1.7203%	96.63055%	-4.30%	-4.40%	0.5935%	6.45897%	-8.50%	-8.60%	0.0038%	0.01563%
-0.20%	-0.30%	1.7757%	94.85487%	-4.40%	-4.50%	0.5744%	5.88452%	-8.60%	-8.70%	0.0034%	0.01219%
-0.30%	-0.40%	1.8101%	93.04475%	-4.50%	-4.60%	0.5216%	5.36293%	-8.70%	-8.80%	0.0021%	0.01007%
-0.40%	-0.50%	1.8162%	91.22853%	-4.60%	-4.70%	0.4789%	4.88400%	-8.80%	-8.90%	0.0025%	0.00755%
-0.50%	-0.60%	1.8499%	89.37867%	-4.70%	-4.80%	0.4493%	4.43475%	-8.90%	-9.00%	0.0015%	0.00609%
-0.60%	-0.70%	1.9451%	87.43354%	-4.80%	-4.90%	0.3940%	4.04075%	-9.00%	-9.10%	0.0008%	0.00530%
-0.70%	-0.80%	2.0857%	85.34786%	-4.90%	-5.00%	0.3702%	3.67059%	-9.10%	-9.20%	0.0007%	0.00464%
-0.80%	-0.90%	2.2546%	83.09325%	-5.00%	-5.10%	0.3431%	3.32746%	-9.20%	-9.30%	0.0011%	0.00358%
-0.90%	-1.00%	2.4932%	80.60004%	-5.10%	-5.20%	0.3205%	3.00698%	-9.30%	-9.40%	0.0009%	0.00265%
-1.00%	-1.10%	2.6999%	77.90016%	-5.20%	-5.30%	0.3023%	2.70465%	-9.40%	-9.50%	0.0005%	0.00212%
-1.10%	-1.20%	3.0227%	74.87742%	-5.30%	-5.40%	0.2720%	2.43266%	-9.50%	-9.60%	0.0004%	0.00172%
-1.20%	-1.30%	3.3504%	71.52704%	-5.40%	-5.50%	0.2542%	2.17843%	-9.60%	-9.70%	0.0003%	0.00146%
-1.30%	-1.40%	3.7641%	67.76292%	-5.50%	-5.60%	0.2228%	1.95559%	-9.70%	-9.80%	0.0003%	0.00119%
-1.40%	-1.50%	4.1030%	63.65991%	-5.60%	-5.70%	0.2181%	1.73752%	-9.80%	-9.90%	0.0004%	0.00079%
-1.50%	-1.60%	4.1177%	59.54219%	-5.70%	-5.80%	0.1921%	1.54542%	-9.90%	-10.00%	0.0000%	0.00079%
-1.60%	-1.70%	4.0784%	55.46382%	-5.80%	-5.90%	0.1771%	1.36829%	-10.00%	-10.10%	0.0008%	0.00000%
-1.70%	-1.80%	3.9402%	51.52363%	-5.90%	-6.00%	0.1558%	1.21249%	-10.10%	-10.20%	0.0000%	0.00000%
-1.80%	-1.90%	3.7290%	47.79461%	-6.00%	-6.10%	0.1412%	1.07126%	-10.20%	-10.30%	0.0000%	0.00000%
-1.90%	-2.00%	3.4909%	44.30367%	-6.10%	-6.20%	0.1284%	0.94289%	-10.30%	-10.40%	0.0000%	0.00000%
-2.00%	-2.10%	3.2668%	41.03690%	-6.20%	-6.30%	0.1133%	0.82961%	-10.40%	-10.50%	0.0000%	0.00000%
-2.10%	-2.20%	3.0842%	37.95268%	-6.30%	-6.40%	0.1008%	0.72879%	-10.50%	-10.60%	0.0000%	0.00000%
-2.20%	-2.30%	2.7750%	35.17768%	-6.40%	-6.50%	0.0884%	0.64043%	-10.60%	-10.70%	0.0000%	0.00000%
-2.30%	-2.40%	2.5898%	32.58789%	-6.50%	-6.60%	0.0774%	0.56305%	-10.70%	-10.80%	0.0000%	0.00000%
-2.40%	-2.50%	2.3847%	30.20319%	-6.60%	-6.70%	0.0762%	0.48688%	-10.80%	-10.90%	0.0000%	0.00000%
-2.50%	-2.60%	2.1914%	28.01178%	-6.70%	-6.80%	0.0713%	0.41560%	-10.90%	-11.00%	0.0000%	0.00000%
-2.60%	-2.70%	2.0345%	25.97723%	-6.80%	-6.90%	0.0653%	0.35029%	-11.00%	-11.10%	0.0000%	0.00000%
-2.70%	-2.80%	1.9131%	24.06417%	-6.90%	-7.00%	0.0454%	0.30484%	-11.10%	-11.20%	0.0000%	0.00000%
-2.80%	-2.90%	1.7561%	22.30810%	-7.00%	-7.10%	0.0416%	0.26324%	-11.20%	-11.30%	0.0000%	0.00000%
-2.90%	-3.00%	1.6510%	20.65709%	-7.10%	-7.20%	0.0407%	0.22257%	-11.30%	-11.40%	0.0000%	0.00000%
-3.00%	-3.10%	1.5463%	19.11074%	-7.20%	-7.30%	0.0306%	0.19197%	-11.40%	-11.50%	0.0000%	0.00000%
-3.10%	-3.20%	1.4208%	17.68999%	-7.30%	-7.40%	0.0262%	0.16574%	-11.50%	-11.60%	0.0000%	0.00000%
-3.20%	-3.30%	1.3319%	16.35813%	-7.40%	-7.50%	0.0252%	0.14056%	-11.60%	-11.70%	0.0000%	0.00000%
-3.30%	-3.40%	1.2522%	15.10590%	-7.50%	-7.60%	0.0223%	0.11831%	-11.70%	-11.80%	0.0000%	0.00000%
-3.40%	-3.50%	1.1901%	13.91580%	-7.60%	-7.70%	0.0209%	0.09738%	-11.80%	-11.90%	0.0000%	0.00000%
-3.50%	-3.60%	1.0864%	12.82944%	-7.70%	-7.80%	0.0152%	0.08214%	-11.90%	-12.00%	0.0000%	0.00000%
-3.60%	-3.70%	1.0209%	11.80852%	-7.80%	-7.90%	0.0131%	0.06902%	-12.00%	-12.10%	0.0000%	0.00000%
-3.70%	-3.80%	0.9511%	10.85742%	-7.90%	-8.00%	0.0122%	0.05684%	-12.10%	-12.20%	0.0000%	0.00000%
-3.80%	-3.90%	0.8853%	9.97217%	-8.00%	-8.10%	0.0099%	0.04690%	-12.20%	-12.30%	0.0000%	0.00000%
-3.90%	-4.00%	0.7929%	9.17925%	-8.10%	-8.20%	0.0101%	0.03683%	-12.30%	-12.40%	0.0000%	0.00000%
-4.00%	-4.10%	0.7521%	8.42714%	-8.20%	-8.30%	0.0068%	0.03007%	-12.40%	-12.50%	0.0000%	0.00000%

Chart 1b : Maximum loss over 60 business day. Correlation greater than 95% at strategy entry and exit. 1,000,000 simulations.



Cluster	Proba	Cumulative	Cluster	Proba	Density	Cluster	Proba	Density
>0	0.0000%	100.00000%	-4.10% -4.20%	0.7759%	8.46098%	-8.30% -8.40%	0.0036%	0.01771%
0.00% -0.10%	1.1962%	98.80382%	-4.20% -4.30%	0.7296%	7.73135%	-8.40% -8.50%	0.0032%	0.01447%
-0.10% -0.20%	1.2193%	97.58447%	-4.30% -4.40%	0.6596%	7.07171%	-8.50% -8.60%	0.0032%	0.01124%
-0.20% -0.30%	1.2697%	96.31473%	-4.40% -4.50%	0.6379%	6.43385%	-8.60% -8.70%	0.0026%	0.00868%
-0.30% -0.40%	1.3401%	94.97466%	-4.50% -4.60%	0.5839%	5.84998%	-8.70% -8.80%	0.0017%	0.00698%
-0.40% -0.50%	1.3699%	93.60480%	-4.60% -4.70%	0.5277%	5.32230%	-8.80% -8.90%	0.0022%	0.00477%
-0.50% -0.60%	1.4605%	92.14435%	-4.70% -4.80%	0.4969%	4.82543%	-8.90% -9.00%	0.0012%	0.00358%
-0.60% -0.70%	1.5703%	90.57407%	-4.80% -4.90%	0.4383%	4.38714%	-9.00% -9.10%	0.0005%	0.00306%
-0.70% -0.80%	1.7673%	88.80678%	-4.90% -5.00%	0.4104%	3.97678%	-9.10% -9.20%	0.0003%	0.00272%
-0.80% -0.90%	1.9604%	86.84640%	-5.00% -5.10%	0.3751%	3.60166%	-9.20% -9.30%	0.0009%	0.00187%
-0.90% -1.00%	2.2509%	84.59553%	-5.10% -5.20%	0.3552%	3.24647%	-9.30% -9.40%	0.0007%	0.00119%
-1.00% -1.10%	2.5051%	82.09044%	-5.20% -5.30%	0.3412%	2.90524%	-9.40% -9.50%	0.0003%	0.00085%
-1.10% -1.20%	2.8417%	79.24871%	-5.30% -5.40%	0.3063%	2.59891%	-9.50% -9.60%	0.0002%	0.00068%
-1.20% -1.30%	3.2129%	76.03579%	-5.40% -5.50%	0.2813%	2.31762%	-9.60% -9.70%	0.0002%	0.00051%
-1.30% -1.40%	3.7176%	72.31816%	-5.50% -5.60%	0.2479%	2.06970%	-9.70% -9.80%	0.0002%	0.00034%
-1.40% -1.50%	4.1549%	68.16327%	-5.60% -5.70%	0.2449%	1.82484%	-9.80% -9.90%	0.0002%	0.00017%
-1.50% -1.60%	4.2177%	63.94555%	-5.70% -5.80%	0.2123%	1.61251%	-9.90% -10.00%	0.0000%	0.00017%
-1.60% -1.70%	4.2554%	59.69020%	-5.80% -5.90%	0.1917%	1.42078%	-10.00% -10.10%	0.0002%	0.00000%
-1.70% -1.80%	4.1377%	55.55251%	-5.90% -6.00%	0.1684%	1.25238%	-10.10% -10.20%	0.0000%	0.00000%
-1.80% -1.90%	3.9419%	51.61063%	-6.00% -6.10%	0.1514%	1.10100%	-10.20% -10.30%	0.0000%	0.00000%
-1.90% -2.00%	3.7130%	47.89761%	-6.10% -6.20%	0.1408%	0.96018%	-10.30% -10.40%	0.0000%	0.00000%
-2.00% -2.10%	3.4913%	44.40628%	-6.20% -6.30%	0.1231%	0.83707%	-10.40% -10.50%	0.0000%	0.00000%
-2.10% -2.20%	3.3073%	41.09903%	-6.30% -6.40%	0.1085%	0.72861%	-10.50% -10.60%	0.0000%	0.00000%
-2.20% -2.30%	2.9715%	38.12755%	-6.40% -6.50%	0.0919%	0.63666%	-10.60% -10.70%	0.0000%	0.00000%
-2.30% -2.40%	2.7746%	35.35291%	-6.50% -6.60%	0.0824%	0.55425%	-10.70% -10.80%	0.0000%	0.00000%
-2.40% -2.50%	2.5485%	32.80440%	-6.60% -6.70%	0.0783%	0.47592%	-10.80% -10.90%	0.0000%	0.00000%
-2.50% -2.60%	2.3592%	30.44524%	-6.70% -6.80%	0.0770%	0.39896%	-10.90% -11.00%	0.0000%	0.00000%
-2.60% -2.70%	2.1926%	28.25260%	-6.80% -6.90%	0.0695%	0.32948%	-11.00% -11.10%	0.0000%	0.00000%
-2.70% -2.80%	2.0515%	26.20112%	-6.90% -7.00%	0.0468%	0.28266%	-11.10% -11.20%	0.0000%	0.00000%
-2.80% -2.90%	1.8994%	24.30170%	-7.00% -7.10%	0.0417%	0.24094%	-11.20% -11.30%	0.0000%	0.00000%
-2.90% -3.00%	1.7727%	22.52896%	-7.10% -7.20%	0.0404%	0.20058%	-11.30% -11.40%	0.0000%	0.00000%
-3.00% -3.10%	1.6643%	20.86469%	-7.20% -7.30%	0.0303%	0.17028%	-11.40% -11.50%	0.0000%	0.00000%
-3.10% -3.20%	1.5415%	19.32319%	-7.30% -7.40%	0.0254%	0.14490%	-11.50% -11.60%	0.0000%	0.00000%
-3.20% -3.30%	1.4448%	17.87840%	-7.40% -7.50%	0.0245%	0.12038%	-11.60% -11.70%	0.0000%	0.00000%
-3.30% -3.40%	1.3658%	16.51262%	-7.50% -7.60%	0.0211%	0.09927%	-11.70% -11.80%	0.0000%	0.00000%
-3.40% -3.50%	1.2892%	15.22347%	-7.60% -7.70%	0.0191%	0.08020%	-11.80% -11.90%	0.0000%	0.00000%
-3.50% -3.60%	1.1887%	14.03478%	-7.70% -7.80%	0.0141%	0.06607%	-11.90% -12.00%	0.0000%	0.00000%
-3.60% -3.70%	1.1056%	12.92918%	-7.80% -7.90%	0.0121%	0.05398%	-12.00% -12.10%	0.0000%	0.00000%
-3.70% -3.80%	1.0264%	11.90276%	-7.90% -8.00%	0.0117%	0.04223%	-12.10% -12.20%	0.0000%	0.00000%
-3.80% -3.90%	0.9678%	10.93491%	-8.00% -8.10%	0.0085%	0.03371%	-12.20% -12.30%	0.0000%	0.00000%
-3.90% -4.00%	0.8677%	10.06719%	-8.10% -8.20%	0.0077%	0.02605%	-12.30% -12.40%	0.0000%	0.00000%
-4.00% -4.10%	0.8303%	9.23693%	-8.20% -8.30%	0.0048%	0.02128%	-12.40% -12.50%	0.0000%	0.00000%

iii. Impact on the structure

The Fund provides for monthly liquidity (month-end redemption) with a cut-off date for notification on the 15th calendar day before each month. The liquidity window therefore ranges between 16 calendar days (redemption order sent on the 14th, value date on the 31st) and 45 calendar days (redemption order sent on the 16th, value date on the 31st of the following month). This means between 10 and 30 business days.

The liquidity of the underlying assets of the Fund is even better than this: liquidating the Portfolio of stocks with no market impact is a matter of 3 to 4 days. Regarding the liquidity of the options: they are American style options, and thus can simply be exercised rather than sold.

Therefore, the simulations carried over 60 business days cover much more than the longest liquidity window and strengthen the analysis. Tensyr Limited (the “Issuer”) is requested to permanently keep a cushion of at least 10% below the mezzanine debt tranche. If the cushion falls below 10% on any day, it must be increased back to 15% by redeeming enough Fund shares and keeping cash in the structure. The historical simulations-based probability for the strategy to fall by more than 10% over 60 business days is equal to zero.

C. Bankruptcy of parties have limited impact on the transaction

i. Bankruptcy of BMI

Although the Fund has an ongoing relationship with BMI and although the 12 banks that are counterparties of the call options would have an incentive to closely monitor BMI’s health, a sudden bankruptcy cannot be excluded.

Numerous factors could lead to the insolvency of a broker/dealer and it is not possible to list the various factors. Some factors follow as examples: the broker/dealer could file for bankruptcy, could fail to meet its capital requirements, could be in violation of applicable rules relating to the treatment of customer securities, or could be unable to make the calculations necessary to determine whether it is in compliance with applicable rules. The SIPIC test is whether the broker/dealer has failed or is in danger of failing to meet its obligations to its customers.

In the case of a bankruptcy of BMI and except fraud, it is likely that the Cash Account and the Margin Account will be transferred to a safe broker/dealer⁹. If the strategy was in place at that time, FGB will request that the new broker/dealer liquidates orderly the equity stocks and exercises or sells the options. If this takes places in a few business days, the impact on the strategy would likely be very limited.

⁹ See Appendix F

If for any reason the transfer of the Cash Account takes longer than expected (say 10 to 20 days), it is likely that the options will come to expiration. The options being OTC (and not exchange traded), their exercise is independent from BMI bankruptcy. In this situation, FGB will have the ability to exercise the put options and to put in place a new collar or simply hedge the portfolio by purchasing a put.

If FGB does not hedge the Portfolio, the Issuer can itself purchase a put option to cover its own position. A 1-month put option at a strike of 90% of the S&P100 spot price has a cost of around 2.66% when implied vol (VIX) is at or below 60%, which was the case of 99.81% of the days in the last 20 years. The probability of a loss exceeding 10% over 20 business days with a put at 90% is below [2.5]%

Therefore, in the very unlikely scenario where (i) BMI is bankrupt (and it is so sudden that the transaction has not been unwound before it happens), (ii) the transfer of the account takes 30 calendar days where it usually takes 3 to 4 days, (iii) FGB does not hedge the Portfolio and (iv) the implied volatility is as high as 60%, the probability of losing more than 10% should be below AAA.


ii. Bankruptcy of a Put counterparty

Because the internal credit policy at BMI is to use counterparties rated at least "A", the default of such counterparty within the maturity of a put option (max 57 calendar days) is extremely low. Even in case of such bankruptcy, it is likely that BMI's immediate action would either be to unwind the un-hedged portion of the Portfolio or to purchase another put option.

In order to prove the robustness of the structure, we have simulated the strategy with put options covering only 80% of the Portfolio notional (default of put counterparty representing 20% of the portfolio with no value recovered on the put option) and observed the maximum loss over 40 business days, which is the maximum length of an option, assuming that the default occurs at the very end of the option's length.

The maximum loss distribution for these assumptions is shown in Chart 2 below:

Chart 2 : Maximum loss over 40 business days. Put covers only 80% of Portfolio notional
Correlation greater than 95% at strategy entry. 1,000,000 simulations.



Cluster	Proba	Cumulative	Cluster	Proba	Density	Cluster	Proba	Density
>0	0.0000%	100.00000%	-4.10% -4.20%	0.4477%	5.03164%	-8.30% -8.40%	0.0033%	0.00829%
0.00% -0.10%	2.0234%	97.97660%	-4.20% -4.30%	0.4114%	4.62027%	-8.40% -8.50%	0.0029%	0.00539%
-0.10% -0.20%	2.0832%	95.89341%	-4.30% -4.40%	0.3697%	4.25061%	-8.50% -8.60%	0.0015%	0.00387%
-0.20% -0.30%	2.1321%	93.76134%	-4.40% -4.50%	0.3387%	3.91188%	-8.60% -8.70%	0.0008%	0.00304%
-0.30% -0.40%	2.1778%	91.58356%	-4.50% -4.60%	0.3288%	3.58310%	-8.70% -8.80%	0.0008%	0.00221%
-0.40% -0.50%	2.1093%	89.47427%	-4.60% -4.70%	0.3096%	3.27350%	-8.80% -8.90%	0.0004%	0.00180%
-0.50% -0.60%	2.1307%	87.34358%	-4.70% -4.80%	0.2806%	2.99291%	-8.90% -9.00%	0.0001%	0.00166%
-0.60% -0.70%	2.2163%	85.12728%	-4.80% -4.90%	0.2602%	2.73275%	-9.00% -9.10%	0.0004%	0.00124%
-0.70% -0.80%	2.3026%	82.82466%	-4.90% -5.00%	0.2466%	2.48613%	-9.10% -9.20%	0.0001%	0.00110%
-0.80% -0.90%	2.4425%	80.38217%	-5.00% -5.10%	0.2388%	2.24738%	-9.20% -9.30%	0.0001%	0.00097%
-0.90% -1.00%	2.5770%	77.80518%	-5.10% -5.20%	0.2096%	2.03776%	-9.30% -9.40%	0.0004%	0.00055%
-1.00% -1.10%	2.8117%	74.99344%	-5.20% -5.30%	0.1948%	1.84292%	-9.40% -9.50%	0.0001%	0.00041%
-1.10% -1.20%	3.0263%	71.96711%	-5.30% -5.40%	0.1832%	1.65967%	-9.50% -9.60%	0.0003%	0.00014%
-1.20% -1.30%	3.2826%	68.68449%	-5.40% -5.50%	0.1733%	1.48637%	-9.60% -9.70%	0.0000%	0.00014%
-1.30% -1.40%	3.6549%	65.02859%	-5.50% -5.60%	0.1511%	1.33531%	-9.70% -9.80%	0.0001%	0.00000%
-1.40% -1.50%	4.0000%	61.02961%	-5.60% -5.70%	0.1395%	1.19584%	-9.80% -9.90%	0.0000%	0.00000%
-1.50% -1.60%	4.2590%	56.77057%	-5.70% -5.80%	0.1379%	1.05789%	-9.90% -10.00%	0.0000%	0.00000%
-1.60% -1.70%	4.3337%	52.43683%	-5.80% -5.90%	0.1218%	0.93610%	-10.00% -10.10%	0.0000%	0.00000%
-1.70% -1.80%	4.2356%	48.20127%	-5.90% -6.00%	0.1127%	0.82342%	-10.10% -10.20%	0.0000%	0.00000%
-1.80% -1.90%	4.1447%	44.05657%	-6.00% -6.10%	0.1027%	0.72068%	-10.20% -10.30%	0.0000%	0.00000%
-1.90% -2.00%	3.9876%	40.06902%	-6.10% -6.20%	0.0938%	0.62692%	-10.30% -10.40%	0.0000%	0.00000%
-2.00% -2.10%	3.7420%	36.32898%	-6.20% -6.30%	0.0888%	0.53813%	-10.40% -10.50%	0.0000%	0.00000%
-2.10% -2.20%	3.5116%	32.81541%	-6.30% -6.40%	0.0659%	0.47226%	-10.50% -10.60%	0.0000%	0.00000%
-2.20% -2.30%	3.1989%	29.61648%	-6.40% -6.50%	0.0675%	0.40473%	-10.60% -10.70%	0.0000%	0.00000%
-2.30% -2.40%	2.9275%	26.68902%	-6.50% -6.60%	0.0552%	0.34950%	-10.70% -10.80%	0.0000%	0.00000%
-2.40% -2.50%	2.6476%	24.04146%	-6.60% -6.70%	0.0505%	0.29896%	-10.80% -10.90%	0.0000%	0.00000%
-2.50% -2.60%	2.4132%	21.62825%	-6.70% -6.80%	0.0424%	0.25657%	-10.90% -11.00%	0.0000%	0.00000%
-2.60% -2.70%	2.1520%	19.47629%	-6.80% -6.90%	0.0354%	0.22122%	-11.00% -11.10%	0.0000%	0.00000%
-2.70% -2.80%	1.9204%	17.55590%	-6.90% -7.00%	0.0369%	0.18435%	-11.10% -11.20%	0.0000%	0.00000%
-2.80% -2.90%	1.6780%	15.87786%	-7.00% -7.10%	0.0308%	0.15355%	-11.20% -11.30%	0.0000%	0.00000%
-2.90% -3.00%	1.4893%	14.38859%	-7.10% -7.20%	0.0254%	0.12815%	-11.30% -11.40%	0.0000%	0.00000%
-3.00% -3.10%	1.3354%	13.05314%	-7.20% -7.30%	0.0210%	0.10716%	-11.40% -11.50%	0.0000%	0.00000%
-3.10% -3.20%	1.1645%	11.88865%	-7.30% -7.40%	0.0189%	0.08824%	-11.50% -11.60%	0.0000%	0.00000%
-3.20% -3.30%	1.0449%	10.84374%	-7.40% -7.50%	0.0156%	0.07263%	-11.60% -11.70%	0.0000%	0.00000%
-3.30% -3.40%	0.9279%	9.91579%	-7.50% -7.60%	0.0139%	0.05869%	-11.70% -11.80%	0.0000%	0.00000%
-3.40% -3.50%	0.8236%	9.09224%	-7.60% -7.70%	0.0110%	0.04764%	-11.80% -11.90%	0.0000%	0.00000%
-3.50% -3.60%	0.7540%	8.33828%	-7.70% -7.80%	0.0083%	0.03935%	-11.90% -12.00%	0.0000%	0.00000%
-3.60% -3.70%	0.6903%	7.64798%	-7.80% -7.90%	0.0090%	0.03038%	-12.00% -12.10%	0.0000%	0.00000%
-3.70% -3.80%	0.6077%	7.04026%	-7.90% -8.00%	0.0058%	0.02458%	-12.10% -12.20%	0.0000%	0.00000%
-3.80% -3.90%	0.5559%	6.48432%	-8.00% -8.10%	0.0055%	0.01906%	-12.20% -12.30%	0.0000%	0.00000%
-3.90% -4.00%	0.5170%	5.96732%	-8.10% -8.20%	0.0041%	0.01491%	-12.30% -12.40%	0.0000%	0.00000%
-4.00% -4.10%	0.4880%	5.47932%	-8.20% -8.30%	0.0033%	0.01160%	-12.40% -12.50%	0.0000%	0.00000%

As shown in the table above, even if the default of the counterparty occurs at the very end of the 40 days of the option, the probability of having a loss exceeding 10% is also equal to zero.

D. Conclusion

In this transaction we expect to reach a AAA rating on the two tranches of debt.

We estimate that:

1. The “single manager” risk does not differ from the risk borne by a standard CFO and is very similar to the risk borne by cash CDOs or CLOs. If there is no pre-trade verification, there are two independent parties to control post-trade execution and within a few hours from such execution. The alignment of interests and the incentive to deliver best execution are clearly demonstrated.
2. The bankruptcy risk of BMI is monitored by FGB and it has a clear incentive to preserve investors in the Fund. In the case of a sudden bankruptcy of BMI, all the assets could be transferred to a safe broker/dealer and the positions unwound. Even if the transfer takes as long as 20 business days, the options can directly be rolled at the fund level. If FGB does not roll the options, the issuer itself can purchase a put option and has enough cash and cushion reserves to pay for it, even in adverse market conditions.
3. The strategy risk is very limited as has been demonstrated. Even if the skill of the Execution Agent cannot be rated here, the 17 year track-record adds another element of comfort to the transaction.

EXHIBIT B

Baker & Hostetler LLP

45 Rockefeller Plaza
New York, New York 10111
Telephone: (212) 589-4200
Facsimile: (212) 589-4201

*Attorneys for Irving H. Picard, Trustee
for the Substantively Consolidated SIPA Liquidation
of Bernard L. Madoff Investment Securities LLC
and the Estate of Bernard L. Madoff*

**UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK**

SECURITIES INVESTOR PROTECTION CORPORATION, Plaintiff-Applicant, v. BERNARD L. MADOFF INVESTMENT SECURITIES LLC, Defendant.
In re: BERNARD L. MADOFF, Debtor.
IRVING H. PICARD, Trustee for the Liquidation of Bernard L. Madoff Investment Securities LLC, Plaintiff, v. UBS AG, UBS (LUXEMBOURG) SA, UBS FUND SERVICES (LUXEMBOURG) SA, UBS THIRD PARTY MANAGEMENT COMPANY SA, ACCESS INTERNATIONAL ADVISORS LLC, ACCESS INTERNATIONAL ADVISORS LTD., ACCESS MANAGEMENT LUXEMBOURG SA (f/k/a ACCESS INTERNATIONAL ADVISORS (LUXEMBOURG) SA) as represented by its Liquidator MAITRE FERNAND ENTRINGER, ACCESS PARTNERS SA as represented by its

Adv. Pro. No. 08-01789 (SMB)

SIPA Liquidation

(Substantively Consolidated)

Adv. Pro. No. 10-04285 (SMB)

**SECOND AMENDED
COMPLAINT**

Liquidator MAITRE FERNAND ENTRINGER, PATRICK LITTAYE, CLAUDINE MAGON DE LA VILLEHUCHET (a/k/a CLAUDINE DE LA VILLEHUCHET) in her capacity as Executrix under the Will of THIERRY MAGON DE LA VILLEHUCHET (a/k/a RENE THIERRY DE LA VILLEHUCHET), CLAUDINE MAGON DE LA VILLEHUCHET (a/k/a CLAUDINE DE LA VILLEHUCHET) individually as the sole beneficiary under the Will of THIERRY MAGON DE LA VILLEHUCHET (a/k/a RENE THIERRY DE LA VILLEHUCHET), PIERRE DELANDMETER, THEODORE DUMBAULD, LUXALPHA SICAV as represented by its Liquidators MAITRE ALAIN RUKAVINA and PAUL LAPLUME, MAITRE ALAIN RUKAVINA AND PAUL LAPLUME, in their capacities as liquidators and representatives of LUXALPHA SICAV, GROUPEMENT FINANCIER LTD.,

Defendants.

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Irving H. Picard, as trustee (the “Trustee”) for the liquidation of the business of Bernard L. Madoff Investment Securities LLC (“BLMIS”), under the Securities Investor Protection Act (“SIPA”), § 78aaa *et seq.*, and the substantively consolidated estate of Bernard L. Madoff (“Madoff”) (collectively, the “Debtors”), individually, by and through his undersigned counsel, as and for his Second Amended Complaint, alleges as follows:

NATURE OF THE PROCEEDING

1. In this action under SIPA, the Trustee seeks the avoidance of the fraudulent transfers of customer property the Defendants received from BLMIS, the recovery of those transfers or their value from the Defendants and/or any subsequent transferees that received any portion of the initial transfers from BLMIS, and any other relief the Court deems just, proper, and equitable.

2. This action focuses on two BLMIS feeder funds, defendants Luxalpha SICAV (“Luxalpha”) and Groupement Financier Ltd. (“Groupement Financier”) (collectively, the “Feeder Fund Defendants”), and the network of individuals and entities associated with them, which were integral to perpetuating Madoff’s Ponzi scheme.

3. Together, these two funds directed no less than \$2 billion into the scheme.

4. Both funds had highly sophisticated service providers—UBS AG and its affiliates (collectively, the “UBS Defendants”), and Access International Advisors, and its officers and affiliates (collectively, the “Access Defendants”)—all of which became aware of the impossibilities and indicia of Madoff’s fraud.

5. Luxalpha was established in 2004 as a joint venture between the Access Defendants and UBS AG and UBS (Luxembourg) S.A. (“UBS SA”) to replace an earlier Access-established fund known as Oreades SICAV (“Oreades”), which was closed when its service provider, BNP Paribas, developed misgivings about the legitimacy of BLMIS. UBS AG and

UBS SA stepped in to replace BNP Paribas and to create Luxalpha. The next year, certain of the UBS Defendants subsequently began to service Groupement Financier, which had been established in 2003.

6. Even before the UBS Defendants became involved with Luxalpha and Groupement Financier, UBS analysts determined that BLMIS's purported performance was impossible given the strategy that Madoff claimed to employ. UBS analysts assessing Madoff's results concluded that "it would be IMPOSSIBLE to generate the returns that he has produced since 1990." This and other indicia of fraud led UBS's Private Wealth Management Group to put BLMIS on a "non-approved" list, prohibiting the recommendation of BLMIS to Private Wealth clients out of concern that BLMIS was a fraudulent scheme.

7. The UBS Defendants nevertheless found a way to profit from Madoff's fraud. The UBS Defendants assumed a number of key roles for the Feeder Fund Defendants, but delegated these roles to Madoff and/or BLMIS. UBS then sought to disavow any potential liability through indemnity agreements and insurance policies that were never disclosed to investors or regulators.

8. UBS concealed Madoff's involvement with Luxalpha from the Luxembourg regulator, the Commission de Surveillance du Secteur Financier (the "CSSF"), knowingly omitting any reference to Madoff or BLMIS when identifying Luxalpha's custodians and managers.

9. The Access Defendants, in turn, marketed the Feeder Fund Defendants by touting a rigorous due diligence process and a series of antifraud measures that in reality never applied to the Feeder Fund Defendants. Access treated Luxalpha and Groupement Financier differently than the non-Madoff funds they promoted and monitored, and Access's BLMIS offerings were

allowed to operate as an exception to the Access Defendants' normal policies and procedures regarding the due diligence of funds and their managers. Madoff was, for example, excused from background checks. He was not required to allow the Access Defendants to regularly visit his office or meet with his staff. He was allowed to report his purported trades on a delayed basis, using only hard copy confirmations that provided ample opportunity for him to commit and perpetuate his fraud. All were deviations from Access's normal practices.

10. At the same time, Access and UBS analysts and professionals received and reviewed Luxalpha's and Groupement Financier's account statements and knew—from those documents—that Madoff could not be executing all the securities transactions reported therein, because many of them were simply impossible.

11. The Access Defendants and, thereby, Luxalpha's and Groupement Financier's Boards of Directors, which consisted of the principals of the Access entities and of UBS SA executives, knew that the volume of options trades Madoff reported was impossible, but they did not disclose that information publicly. The UBS Defendants were also aware of the false options issues, both through the account statements and because, at least once, the SEC informed UBS AG that Madoff had identified a UBS affiliate in Europe as one of his options trading counterparties. The UBS Defendants knew this to be false. The Access Defendants were informed of Madoff's impossible trading activity by an outside consultant, who advised them to exit all of their BLMIS investments. The Access Defendants and the UBS Defendants also knew that Madoff's market-timing ability and performance were impossible, among many other indicia of fraud. Together, the UBS Defendants and the Access Defendants enabled the Ponzi scheme through Luxalpha and Groupement Financier, and profited tremendously for their efforts.

12. Although they had evidence strongly indicating that BLMIS was engaged in fraud, the Defendants continued to facilitate the investment of hundreds of millions of dollars with BLMIS. Collectively, the Defendants received approximately \$1.1 billion in avoidable transfers from BLMIS. The UBS Defendants and Access Defendants profited, receiving approximately \$126 million in management, custodial, advisory, administration, and performance fees in connection with moneys directed to Luxalpha and Groupement Financier's investment with BLMIS. All moneys withdrawn from BLMIS, whether redemptions by feeder funds or fees paid to the feeder funds' service providers, is Customer Property, as defined by the SIPA statute, and must be returned to the Trustee for equitable distribution to BLMIS customers.

JURISDICTION AND VENUE

13. This is an adversary proceeding commenced in this Court, in which the main underlying SIPA proceeding, No. 08-01789 (SMB) (the "SIPA Proceeding"), is pending. The SIPA Proceeding was originally brought in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York as *Securities Exchange Commission v. Bernard L. Madoff Investment Securities LLC et al.*, No. 08 CV 10791 (the "District Court Proceeding") and has been referred to this Court. This Court has jurisdiction over this adversary proceeding under 28 U.S.C. § 1334(b) and (e)(1), and 15 U.S.C. § 78eee(b)(2)(A) and (b)(4).

14. This is a core proceeding under 28 U.S.C. §§ 157(b)(2)(A), (B), (F), (H) and (O). The Trustee consents to the entry of final orders or judgment by this Court if it is determined that consent of the parties is required for this Court to enter final orders or judgment consistent with Article III of the U.S. Constitution.

15. Venue in this judicial district is proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1409.

16. This adversary proceeding is brought under 15 U.S.C. §§ 78fff(b) and 78fff-2(c)(3), 11 U.S.C. §§ 105(a), 502(a), (b) and (d), 510(c), 544(b), 548(a), 550(a) and 551, the

New York Fraudulent Conveyance Act (N.Y. Debt. & Cred. § 270 et seq. (McKinney 2001)), the New York Civil Practice Law and Rules (McKinney 2003) (“N.Y. C.P.L.R.”), and other applicable law.¹

17. This Court has personal jurisdiction over each of the Defendants under N.Y. C.P.L.R. 301 and 302, and Bankruptcy Rule 7004. Each Defendant has maintained minimum contacts with New York in connection with the claims in this adversary proceeding. As alleged herein, the Defendants have or had offices in New York, or are doing or did business in New York, and/or transact or transacted business in New York during the time periods addressed herein. Defendants Luxalpha and Groupement Financier had accounts with BLMIS in New York. The UBS Defendants, the Access Defendants, the Feeder Fund Defendants and the Feeder Fund Director Defendants (defined below), delivered agreements or caused agreements relating to BLMIS to be delivered in New York. In addition, certain of the UBS Defendants and Access Defendants communicated regularly with persons in New York regarding the Feeder Fund Defendants and/or BLMIS, and also sent and/or received funds to and/or from BLMIS in New York, utilizing New York banks. In addition, Luxalpha filed Customer Claims in the SIPA Proceeding seeking to recover funds it allegedly lost on its investments in BLMIS, and has thus submitted to the jurisdiction of this Court.

BACKGROUND, THE TRUSTEE AND STANDING

18. On December 11, 2008 (the “Filing Date”), Madoff was arrested by federal agents for criminal violations of federal securities laws, including securities fraud, investment adviser

¹ Until a final determination on appeal of the applicable measure and burden of proof concerning a defendant’s knowledge in connection with the applicability of section 546(e) of the Bankruptcy Code to the Trustee’s claims to avoid and recover transfers made within six years of the Filing Date, the Trustee asserts avoidance and recovery claims under sections 548(a)(1)(B), 544(b)(1), 550 and 551 of the Bankruptcy Code, and applicable provisions of the NYDCL. Until a final determination on appeal of the applicability of section 502(a) and (b)(1), and equitable grounds as a basis to challenge any claim against the estate, the Trustee asserts such grounds for relief in this proceeding.

fraud, and mail and wire fraud. Contemporaneously, the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) commenced the District Court Proceeding.

19. On December 15, 2008, under SIPA § 78eee(a)(4)(A), the SEC consented to combining its action with an application by the Securities Investor Protection Corporation (“SIPC”). Thereafter, under SIPA § 78eee(a)(4)(B), SIPC filed an application in the District Court alleging, among other things, that BLMIS could not meet its obligations to securities customers as they came due and its customers needed the protections afforded by SIPA.

20. Also on December 15, 2008, Judge Stanton granted SIPC’s application and entered an order pursuant to SIPA, which, in pertinent part:

- (a) appointed the Trustee for the liquidation of the business of BLMIS pursuant to SIPA § 78eee(b)(3);
- (b) appointed Baker & Hostetler LLP as counsel to the Trustee pursuant to SIPA § 78eee(b)(3); and
- (c) removed this case to this Court pursuant to SIPA § 78eee(b)(4).

21. By orders dated December 23, 2008 and February 4, 2009, respectively, this Court approved the Trustee’s bond and found that the Trustee was a disinterested person. Accordingly, the Trustee is duly qualified to serve and act on behalf of the estate.

22. On April 13, 2009, an involuntary bankruptcy petition was filed against Madoff, and on June 9, 2009, this Court substantively consolidated the chapter 7 estate of Madoff into the SIPA Proceeding.

23. At a plea hearing on March 12, 2009, in the case captioned *United States v. Madoff*, Case No. 09-CR-213(DC), Madoff pleaded guilty to an 11-count criminal information filed against him by the United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York. At the plea hearing, Madoff admitted he “operated a Ponzi scheme through the investment advisory side of [BLMIS].”

24. At a plea hearing on August 11, 2009, in the case captioned *United States v. DiPascali*, Case No. 09-CR-764 (RJS), Frank DiPascali, a former BLMIS employee, pleaded guilty to a ten-count criminal information charging him with participating in and conspiring to perpetuate the Ponzi scheme. DiPascali admitted that no purchases or sales of securities took place in connection with BLMIS customer accounts and that the Ponzi scheme had been ongoing at BLMIS since at least the 1980s.

25. At a plea hearing on November 21, 2011, in the case captioned *United States v. Kugel*, Case No. 10-CR-228 (LTS), David Kugel, a former BLMIS trader and manager, pleaded guilty to a six-count criminal information charging him with securities fraud, falsifying the records of BLMIS, conspiracy, and bank fraud. Kugel admitted to helping create false, backdated trades in BLMIS customer accounts beginning in the early 1970s.

26. On March 24, 2014, Daniel Bonventre, Annette Bongiorno, Jo Ann Crupi, George Perez, and Jerome O'Hara were convicted of fraud and other crimes in connection with their participation in the Ponzi scheme as employees of BLMIS's investment advisory business ("IA Business").

27. As the Trustee appointed under SIPA, the Trustee is charged with assessing claims, recovering and distributing customer property to BLMIS's customers holding allowed customer claims, and liquidating any remaining BLMIS assets for the benefit of the estate and its creditors. The Trustee is using his authority under SIPA and the Bankruptcy Code to avoid and recover payouts of fictitious profits and/or other transfers made by the Debtors to customers and others to the detriment of defrauded, innocent customers whose money was consumed by the Ponzi scheme. Absent this and other recovery actions, the Trustee will be unable to satisfy the claims described in subparagraphs (A) through (D) of SIPA § 78fff-2(c)(1).

28. Pursuant to SIPA § 78fff-1(a), the Trustee has the general powers of a bankruptcy trustee in a case under the Bankruptcy Code in addition to the powers granted by SIPA pursuant to SIPA § 78fff(b). Chapters 1, 3, 5 and subchapters I and II of chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code apply to this proceeding to the extent consistent with SIPA pursuant to SIPA § 78fff(b).

29. The Trustee has standing to bring the avoidance and recovery claims under SIPA § 78fff-1(a) and applicable provisions of the Bankruptcy Code, including 11 U.S.C. §§ 323(b), 544, and 704(a)(1), because the Trustee has the power and authority to avoid and recover transfers under Bankruptcy Code sections 544, 548, 550(a), and 551, and SIPA §§ 78fff-1(a) and 78fff-2(c)(3).

30. The Trustee has standing to object to customer and creditor claims under SIPA § 78fff-1(a) and 78fff(b), and 11 U.S.C. § 502(a), because the Trustee has the power and authority to discharge obligations to a customer to the extent they are established to the satisfaction of the Trustee under SIPA §§ 78fff(2) and 78fff-2(b). By his objection, the Trustee seeks disallowance of any customer and general creditor claims that are unenforceable against the Debtors or their property under (i) SIPA § 78fff-2(b), because such claims have not been established to his satisfaction; (ii) SIPA § 78fff(2), because such claims are not entitled to a distribution *pari passu* with other customers; and (iii) 11 U.S.C. § 502(b)(1), because such claims are otherwise unenforceable under applicable law.

THE PONZI SCHEME

31. Madoff founded BLMIS in or about 1960 as a sole proprietorship. On January 1, 2001, Madoff continued BLMIS as a sole member limited liability company under the laws of the State of New York. BLMIS's ownership and control did not change since its formation in 1960. During that time, BLMIS had been continually registered with the SEC, and remained a SIPC member since its formation in late 1970. For most of its existence, BLMIS operated from

its principal place of business at 885 Third Avenue, New York, New York. Madoff, as founder, sole owner, chairman, and chief executive officer, operated BLMIS with several family members and other employees, including DiPascali and David Kugel, who pleaded guilty to helping Madoff carry out the fraudulent scheme.

32. Beginning in the 1990s, Madoff outwardly ascribed the consistent investment success of BLMIS's IA Business to the "split-strike conversion" ("SSC") investment strategy. Madoff claimed his strategy would produce steady returns without the volatility in the stock market or other high return investment strategies. Madoff generally indicated that investors' funds would be invested in a basket of common stocks within the Standard & Poor's 100 Index ("S&P 100 Index"), which is a collection of the 100 largest publicly traded companies, as determined by Standard & Poor's Index Committee. The basket of stocks was designed to correlate to the movement of the S&P 100 Index. The second part of the SSC strategy involved purporting to sell call options and buy put options on the S&P 100 Index; this is commonly referred to as a "collar." Madoff purported to purchase and sell option contracts to control the downside risk of price changes in the basket of stocks correlated to the performance of the S&P 100 Index. All options relating to the companies within the S&P 100 Index, including options based upon the S&P 100 Index itself, clear through the Options Clearing Corporation ("OCC"). The OCC has no records showing that BLMIS's IA Business cleared any trades in any exchange-listed options.

33. BLMIS commingled all of the funds received from IA Business investors in a single BLMIS account maintained at JPMorgan Chase Bank.

34. Because Madoff claimed that he would carefully time purchases and sales to maximize value, customer funds would intermittently be out of the market. During those times,

Madoff claimed that the funds were invested in U.S. Treasury securities (“Treasury Bills”) or mutual funds invested in Treasury Bills. There is no record of BLMIS clearing a single purchase or sale of securities in connection with the SSC strategy at the Depository Trust & Clearing Corporation, the clearing house for such transactions, or any other trading platform on which BLMIS could have traded securities. There are no other BLMIS records that demonstrate that BLMIS traded securities using the SSC strategy.

35. At their plea hearings, Madoff and DiPascali admitted that BLMIS purchased none of the securities listed on the IA Business customers’ fraudulent statements.

36. Madoff operated the IA Business as a Ponzi scheme. The money received from IA Business customers was used primarily to make distributions to, or payments for, other customers. The falsified trades reflected in monthly account statements made it appear that the IA Business accounts included substantial gains on customers’ principal investments. The Ponzi scheme collapsed in December 2008, when the requests for redemptions overwhelmed the flow of new investments with BLMIS’s IA Business.

37. Since at least 1983, BLMIS financial reports filed with the SEC fraudulently omitted the existence of the billions of dollars of customer funds held by BLMIS.

38. BLMIS did not register as an investment adviser with the SEC until August 2006. At that time, BLMIS filed with the SEC a Form ADV (Uniform Application for Investment Adviser Registration) representing, among other things, that BLMIS had 23 customer accounts and assets under management of \$11.7 billion. Thereafter, BLMIS filed a Form ADV annually with the SEC, the latest of which was filed in January 2008. It represented that BLMIS had 23 customer accounts with assets under management of \$17.1 billion. In fact, at that time BLMIS

had over 4,900 active customer accounts with a purported value of approximately \$68 billion under management.

39. Contrary to standard practice in the investment advisory industry, BLMIS did not charge the IA Business customers a fee for investment advisory services. Madoff knew others that solicited investors for BLMIS, or, directly or indirectly, funded customer accounts, charged hundreds of millions of dollars for investment advisory services attributed to BLMIS. Instead of investment advisory fees, BLMIS purported to accept commissions for the purported trades, as reflected in the fraudulent IA Business customer statements.

40. BLMIS's auditor was Friehling & Horowitz, CPA, P.C. ("Friehling & Horowitz"), a three-person accounting firm in Rockland County, New York. Of the three employees at the firm, one employee was an administrative assistant and one was a semi-retired accountant living in Florida. On or about November 3, 2009, David Friehling, the sole proprietor of Friehling & Horowitz, pleaded guilty to filing false audit reports for BLMIS and filing false tax returns for Madoff and others.

41. At all relevant times, BLMIS was insolvent because (i) its assets were worth less than the value of its liabilities; (ii) it could not meet its obligations as they came due; and (iii) at the time of the transfers alleged herein, BLMIS was left with insufficient capital.

THE DEFENDANTS

A. The UBS Defendants

42. Defendant UBS AG is a Swiss public company with registered and principal offices at Bahnhofstrasse 45, CH-8001 Zurich, and Aeschenvorstadt 1, CH-4051 Basel, Switzerland. UBS AG is the parent company of the global UBS bank, and is present in New York, with offices at 299 Park Avenue, New York, NY 10171 and 101 Park Avenue, New York,

NY 10178. It also conducts daily business activities in Stamford, Connecticut and other locations in the United States.

43. Defendant UBS (Luxembourg) S.A. (“UBS SA”), a wholly owned subsidiary of UBS AG, is a Luxembourg limited liability company incorporated as a *société anonyme*. Its registered office is at 33a, Avenue John F. Kennedy, BP 2, L-1855 Luxembourg.

44. Defendant UBS Fund Services (Luxembourg) S.A. (“UBSFSL”), a wholly owned subsidiary of UBS AG, is a Luxembourg limited liability company incorporated as a *société anonyme*. Its registered office is at 33a, Avenue John F. Kennedy, L-1855 Luxembourg.

45. Defendant UBS Third Party Management Company S.A. (“UBSTPM”), a wholly owned subsidiary of UBS AG, is a Luxembourg limited liability company incorporated as a *société anonyme*. Its registered office is at 33a, Avenue John F. Kennedy, L-1855 Luxembourg.

B. The Access Defendants

46. Defendant Access International Advisors LLC (“AIA LLC”) is a Delaware limited liability company. Its principal place of business was at 509 Madison Avenue, 22nd Floor, New York, New York 10022 during the relevant period.

47. Defendant Access International Advisors Ltd. (“AIA Ltd.”) is a Bahamas limited liability company. Its registered address is MMG Bahamas Ltd., P.O. Box CB – 13937, Suite 102, Saffrey Square, Bay Street & Bank Lane, Nassau, Bahamas.

48. Defendant Access Management Luxembourg S.A. (“AML”) (f/k/a Access International Advisors (Luxembourg) S.A. (“AIA (Lux)”)) is a Luxembourg limited liability company incorporated as a *société anonyme*. Its registered office is at 34A, rue Philippe II, L-2340 Luxembourg. AML is in liquidation in Luxembourg. Maître Fernand Entringer, with offices at 34A, rue Philippe II, L-2340, Luxembourg, is AML’s liquidator.

49. Defendant Access Partners S.A. (Luxembourg) (“AP (Lux)”) is a Luxembourg limited liability company incorporated as a *société anonyme*. Its registered office is at 34A, rue Philippe II, L-2340 Luxembourg. AP (Lux) is in liquidation in Luxembourg. Maître Fernand Entringer, with offices at 34A, rue Philippe II, L-2340, Luxembourg, is AP (Lux)’s liquidator.

50. Defendant Patrick Littaye (“Littaye”) co-founded the Access International Advisors group in 1994 with the creation of a New York corporation, Access International Advisors Inc. (“AIA Inc.”), and co-founded AIA LLC as a wholly owned subsidiary in 2001. Littaye was Access International Advisors’ Partner and Chief Executive Officer and AIA LLC’s Partner, Chairman, Chief Executive Officer, and co-owner. He was a director of AIA Inc. from at least 2003 through 2008. He was a Director of Luxalpha, Groupement Financier, and Groupement Financier Levered Ltd. (“Groupement Levered”). Littaye co-owns AIA Ltd., AML, and AP (Lux), and at various times served as a director of each of these Defendants. Littaye is a citizen of France.

51. Claudine Magon de la Villehuchet a/k/a Claudine de la Villehuchet (“Ms. Villehuchet”), is named in her capacity as Executrix under the Last and Will and Testament of Thierry Magon de la Villehuchet a/k/a René Thierry de la Villehuchet, dated November 6, 2000. Thierry Magon de la Villehuchet (“Villehuchet”) co-founded the Access International Advisors group in 1994 with the creation of a New York corporation, AIA Inc. and co-founded AIA LLC as a wholly owned subsidiary in 2001. Villehuchet was Access International Advisors’ Partner and Chief Executive Officer and AIA LLC’s President, Partner, Chairman, Chief Executive Officer, and co-owner up until his death on December 22, 2008. He was also Director of Groupement Financier and Groupement Levered. In addition, Villehuchet co-owned AIA Ltd., AML, and AP (Lux), and at various times served as a director of each of these Defendants. At

the time of Villehuchet's death, Villehuchet and Ms. Villehuchet were U.S. citizens and resided in New York.

52. Ms. Villehuchet is also named individually as the sole beneficiary under Villehuchet's last will and testament.

53. Defendant Pierre Delandmeter ("Delandmeter") was a member of AML's board. He was both a Director and Legal Advisor of Luxalpha, and an advisor to Littaye, Villehuchet, and the other Access Defendants. Delandmeter was a Legal Advisor to Groupement Financier and Groupement Levered. In addition, Delandmeter was a Director of AML, AP (Lux), and AIA Inc. Delandmeter is a Belgian citizen.

54. Beginning in 2002, Defendant Theodore Dumbauld ("Dumbauld") was a Partner at AIA LLC. He also served as Chief Investment Officer of AIA LLC until his departure in 2006. Dumbauld resides in Connecticut.

C. The Feeder Fund Defendants

Luxalpha

55. Defendant Luxalpha is a Luxembourg-based UCITS fund sponsored by UBS AG and UBS SA, with its registered office at 33A, Avenue J.F. Kennedy, L-1855 Luxembourg. UCITS is an acronym for "Undertakings for Collective Investments in Transferable Securities" and refers to a series of EU directives regulating open-ended collective investment schemes. Each EU member state was required to enact legislation implementing various EU UCITS directives. The UCITS regulatory structure allows a collective investment scheme to operate throughout the EU once it is approved and authorized by a single member state.

56. Luxalpha was authorized under Luxembourg law and was subject to the regulatory authority of the Luxembourg financial regulator, the CSSF. Luxalpha is listed in the Trade and Companies Register under number B.98874. Luxalpha was placed in liquidation by

the District Court of Luxembourg on April 2, 2009 and is represented by its court-appointed liquidators, Maître Alain Rukavina, barrister (avocat á la Cour) and Paul Laplume, company auditor (the “Luxembourg Liquidators”). Me. Rukavina resides at 10A, Boulevard de la Foire, L-1528 Luxembourg. Mr. Laplume resides at 42, Rue des Cerises, L-6113 Junglinster.

57. Me. Rukavina and Mr. Laplume are also defendants in their capacity as the court-appointed liquidators and representatives of Luxalpha, and as representatives of Luxalpha’s investors and creditors, according to the provisions of the District Court of Luxembourg judgment dated April 2, 2009. Me. Rukavina and Mr. Laplume are both residents of Luxembourg. References to Defendant Luxalpha herein include Me. Rukavina and Mr. Laplume.

Luxalpha Director Defendants

58. Defendant Littaye was a Director of Luxalpha from June 26, 2006 through its liquidation.

59. Defendant Delandmeter was a Director of and Legal Advisor to Luxalpha from February 2004 through its liquidation.

60. Defendants Littaye and Delandmeter are referred to collectively as the “Luxalpha Director Defendants.”

Groupement Financier

61. Defendant Groupement Financier is an investment fund organized under the laws of the British Virgin Islands (“BVI”). Groupement Financier’s registered agent is Maples & Calder and its registered office is at Sea Meadow House, P.O. Box 173, Road Town, Tortola VG 1110, BVI.

Groupement Financier Director Defendants

62. Access Defendants Littaye and Villehuchet were the Directors of Groupement Financier, and are referred to collectively as the “Groupement Financier Director Defendants.”

63. The Luxalpha Director Defendants and the Groupement Financier Director Defendants are collectively referred to herein as the “Feeder Fund Director Defendants.”

PRIOR TO THE CREATION OF GROUPEMENT FINANCIER AND LUXALPHA, THE UBS AND ACCESS DEFENDANTS WERE AWARE OF THE IMPOSSIBLE NATURE OF BLMIS’S INVESTMENT STRATEGY

A. Early On, UBS AG and Its Affiliates Voiced Concerns About BLMIS

64. Before the UBS Defendants created Luxalpha and began servicing Groupement Financier, UBS Wealth Management, a UBS AG business division, considered and rejected BLMIS as a vehicle for direct investment and derivative financial products.

65. Several other UBS entities—the UBS AG subsidiary UBS O’Connor, among them—also analyzed BLMIS and as early as 2002 found its performance figures to be “more or less impossible” in light of the strategy Madoff claimed to employ. The UBS analysts assessing the strategy stated “[w]e consider ourselves pretty smart and no one in their firm [BLMIS] has properly explained their strategy to match the return profile to us, so we avoid stuff like that.” Like UBS Wealth Management, UBS O’Connor also considered and then rejected the idea of recommending Madoff investment to its clients.

66. Assessing BLMIS again in 2004, UBS O’Connor concluded that “it would be IMPOSSIBLE to generate the returns that [Madoff] has produced since 1990.” UBS O’Connor also questioned Madoff’s practice of not charging fees, choosing to earn revenue only from commissions. The “simple fact that an investor has to start considering how the fund and the [broker/dealer] benefit one another [was] a non-starter” in UBS O’Connor’s assessment, and was reason enough to stay away from BLMIS investment.

67. In 2005, when considering another Madoff investment, UBS O'Connor reiterated its doubts about the propriety of Madoff's operations and whether Madoff's purported implementation of the SSC strategy could generate the results he reported.

68. Between September 2007 and December 2008, UBS AG was approached about investing in several BLMIS-related products. In accordance with UBS policy, UBS designated its London-based risk analysts to visit BLMIS headquarters and meet "face to face" with BLMIS's manager. Madoff declined the request for a meeting on the grounds that agreeing to meet with one potential investor would force him to meet with others.

69. UBS AG ultimately decided that it did not have sufficient information on Madoff and BLMIS to recommend BLMIS as an investment target for its clients.

70. In the aftermath of Madoff's collapse, UBS sought to portray UBS Wealth Management's caution toward Madoff as indicative of UBS's overall approach to BLMIS, touting UBS Wealth Management's ability to foresee the problems at BLMIS. UBS cultivated the public perception that it had reviewed Madoff in the early 2000s, detected risks and, consequently, designated Madoff as "non-approved" for investment." But that is not the whole story. As more fully set forth below, the UBS Defendants were integral in creating, operating and servicing several feeder Funds that funneled over billions of dollars into BLMIS, and earned lucrative fees in the process.

B. Littaye and Access Jointly Operated and Serviced Oreades and Were Confronted With Indicia of Fraud at BLMIS

71. Oreades was a Madoff feeder fund that predated Groupment Financier and Luxalpha. Oreades was jointly operated by Littaye, certain Access Defendants, and BNP Paribas. The BLMIS accounts for Oreades were opened in November 1997. The fund was shut

down in March 2004 after BNP Paribas grew increasingly uncomfortable with the operations of Oreades and BLMIS.

72. In July 2003, BNP Paribas told Littaye that it was particularly concerned that BLMIS's role as asset manager had not been properly disclosed, noting that in the eyes of the Luxembourg regulator, BLMIS "does not exist." BNP Paribas knew that it would bear the risk of any liabilities associated with the management of Oreades. BNP Paribas also questioned BLMIS's capacity to serve as a custodian, noting that BLMIS was not a bank and asking where the fund's assets were actually being held.

73. In 2003, BNP Paribas also attempted to confirm that a segregated Oreades account existed at BLMIS, and raised issues concerning the fact that reports of trading activity and positions for Oreades were delivered only by fax and mail, seven or eight days after the reported trades. BNP Paribas and Access knew that this process failed to provide any opportunity to verify trades.

74. Such practices departed from BNP Paribas's standard operating procedures in 2003, which provided for order transmission by fax or electronic communication on the day of the trade, followed by settlement confirmation by the depository bank within one to three days thereafter. During internal audits, BNP Paribas's risk and ethics department highlighted Madoff's refusal to conform to then-current practices, or to otherwise satisfy BNP Paribas's requests for more timely transmission of trade information.

75. In spring 2004, shortly after BNP Paribas raised its concerns to Access and BLMIS, Oreades was shut down and its BLMIS accounts were closed.

**THE ACCESS AND UBS DEFENDANTS ESTABLISHED GROUPEMENT FINANCIER
AND LUXALPHA DESPITE THEIR KNOWLEDGE OF, OR WILLFUL BLINDNESS
TO, FRAUD AT BLMIS**

A. Access's Relationship With Madoff

76. Littaye and Madoff had a social and professional relationship dating back to 1985, and this relationship led to Access's dealings with BLMIS.

77. Investing with BLMIS was Access's primary business. Access functioned as the manager and/or portfolio advisor for numerous BLMIS feeder funds. As such, Access was the point of entry to BLMIS for billions of dollars from European investors.

78. Littaye and Madoff's relationship gave rise to several BLMIS feeder funds, including the Feeder Fund Defendants. Aside from the Feeder Fund Defendants, Littaye had a role in founding Trotanoy Investment Company Ltd. and Citrus Investment Holdings Ltd., feeder funds which together invested over \$200 million with BLMIS. He opened or introduced at least eight other BLMIS managed accounts. Tens of millions of dollars were directed into Madoff's scheme through those accounts. Those funds and accounts are implicated in other actions commenced by the Trustee.

79. Access's BLMIS-related investments (which, at their peak, exceeded \$2 billion), dwarfed its non-Madoff holdings. In 2005, 50% of Access subscriptions were invested with BLMIS, accounting for 61% of Access's total net revenue. By February 2008, 79% of Access subscriptions were invested with BLMIS, accounting for 92% of Access's total net revenue.

80. Littaye closely guarded his relationship with Madoff. He assumed primary responsibility for Access products that invested with BLMIS and had responsibility for doing due diligence on Madoff. Whenever questions arose at Access with regard to its BLMIS funds, it was Littaye who would raise them with Madoff.

81. Littaye visited BLMIS's New York offices quarterly, and relayed the substance of his discussions with Madoff to Access's New York employees. Littaye was also in regular written communication with BLMIS on a wide range of matters, including the opening of accounts, the receipt and review of trade tickets and account statements, and instructions regarding redemptions.

82. Littaye also regularly attended and presented at Access's strategy meetings in New York regarding its BLMIS funds. When not in New York, Littaye was in regular email and telephone contact with Access's headquarters there, directing and managing its operations along with Villehuchet. Access's marketing materials listed Littaye as having an office and phone number in New York. Villehuchet was a U.S. citizen who lived in New Rochelle, New York and was permanently based in Access's New York office.

83. Along with Littaye and Villehuchet, Delandmeter was also involved in Access's New York-based operations. On several occasions, Delandmeter attended Access's quarterly strategic meetings in New York in person, and on many other occasions Delandmeter participated in Access's strategic, administrative or partners' meetings by telephone conference. Luxalpha, Groupement Financier and Access's other BLMIS-related investments were among the key items discussed and reviewed at these meetings.

84. Delandmeter was also in regular communication with Access's New York staff regarding many matters relating to the Feeder Fund Defendants and BLMIS. As just one example, as of October 2008, Access's procedures mandated that any written communications from Access's New York staff involving Luxalpha or Groupement Financier be authorized by Delandmeter before the communications could be sent.

85. Delandmeter was also involved with Access's investments in BLMIS in several other ways. Delandmeter executed the board resolution directing the opening of Luxalpha's BLMIS accounts and approved the prospectus that concealed the delegation of custodial and management authority to BLMIS. Among many other tasks, Delandmeter also participated in the drafting of prospectuses, and was responsible for meeting with and approving invoices from a New York-based insurance broker who was responsible for professional liability insurance for Luxalpha's board.

86. Together, Littaye, Villehuchet and Delandmeter worked with the Access partners and staff in New York to coordinate Access's overall operations and to grow Access's fees relating to the Feeder Fund Defendants.

B. Access Created Groupement Financier and Engaged UBS as a Service Provider

87. The Access Defendants established Groupement Financier in February 2003, opening BLMIS account 1FR096 in April 2003. Littaye executed Groupement Financier's BLMIS account opening documents, including a Customer Agreement, an Option Agreement, and a Trading Authorization Limited to Purchases and Sales of Securities and Options ("BLMIS Account Opening Agreements"). The Trading Authorization granted complete managerial authority for Groupement Financier to BLMIS. According to its terms, the Customer Agreement was deemed to have been made in New York, included a New York choice of law clause and included an arbitration clause that required any controversies between BLMIS and Groupement Financier be settled under the Federal Arbitration Act "before the American Arbitration Association, or before the New York Stock Exchange, Inc., or an arbitration facility provided by any other exchange of which the broker is a member, or the National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc. . . ." The Customer Agreement further provided that all transactions in the customers' account must be subject to the provisions of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, the

Commodities Exchange Act, the rules and regulations of the SEC, the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System and the Commodities Futures Trading Commission.

88. In June 2003, the Access Defendants created the Groupement Levered fund, also known as Groupement Financier II Limited. Groupement Levered invested all of its assets with Groupement Financier, which in turn invested all of its assets directly with BLMIS. Both Groupement Financier and Groupement Levered were thus effectively 100% invested in BLMIS.

89. Groupement Financier's BLMIS account remained open until Madoff's arrest in December 2008.

90. At all times, Littaye and Villehuchet comprised both Groupement Financier's and Groupement Levered's board of directors.

91. AIA Ltd. served as both Groupement Financier's and Groupement Levered's official manager, while AML and AP (Lux), served at different times as the official investment advisor to both funds. But Access provided no actual investment management or advisory services, as all investment authority over the money invested with Groupement Financier and Groupement Levered was contractually delegated to BLMIS.

92. In 2005, the UBS Defendants began to service Groupement Financier and Groupement Levered. UBS SA was Groupement Financier's official prime bank and Groupement Levered's official custodian. But UBS SA did not exercise any actual custodial authority over the money invested with Groupement Financier or Groupement Levered, as this responsibility was contractually delegated to BLMIS. From February 2005, UBSFSL served as the Groupement Financier's and Groupement Levered's official administrator, and was responsible for calculating the funds' net asset values.

93. To minimize their direct association with Madoff, UBSFSL and UBS SA sought to maintain a hands off-approach to BLMIS. In a combined Groupement Financier and Groupement Levered Operating Memorandum dated July 12, 2005, § 3.5 entitled “Not to do” reads in extra-large, bold font: **“Neither UBSL nor UBSFSL should ever enter into a direct contact with Bernard Madoff!!!”**

94. Groupement Financier and Groupement Levered were formally managed and supervised by UBS SA and UBSFSL, in conjunction with several of the Access Defendants, including AIA Ltd., AIA (Lux), and AP (Lux). AIA Ltd. was designated as Groupement Financier’s and Groupement Levered’s investment manager. AIA (Lux), and then AP (Lux), served as Groupement Financier’s and Groupement Levered’s purported investment advisers, though in practice, this role was performed by Madoff.

95. Along with communicating with BLMIS directly, UBSFSL employees frequently corresponded with Access’s New York office regarding issues related to the administration of Groupement Financier or Groupement Levered, such as NAV calculations, NAV reports and Access’s indemnity of the UBS Defendants. UBSFSL also communicated with CDC Financial Products, the New York-based provider of leverage to Groupement Levered, regarding Groupement Financier and Groupement Levered valuations and received invoices from a New York-based insurance broker for professional liability policies.

96. UBSFSL processed subscriptions for Groupement Financier and Groupement Levered, instructing investors to route U.S. dollar subscriptions through UBS SA’s account at UBS AG in Stamford, Connecticut. UBS SA and UBSFSL’s operating memorandum for Groupement Financier and Groupement Levered notes that “Groupement . . . will invest the subscription monies with Bernard Madoff,” as UBS SA would transfer the funds to


Groupement's account at the Bank of Bermuda, which then forwarded the funds on to BLMIS's account at JPMorgan in New York (the "703 Account"). The subscription forms for both funds also made specific reference to U.S. anti-money laundering laws and the U.S. Patriot Act.

97. Redemptions in U.S. dollars for Groupement Financier, Groupement Levered and Luxalpha were also processed through UBS S.A.'s account at UBS AG in Stamford, Connecticut.

98. BLMIS had custody of Groupement Financier's assets and served as its exclusive trader. All transactions involving the Groupement Financier's assets were permitted to be executed and settled solely by BLMIS. Groupement Financier's NAV was calculated by UBSFSL based on unverified and unconfirmed trade confirmations that BLMIS provided to UBS SA. UBSFSL only created "mirror" accounting records based on the trade confirmations and account statements that it received from BLMIS. There was no third-party verification of the information provided by BLMIS. In fact, UBSFSL was aware of instances in which options trade information from BLMIS was in direct conflict with prices reported in Bloomberg and understood that BLMIS's trades at such prices were impossible. The UBS Defendants' Operating Memorandum for Groupement Financier further accepted the "considerable delay" with which BLMIS dispatched trade confirmations and provided for "the issu[ance of] the NAV with a delay of **up to 9** business days." (emphasis in original)

99. Thus, acting with the Access Defendants, UBS SA and UBSFSL implemented and supported a series of operational procedures for Groupement Financier and Groupement Levered that facilitated Madoff's ability to commit and perpetuate his fraud.

100. The following chart sets forth the organizational structure of Groupement Financier and Groupement Levered:



C. The Access and UBS Defendants Worked Together to Open Luxalpha

101. After BNP Paribas closed Oreades, Access found itself without a prime bank to administer the investments it directed into BLMIS. Not wanting to lose its access to Madoff, Access’s principals sought and found new partners, the UBS Defendants.

102. Notwithstanding that several UBS entities had rejected BLMIS as an unsuitable investment, UBS recognized that there was a strong market demand for investment in BLMIS, and that there was money to be made by meeting that demand. Luxalpha provided UBS with the means to capture that market. Luxalpha was incorporated in February 2004.

103. A week after Oreades was closed, UBS SA opened BLMIS Account 1FR108 in March 2004, and executed on behalf of Luxalpha and as Luxalpha's agent, BLMIS Account Opening Agreements.

104. UBS SA also entered into a separate agreement with BLMIS which explicitly designated BLMIS as the sub-custodian of Luxalpha's assets.

105. UBS SA operated as Luxalpha's agent and held the account in the name of "UBS (Luxembourg) S.A. for the benefit of Luxalpha." Luxalpha's BLMIS Account was still open when Madoff was arrested on December 11, 2008.

106. Luxalpha's nascency was fraught with negative feedback about BLMIS. A UBS AG (Zurich) employee stated that Madoff's role as both Luxalpha's manager and custodian was, standing alone, sufficient reason to decline investment with BLMIS:

We normally have to give "NO" as the answer in cases like Madoff. In doing so, we make reference to the following principles: no broker as depository, and the broker may under no circumstances also be a depository at the same time! Such a NO is easy to comprehend for both business policy reasons and risk reasons.

107. UBS SA was aware of and dismissed these and other concerns, and concluded that even though "[t]he risk of [investing with BLMIS] should not be underestimated . . . [investing with BLMIS] would be advantageous on the income side."

108. UBS SA's response to reports of indicia of fraud at BLMIS was to look into "additional insurance," and press forward to establish Luxalpha regardless of these concerns.


109. The internal message imparted by high-level UBS employees was clear: concerns about fraud at BLMIS were not to prevent UBS from profiting. Bernd Stiehl, a Luxalpha director and a UBS SA managing director, subordinated negative reports on BLMIS to UBS's

drive to capitalize on Madoff. “Business is business,” Stiehl wrote. “We cannot permit ourselves to lose 300 million. Accept client.”

110. With the opening of Luxalpha, the infusions of cash previously made into Oreades were maintained and even augmented, and in the process generated hundreds of millions of dollars in fees for Access and UBS.

111. The following chart sets forth Luxalpha’s organizational structure:

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D. The UBS Defendants Insulated Themselves From Liability Through a Series of Undisclosed Indemnity Agreements With the Access Defendants

112. Because its analysis had already identified BLMIS as a fraud risk, the UBS Defendants recognized that their connection to Luxalpha exposed them to liability for BLMIS. The UBS Defendants therefore sought to protect themselves through a series of indemnity agreements with the Access Defendants, who were responsible for marketing Luxalpha to

investors. None of these indemnity agreements were ever disclosed to Luxalpha investors or the CSSF.

113. Through these indemnity agreements, the UBS defendants sought to avoid the risks associated with Luxalpha's creation and management. On or about February 5, 2004, AIA (Lux), which purported to advise UBS SA in connection with UBS's nominal role as Luxalpha's portfolio manager from February 4, 2004 to August 1, 2004, entered into a series of indemnity agreements with Luxalpha directors who were also UBS SA employees. The agreements purported to indemnify and hold harmless the directors and UBS SA for any liabilities resulting from their involvement with Luxalpha.

114. In the indemnity agreement between AIA (Lux) and UBS SA, the parties acknowledged and agreed that AIA (Lux) "[R]equested [UBS SA] to act as a figure head to third parties in the sponsorship and in the managementship [sic] of the Fund."

115. In the indemnity agreement, AIA (Lux) also agreed that it would assume UBS SA's liability for "damages resulting from proved irregularities, inadequacies, or omissions in the administration or management" of Luxalpha.

116. From UBS's perspective, such agreements were necessary to avoid the "worst case scenario": BLMIS's failure and UBS SA's resulting liability to Luxalpha investors.

117. UBS SA took other measures to limit its liability in the event of BLMIS's failure. UBS SA demanded that Access provide a "hold harmless" letter from Luxalpha's investors for loss resulting from BLMIS's failure. It also required Access to obtain and pay for an insurance policy covering Luxalpha's risks.

118. Upon its appointment as Luxalpha's manager in November 2008, AML entered into substantially similar indemnity agreements with UBS SA and the Luxalpha directors (the

“November 2008 Indemnity Letters”). Through these indemnity agreements, the UBS Defendants continued to limit the liability to which Luxalpha exposed them.

119. The November 2008 indemnity letter between UBS SA and AML replaced the prior 2004 indemnity agreement between AIA (Lux) and UBS SA. This letter indemnified and held harmless UBS SA and acknowledged that UBS SA was appointed Luxalpha’s sponsor to establish it as a “figure head.”

120. In November 2008, AML also executed indemnity agreements in favor of directors Kranz, Egger, Schroeter and Hondequin, who were UBS employees, and Delandmeter, an Access employee. The November 2008 Indemnity Letters were all executed on November 17, 2008—less than a month before Madoff confessed.

E. The UBS Defendants Received Fees of at Least \$97 Million In Connection With the Services They Purported to Render to the Feeder Fund Defendants

121. Even though they claimed no responsibility and purported to disclaim all liability for the investment and management of the Luxalpha and Groupement Financier funds, and subdelegated all of their material responsibilities to BLMIS or Madoff, the UBS Defendants received more than \$97 million in fees for their purported duties relating to these funds.

122. UBSFSL was paid a fee of .05% of fund assets for its administration services to Luxalpha, resulting in a total of at least \$2,500,000.

123. UBS SA was paid at least \$39,400,000 in fees, in connection with its purported roles as Luxalpha’s custodian, and as Luxalpha’s purported manager from February 2004 until August 2006.

124. UBSTPM was paid at least \$53,300,000 in fees, in connection with its purported role as Luxalpha’s manager from August 2006 until November 2008.

125. UBS SA was paid at least \$1,500,000 in fees for its official roles as prime bank for Groupement Financier, and as custodian for Groupement Levered.

126. UBSFSL was paid at least \$497,000 in fees for its official role as administrator to Groupement Financier and Groupement Levered.

F. Access Was Structured and Operated to Maximize the Fees It Received for Services Purportedly Rendered to the Feeder Fund Defendants

127. In 1994, Defendants Littaye and Villehuchet founded the Access International Advisors group with the formation of a New York corporation, AIA Inc., and in 2001, created its wholly owned subsidiary, AIA LLC. Both AIA Inc. and AIA LLC were based out of Access's New York headquarters office.

128. Both Littaye and Villehuchet were sophisticated investment professionals who had long held senior-level positions at major financial institutions before they founded AIA LLC. Upon founding AIA LLC, they installed themselves as its co-Chairmen and co-Chief Executive Officers.

129. AIA LLC served outwardly as Luxalpha's portfolio advisor from August 1, 2004 to November 17, 2008, charged with primary responsibility for marketing and monitoring Luxalpha's investments through BLMIS. In this capacity, AIA LLC also contracted with UBS SA to provide UBS SA with "portfolio advisory services," in connection with UBS SA's role as Luxalpha's portfolio manager from August 1, 2004 to August 1, 2006. AIA LLC's purported advisory services included advising UBS SA on "the manner in which the assets of the Fund might be traded, cleared and invested . . ."—that is, with BLMIS in New York. Moreover, the contract between UBS SA and AIA LLC contains a New York choice of law clause and an arbitration provision that requires any dispute to be arbitrated in New York City.

130. At various times between 1995 and December 2008 , Littaye and Villehuchet formed several additional entities, including AIA Ltd., AIA (Lux), later known as AML, AP (Lux), and AIA Europe, which they referred to, collectively, as “Access.”

131. The Access entities were installed in management and administration positions for the Luxalpha and Groupement Financier funds to create the appearance that those positions were occupied by separate, independent actors.

132. Littaye and Villehuchet cultivated the appearance that the entities that comprised Access were distinct from one another and separately organized, but those entities operated as a single business enterprise, or alter egos of one another. AIA LLC’s New York offices served as the headquarters for Access’s operations, and Access’s quarterly strategic meetings were held in New York.

133. Littaye and Villehuchet operated many of the Access entities as shell entities, and some did not have employees of their own. All of Access’s approximately twenty employees were located in New York, London, and Paris. No Access employees were based in the Bahamas or Luxembourg.

1. AIA Ltd.

134. According to various operating memoranda, Access’s Bahamian entity AIA Ltd. was the purported investment manager of Groupement Financier until July 2007, though it had improperly delegated those responsibilities to BLMIS. At various times, AIA Ltd. was also identified as Groupement Financier’s operator, sponsor, and investment advisor, and also served as the official investment manager of Groupement Levered. AIA Ltd. also served as the official “Consultant and Client Introducer” and exclusive introducing agent for Luxalpha.

135. Although it was formed in 1998, as of 2004, AIA Ltd. was a shell entity that did not have a physical presence in any jurisdiction. AIA Ltd. is described in Access’s internal

documents as an offshore “money box” set up for the “prime purpose [of] ... the receipt of fees” on behalf of Access. Money from AIA Ltd. funds was indeed used to pay Access employees in New York. In another internal Access document, an Access employee in New York stated that AIA Ltd. was incorporated offshore in the Bahamas because “Bernie Madoff wants to only deal with offshore entities related to our accounts.”

136. Access’s employees in New York regularly compiled reports regarding the performance of Luxalpha and Groupement Financier and tracked BLMIS’s purported entrances and exits from the stock market. These reports state they were “[p]repared by [New York-based] Access International Advisors, Inc. for Access International Advisors Limited.”

137. Although AIA Ltd. held itself out as the investment manager of both Groupement Financier and Groupement Levered, AIA Ltd.’s own accountants recognized that it was never licensed anywhere in the world to act as an investment manager.

138. AIA Ltd. received the vast majority of fees that Access collected from Luxalpha and Groupement Financier.

2. AML/AIA (Lux) and AP (Lux)

139. AML (formerly AIA (Lux)) and AP (Lux) were other shell entities set up for the receipt of fees by Access, and to provide nominal Luxembourg presences for the operation of Luxalpha.

140. AML formally served as portfolio manager for Luxalpha from November 17, 2008 through its liquidation, but entered into an Investment Advisory Agreement with Access Partners S.A. (Luxembourg). AML ultimately left the management of Luxalpha’s portfolio to BLMIS. As AIA (Lux), AML also served as Luxalpha’s portfolio advisor from February 4, 2004 until August 1, 2004, where it purported to advise UBS SA in connection with UBS SA’s role as

Luxalpha's portfolio manager. As AIA (Lux), it also served as the investment adviser of Groupement Financier and Groupement Levered before 2007.

141. AP (Lux) formally served as Luxalpha's investment advisor from February 13, 2007 through its liquidation, where it purported to advise UBSTPM, and later AML, in connection with their roles as managers for Luxalpha. AP (Lux) was also the purported investment adviser of Groupement Financier and Groupement Levered beginning in 2007.

142. A September 2004 questionnaire regarding Luxalpha completed by Access states that AIA (Lux) has "no regular employees" and "no full time employees," lists Littaye and its outside counsel Pierre Delandmeter as the only investment professionals at the firm, and identifies no one as carrying out its responsibilities other than Littaye or Delandmeter. The questionnaire also indicates that AIA (Lux) "outsourced" the functions of trading; research and development; IT/programming; administration; and marketing and business development. And notes from an Access meeting confirm AIA (Lux)'s purpose as an overseas shell entity for the receipt of funds—stating that a "[s]ervice agreement will have to be put in place between the companies of AIA group, to spread the AIA Lux incomes."

143. Access used AP (Lux) as a shell entity to protect Luxalpha and BLMIS from U.S. regulatory scrutiny. Littaye acknowledged in an internal meeting that Access "already took a small risk for Luxalpha" with respect to BLMIS and the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission when it had New York-incorporated AIA LLC previously serve as the investment advisor for Luxalpha and, therefore, created AP (Lux) to take over that role.

144. Analyses of Luxalpha and Groupement Financier performance were composed on AP (Lux) letterhead and distributed, but internal Access documents show that these analyses were prepared by employees in Access's New York headquarters. A 2008 contact list for various

Access entities, including AP (Lux), shows an address and a phone number for a Luxembourg office, but not a single Access employee is associated with this phone number.

145. In February 2005, a memo was circulated in Access's New York office providing instructions as to how to use remote access software to access the Luxembourg office, where no meaningful business actually took place, and concerning how emails, faxes and phone calls sent there would be forwarded.

DEFENDANTS WERE AWARE
BLMIS WAS THE PERFECT STRUCTURE FOR FRAUD

146. The UBS Defendants' operating procedures for Luxalpha had the overall effect of enabling and perpetuating Madoff's Ponzi scheme. The operational procedures that the UBS Defendants established for Luxalpha placed both custody and investment authority in Madoff's hands.

147. The Operating Memorandum for Luxalpha dated October 10, 2008 provides that any cash and security movements for Luxalpha would be communicated by Madoff and/or BLMIS on a daily basis to UBS SA, and states that, "[a]s B. Madoff is at the same time acting as investment trader, broker and sub-custodian, there will be one single confirmation form issued by BM." Despite UBSFSL's knowledge that some options trades took place at prices outside the daily range as reported in Bloomberg, the operating procedures further provide that UBSFSL, as administrator, was to take the unconfirmed and unverified information that UBS SA received from BLMIS to determine Luxalpha's NAV.

148. With regard to the calculation of Luxalpha's NAV, the Operating Memorandum specifically states:

[d]ue to the considerable delay in the dispatching of the trade confirmations and Broker statements from B. Madoff, the client has accepted that UBSFSL issues the NAV with a delay of up to 10 business days.

149. The Operating Memorandum also provides that BLMIS, as sub-custodian, will “promptly report by fax as of each trade date the transactions entered into the Account.” These daily faxes were supposed to be sent to UBS SA. Nothing in BLMIS’s records suggests that this procedure was followed. Instead, BLMIS reported trades in hard copy only, usually days after the purported trade date.

150. This Operating Memorandum specified that Luxalpha’s Management Company, identified as AML, would provide UBS SA “**with a backdated monthly investment recommendation.**” (Emphasis added.) UBS knowingly participated in Madoff’s fraud by endorsing these backdated recommendations.

A. In Coordination with the Access Defendants, the UBS Defendants and Luxalpha Intentionally Violated the Law and Misled Regulators in Delegating Duties to BLMIS

1. UBS Circumvented UCITS Requirements

151. To establish Luxalpha as a Madoff feeder fund, UBS had to give BLMIS “‘special’ handling”—granting exceptions to UBS policies in order to accede to BLMIS requirements. Many of these exceptions violated Luxembourg’s UCITS regulations.

152. Under applicable Luxembourg law, a Luxembourg UCITS fund must have a sponsor, or promoter, responsible for creating the fund. Under then-existing law, the promoter is liable to third parties for damages if the fund is mismanaged.

153. UBS AG and UBS SA served as Luxalpha’s co-sponsor and co-promoter. UBS AG’s sponsorship of Luxalpha was integral to the fund obtaining approval as a UCITS-compliant fund. It created the appearance, both with the CSSF and with potential investors, that the fund was backed by a highly capitalized, stable bank.

154. Luxembourg’s UCITS regulations prohibit UCITS fund custodians from sub-delegating custodial functions except under very specific circumstances. Those circumstances

were not met here. UBS SA, a UBS AG subsidiary, was Luxalpha's custodian in name only, improperly delegating its core custodial functions to BLMIS upon Luxalpha's inception.

155. Luxembourg's UCITS regulations further prohibit UCITS funds from appointing one entity as both custodian and investment manager. When UBS delegated its duty as fund custodian to BLMIS, it did so knowing that BLMIS was also Luxalpha's investment manager, and knowing that this structure was illegal. The delegation of these functions was disclosed neither to the CSSF nor in Luxalpha's sales prospectus. Nonetheless, UBS SA continued to receive fees for acting as the fund's custodian, and remained responsible on paper for safekeeping the fund's assets and supervising the fund.

156. UBS AG made an exception to its usual policy prohibiting the delegation of custodial and management authority to a single entity after being persuaded to do so by UBS SA.

157. The purpose of the UCITS regulations was to protect against fraud, yet the UBS Defendants, together with the Access Defendants, orchestrated a structure designed to circumvent those very regulations.

2. To Conceal the Delegation of Their Duties, the UBS Defendants Used Subsidiaries as Luxalpha's Managers, Custodian, and Administrator

158. UBS SA was Luxalpha's nominal portfolio manager from February 2004 until August 2006, but in reality the management of the fund's assets had been delegated to BLMIS since the fund's inception.

159. On March 18, 2004, in its capacity as Luxalpha's manager, UBS SA executed an agreement with BLMIS entitled "Trading Authorization Limited to Purchases and Sales of Securities and Options." Under the agreement's terms, Luxalpha delegated management of Luxalpha's assets to BLMIS, designating BLMIS as their "agent and attorney in fact to buy, sell and trade in stocks, bonds, options and any other securities." The Trading Authorization also

states that the assets of Luxalpha would be invested with U.S. equities listed on the S&P 100 Index.

160. The BLMIS Account Opening Agreements executed by UBS SA also contain an Option Agreement and a Customer Agreement. The Customer Agreement was deemed to have been made in New York, included a New York choice of law clause and included an arbitration clause that required any controversies between BLMIS and Luxalpha be settled under the Federal Arbitration Act “before the American Arbitration Association, or before the New York Stock Exchange, Inc., or an arbitration facility provided by any other exchange of which the broker is a member, or the National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc. . . .” The Customer Agreement further provided that all transactions in the customers’ account must be subject to the provisions of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, the Commodities Exchange Act, the rules and regulations of the SEC, the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System and the Commodities Futures Trading Commission.

161. The delegation of management functions was disclosed neither to the CSSF nor in Luxalpha’s prospectus. Even after the delegation, UBS SA represented to the CSSF and potential investors on Luxalpha’s prospectuses that it managed Luxalpha’s assets and monitored and adjusted the fund’s investments, under the supervision of the fund’s board of directors.

162. UBS SA also represented itself as Luxalpha’s custodian on sales prospectuses for the life of the fund, but in reality the custodial function of the fund’s assets had been delegated to BLMIS since the fund’s inception.

163. By February 5, 2004, UBS SA had entered into a Sub-Custodian Agreement with BLMIS (the “Sub-Custodian Agreement”), which delegated UBS SA’s custodial duties to BLMIS “with the function of safekeeping holder and settlement and corporate agent of United

States securities, cash, derivatives instruments and other assets” and noted that the “US assets of the Fund” would be invested with BLMIS. The Sub-Custodian Agreement was not disclosed in any prospectus filed with the CSSF. Nor could the Sub-Custodian Agreement have been approved by the CSSF, because neither Madoff nor BLMIS complied with Luxembourg law governing fund custodians. BLMIS received no compensation for serving as *de facto* manager and sub-custodian.

164. The UBS Defendants concealed the delegation of duties to BLMIS because they knew and understood such a structure facilitated the fraud from which they profited. The February 2004, August 2004, August 2006, March 2007, and November 2008 Luxalpha sales prospectuses each misleadingly state that UBS SA had assumed Luxalpha’s custodial rights and duties, failing to disclose the delegation of custodial responsibilities to BLMIS. Each of those prospectuses touted UBS SA’s banking experience.

165. Documents submitted to the CSSF on UBS SA’s behalf also misrepresented UBS SA’s custodial function. In a report dated January 15, 2008 entitled “Control Report of the Independent Auditor on the Custodian Bank Function in the Context of the CSSF Circular 02/81,” to meet CSSF requirements, UBS SA purported to set forth complete lists of the funds for which it served as custodian and the sub-custodians that it used worldwide. Although Luxalpha was included in the list of funds in the report, neither Madoff nor BLMIS was identified as a sub-custodian and are nowhere to be found in the report. The report misleadingly identifies Brown Brothers Harriman as the only sub-custodian that UBS SA used in the United States.

166. Upon information and belief, UBS SA submitted such reports regarding its custodial function and its global custodial network to the CSSF annually from 2004 (the year of

its delegation to BLMIS) through 2008, and failed to identify Madoff or BLMIS as a sub-custodian in any of those reports.

167. In an August 14, 2009 interview given to *Les Echos*, a French financial publication, Jean Guill, General Director of the CSSF, confirmed that Luxalpha and UBS SA never disclosed—either to the CSSF or in sales prospectuses—that they had ultimately delegated custody of the fund’s assets to BLMIS, and that the non-disclosure violated UCITS law.

168. The 2009 Annual Report of the CSSF further confirms that the documents that were submitted to it on behalf of Luxalpha, upon which the CSSF based its decision to approve Luxalpha as a UCITS fund,

did not contain any reference either to the identity of B[L]MIS or to the multiple responsibilities carried on *de facto* by one entity. Between the launch of [Luxalpha] and the breakout of the Madoff affair in December 2008, the CSSF was never informed in a transparent manner, by the professionals involved, of the structure actually set in place nor [sic] of the role played in practice by B[L]MIS at different levels of this structure.

169. UBS SA’s legal department acknowledged that the delegation of both custodial and management authority to BLMIS was improper. The UBS Defendants also knew that their failure to disclose Madoff and BLMIS in the sales prospectus was a violation of Luxembourg law. UBS AG admitted as much, stating, “[a]s far as I understand it, the bottom line seems to be that what the fund does is not in line with what the prospectus says (??).” Knowing that Luxalpha was neither structured nor managed as represented in its prospectuses, many UBS employees complained that the irregularities and non-disclosures put UBS at risk. UBS SA squelched the dissenting voices.

170. Following the delegation of custodial and management functions to BLMIS, UBS SA remained in regular contact with BLMIS. In addition to receiving account statements and trade confirmations from BLMIS, UBS SA communicated regularly with BLMIS via mail, fax

and telephone to request withdrawals from Luxalpha's account and to address a variety of issues, including mismatched trade tickets, tax issues, and missing account statements.

171. UBS AG subsidiary UBSFSL was Luxalpha's administrator for the life of the fund. In this role, UBSFSL was responsible for calculating Luxalpha's Net Asset Value, or NAV, which is the market value of each share of the fund, by independently verifying the execution of trades and prices at which those trades took place. Without any independent verification, UBSFSL only created "mirror" accounting records based on the trade confirmations and account statements that it received from BLMIS.

172. UBSFSL facilitated the concealment of BLMIS's true involvement and perpetuated the fraud by relying solely upon trade data provided by BLMIS to calculate the fund's NAV, despite verifying and understanding that some BLMIS trade tickets showed options traded at prices outside the daily range as published in Bloomberg.

173. Along with direct communications with BLMIS, UBSFSL employees frequently corresponded with Access's New York office regarding issues related to Luxalpha's administration, such as Access's SEC registration, Luxalpha investor subscriptions and redemptions, and payment of Access's portfolio advisory fees. UBSFSL also received invoices from a New York-based insurance broker for professional liability policies. UBSFSL also directed subscriptions for Luxalpha, instructing investors to route U.S. dollar subscriptions through UBS SA's account at UBS AG in Stamford, Connecticut. These subscriptions were pooled by UBS SA and then sent to BLMIS's 703 Account at JPMorgan in New York—again passing through UBS SA in Stamford. When Luxalpha redeemed money from BLMIS, the money flowed from the 703 Account at JPMorgan in New York to UBS SA's account at UBS AG's Stamford branch and then to Luxalpha's bank account at UBS SA.

174. UBS AG subsidiary UBSTPM replaced UBS SA as Luxalpha’s nominal investment manager from August 2006 to November 2008. UBSTPM represented to the CSSF and Luxalpha investors that it managed, administered, and monitored the fund’s investment policies and restrictions. But UBSTPM never managed Luxalpha, as that function had already been delegated to BLMIS under the asset management agreement between UBS SA and BLMIS, which delegation was disclosed neither to the CSSF nor in Luxalpha’s sales prospectus.

175. When UBSTPM was contracted as Luxalpha’s new management company, the UBS Defendants continued to conceal the delegation of the fund’s management to BLMIS. Luxalpha’s August 2006 prospectus states that UBSTPM, as management company:

[i]s responsible for the management, the administration and the distribution of the Fund’s assets but is allowed to delegate, under its supervision and control, all or part of these duties to third parties. In case of changes or appointment of additional third parties, the prospectus will be updated accordingly.

No such “updated” prospectus disclosing Luxalpha’s delegation of management to BLMIS was ever provided. Further, this provision of the August 2006 prospectus fostered the misleading impression that, as of 2006, Luxalpha had not yet delegated its management to BLMIS. But UBS had already delegated that role—in 2004—upon Luxalpha’s launch. Nor did UBSTPM ever attempt to exercise any “supervision” or “control” over BLMIS. UBSTPM assumed the official managerial role only to nominally comply with regulations that prohibited the same entity from serving as both custodian and manager. The UBS Defendants created a façade to make it appear that Luxalpha’s custodial and managerial duties had been divided separately between two Luxembourg companies, UBS SA and UBSTPM, when in fact both roles had rested solely with BLMIS in New York from the first day of Luxalpha’s operation.

176. AML nominally became Luxalpha’s new manager as a result of a “Management Company Services Agreement,” entered into on or about November 17, 2008. On the same date,

a new “Investment Advisory Agreement” was signed between AML and AP (Lux), which replaced an agreement signed in February 2007 between UBSTPM and AP (Lux). Neither agreement had any impact on the sub-delegation of investment management and advisory responsibilities to BLMIS, which at all times, managed and controlled Luxalpha’s assets.

177. Despite representations to the contrary in sales prospectuses and disclosures to the CSSF, the UBS Defendants performed no investment management or custodial functions for Luxalpha, even though they collected significant fees for those services. Since Luxalpha’s inception, all such responsibilities were delegated to Madoff and/or BLMIS. Certain Access Defendants also purported to serve as Luxalpha advisors and managers, even though Luxalpha was always intended to be and always was 100% invested with BLMIS.

3. UBS’s Role as a “Front” and Mere “Window Dressing” for Luxalpha Was Executed in Coordination with the Access Defendants in Order to Market and Sell the Fund

178. The UBS Defendants’ figurehead role with respect to Luxalpha was widely acknowledged and freely discussed among Access’s insiders. The minutes of Access’s February 2007 Quarterly Executive Meeting state that “Luxalpha UCITS is a strange entity; **UBS is window dressing or a front.**” (Emphasis added.)

179. When shown a copy of the minutes of Access’s February 2007 Quarterly Executive Meeting in a Bankruptcy Rule 2004 examination, Philip H. Wogsberg, who was with AIA LLC for ten years and who served as its Director of Research, testified: “[T]he rules are one thing, but also there is [sic] some winks and nods in regulation in Europe, and I think this was a wink and a nod to Patrick [Littaye] please sanitize this and get it all Luxembourg-looking ...”

180. When also asked in a Bankruptcy Rule 2004 examination about the comment that UBS was a mere front or window dressing, Theodore Dumbauld, a former Access partner and its Chief Investment Officer, testified as follows:

UBS was just a pass-through entity. It really didn't have any responsibilities in the management of the product, whether it was collecting investors or maintaining a relationship with Madoff. So, in that it was purely – Access was using its [*i.e.*, UBS's] balance sheet or its reputation in order to be compliant with the regulations in Luxembourg.

181. As set forth in further detail below, the Access Defendants were privy to clear evidence of fraud. Nevertheless, in soliciting European investors for BLMIS, they touted controls, oversight, and protections that they knew did not exist. They also knew that BLMIS could not be trading in accordance with the SSC strategy. The Access Defendants' misrepresentations and omissions facilitated the flow of new money into BLMIS, thereby helping to perpetuate the scheme.

182. The Access Defendants were sophisticated investors, who knew and understood the working of the financial markets. As self-proclaimed diligence experts, the Access Defendants knew and understood that Madoff was not engaged in legitimate securities transactions.

183. In materials issued by their New York office, the Access Defendants touted their rigorous due diligence processes, which were designed “to avoid the three main risk[s] to the hedge fund industry. . . , [protecting against] [r]isk of fraud by doing an extensive due diligence . . . , [r]isk of drift by the implementation of an ongoing qualitative, operational and quantitative monitoring . . . , [and] [r]isk of dilution of the performance . . . by controlling the flow of investment.”

B. BLMIS Customer Statements and Trade Confirmations for Luxalpha and Groupement Financier Revealed Numerous Indicia of Fraud

184. The Access Defendants and the UBS Defendants received and reviewed Luxalpha's and Groupement Financier's account statements and trade confirmations. Luxalpha's account statements and trade confirmations were sent from BLMIS to UBS SA, who then shared their contents with UBSFSL. BLMIS also sent Luxalpha's account statements and trade confirmations to Access's New York and London offices. Groupement Financier's account statements and trade confirmations were sent from BLMIS to Access's New York and London offices. The Access Defendants shared Groupement Financier's account statements and trade confirmations with UBS SA and UBSFSL. The UBS Defendants and the Access Defendants were, therefore, aware of numerous trading impossibilities in the reported performance of the Luxalpha and Groupement Financier accounts at BLMIS. These impossibilities are not just facts suggestive of fraud, or mere warning signs that should have led to further inquiry—they are quantitative evidence demonstrating that the Luxalpha and Groupement Financier account statements and trade confirmations reported non-existent securities transactions.

1. The SSC Strategy BLMIS Purported to Employ Could Not Yield the Results Reported on the BLMIS Account Statements

185. The SSC strategy was a "collared" investment strategy that was supposed to track the S&P 100 Index and also temper volatility in that market. But the virtual elimination of market volatility would have been impossible under the SSC strategy. At best, this strategy would have leveled out peaks and valleys but could not have eliminated volatility otherwise inherent in the S&P 100 Index. Luxalpha's and Groupement's Financier's account statements should have been closely correlated to the S&P 100 Index, but with less dramatic down or upswings.

186. The S&P 100 Index put and call options (“OEX Options”) collars attached to BLMIS’s stock purchases should, in theory, have ensured that when the S&P 100 Index dropped, it would not drop as much for BLMIS investors. Collapses in stock price would be hedged by put contracts funded by the sale of call options. The effect of that strategy, however, would also limit gains when the S&P 100 Index went up.

187. It would have been impossible for Luxalpha or Groupement Financier to post gains on their investment when the S&P 100 Index was significantly down if BLMIS was genuinely deploying the SSC strategy. This is because the put options only limited losses during downswings. The exercise of those put options would not have turned losses into gains; it would simply have put a floor on losses.

188. Similarly, outperforming the S&P 100 Index during a major upswing should also have been impossible, as call options sold by BLMIS would have been exercised during a significant market upswing, putting a ceiling on gains.

189. Luxalpha’s and Groupement Financier’s respective account statements consistently show gains where the market shows losses, and when the market is moving up, show gains outperforming that market. This is objectively impossible under the SSC strategy.

190. BLMIS’s returns purported to be immune from any market instability, enjoying consistently positive rates of return at all times, even during catastrophic market downturns such as the “dot com” bubble burst of 2000, the 2000–2002 bear market, and the disastrous and unforeseeable market impact of September 11, 2001:

Year	Luxalpha Account Rate of Return	Groupement Financier Account Rate of Return	S&P 100 Index Rate of Return
2004	8.1% (partial year)	9.4%	4.5%
2005	10.5%	10.4%	(0.9%)
2006	13.1%	13.3%	15.9%
2007	11.0%	10.7%	3.8%
2008 (through Nov.)	9.4%	9.3%	(36.9%)

191. During its 68-month operational life, Groupement Financier’s BLMIS account had a negative rate of return during only one month. The S&P 100 Index had a negative rate of return in 26 months over this period. Likewise, Luxalpha’s BLMIS account had only one month of negative performance during its 57 month operational life, whereas over the same period, the S&P 100 Index was negative for 25 months.


192. As early as 1999, with Oreades, Access assessed BLMIS’s returns and acknowledged the irregularity of BLMIS’s performance in that BLMIS returns were unusually stable.

193. The following chart used in one of Access’s communications to investors, shows Luxalpha’s impossibly consistent performance, as compared to the S&P 100:

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ACCESS INTERNATIONAL ADVISORS LLC

**Comparative Performances since January 1998:
 Luxalpha (USD Class) vs. S&P 500 w/ dividends**



194. UBS recognized Madoff’s impossibly consistent returns even before Luxalpha’s or Groupement Financier’s creation. In response to UBS SA’s inquiries about BLMIS in March 2004, UBS O’Connor remarked that “people often speculate how Madoff actually makes money so consistently . . . with only a handful of negative months . . .” UBS concluded that if Madoff were running the strategy legitimately, “it would be IMPOSSIBLE to generate the returns that he has produced since 1990.”

2. Luxalpha's and Groupement Financier's Account Statements Reflected Impossible Options Trading Volumes

195. Madoff's SSC strategy required the purchase and sale of massive quantities of OEX Options to put together the "collar" on BLMIS's securities baskets. These trades were reported on the Luxalpha and Groupement Financier customer statements and trade confirmations. OEX Options are traded on the Chicago Board Options Exchange (the "CBOE"), and their trading volume is commonly measured and reported.

196. Even using conservative estimates of BLMIS's assets under management, there were not enough OEX options contracts with the relevant strike price and expiration date to hedge a fund the size of BLMIS's IA Business. The statements and trade confirmations revealed that in 52% of the instances when Madoff purported to trade options for Luxalpha, or Groupement Financier, he purported to trade more than 100% of such options that were traded on the entire CBOE on that day. This is, of course, impossible. Even one instance of such a trade should have been a major red flag. But there was not one instance, there were many—hundreds of incidents where purported purchases or sales of options with the same strike price and expiration date for Luxalpha and Groupement Financier exceeded the entire volume of such options traded on the CBOE.

197. Graphical displays of the options needed to hedge *just* Luxalpha's and Groupement Financier's BLMIS investments show the impossibility of these purported trades. The below charts depict the volume of S&P 100 Index put options BLMIS purported to trade on behalf of Luxalpha and Groupement Financier as compared to the entire CBOE volume.

198. As shown below in charts 1(a) and 1(b), the volume of S&P 100 Index put options BLMIS purported to trade on behalf of Luxalpha and Groupement (red bars) completely dwarfs the volume of S&P 100 Index put options on the entire CBOE (black bars).

Chart 1(a)






Chart 1(b)




199. Charts 2(a) and 2(b) below depict the volume of S&P 100 Index call options BLMIS purportedly traded on behalf of Luxalpa and Groupement (blue bars) as compared to the entire CBOE exchange volume (black bars).

Chart 2(a)



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Chart 2(b)



200. There were 473 instances over the lifetime of Luxalpa and Groupement Financier where BLMIS purported to execute trades on behalf of Luxalpa and Groupement Financier that exceeded the total available volume on the CBOE. On 362 of these instances, the volume traded was twice the CBOE; on 151 of these instances, the volume traded was *ten times* the volume traded on the CBOE. When verifying BLMIS’s purported trading activity, Luxalpa and Groupement Financier, their managers, and their administrators understood it was impossible to trade above the market volume for any security—even once.

201. By no later than 2006, when the reported option trade volumes in the accounts of Luxalpa and Groupement Financier alone exceeded the entire reported market for such options, all of the Defendants were well aware of this glaring indicator of fraud.

202. During 2006, at the same time a Swiss private bank was making inquiries to Access regarding BLMIS’s inexplicable option volumes, Access was conducting its own review

of the issue. Initially, Defendant Theodore Dumbauld, an Access partner and the Chief Investment Officer, looked into the issue and concluded that the options trades could not be occurring as reported by BLMIS. Dumbauld reported his findings to Villehuchet, who refused to accept that conclusion, and demanded that Dumbauld get a second opinion.

203. Access hired Chris Cutler, a consultant doing business as Manager Analysis Services LLC, to provide a second opinion. Cutler specialized in providing due diligence services on hedge funds, and he was asked to look at BLMIS and provide his opinion. Cutler had previously done work for Access relating to non-Madoff funds.

204. In doing due diligence on BLMIS, Cutler reviewed available information, including information on the business of BLMIS generally, its auditor, audit reports, available trade tickets and descriptions of the trading strategy. Although he was asked to do due diligence on Madoff and BLMIS, he was specifically instructed not to speak to Madoff or anyone at BLMIS.

205. It took Cutler the equivalent of four days' work to determine that there were serious problems with BLMIS. In addition to confirming the impossible options volume previously identified by Dumbauld as a red flag, Cutler also identified and saw, among other things: (i) serious problems with the feasibility of Madoff's strategy; (ii) the lack of any independent verification of trades or assets; and (iii) the opportunity for fraud caused by the delayed, paper confirmation-only way in which trades were reported to Access.

206. On April 20, 2006, Cutler sent an email to Dumbauld outlining his preliminary findings concerning BLMIS. In that email, Cutler wrote, "Ted, if this were a new investment product, not only would it simply fail to meet due dili standards: **you would likely shove it out the door.**" In the same email, Cutler went on to note, "EITHER extremely sloppy errors OR

serious omissions in tickets. That's the best case ... arithmetic errors in the founder's strategy description [found at another source], which is so basic that it suggests that the founder doesn't really understand the costs of the option strategy." Cutler also noted with regard to Madoff's purported option counterparties, "I just can't find the other side of the trade."

207. Upon the completion of his due diligence and analysis, Cutler came to the conclusion that BLMIS certainly did not meet his standards and that Access should exit all of its investments with BLMIS. Cutler was not asked to produce a formal report or to put his findings in writing, despite having done so in the past when advising the Access Defendants with regard to other investments.

208. Cutler conveyed his conclusions in an oral report given to Access's inner circle. In late April or early May 2006, Cutler attended a lunch meeting at the University Club in New York. Present at the meeting were Littaye, Villehuchet, Dumbauld and Chantal Lanchon, a long-time, trusted adviser to Littaye and Villehuchet who did work for Access from time to time. Cutler conveyed his conclusion at this meeting that Access should exit BLMIS and concentrate on building other aspects of its business.

209. As he was conveying his conclusion, Cutler was interrupted by Littaye, who said that he questioned Cutler's "business judgment" given that the Access Defendants' BLMIS business was "going well," while the other parts of the Access Defendants' business were not going well. Chantal Lanchon then declared her view that Cutler's conclusions could not be correct because, she claimed, BLMIS was audited on a regular basis by the SEC and FINRA, and that there could not possibly be a problem. Littaye thus considered the subject closed.

210. On May 9, 2006, Cutler sent an e-mail to Dumbauld concerning the University Club lunch which stated in relevant part:

Ted, I did my best to inject doubt in a courteous yet effective manner. I would actually like to follow up with Patrick via phone.

On May 10, 2006, Dumbauld replied:

I believe you handled the lunch perfectly. As you could tell, Patrick is highly sensitive and defensive of the situation. We have not had a chance to discuss post lunch; I will give you some feedback when I have it. I will also let you know about a call with Patrick.

211. There was never any follow-up conversation between Dumbauld and any of Littaye, Villehuchet, or Lanchon. Cutler was never given any feedback on the evidence of fraud that he had so easily identified.

212. Cutler's findings were not shared with anyone else at the Access Defendants, including its research and marketing staff. In his Rule 2004 Bankruptcy examination, Cutler testified that it was "understood" that his conclusion would not be shared beyond the individuals at the University Club lunch meeting.

213. On May 12, 2006, the Access Products Committee held a meeting that was attended by, among others, Littaye, Villehuchet, Dumbauld, and Lanchon. The minutes from that meeting state:

As a result of the conversations we had recently with various sources, it was decided we need to add additional disclosures to the monthly report describing monthly portfolio movements. **The disclosure needs to make clear that AIA is dependent on the information provided to us by BMI and that we do not validate the accuracy of that information.** (Emphasis added.)

3. BLMIS Purported to Trade Equities and Options Outside the Daily Reported Price Range

214. BLMIS trade confirmations showed the prices for every purported purchase and sale of stocks and options. The Luxalpha and Groupement Financier BLMIS trade confirmations showed many trades executed outside the daily price range.

215. Over the lifetime of these accounts, there were no fewer than 100 instances where BLMIS purported to execute an equity trade at a price that fell outside the publicly reported daily price range. These 100 impossibly priced transactions represented more than 4.8 million shares of stock.

216. For example, Luxalpha's account statements and trade confirmations report the sale of 127,275 shares of Merck on December 22, 2006. Groupement Financier's account statements and trade confirmations also report the sale of 20,953 shares of Merck on December 22, 2006. The account statements reflect that these shares were sold for \$44.61. This was impossible given that the actual price range for Merck on December 22, 2006 ranged from \$42.78 to \$43.42.

217. Even one such instance should have been sufficient to reveal the existence of a fraud. Both the Access Defendants and the UBS Defendants, who each received and reviewed copies of BLMIS's trade confirmations for Luxalpha and Groupement Financier, were aware of these impossibilities.

218. As Luxalpha and Groupement Financier's investment advisor and Groupement Financier's investment manager, the Access Defendants were, among other things, required to "keep the net assets of the Fund[s] under surveillance and constant review; carry out reviews and controls of the portfolio" and "assist the Fund[s] in obtaining necessary information to determine the net asset value of the sub-funds."

219. As Luxalpha and Groupement Financier's administrator, UBSFSL's primary duty was to calculate the NAV of the fund. In so doing, UBSFSL was aware of specific instances in which trade information from BLMIS was in direct conflict with prices reported in Bloomberg and understood that BLMIS's trades at such prices were impossible.

220. Under their respective management agreements with Luxalpha, UBS SA and UBSTPM were responsible for managing the fund's assets. Thus, the UBS Defendants, who received and analyzed BLMIS reported trade data and customer statements, were well aware of trades executed outside the daily price range and understood that such trades were impossible.

4. BLMIS's Time Slicing Success Was Statistically Impossible

221. Madoff claimed that he was time slicing, i.e., entering the market at different times throughout a trading day—and that the equity price reported on an account statement reflected the average price. When Madoff claimed to be purchasing equities, the reported average price was almost always in the lower half of the daily trade range; when he claimed to be selling equities, the sale price was almost always in the upper half of the daily trade range.

222. Over the lifetime of the Luxalpha and Groupement Financier accounts, BLMIS account statements and trade confirmations disclose that 83.5% of 6,790 (reported) stock purchases occurred below the volume-weighted average price and 74.8% of 6,131 (reported) stock sales occurred above the volume-weighted average price. The Access Defendants, as well as the UBS Defendants possessed clear evidence that the frequency with which BLMIS purported to trade at the optimal price point was statistically impossible.

223. Within Access, there was skepticism that Madoff could legitimately achieve the consistent returns he reported through the SSC strategy. The Access Defendants suspected that Madoff was engaging in illegal frontrunning (i.e., trading ahead of other customers' orders) or was otherwise illicitly using his market-making operation for insight as to when the market would move.

224. Ultimately, Littaye quashed the Access Defendants' concerns regarding Madoff's suspected market-timing edge. Littaye reported to the rest of Access that BLMIS had three models – short, middle and long-term models of the market – that Madoff used in making

decisions of when to enter and exit the market. Access's research staff, including Wogsberg, was never provided with any detail concerning these purported models, and the Access Defendants accepted them as an explanation of Madoff's market-timing ability. The notion of short, middle, and long-term market models made no sense, especially because Madoff purported to move customer funds out of the market at quarter-end and into the market at the beginning of each quarter, regardless of the market's prevailing performance.

5. The Dividend Activity Reported on Luxalpha and Groupement Financier's Customer Statements Was Impossible

225. During the period that BLMIS's IA Business was purportedly out of the market, BLMIS claimed to invest in U.S. Treasury Bills, including the Fidelity Spartan U.S. Treasury Money Market Fund (the "Fidelity Fund"). BLMIS purported to do so notwithstanding the fact that this fund changed its name in August 2005. Nevertheless, from the end of that year until Madoff's arrest, Luxalpha's and Groupement Financier's account statements continued to show transactions with a fund that no longer existed under that name.

226. The Fidelity Fund and its successor issues dividend payments once a month at either the end or beginning of the month. During Luxalpha and Groupement Financier's investment with BLMIS, neither the Fidelity Fund nor its successor ever deviated from this payment schedule.

227. Luxalpha and Groupement Financier's customer statements and trade confirmations, in more than sixty percent of months in which money market dividends were paid, show multiple dividend payments in the same month—even though the money market funds at issue paid dividends only once a month.

228. Even where account statements show single monthly payments, they are issued on the wrong date. In total, ninety-nine percent of the money market payments purportedly received were impossible.

C. In Addition to Being Aware of Objective Evidence of Fraud, the UBS Defendants and the Access Defendants Were Presented With Myriad Subjective Indicia of Fraud

229. In addition to objective trading impossibilities, Defendants saw and recognized myriad indicia of fraud. Coupled with the objective evidence, this overwhelmingly demonstrated that BLMIS was a fraudulent operation.

1. Luxalpha's and Groupement Financier's Account Statements Demonstrated That Madoff Was Not Implementing the SSC Strategy

230. Various SEC reporting requirements are triggered when securities are invested in the market at either the end of the quarter or the end of the year. To evade these reporting requirements, Madoff purported to liquidate all investments at those times, and invest the proceeds in Treasury Bills. Luxalpha's and Groupement Financier's account statements reflected this practice.

231. Madoff's exiting the market according to the calendar, rather than based on market or economic indicators is strong evidence of fraud. The Defendants knew that Madoff touted "market timing" as a cornerstone of the SSC strategy and that Madoff's practice of liquidating all stocks and options at quarter- and year-end contravened that strategy because it meant that Madoff was locked into whatever market conditions existed at those times, regardless of whether they were favorable. Such trading circumstances were inconsistent with the SSC strategy, which was purportedly based on long positions hedged by options contracts subject to expiration.

232. In addition, Luxalpha's and Groupement Financier's account statements showed the purchase and sale of options to generate short-term gains. These speculative options trades on behalf of Luxalpha and Groupement Financier often showed significant gains, but they were high-risk, short-term gains that were wholly inconsistent with the SSC strategy.

233. For example, in 2008, Luxalpha and Groupement Financier each participated in two of these trades, which generated gains of approximately \$17.5 million and \$4.7 million, respectively. These gains were purportedly achieved through highly risky speculation in the options market, which would contradict the inherently conservative premise of the SSC strategy. Between 2003 and 2008, Luxalpha and Groupement Financier together benefitted in excess of \$30 million from such trades.

234. BLMIS customer statements regularly reflected "unbalanced hedges," in which the basket of equities purportedly purchased for customers did not correspond to the hedge. An unbalanced hedge occurs where, for example, certain equities in a basket are sold, but there is no corresponding adjustment to the options collar. Such an unbalanced hedge creates potentially significant exposure to losses because the value of the basket and the corresponding options positions no longer match, reducing the potential gain and leaving the customer exposed to potential losses.

235. For example, Luxalpha's account statements indicate that on May 16, 2007, BLMIS purported to purchase a basket of S&P 100 Index stocks that included shares of 3M Company. The shares of 3M Company were sold on May 21, 2007 whereas the other equities contained in the basket were not sold until June 21, 2007. In light of the early sale of the 3M shares, the corresponding options collar should have been rebalanced to protect against exposure

to market risk. No such adjustment was reflected in the customer statements or trade confirmations.

2. Madoff’s Claims to Trade Options in the Over-the-Counter Market Were False

236. When confronted with questions concerning his options trading practices, Madoff sometimes claimed to be trading options on the over-the-counter market (the “OTC”), for which volumes of trades are not publicly reported. To sophisticated financial entities like the UBS Defendants and the Access Defendants, such an explanation could only be a lie. Luxalpha’s and Groupement Financier’s trade confirmations indicated the purchase of OEX Options and included a unique identifier, known as a “CUSIP” number. The CUSIP number allows traders to quickly access information regarding a particular transaction. An OEX Option would have a CUSIP number only if were traded on the CBOE. Any explanation referring to OTC trading was therefore objectively false and a clear indication of fraud.

237. Even Madoff’s claims to be trading over the OTC were to be taken at face value, trading OTC options also would have required BLMIS to enter into private contracts with willing counterparties. BLMIS purportedly entered into those options contracts as an agent on behalf of BLMIS’s IA Business customers, such as Luxalpha and Groupement Financier. Had those theoretical counterparties defaulted on those contracts, BLMIS’s IA Business customers, including Luxalpha and Groupement Financier, would have been exposed to substantial losses. Had a counterparty failed to perform, it was Luxalpha and Groupement Financier—not BLMIS—that would have suffered the loss.

238. Madoff refused to identify the counterparties, claiming he had to prevent his customers from dealing directly with the counterparties, and that the names of parties were “proprietary.” The Defendants never reviewed, commented, modified, negotiated, or rejected

any form of draft or final counterparty agreement or OTC transaction confirmation. Indeed, the Defendants never knew the identities of these options counterparties due to Madoff's refusal to identify counterparties that did not exist.

239. The Defendants, who were sophisticated, financially savvy professionals, recognized that Luxalpha and Groupement Financier had hundreds of millions of dollars in counterparty exposure, yet they had no idea whether the counterparties were reliable, well capitalized and liquid, or whom they would pursue in the event of a default. The Defendants were concerned about their lack of knowledge and recognized Madoff's secrecy about his counterparties as a badge of fraud.

240. Starting in February 2006, and continuing through at least the fall of that year, representatives from Access's client, a Swiss private bank, demanded an explanation for how the purported trades could be taking place at the volume Madoff represented and who the purported counterparties for those trades were. Access repeatedly failed to provide any explanation, and by October 2006, the representatives of the Swiss private bank decided to contact BLMIS directly for an answer.

241. The inquiry from the Swiss private bank prompted Madoff to call Littaye at Access. Littaye's notes of that call indicate that Madoff stated he would not identify the counterparties for the options trades unless there was a default, and that there was no risk because the options were part of "portfolio assurance programs." Littaye's notes further indicate that he had never heard of a "portfolio assurance program" and had no idea what such a program was.

242. Littaye then conveyed Madoff's response to the Swiss private bank. In notes and emails, the bank observed that Littaye "did not understand the reply from Madoff and was unable

to elaborate,” and that Littaye’s explanation was “not very credible.” Villehuchet also called an employee of the Swiss bank and asked that he not send any more inquiries directly to Madoff.

243. The UBS Defendants were also aware of problems regarding BLMIS’s purported option counterparties. As set forth in the SEC Office of Inspector General’s report dated August 30, 2009 (the “OIG Report”), the SEC’s Enforcement Staff sent a draft document request to UBS’s offices in the U.S. on June 16, 2006 in an attempt to verify whether any of UBS’s European affiliates served as one of Madoff’s purported OTC option counterparties as Madoff had claimed. The OIG Report details that, instead of providing the SEC with a direct answer, UBS’s U.S. offices claimed to be unable to access the relevant data from Europe, and informed the SEC’s Enforcement Staff that it would have to seek the relevant information directly from Europe. However, the UBS Defendants knew in 2006 that they had never been a counterparty to one of Madoff’s trades. Despite being alerted to yet another significant indicia of fraud relating to Madoff’s purported trading activity, the UBS Defendants continued to service the BLMIS feeder funds.

244. Another example of the UBS Defendants’ misrepresentations concerning BLMIS’s options counterparties can be seen in Risk Approach Memos that were prepared for Luxalpha’s auditors. Those memos, which were prepared by UBS SA and sent to the fund’s auditors in 2004 and 2006, falsely state that the option counterparties are approved by UBS AG as promoter of Luxalpha. In reality, no such counterparties were ever identified to, or approved by, UBS AG.

3. Luxalpha and Groupement Financier Regularly Had Negative Cash Balances With BLMIS

245. On at least twenty-five occasions, for a total of 64 days, Luxalpha's cash balance with BLMIS had a negative value. When the Luxalpha cash balance was negative, its average negative cash balance was \$8,825,154.

246. On at least forty occasions, for a total of 112 days, Groupement Financier's cash balance with BLMIS had a negative value. When the Groupement Financier cash balance was negative, its average negative cash balance was \$3,370,627.

247. For example, on March 3, 2006, Littaye sent a fax to BLMIS requesting a \$16,000,000 withdrawal from Groupement Financier's account. The request from Littaye asked that securities be redeemed to fund the withdrawal. On March 8, 2006, BLMIS issued a \$16,000,000 wire to Groupement Financier's account at the Bank of Bermuda.

248. The account statements sent to and reviewed by the Access Defendants and UBS Defendants show that as of the time of Littaye's request, the cash balance at the beginning of the month in Groupement Financier's BLMIS account was \$0.88, no securities were redeemed prior to the withdrawal, and that after the withdrawal the account cash balance was negative \$15,435,156.36 and was not returned to a positive balance until March 16, 2006, when equities and call options were sold.

249. UBSFSL, as the administrator to not only Luxalpha and Groupement Financier but also to Luxembourg Investment Fund–U.S. Equity Plus, another BLMIS feeder fund, tracked the funds' cash balance, and noted that, from time to time, the funds had a negative cash balance. For example, in July 2006, UBSFSL recognized that a fund had been in an "overdraft position" for several weeks, and attempted to obtain an explanation for that "leverage situation."

250. In another example, on July 1, 2004, employees of UBS SA sent a fax to BLMIS requesting a \$4,000,000 withdrawal from Luxalpha's account. On July 6, 2004, BLMIS issued a \$4,000,000 wire to Luxalpha's account at UBS AG in Stamford, Connecticut. The account statements sent to and reviewed by the Access Defendants and UBS Defendants showed that as of the time of the request, the cash balance in Luxalpha's BLMIS account was \$0.47. Accordingly, after the withdrawal, the account cash balance was negative \$3,952,257.79. The account was not returned to a positive balance until July 12, 2004, when Treasury Bills were purportedly sold.

251. BLMIS was therefore purporting to provide Luxalpha and Groupement Financier with millions of dollars of interest-free loans for days at a time.

252. As Luxalpha and Groupement Financier did not have margin accounts with BLMIS, neither fund could have traded on credit. As Defendants knew, no legitimate broker-dealer would have advanced the funds millions of dollars at zero interest under these circumstances.

4. BLMIS Provided Delayed Paper-Only Customer Statements

253. The Access Defendants knew that the trade confirmations received from BLMIS were only in a hard copy, paper format and were delayed because they were sent via regular mail service, sometimes several days after the purported trade. The Access Defendants knew it was "abnormal" in the mid-2000s not to have more prompt, electronic access to such information.

254. Of all the funds whose investment portfolios the Access Defendants managed, BLMIS was the lone investment for which Access did not have immediate or next-day transparency, either through website access or next-day batch reports.

255. As a result of BLMIS's delays in providing trade information, AML provided UBS SA with "backdated monthly investment recommendation[s]" for Luxalpha, a practice that

UBS SA endorsed in the October 16, 2008 Luxalpha Operating Memorandum. This backdating procedure was made necessary and put in place to accommodate BLMIS's delayed, hard copy reporting of its purported trades.

256. The UBS Defendants repeatedly asked Madoff for electronic trade and transfer information, but were rebuffed on multiple occasions. In a January 13, 2006 email, a UBS SA managing director stated: "Unfortunately although we submitted this request [for electronic data] on several times the answer remains still no." Despite having their requests for electronic account access rebuffed, the UBS Defendants were undeterred from continuing to facilitate investment with BLMIS.

5. Madoff's "Strip Mall" Auditor Was Not Qualified or Capable of Auditing a Global Investment Management Company with Billions of Dollars Under Management

257. The Defendants knew that BLMIS's auditor was neither legitimate, nor independent, nor reasonably capable of performing the required domestic and international auditing functions for BLMIS. BLMIS, which purported to have tens of billions of dollars under management, was audited not by a major firm, but by Friehling & Horowitz, a three-person accounting "firm," located in a strip mall in Rockland County, New York. Of the firm's three employees, one was an administrative assistant, another was semi-retired and living in Florida.

258. As sophisticated market participants, the Defendants knew that all accounting firms that perform audit work must enroll in the peer review program of the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants ("AICPA"), and those that do are listed on the public area of the AICPA website. Although it held itself out as a member of AICPA, Friehling & Horowitz had avoided peer review since 1993 by representing that it did not perform any audit work and, therefore, was not listed AICPA's public peer review list. With billions of dollars under

management, BLMIS's use of a small, ill-equipped auditor like Friehling & Horowitz was a clear indicia of fraud.

259. The Access Defendants knew that BLMIS was using a small, unknown auditing firm for the reports it filed with the SEC and provided to investors. They expressed concern after preliminary research on Friehling & Horowitz, but quashed any further inquiry.

260. Access was aware that Friehling & Horowitz was incapable of providing large-scale and international auditing services to BLMIS and the billions it had under management.

6. Madoff's Unusual Fee Structure

261. BLMIS did not charge investors any traditional management or performance fees, which were standard in the hedge fund industry. Madoff was purportedly satisfied with simply charging BLMIS's IA Business customers \$1 per option contract and \$0.04 per equity share traded. The standard investment advisory fee charged by a hedge fund manager ranges from 1% to 2% of assets under management plus a performance fee of 10% to 20% of any profits earned by the investment. Fees normally run higher for investment advisers with a history of success. Compared with industry practice, this fee structure had Madoff leaving hundreds of millions, if not billions, of dollars on the table. As UBS O'Connor had previously recognized as a reason to spurn investments with BLMIS, the "simple fact that an investor has to start considering how the fund and the [broker/dealer] benefit one another is a non-starter." BLMIS allowed investment funds, their managers, and advisers to collect those lucrative fees for themselves.

262. Other industry professionals realized that BLMIS's highly unusual fee structure was a serious warning sign. The Defendants, however, having already invested millions of dollars of their clients' funds in BLMIS feeder funds, knowingly ignored this evidence of fraud.

7. Lack of an Independent, Disclosed Custodian

263. The UBS Defendants knew that the lack of an independent, disclosed custodian for the assets invested with BLMIS violated UBS's compliance procedures, but decided to establish Luxalpha anyway.

264. The Access Defendants also knew that the Feeder Fund Defendants did not have an independent custodian for the funds' assets and that the assets were not being independently verified.

8. Madoff's Insistence on Secrecy

265. Madoff's insisted that his name not appear in any official offering document relating to the Feeder Fund Defendants. The Access Defendants acquiesced to that request even when the absence of his name from such documents would violate applicable laws.

266. Madoff's name was not allowed to appear as the custody broker or the manager for any fund. The Feeder Fund Defendants' offering documents reflected only that an Access entity was the fund manager. The documents omitted references to the Access entities acting in other capacities.

267. In 2000 Access instructed that "BMI should not appear in any official document." In a 2004 document, Littaye wrote, "[w]e underline the confidentiality of the product and insist on the fact that BM name must never be published."

268. During a May 10, 2006 lunch, Madoff asked Littaye if his name was mentioned in Luxalpha's prospectus. In his notes on the meeting, Littaye wrote that he assured Madoff that "by no means" did his name appear in the prospectus—for which Madoff expressed relief.

269. The UBS Defendants also complied with Madoff's demand for secrecy. In addition to omitting Madoff's name from Luxalpha's offering documents and the Control Report on custodian bank functions submitted to the CSSF, UBS SA also took steps to remove all

references to Madoff from Luxalpha audit reports, prepared by Ernst & Young. Ernst & Young agreed to remove Madoff's name from its reports after "very long discussions on the subject" with a UBS SA executive. That same executive later cautioned another UBS SA executive that "[o]ne has to be careful about everything" when it comes to ensuring Madoff's name remains undisclosed. UBS SA chose to risk regulatory and legal sanctions rather than jeopardize its lucrative relationship with BLMIS.

9. Lack of Scalability

270. In connection with financial markets, scalability refers to an investment strategy's ability to handle higher trading volumes or growing assets under management. As a fund grows, and its assets under management increase, it becomes more difficult for the fund to find opportunities of a scale in proportion to the fund's size.

271. The SSC strategy was not scalable for the amount of BLMIS's purported assets under management. Even before the creation of Luxalpha and Groupement Financier, the Access Defendants and UBS SA knew that BLMIS purportedly held more than \$10 billion of assets under management. To execute the SSC strategy with at least \$10 billion of assets under management, BLMIS would need \$10 billion of notional value in call options.

272. By 2006, BLMIS began publicly disclosing its assets under management in Form ADV's filed with the SEC, reporting that its assets under management was approximately \$11.7 billion as of July 2006, \$13.2 billion as of December 2006, and \$17.1 billion as of December 2007. The Access Defendants and UBS SA reviewed BLMIS's filings.

273. Between 2000 and 2008, there was no time when there were enough options on the listed market to implement Madoff's purported SSC strategy.

10. BLMIS's Trade Confirmations Frequently Contained Settlement Anomalies in Purported Options Transactions

274. According to industry standards, the settlement date for exchange-listed options is the business day following the trade date, referred to as "T+1." Trade confirmations produced by BLMIS and sent to the UBS Defendants and the Access Defendants regularly showed options transactions that settled more than one day after execution. All of the options trade confirms showed CBOE-traded OEX Options, which would have been subject to the T+1 settlement date.

275. Approximately 51% of Luxalpha's, and 48% of Groupement Financier's purported options transactions settled at least three business day after execution and therefore did not comply with standard market practices.

IMPUTATION OF KNOWLEDGE FROM THE UBS DEFENDANTS AND ACCESS DEFENDANTS TO LUXALPHA AND GROUPEMENT FINANCIER

276. At all times, the UBS Defendants and the Access Defendants dominated and controlled Luxalpha and Groupement Financier. Neither Luxalpha nor Groupement Financier ever had any employees or independent office space. Rather, the UBS Defendants and Access Defendants operated the funds as joint business ventures.

277. The UBS Defendants and Access Defendants created Luxalpha. The UBS Defendants served as official sponsor, custodian, administrator, and manager of Luxalpha, while the Access Defendants served in official advisory and managerial roles. Both the Access Defendants and UBS Defendants received Luxalpha's BLMIS account statements and trade confirmations. Luxalpha's board of directors was at all times composed of UBS SA and Access principals.

278. Likewise, the Access Defendants created Groupement Financier. The UBS Defendants served as the official prime bank and administrator of Groupement Financier, while the Access Defendants served in official management and advisory roles. Both the Access

Defendants and the UBS Defendants received Groupement Financier's BLMIS account statements and trade confirmations. The board of directors of Groupement Financier was at all times composed of Access founders Littaye and Villehuchet.

279. The UBS Defendants and the Access Defendants were the agents of Luxalpha and Groupement Financier, and their conduct and/or direct knowledge of fraud at BLMIS is imputed to these two funds.

THE TRANSFERS

A. The Initial Transfers

280. Prior to the Filing Date, the Feeder Fund Defendants – Luxalpha and Groupement Financier – maintained two accounts, 1FR108 and 1FR096, respectively (collectively, the “Accounts”), as set forth on Exhibit A. For each account, the respective Feeder Fund Defendant executed, or caused to be executed, a Customer Agreement, an Option Agreement, and/or a Trading Authorization Limited to Purchases and Sales of Securities and Options (collectively, as previously defined, the “BLMIS Account Opening Agreements”), and delivered such documents, or caused them to be delivered, to BLMIS at BLMIS's headquarters at 885 Third Avenue, New York, New York.

281. The BLMIS Account Opening Agreements were to be performed in New York, New York through securities trading activities that would take place in New York, New York. The Accounts were held in New York, New York and the Feeder Fund Defendants sent funds to BLMIS and/or to the 703 Account in New York, New York for application to the Accounts and the purported conducting of trading activities.

282. The Feeder Fund Defendants collectively invested approximately \$2 billion with BLMIS through more than 150 separate transfers via check and wire directly into the 703 Account at JPMorgan Chase in New York, New York.

283. During the six years preceding the Filing Date, BLMIS made transfers to the Feeder Fund Defendants in the collective amount of at least \$1.1 billion (the “Six Year Initial Transfers”). The Six Year Initial Transfers include transfers of approximately \$752 million to Defendant Luxalpha (the “Luxalpha Six Year Initial Transfers”) and \$352 million to Defendant Groupement Financier (the “Groupement Six Year Initial Transfers”). Each of the Six Year Initial Transfers is avoidable under § 544 of the Bankruptcy Code and applicable provisions of the N.Y. Debt. & Cred. Law, particularly §§ 273-279, and of SIPA, particularly § 78fff-2(c)(3). Each of the Six Year Initial Transfers is recoverable under § 550(a)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code, and applicable provisions of the N.Y. Debt. & Cred. Law, particularly §§ 278 and 279, and of SIPA, particularly § 78fff-2(c)(3). The Feeder Fund Defendants received each of the Six Year Initial Transfers with knowledge of fraud at BLMIS.

284. The Six Year Initial Transfers include approximately \$1.01 billion which BLMIS transferred to the Feeder Fund Defendants during the two years preceding the Filing Date (the “Two Year Initial Transfers”). The Two Year Initial Transfers included transfers of approximately \$735 million to Luxalpha (the “Luxalpha Two Year Initial Transfers”) and approximately \$275 million to Groupement Financier (the “Groupement Two Year Initial Transfers”). Each of the Two Year Initial Transfers is avoidable under § 548 of the Bankruptcy Code, and applicable provisions of SIPA, particularly 15 U.S.C. § 78fff-2(c)(3). Each of the Two Year Initial Transfers is recoverable under § 550(a)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code, and applicable provisions of SIPA, particularly § 78fff-2(c)(3). The Feeder Fund Defendants received each of the Two Year Initial Transfers with knowledge of fraud at BLMIS, or with willful blindness to circumstances suggesting a high probability of fraud at BLMIS.

285. The Six Year Initial Transfers and Two Year Initial Transfers are collectively referred to herein as “Initial Transfers.”

286. Charts setting forth the Initial Transfers are included as Exhibits B and C.

287. The Initial Transfers were and continue to be customer property within the meaning of 15 U.S.C. § 78III(4).

B. The Subsequent Transfers

288. Based on the Trustee’s investigation to date, Feeder Fund Defendants Luxalpha and Groupement Financier subsequently transferred some of the Initial Transfers to the Access Defendants and the UBS Defendants (collectively, the “Subsequent Transferee Defendants”) as payment for their alleged service of the Feeder Fund Defendants, which in reality were being managed by BLMIS. In addition, some of the Initial Transfers to Groupement Financier were subsequently transferred to Groupement Levered. Groupement Levered then further subsequently transferred the Initial Transfers to the Subsequent Transferee Defendants. All of these payments from the Feeder Fund Defendants constitute subsequent transfers of the Initial Transfers from BLMIS to the Feeder Fund Defendants. All avoidable transfers from BLMIS to the Feeder Fund Defendants, which the Feeder Fund Defendants subsequently transferred, either directly or indirectly, to the Subsequent Transferee Defendants (collectively, the “Subsequent Transfers”), are recoverable from the Subsequent Transferee Defendants by the Trustee under § 550(a) of the Bankruptcy Code, and applicable provisions of SIPA, particularly 15 U.S.C. § 78fff-2(c)(3).

289. Based on the Trustee’s investigation to date, the UBS Defendants received at least \$97 million in Subsequent Transfers, including but not limited to:

- a. UBS SA received at least \$32.8 million in fees from Luxalpha for serving as the official custodian and official manager of Luxalpha from February 2004 to August 2006, and an additional \$6.6 million in fees from

Luxalpha for serving as the official custodian of Luxalpha from August 2006 to December 2008. UBS SA also received at least \$1 million in fees from Groupement Financier for serving as the official prime bank of Groupement Financier from 2005 to December 2008, and at least \$500,000 in fees from Groupement Levered for serving as the official custodian of Groupement Levered from 2005 to December 2008.

- b. UBSFSL received at least \$2.5 million in fees from Luxalpha for serving as the official administrator of Luxalpha from February 2004 to December 2008. UBSFSL also received at least \$497,000 from Groupement Financier for serving as the official administrator of Groupement and Groupement Levered from 2005 to December 2008.
- c. UBSTPM received at least \$53.3 million in fees from Luxalpha for serving as the official manager of Luxalpha from August 2006 to November 2008.
- d. UBS AG received at least \$4.2 million in recoverable Subsequent Transfers from 2004 through 2008, in the form of dividends paid by UBS SA and UBSFSL, which were comprised, in part, of fee amounts received from Luxalpha, Groupement Financier, and Groupement Levered. UBS SA paid dividends to corporate parent UBS AG in 2004, 2006, 2007, and 2008, and UBSFSL paid dividends to corporate parent UBS AG in each year from 2004 to 2008, all of which were based upon revenues received by UBS SA and UBSFSL.

290. Based on the Trustee's investigation to date, the Access Defendants AIA Ltd., AIA LLC, AP (Lux), and AML (f/k/a AIA (Lux)) received at least \$100.6 million in Subsequent Transfers, including but not limited to:

- a. AIA Ltd. received at least \$25.4 million in fees from February from UBS SA pursuant to a February 5, 2004 "Consulting and Exclusive Introducing Agreement," which consisted of fees received by UBS SA from Luxalpha for serving as Luxalpha's official manager. AIA Ltd. also received at least \$28.5 million in fees from UBSTPM under an August 1, 2006 "Client Introducer Agreement," which consisted of fees received by UBSTPM from Luxalpha for serving as Luxalpha's official manager. AIA Ltd. further received at least \$15 million in fees from Groupement Financier for serving as the official manager of Groupement Financier from 2003 to December 2008, and received at least \$400,000 in fees for serving as the official manager of Groupement Levered from 2003 to December 2008.
- b. AIA LLC received at least \$189,000 in fees from UBS SA in connection with its role as official portfolio advisor to Luxalpha from August 2004 to

August 2006, which consisted of fees received by UBS SA for serving as Luxalpha's official manager.

- c. AP (Lux) received at least \$17.8 million in fees from UBSTPM for serving as the investment advisor to Luxalpha from 2007 to December 2008, consisting of fees received by UBSTPM from Luxalpha for serving as Luxalpha's official manager. AP (Lux) also received at least \$8.4 million in fees from Groupement Financier for serving as the official investment advisor to Groupement Financier from 2007 to December 2008, and received an additional \$2.5 million in fees from Groupement Levered for serving as the official investment advisor to Groupement Levered from 2007 to December 2008.
- d. AML (f/k/a AIA (Lux)) received at least \$2.4 million in fees from Groupement Financier for serving as the investment advisor to Groupement Financier from 2003 to 2007, and received at least \$50,000 for serving as the investment advisor to Groupement Levered from 2003 to 2007. In addition, AML (f/k/a AIA (Lux)) received fees from UBS SA in connection with its role as official portfolio advisor to Luxalpha from February 2004 to August 2004, which consisted of fees received by UBS SA from Luxalpha for serving as Luxalpha's official manager, in an amount to be proven at trial.

291. Based on the Trustee's investigation to date, Access Defendants Littaye, Villehuchet and Ms. Villehuchet, received millions of dollars of Subsequent Transfers, in an amount to be proven at trial. At all relevant times, each of AIA Ltd., AIA LLC, AP (Lux), and AML (f/k/a AIA (Lux)) was either completely or nearly-completely owned by Littaye and Villehuchet. At various times, each of Littaye and Villehuchet also served as directors of AIA Ltd., AP (Lux), and AML (f/k/a AP (Lux)). A significant amount of the Subsequent Transfers received by AIA Ltd., AIA LLC, AP (Lux), and AML (f/k/a AIA (Lux)) were subsequently transferred to Littaye and Villehuchet, either directly or indirectly, in the form of distributions, payments, or other transfers of value. Among other transfers, Villehuchet received \$6.5 million in compensation paid from bank accounts controlled by Access's New York office from 2004 through 2008, and, upon information and belief, his co-owner Littaye received at least the same amount of compensation paid from other Access-controlled bank accounts. The transfers

received by Villehuchet are recoverable from Ms. Villehuchet, as the executrix and sole beneficiary under the will of Villehuchet.

292. Access Defendant Delandmeter received approximately \$350,000 in Subsequent Transfers from Luxalpha, in connection with Delandmeter's purported provision of legal services to Luxalpha. Delandmeter also received Subsequent Transfers from Groupement Financier in connection with Delandmeter's purported provision of legal services to Groupement Financier, in an amount to be proven at trial. Upon information and belief, a portion of the Luxalpha, Groupement Financier, and Groupement Levered-related Subsequent Transfers received by AIA Ltd., AIA LLC, AP (Lux), and AML (f/k/a AIA (Lux)) were subsequently transferred to Delandmeter, directly or indirectly, in compensation for Luxalpha, Groupement Financier and Groupement Levered-related services Delandmeter provided to Access, in an amount to be proven at trial.

293. Based on the Trustee's investigation to date, a portion of the Luxalpha, Groupement Financier, and Groupement Levered-related Subsequent Transfers received by AIA Ltd., AIA LLC, AP (Lux), and AML (f/k/a AIA (Lux)) were subsequently transferred to Access Defendant Dumbauld, in an amount to be proven at trial. At minimum, Dumbauld received \$1.25 million in compensation paid from bank accounts controlled by Access's New York office from 2004 through 2007. Dumbauld received these transfers as distributions, payments, or other transfers of value in connection with his role as Access partner and Chief Investment Officer.

294. The Subsequent Transferee Defendants received each of the Subsequent Transfers with actual knowledge of fraud at BLMIS, or with willful blindness to circumstances suggesting a high probability of fraud at BLMIS.


295. To the extent that any of the avoidance and recovery counts may be inconsistent with each other, they are to be treated as being pled in the alternative.

296. The Trustee's discovery and investigation is ongoing, and the Trustee reserves the right to: (i) supplement the information on the Initial Transfers, the Subsequent Transfers, and any additional transfers; and (ii) seek avoidance and recovery of such transfers.

297. The following chart summarizes the Initial Transfers and the Subsequent Transfers:

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Transfers from BLMIS to Defendants



CUSTOMER CLAIMS

298. On or about March 2, 2009, Defendant Luxalpha filed a customer claim with the Trustee that the Trustee has designated as Claim No. 004419. On March 3, 2009, Defendant Luxalpha filed another customer claim with the Trustee that the Trustee has designated as Claim No. 005725. These two claims, which are duplicative of each other, were signed by two of Luxalpha's directors, Ralf Schroeter and Alan Hondequin, and both claim the same amount of \$1,537,099,731. In addition, on or about March 2, 2009, Defendant UBS SA filed an additional customer claim on behalf of Luxalpha with the Trustee, which the Trustee has designated as Claim No. 005025. These three customer claims are referred to herein as the "Customer Claims." The Trustee is seeking to have these claims disallowed and/or equitably subordinated.

COUNT ONE **FRAUDULENT TRANSFERS (INITIAL TRANSFEREE)** **11 U.S.C. §§ 105(a), 502(d), 548(a)(1)(A), 550(a), AND 551**

Against The Feeder Fund Defendants

299. The Trustee incorporates by reference the allegations contained in the previous paragraphs of this Second Amended Complaint as if fully realleged herein.

300. Each of the Two Year Initial Transfers were made on or within two years before the Filing Date.

301. Each of the Two Year Initial Transfers constituted a transfer of an interest of BLMIS in property within the meaning of 11 U.S.C. §§ 101(54) and 548(a), and 15 U.S.C. § 78fff-2(c)(3).

302. Each of the Two Year Initial Transfers were made by BLMIS with the actual intent to hinder, delay or defraud some or all of BLMIS's then existing or future creditors. BLMIS made the Two Year Initial Transfers to or for the benefit of the Feeder Fund Defendants in furtherance of a fraudulent investment scheme.

303. Each of the Two Year Initial Transfers constitutes a fraudulent transfer avoidable by the Trustee pursuant to section 548(a)(1)(A) of the Bankruptcy Code and recoverable from the Feeder Fund Defendants pursuant to section 550(a) of the Bankruptcy Code and applicable provisions of SIPA, particularly 15 U.S.C. § 78fff-2(c)(3).

304. As a result of the foregoing, pursuant to sections 105(a), 502(d), 548(a)(1)(A), 550(a), and 551 of the Bankruptcy Code, and 15 U.S.C. § 78fff-2(c)(3), the Trustee is entitled to a judgment against the Feeder Fund Defendants: (a) avoiding and preserving the Two Year Initial Transfers, (b) directing that the Two Year Initial Transfers be set aside; (c) recovering the Two Year Initial Transfers or the value thereof, for the benefit of the estate of BLMIS; (d) directing the Feeder Fund Defendants, to the extent allowable by law, to disgorge to the Trustee all profits, including any and all compensation and/or remuneration received by the Feeder Fund Defendants related to or arising from, or concerning the Two Year Initial Transfers from BLMIS to the Feeder Fund Defendants; (e) disallowing any claim that the Feeder Fund Defendants may have against the Debtors until such time as the Two Year Initial Transfers are repaid to the Trustee; (f) recovering attorneys' fees and costs from the Defendants; and (g) awarding any other relief the Court deems just and appropriate.

COUNT TWO
FRAUDULENT TRANSFERS (INITIAL TRANSFEREE)
11 U.S.C. §§ 105(a), 502(d), 548(a)(1)(B), 550(a), AND 551

Against The Feeder Fund Defendants

305. The Trustee incorporates by reference the allegations contained in the previous paragraphs of this Second Amended Complaint as if fully realleged herein.

306. Each of the Two Year Initial Transfers were made on or within two years before the Filing Date.

307. Each of the Two Year Initial Transfers constitutes a transfer of an interest of BLMIS in property within the meaning of 11 U.S.C. §§ 101(54) and 548(a), and 15 U.S.C. § 78fff-2(c)(3).

308. BLMIS received less than a reasonably equivalent value in exchange for each of the Two Year Initial Transfers.

309. At the time of each of the Two Year Initial Transfers, BLMIS was insolvent, or became insolvent as a result of each of the Two Year Initial Transfers.

310. At the time of each of the Two Year Initial Transfers, BLMIS was engaged in a business or a transaction, or was about to engage in a business or a transaction, for which any property remaining with BLMIS was an unreasonably small capital.

311. At the time of each of the Two Year Initial Transfers, BLMIS intended to incur, or believed that it would incur, debts that would be beyond BLMIS's ability to pay as such debts matured.

312. Each of the Two Year Initial Transfers constitutes a fraudulent transfer avoidable by the Trustee pursuant to section 548(a)(1)(B) of the Bankruptcy Code and recoverable from the Feeder Fund Defendants pursuant to section 550(a) of the Bankruptcy Code and applicable provisions of SIPA, particularly 15 U.S.C. § 78fff-2(c)(3).

313. As a result of the foregoing, pursuant to sections 105(a), 502(d), 548(a)(1)(B), 550(a), and 551 of the Bankruptcy Code, and 15 U.S.C. § 78fff-2(c)(3), the Trustee is entitled to a judgment against the Feeder Fund Defendants: (a) avoiding and preserving the Two Year Initial Transfers; (b) directing that the Two Year Initial Transfers be set aside; (c) recovering the Two Year Initial Transfers, or the value thereof, for the benefit of the estate of BLMIS; (d) directing the Feeder Fund Defendants, to the extent allowable by law, to disgorge to the Trustee

all profits, including any and all compensation and/or remuneration received by the Feeder Fund Defendants related to or arising from, or concerning the Two Year Initial Transfers from BLMIS to the Feeder Fund Defendants; (e) disallowing any claim that the Feeder Fund Defendants may have against the Debtors until such time as the Two Year Initial Transfers are repaid to the Trustee; (f) recovering attorneys' fees and costs from the Defendants; and (g) awarding any other relief the Court deems just and appropriate.

COUNT THREE
FRAUDULENT TRANSFERS (INITIAL TRANSFEREE)
NEW YORK DEBTOR AND CREDITOR LAW §§ 276, 276-a,
278 AND/OR 279, AND 11 U.S.C. §§ 105(a), 502(d), 544(b), 550(a), AND 551

Against The Feeder Fund Defendants

314. The Trustee incorporates by reference the allegations contained in the previous paragraphs of this Second Amended Complaint as if fully realleged herein.

315. At all times relevant to the Six Year Initial Transfers, there have been one or more creditors who have held and still hold matured or unmatured unsecured claims against BLMIS that are allowable under section 502 of the Bankruptcy Code or that are not allowable only under section 502(e) of the Bankruptcy Code.

316. Each of the Six Year Initial Transfers constituted a conveyance by BLMIS as defined under section 270 of the N.Y. Debt. & Cred. Law.

317. Each of the Six Year Initial Transfers were made by BLMIS and transferees with the actual intent to hinder, delay or defraud the creditors of BLMIS. BLMIS made the Six Year Initial Transfers to or for the benefit of Luxalpha and/or Groupement Financier in furtherance of a fraudulent investment scheme.

318. Each of the Six Year Initial Transfers were received by the Feeder Fund Defendants with actual intent to hinder, delay or defraud creditors of BLMIS at the time of each of the transfers and/or future creditors of BLMIS.

319. As a result of the foregoing, pursuant to sections 276, 276-a, 278, and/or 279 of the N.Y. Debt. & Cred. Law., sections 105(a), 502(d), 544(b), 550(a), and 551 of the Bankruptcy Code, and 15 U.S.C. § 78fff-2(c)(3), the Trustee is entitled to a judgment against the Feeder Fund Defendants: (a) avoiding and preserving the Six Year Initial Transfers; (b) directing that the Six Year Initial Transfers be set aside; (c) recovering the Six Year Initial Transfers, or the value thereof, for the benefit of the estate of BLMIS; (d) directing the Feeder Fund Defendants, to the extent allowable by law, to disgorge to the Trustee all profits, including any and all compensation and/or remuneration received by the Feeder Fund Defendants related to or arising from, or concerning the Six Year Initial Transfers from BLMIS to the Feeder Fund Defendants; (e) disallowing any claim that the Feeder Fund Defendants may have against the Debtors until such time as the Six Year Initial Transfers are repaid to the Trustee; (f) recovering attorneys' fees and costs from the Defendants; and (g) awarding any other relief the Court deems just and appropriate.

COUNT FOUR
FRAUDULENT TRANSFERS (INITIAL TRANSFEREE)
NEW YORK DEBTOR AND CREDITOR LAW §§ 273 AND 278
AND/OR 279, AND 11 U.S.C. §§ 105(a), 502(d), 544(b), 550, AND 551

Against The Feeder Fund Defendants

320. The Trustee incorporates by reference the allegations contained in the previous paragraphs of this Second Amended Complaint as if fully realleged herein.

321. At all times relevant to the Six Year Initial Transfers there have been one or more creditors holding matured or unmatured unsecured claims against BLMIS that are allowable

under § 502 of the Bankruptcy Code or that are not allowable only under section 502(e) of the Bankruptcy Code.

322. Each of the Six Year Initial Transfers constituted a conveyance by BLMIS as defined under section 270 of the N.Y. Debt. & Cred. Law.

323. BLMIS did not receive fair consideration for the Six Year Initial Transfers.

324. BLMIS was insolvent at the time it made each of the Six Year Initial Transfers or, in the alternative, BLMIS became insolvent as a result of each of the Six Year Initial Transfers.

325. As a result of the foregoing, pursuant to sections 273, 278, and/or 279 of the N.Y. Debt. & Cred. Law., sections 105(a), 502(d), 544(b), 550, and 551 of the Bankruptcy Code, and 15 U.S.C. § 78fff-2(c)(3), the Trustee is entitled to a judgment against the Feeder Fund Defendants: (a) avoiding and preserving the Six Year Initial Transfers; (b) directing that the Six Year Initial Transfers be set aside; (c) recovering the Six Year Initial Transfers, or the value thereof, for the benefit of the estate of BLMIS; (d) directing the Feeder Fund Defendants, to the extent allowable by law, to disgorge to the Trustee all profits, including any and all compensation and/or remuneration received by the Feeder Fund Defendants related to or arising from, or concerning the Six Year Initial Transfers from BLMIS to the Feeder Fund Defendants; (e) disallowing any claim that the Feeder Fund Defendants may have against the Debtors until such time as the Six Year Initial Transfers are repaid to the Trustee; (f) recovering attorneys' fees and costs from the Defendants; and (g) awarding any other relief the Court deems just and appropriate.

COUNT FIVE
FRAUDULENT TRANSFERS (INITIAL TRANSFEREE)
NEW YORK DEBTOR AND CREDITOR LAW §§ 274, 278, AND/OR 279,
AND 11 U.S.C. §§ 105(a), 502(d), 544(b), 550(a), AND 551

Against The Feeder Fund Defendants

326. The Trustee incorporates by reference the allegations contained in the previous paragraphs of this Second Amended Complaint as if fully realleged herein.

327. At all times relevant to the Six Year Transfers there have been one or more creditors holding matured or unmatured unsecured claims against BLMIS that are allowable under section 502 of the Bankruptcy Code or that are not allowable only under § 502(e) of the Bankruptcy Code.

328. Each of the Six Year Initial Transfers constituted a conveyance by BLMIS as defined under section 270 of the N.Y. Debt. & Cred. Law.

329. BLMIS did not receive fair consideration for the Six Year Initial Transfers.

330. At the time BLMIS made each of the Six Year Initial Transfers, BLMIS was engaged or was about to engage in a business or transaction for which the property remaining in its hands after each of the Six Year Initial Transfers was an unreasonably small capital.

331. As a result of the foregoing, pursuant to sections 274, 278, and/or 279 of the N.Y. Debt. & Cred. Law., sections 105(a), 502(d), 544(b), 550(a) and 551 of the Bankruptcy Code, and 15 U.S.C. § 78fff-2(c)(3), the Trustee is entitled to a judgment: (a) avoiding and preserving the Six Year Initial Transfers; (b) directing that the Six Year Initial Transfers be set aside; (c) recovering the Six Year Initial Transfers, or the value thereof, from the Feeder Fund Defendants for the benefit of the estate of BLMIS; (d) directing the Feeder Fund Defendants, to the extent allowable by law, to disgorge to the Trustee all profits, including any and all compensation and/or remuneration received by the Feeder Fund Defendants related to or arising from, or

concerning the Six Year Initial Transfers from BLMIS to the Feeder Fund Defendants; (e) disallowing any claim that the Feeder Fund Defendants may have against the Debtors until such time as the Six Year Initial Transfers are repaid to the Trustee; (f) recovering attorneys' fees and costs from the Defendants; and (g) awarding any other relief the Court deems just and appropriate.

COUNT SIX
FRAUDULENT TRANSFERS (INITIAL TRANSFEREE)
NEW YORK DEBTOR AND CREDITOR LAW §§ 275, 278,
AND/OR 279, AND 11 U.S.C. §§ 105(a), 502(d), 544(b), 550(a), AND 551

Against The Feeder Fund Defendants

332. The Trustee incorporates by reference the allegations contained in the previous paragraphs of this Second Amended Complaint as if fully realleged herein.

333. At all times relevant to the Six Year Initial Transfers there have been one or more creditors holding matured or unmatured unsecured claims against BLMIS that are allowable under section 502 of the Bankruptcy Code, or that are not allowable only under section 502(e) of the Bankruptcy Code.

334. Each of the Six Year Initial Transfers constituted a conveyance by BLMIS as defined under section 270 of the N.Y. Debt. & Cred. Law.

335. BLMIS did not receive fair consideration for the Six Year Initial Transfers.

336. At the time BLMIS made each of the Six Year Initial Transfers, BLMIS had incurred, was intending to incur, or believed that it would incur debts beyond its ability to pay them as the debts matured.

337. As a result of the foregoing, pursuant to sections 275, 278, and/or 279 of the N.Y. Debt. & Cred. Law, sections 105(a), 502(d), 544(b), 550(a), and 551 of the Bankruptcy Code, and 15 U.S.C. § 78fff-2(c)(3), the Trustee is entitled to a judgment: (a) avoiding and preserving

the Six Year Initial Transfers; (b) directing that the Six Year Initial Transfers be set aside; (c) recovering the Six Year Initial Transfers, or the value thereof, from the Feeder Fund Defendants for the benefit of the estate of BLMIS; (d) directing the Feeder Fund Defendants, to the extent allowable by law, to disgorge to the Trustee all profits, including any and all compensation and/or remuneration received by the Feeder Fund Defendants related to or arising from, or concerning the Six Year Initial Transfers from BLMIS to the Feeder Fund Defendants; (e) disallowing any claim that the Feeder Fund Defendants may have against the Debtors until such time as the Six Year Initial Transfers are repaid to the Trustee; (f) recovering attorneys' fees and costs from the Defendants; and (g) awarding any other relief the Court deems just and appropriate.

COUNT SEVEN
RECOVERY OF SUBSEQUENT TRANSFERS: 11 U.S.C. §§ 105(a) and 550(a)

Against The Access Defendants And The UBS Defendants

338. The Trustee incorporates by reference the allegations contained in the previous paragraphs of this Second Amended Complaint as if fully realleged herein.

339. Each of the Initial Transfers is avoidable under sections 544, 548 and/or 550 of the Bankruptcy Code.

340. Each of the Subsequent Transfers is recoverable from the Subsequent Transferee Defendants under section 550(a) of the Bankruptcy Code and 15 U.S.C. § 78fff-2(c)(3).

341. Each of the Subsequent Transfers were made directly or indirectly to the Subsequent Transferee Defendants.

342. Each of the Subsequent Transfers was received by each of the Subsequent Transferee Defendants at a time when it had actual knowledge of fraud at BLMIS, or was willfully blind to facts suggesting a high probability of fraud at BLMIS.

343. As a result of the foregoing, pursuant to sections 105(a), 502(d), and 550(a) of the Bankruptcy Code, and 15 U.S.C. § 78fff-2(c)(3), the Trustee is entitled to a judgment against the Subsequent Transferee Defendants: (a) recovering the Subsequent Transfers, or the value thereof, from the Subsequent Transferee Defendants for the benefit of the estate of BLMIS, (b) directing the Subsequent Transferee Defendants to the extent allowable by law, to disgorge to the Trustee all profits, including any and all management fees, incentive fees or other compensation and/or remuneration received by the Subsequent Transferee Defendants related to or arising from, or concerning the Subsequent Transfers from BLMIS to the Subsequent Transferee Defendants; (c) disallowing any claim that the Subsequent Transferee Defendants may have against the Debtors until such time as the Subsequent Transfers are repaid to the Trustee; (d) recovering attorneys' fees and costs from the Defendants; and (e) awarding any other relief the Court deems just and appropriate.

COUNT EIGHT
OBJECTION TO AND DISALLOWANCE OF CLAIMS

Against Luxalpha And UBS SA

344. The Trustee incorporates by reference the allegations contained in the previous paragraphs of this Amended Complaint as if fully realleged herein.

345. Luxalpha and UBS SA were not innocent investors at the time they invested with BLMIS and provided no consideration to the estate.

346. Luxalpha and UBS SA acted with actual knowledge of fraudulent activity at BLMIS at the time they invested with BLMIS. By their conduct, at the time they invested with BLMIS, they enabled Madoff to perpetuate the fraud at BLMIS.

347. Alternatively, Luxalpha and UBS SA were willfully blind to numerous and serious indications of fraudulent activity at BLMIS, as described in this Second Amended Complaint.

348. As a result of Luxalpha's and UBS SA's conduct, they are not entitled to the protections afforded by SIPA. Thus, Luxalpha and UBS SA do not have a claim enforceable against the BLMIS estate under SIPA or other applicable law.

349. As a result of Luxalpha's and UBS SA's conduct, as described above, pursuant to section 502(a) of the Bankruptcy Code and section 78fff-2 of SIPA, the Trustee objects to any and all claims of Luxalpha and UBS SA against the BLMIS estate, which should be disallowed, and not entitled to receive a distribution from the estate pursuant to section 502(b)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code.

COUNT NINE
EQUITABLE DISALLOWANCE OF CLAIMS

Against Luxalpha And UBS SA

350. The Trustee incorporates by reference the allegations contained in the previous paragraphs of this Second Amended Complaint as if fully realleged herein.

351. Luxalpha and UBS SA engaged in and benefited from inequitable conduct and with actual knowledge of fraudulent activity at BLMIS, including the conduct described in this Second Amended Complaint. By their conduct, they have taken unconscionable advantage of, resulting in injury to, innocent customers and other creditors of the estate.

352. Based upon Luxalpha's and UBS SA's failure to deal fairly and in good faith, as described above, all customers and other creditors of BLMIS have been injured, including by being (a) misled as to the true financial condition of the debtor; (b) induced to invest with BLMIS without knowledge of BLMIS's financial condition; and (c) hindered and delayed in

recovering the full amounts due to them. Luxalpha's and UBS SA's conduct further enabled Madoff to continue the Ponzi scheme.

353. By submitting their Customer Claims, Luxalpha and UBS SA exchanged their legal claim for an equitable claim to share pro rata in the estate and submitted to this Court's equitable jurisdiction.

354. Luxalpha's and UBS SA's conduct was so egregious that they should not be allowed to share in any equitable distribution made by the Trustee to innocent customers holding allowed claims against BLMIS and/or Madoff.

355. Pursuant to the Court's equitable powers, the Court should exercise the full extent of its equitable powers to ensure that claims, payments or benefits, of whatever kind or nature, which are asserted or sought by Luxalpha and UBS SA against the estate, are disallowed.

356. Equitable disallowance is consistent with the provisions and purposes of the Bankruptcy Code.

COUNT TEN
EQUITABLE SUBORDINATION OF CUSTOMER CLAIMS

Against Luxalpha And UBS SA

357. The Trustee incorporates by reference the allegations contained in the previous paragraphs of this Second Amended Complaint as if fully realleged herein.

358. Luxalpha and UBS SA engaged in inequitable conduct, including the conduct described in this Second Amended Complaint.

359. Based on Luxalpha and UBS SA's inequitable conduct, BLMIS's customers have been misled as to the true financial condition of BLMIS, and have been induced to invest without knowledge of the actual facts regarding BLMIS's financial condition, and/or customers and creditors are less likely to recover the full amounts due to them.

360. Luxalpha's and UBS SA's conduct enabled Madoff to prolong the Ponzi scheme that resulted in injury to all customers and creditors of the BLMIS estate and conferred an unfair advantage on Luxalpha and UBS SA.

361. Prior to the filing date, Luxalpha and UBS SA benefited by the withdrawal of at least \$766 million from BLMIS. But for these withdrawals, there would have been additional customer property available on the Filing Date for distribution.

362. The Court should exercise the full extent of its equitable powers to ensure that claims, payments, or benefits, of whatever kind or nature, which are asserted or sought by Luxalpha and/or UBS SA directly or indirectly against the estate – and only to the extent such claims are allowed – are subordinated for distribution purposes pursuant to sections 510(c) and 105(a) of the Bankruptcy Code to the allowed claims of all other customers and creditors of BLMIS.

363. Equitable subordination as requested herein is consistent with the provisions and purposes of the Bankruptcy Code.

WHEREFORE, the Trustee respectfully requests that this Court enter judgment in favor of the Trustee and against the Defendants as follows:

(i) On the First Claim for Relief, pursuant to sections 105(a), 502(d), 548(a)(1)(A), 550(a), and 551 of the Bankruptcy Code, and 15 U.S.C. § 78fff-2(c)(3), the Trustee is entitled to a judgment: (a) avoiding and preserving the Two Year Initial Transfers, (b) directing that the Two Year Initial Transfers be set aside; (c) recovering the Two Year Initial Transfers or the value thereof, from the Feeder Fund Defendants for the benefit of the estate of BLMIS; (d) directing the Feeder Fund Defendants, to the extent allowable by law, to disgorge to the Trustee all profits, including any and all compensation and/or remuneration received by the

Feeder Fund Defendants related to or arising from, or concerning the Two Year Initial Transfers from BLMIS to the Feeder Fund Defendants; (e) disallowing any claim that the Feeder Fund Defendants may have against the Debtors until such time as the Two Year Initial Transfers are repaid to the Trustee; (f) recovering attorneys' fees and costs from the Defendants; and (g) awarding any other relief the Court deems just and appropriate;

(ii) On the Second Claim for Relief, pursuant to sections 105(a), 502(d), 548(a)(1)(B), 550(a), and 551 of the Bankruptcy Code, and 15 U.S.C. § 78fff-2(c)(3), the Trustee is entitled to a judgment: (a) avoiding and preserving the Two Year Initial Transfers; (b) directing that the Two Year Initial Transfers be set aside; (c) recovering the Two Year Initial Transfers, or the value thereof, from the Feeder Fund Defendants for the benefit of the estate of BLMIS; (d) directing the Feeder Fund Defendants, to the extent allowable by law, to disgorge to the Trustee all profits, including any and all compensation and/or remuneration received by the Feeder Fund Defendants related to or arising from, or concerning the Two Year Initial Transfers from BLMIS to the Feeder Fund Defendants; (e) disallowing any claim that the Feeder Fund Defendants may have against the Debtors until such time as the Two Year Initial Transfers are repaid to the Trustee; (f) recovering attorneys' fees and costs from the Defendants; and (g) awarding any other relief the Court deems just and appropriate;

(iii) On the Third Claim for Relief, pursuant to sections 276, 276-a, 278, and/or 279 of the N.Y. Debt. & Cred. Law, sections 105(a), 502(d), 544(b), 550(a), and 551 of the Bankruptcy Code, and 15 U.S.C. § 78fff-2(c)(3), the Trustee is entitled to a judgment: (a) avoiding and preserving the Six Year Initial Transfers; (b) directing that the Six Year Initial Transfers be set aside; (c) recovering the Six Year Initial Transfers, or the value thereof, from the Feeder Fund Defendants for the benefit of the estate of BLMIS; (d) directing the Feeder Fund

Defendants, to the extent allowable by law, to disgorge to the Trustee all profits, including any and all compensation and/or remuneration received by the Feeder Fund Defendants related to or arising from, or concerning the Six Year Initial Transfers from BLMIS to the Feeder Fund Defendants; (e) disallowing any claim that the Feeder Fund Defendants may have against the Debtors until such time as the Six Year Initial Transfers are repaid to the Trustee; (f) recovering attorneys' fees and costs from the Defendants; and (g) awarding any other relief the Court deems just and appropriate;

(iv) On the Fourth Claim for Relief, pursuant to sections 273, 278, and/or 279 of the N.Y. Debt. & Cred. Law, sections 105(a), 502(d), 544(b), 550, and 551 of the Bankruptcy Code, and 15 U.S.C. § 78fff-2(c)(3), the Trustee is entitled to a judgment: (a) avoiding and preserving the Six Year Initial Transfers; (b) directing that the Six Year Initial Transfers be set aside; (c) recovering the Six Year Initial Transfers, or the value thereof, from the Feeder Fund Defendants for the benefit of the estate of BLMIS; (d) directing the Feeder Fund Defendants, to the extent allowable by law, to disgorge to the Trustee all profits, including any and all compensation and/or remuneration received by the Feeder Fund Defendants related to or arising from, or concerning the Six Year Initial Transfers from BLMIS to the Feeder Fund Defendants; (e) disallowing any claim that the Feeder Fund Defendants may have against the Debtors until such time as the Six Year Initial Transfers are repaid to the Trustee; (f) recovering attorneys' fees and costs from the Defendants; and (g) awarding any other relief the Court deems just and appropriate;

(v) On the Fifth Claim for Relief, pursuant to sections 274, 278, and/or 279 of the N.Y. Debt. & Cred. Law, sections 105(a), 502(d), 544(b), 550(a) and 551 of the Bankruptcy Code, and 15 U.S.C. § 78fff-2(c)(3), the Trustee is entitled to a judgment: (a) avoiding and

preserving the Six Year Initial Transfers; (b) directing that the Six Year Initial Transfers be set aside; (c) recovering the Six Year Initial Transfers, or the value thereof, from the Feeder Fund Defendants for the benefit of the estate of BLMIS; (d) directing the Feeder Fund Defendants, to the extent allowable by law, to disgorge to the Trustee all profits, including any and all compensation and/or remuneration received by the Feeder Fund Defendants related to or arising from, or concerning the Six Year Initial Transfers from BLMIS to the Feeder Fund Defendants; (e) disallowing any claim that the Feeder Fund Defendants may have against the Debtors until such time as the Six Year Initial Transfers are repaid to the Trustee; (f) recovering attorneys' fees and costs from the Defendants; and (g) awarding any other relief the Court deems just and appropriate;

(vi) On the Sixth Claim for Relief, pursuant to sections 275, 278, and/or 279 of the N.Y. Debt. & Cred. Law, sections 105(a), 502(d), 544(b), 550(a), and 551 of the Bankruptcy Code, and 15 U.S.C. § 78fff-2(c)(3), the Trustee is entitled to a judgment: (a) avoiding and preserving the Six Year Initial Transfers; (b) directing that the Six Year Initial Transfers be set aside; (c) recovering the Six Year Initial Transfers, or the value thereof, from the Feeder Fund Defendants for the benefit of the estate of BLMIS; (d) directing the Feeder Fund Defendants, to the extent allowable by law, to disgorge to the Trustee all profits, including any and all compensation and/or remuneration received by the Feeder Fund Defendants related to or arising from, or concerning the Six Year Initial Transfers from BLMIS to the Feeder Fund Defendants; (e) disallowing any claim that the Feeder Fund Defendants may have against the Debtors until such time as the Six Year Initial Transfers are repaid to the Trustee; (f) recovering attorneys' fees and costs from the Defendants; and (g) awarding any other relief the Court deems just and appropriate;

(vii) On the Seventh Claim for Relief, pursuant to sections 105(a), 502(d) and 550(a) of the Bankruptcy Code, and 15 U.S.C. § 78fff-2(c)(3), the Trustee is entitled to a judgment against the Subsequent Transferee Defendants: (a) recovering the Subsequent Transfers, or the value thereof, from the Subsequent Transferee Defendants for the benefit of the estate of BLMIS, (b) directing the Subsequent Transferee Defendants, to the extent allowable by law, to disgorge to the Trustee all profits, including any and all management fees, incentive fees or other compensation and/or remuneration received by the Subsequent Transferee Defendants related to or arising from, or concerning the Subsequent Transfers from BLMIS to the Subsequent Transferee Defendants; (c) disallowing any claim that the Subsequent Transferee Defendants may have against the Debtors until such time as the Subsequent Transfers are repaid to the Trustee; (d) recovering attorneys' fees and costs from the Defendants; and (e) awarding any other relief the Court deems just and appropriate;

(viii) On the Eighth Claim for Relief, sustaining the Trustee's objections to the Customer Claims filed by Luxalpha and UBS SA pursuant to section 502(a) of the Bankruptcy Code, and disallowing such claims pursuant to section 502(b)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code and 15 U.S.C § 78fff-2(b);

(ix) On the Ninth Claim for Relief, pursuant to this Court's equitable power, disallowing each and every claim that Luxalpha and UBS SA assert against the Debtors' estate, all of which claims have no lawful existence under principles of restitution and other applicable state law;

(x) On the Tenth Claim for Relief, pursuant to this Court's equitable powers, subordinating all claims of Luxalpha and UBS SA for purposes of distribution to all allowed claims of BLMIS's customers and creditors due to Luxalpha and UBS SA's inequitable conduct

pursuant to sections 105(a) and 510(c) of the Bankruptcy Code, such that no claim of Luxalpha or UBS SA is paid ahead of the allowed claim of any customer or creditor of BLMIS

(xii) On the First through the Seventh Claims for Relief, to the extent allowable by law, directing the Defendants to disgorge to the Trustee all profits, including any and all management fees, incentive fees, or other compensation and/or remuneration received by the Defendants related to, arising out of, or concerning the Initial Transfers, the Subsequent Transfers, and the Luxalpha and Groupement Financier BLMIS Accounts;

(xiii) On all Claims for Relief, establishing a constructive trust over all of the Initial Transfers and Subsequent Transfers and their proceeds, product, and offspring in favor of the Trustee for the benefit of the estate;

(xiv) On all Claims for Relief, pursuant to federal common law and/or N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5001 and 5004, as applicable, awarding the Trustee prejudgment interest from the date on which the Initial Transfers were received;

(xv) On all Claims for Relief, awarding the Trustee's attorneys' fees, all applicable interest, costs and disbursements incurred in this proceeding; and

(xvi) Granting the Trustee such other, further and different relief as the Court deems just, proper and equitable.

Dated: June 26, 2015
New York, New York

Respectfully submitted,

/s/ David J. Sheehan

Baker & Hostetler LLP

45 Rockefeller Plaza

New York, New York 10111

Telephone: (212) 589-4200

Facsimile: (212) 589-4201

David J. Sheehan

E-mail: dsheehan@bakerlaw.com

*Attorneys for Irving H. Picard, Trustee
for the Substantively Consolidated SIPA
Liquidation of Bernard L. Madoff Investment
Securities LLC and Estate of Bernard L. Madoff*

BLMIS Account Name	BLMIS Account Number
UBS (LUXEMBOURG) SA FBO LUXALPHA SICAV ATTN: SERGE KARP	1FR108
GROUPEMENT FINANCIER LTD	1FR096

Column 1	Column 2	Column 3	Column 4	Column 5	Column 6	Column 7	Column 8	Column 9	Column 10
Date	Transaction Description	Transaction Amount Reported in Customer Statement	Cash Deposits	Cash Withdrawals	Transfers of Principal In	Transfers of Principal Out	Balance of Principal	2-Year Initial Transfers	6-Year Initial Transfers
3/22/2004	CHECK WIRE	146,100,000	146,100,000	-	-	-	146,100,000	-	-
3/23/2004	CHECK WIRE	101,199,980	101,199,980	-	-	-	247,299,980	-	-
3/24/2004	CHECK WIRE	35,000,000	35,000,000	-	-	-	282,299,980	-	-
3/26/2004	CHECK WIRE	60,400,000	60,400,000	-	-	-	342,699,980	-	-
4/1/2004	CHECK WIRE	(2,200,000)	-	(2,200,000)	-	-	340,499,980	-	(2,200,000)
4/5/2004	CHECK WIRE	(3,000,000)	-	(3,000,000)	-	-	337,499,980	-	(3,000,000)
4/6/2004	FIDELITY SPARTAN U S TREASURY MONEY MARKET W/H TAX DIV FDLXX	(2)	-	* [1]	-	-	337,499,980	-	-
4/16/2004	CHECK WIRE	37,999,980	37,999,980	-	-	-	375,499,960	-	-
4/28/2004	CHECK WIRE	26,999,980	26,999,980	-	-	-	402,499,940	-	-
4/30/2004	W/H TAX DIV MWD	(2,184)	-	* [1]	-	-	402,499,940	-	-
4/30/2004	W/H TAX DIV JPM	(1,677)	-	* [1]	-	-	402,499,940	-	-
5/3/2004	W/H TAX DIV SBC	(8,274)	-	* [1]	-	-	402,499,940	-	-
5/3/2004	W/H TAX DIV VZ	(8,410)	-	* [1]	-	-	402,499,940	-	-
5/11/2004	CHECK WIRE	38,999,980	38,999,980	-	-	1	441,499,920	-	-
5/11/2004	CHECK WIRE	39,999,980	39,999,980	-	-	-	481,499,900	-	-
5/11/2004	CANCEL C&S 5/11/04	(39,999,980)	(39,999,980)	-	-	-	441,499,920	-	-
5/14/2004	W/H TAX DIV PG	(6,432)	-	* [1]	-	-	441,499,920	-	-
5/17/2004	W/H TAX DIV TXN	(375)	-	* [1]	-	-	441,499,920	-	-
5/26/2004	W/H TAX DIV MER	(1,617)	-	* [1]	-	-	441,499,920	-	-
5/28/2004	CHECK WIRE	8,999,980	8,999,980	-	-	-	450,499,900	-	-
5/28/2004	W/H TAX DIV C	(20,951)	-	* [1]	-	-	450,499,900	-	-
6/1/2004	W/H TAX DIV INTC	(2,617)	-	* [1]	-	-	450,499,900	-	-
6/1/2004	W/H TAX DIV WFC	(7,857)	-	* [1]	-	-	450,499,900	-	-
6/4/2004	W/H TAX DIV PFE	(13,085)	-	* [1]	-	-	450,499,900	-	-
6/4/2004	W/H TAX DIV G	(1,643)	-	* [1]	-	-	450,499,900	-	-
6/7/2004	FIDELITY SPARTAN U S TREASURY MONEY MARKET W/H TAX DIV FDLXX	(13)	-	* [1]	-	-	450,499,900	-	-
6/7/2004	W/H TAX DIV WMT	(3,858)	-	* [1]	-	-	450,499,900	-	-
6/8/2004	W/H TAX DIV JNJ	(8,581)	-	* [1]	-	-	450,499,900	-	-
6/9/2004	W/H TAX DIV BUD	(1,819)	-	* [1]	-	-	450,499,900	-	-
6/10/2004	W/H TAX DIV XOM	(17,863)	-	* [1]	-	-	450,499,900	-	-
6/10/2004	W/H TAX DIV IBM	(3,143)	-	* [1]	-	-	450,499,900	-	-
6/10/2004	W/H TAX DIV UTX	(1,312)	-	* [1]	-	-	450,499,900	-	-
6/11/2004	W/H TAX DIV BA	(1,125)	-	* [1]	-	-	450,499,900	-	-
6/14/2004	W/H TAX DIV DD	(3,538)	-	* [1]	-	-	450,499,900	-	-
6/14/2004	W/H TAX DIV MMM	(2,025)	-	* [1]	-	-	450,499,900	-	-
6/15/2004	CHECK WIRE	16,999,980	16,999,980	-	-	-	467,499,880	-	-
6/18/2004	FIDELITY SPARTAN U S TREASURY MONEY MARKET W/H TAX DIV FDLXX	(1)	-	* [1]	-	-	467,499,880	-	-
6/24/2004	W/H TAX DIV HD	(2,652)	-	* [1]	-	-	467,499,880	-	-
6/30/2004	W/H TAX DIV PEP	(5,454)	-	* [1]	-	-	467,499,880	-	-
7/1/2004	W/H TAX DIV KO	(8,425)	-	* [1]	-	-	467,499,880	-	-
7/6/2004	CHECK WIRE	(4,000,000)	-	(4,000,000)	-	-	463,499,880	-	(4,000,000)
7/7/2004	W/H TAX DIV HPQ	(3,395)	-	* [1]	-	-	463,499,880	-	-
7/9/2004	W/H TAX DIV MO	(19,224)	-	* [1]	-	-	463,499,880	-	-
7/12/2004	FIDELITY SPARTAN U S TREASURY MONEY MARKET W/H TAX DIV FDLXX	(8)	-	* [1]	-	-	463,499,880	-	-
7/20/2004	CHECK WIRE	7,999,980	7,999,980	-	-	-	471,499,860	-	-
7/26/2004	W/H TAX DIV GE	(3,116)	-	* [1]	-	-	471,499,860	-	-
8/4/2004	CHECK WIRE	(4,000,000)	-	(4,000,000)	-	-	467,499,860	-	(4,000,000)
8/11/2004	FIDELITY SPARTAN U S TREASURY MONEY MARKET W/H TAX DIV FDLXX	(3)	-	* [1]	-	-	467,499,860	-	-
8/16/2004	CHECK WIRE	14,499,980	14,499,980	-	-	-	481,999,840	-	-
8/18/2004	FIDELITY SPARTAN U S TREASURY MONEY MARKET W/H TAX DIV FDLXX	(0)	-	* [1]	-	-	481,999,840	-	-
8/23/2004	FIDELITY SPARTAN U S TREASURY MONEY MARKET W/H TAX DIV FDLXX	(0)	-	* [1]	-	-	481,999,840	-	-
9/7/2004	W/H TAX DIV WMT	(6,289)	-	* [1]	-	-	481,999,840	-	-
9/10/2004	W/H TAX DIV UTX	(2,116)	-	* [1]	-	-	481,999,840	-	-
9/13/2004	W/H TAX DIV MMM	(3,265)	-	* [1]	-	-	481,999,840	-	-
9/14/2004	W/H TAX DIV MSFT	(13,592)	-	* [1]	-	-	481,999,840	-	-

Column 1	Column 2	Column 3	Column 4	Column 5	Column 6	Column 7	Column 8	Column 9	Column 10
Date	Transaction Description	Transaction Amount Reported in Customer Statement	Cash Deposits	Cash Withdrawals	Transfers of Principal In	Transfers of Principal Out	Balance of Principal	2-Year Initial Transfers	6-Year Initial Transfers
9/15/2004	CHECK WIRE	15,999,980	15,999,980	-	-	-	497,999,820	-	-
9/16/2004	W/H TAX DIV HD	(3,022)	-	* [1]	-	-	497,999,820	-	-
9/17/2004	W/H TAX DIV AIG	(3,093)	-	* [1]	-	-	497,999,820	-	-
9/24/2004	W/H TAX DIV BAC	(29,439)	-	* [1]	-	-	497,999,820	-	-
9/30/2004	W/H TAX DIV PEP	(6,215)	-	* [1]	-	-	497,999,820	-	-
10/1/2004	W/H TAX DIV KO	(9,600)	-	* [1]	-	-	497,999,820	-	-
10/1/2004	W/H TAX DIV VIA.B	(1,667)	-	* [1]	-	-	497,999,820	-	-
10/1/2004	W/H TAX DIV MRK	(13,510)	-	* [1]	-	-	497,999,820	-	-
10/6/2004	W/H TAX DIV HPQ	(3,868)	-	* [1]	-	-	497,999,820	-	-
10/12/2004	W/H TAX DIV MO	(23,878)	-	* [1]	-	-	497,999,820	-	-
10/15/2004	CHECK WIRE	50,999,980	50,999,980	-	-	-	548,999,800	-	-
10/28/2004	CHECK WIRE	2,999,980	2,999,980	-	-	-	551,999,780	-	-
11/3/2004	FIDELITY SPARTAN U S TREASURY MONEY MARKET W/H TAX DIV FDLXX	(38)	-	* [1]	-	-	551,999,780	-	-
11/4/2004	FIDELITY SPARTAN U S TREASURY MONEY MARKET W/H TAX DIV FDLXX	(0)	-	* [1]	-	-	551,999,780	-	-
11/9/2004	FIDELITY SPARTAN U S TREASURY MONEY MARKET W/H TAX DIV FDLXX	(0)	-	* [1]	-	-	551,999,780	-	-
11/10/2004	CHECK WIRE	71,999,980	71,999,980	-	-	-	623,999,760	-	-
11/24/2004	W/H TAX DIV MER	(1,384)	-	* [1]	-	-	623,999,760	-	-
11/26/2004	CHECK WIRE	4,499,980	4,499,980	-	-	-	628,499,740	-	-
12/1/2004	W/H TAX DIV WFC	(7,172)	-	* [1]	-	-	628,499,740	-	-
12/1/2004	W/H TAX DIV INTC	(2,278)	-	* [1]	-	-	628,499,740	-	-
12/3/2004	W/H TAX DIV BA	(2,303)	-	* [1]	-	-	628,499,740	-	-
12/3/2004	W/H TAX DIV PFE	(18,371)	-	* [1]	-	-	628,499,740	-	-
12/7/2004	W/H TAX DIV JNJ	(4,634)	-	* [1]	-	-	628,499,740	-	-
12/10/2004	W/H TAX DIV IBM	(4,376)	-	* [1]	-	-	628,499,740	-	-
12/10/2004	W/H TAX DIV XOM	(25,219)	-	* [1]	-	-	628,499,740	-	-
12/13/2004	CHECK WIRE	37,999,980	37,999,980	-	-	-	666,499,720	-	-
12/13/2004	FIDELITY SPARTAN U S TREASURY MONEY MARKET W/H TAX DIV FDLXX	(17)	-	* [1]	-	-	666,499,720	-	-
12/14/2004	W/H TAX DIV DD	(4,926)	-	* [1]	-	-	666,499,720	-	-
12/16/2004	FIDELITY SPARTAN U S TREASURY MONEY MARKET W/H TAX DIV FDLXX	(1)	-	* [1]	-	-	666,499,720	-	-
12/31/2004	FIDELITY SPARTAN U S TREASURY MONEY MARKET W/H TAX DIV FDLXX	(3)	-	* [1]	-	-	666,499,720	-	-
1/3/2005	W/H TAX DIV WMT	(2,959)	-	* [1]	-	-	666,499,720	-	-
1/18/2005	CHECK WIRE	4,999,980	4,999,980	-	-	-	671,499,700	-	-
2/7/2005	CHECK WIRE	4,999,980	4,999,980	-	-	-	676,499,680	-	-
2/14/2005	W/H TAX DIV TXN	(907)	-	* [1]	-	-	676,499,680	-	-
2/22/2005	CHECK WIRE	4,999,980	4,999,980	-	-	-	681,499,660	-	-
2/24/2005	W/H TAX DIV GS	(378)	-	* [1]	-	-	681,499,660	-	-
2/25/2005	W/H TAX DIV C	(47,871)	-	* [1]	-	-	681,499,660	-	-
2/28/2005	W/H TAX DIV MER	(3,054)	-	* [1]	-	-	681,499,660	-	-
3/1/2005	W/H TAX DIV INTC	(10,651)	-	* [1]	-	-	681,499,660	-	-
3/1/2005	W/H TAX DIV WFC	(17,408)	-	* [1]	-	-	681,499,660	-	-
3/4/2005	W/H TAX DIV G	(3,412)	-	* [1]	-	-	681,499,660	-	-
3/4/2005	W/H TAX DIV BA	(4,295)	-	* [1]	-	-	681,499,660	-	-
3/7/2005	FIDELITY SPARTAN U S TREASURY MONEY MARKET W/H TAX DIV FDLXX	(42)	-	* [1]	-	-	681,499,660	-	-
3/8/2005	W/H TAX DIV JNJ	(17,815)	-	* [1]	-	-	681,499,660	-	-
3/8/2005	W/H TAX DIV PFE	(30,101)	-	* [1]	-	-	681,499,660	-	-
3/9/2005	W/H TAX DIV BUD	(4,209)	-	* [1]	-	-	681,499,660	-	-
3/10/2005	W/H TAX DIV IBM	(6,184)	-	* [1]	-	-	681,499,660	-	-
3/10/2005	W/H TAX DIV XOM	(36,591)	-	* [1]	-	-	681,499,660	-	-
3/10/2005	W/H TAX DIV UTX	(5,039)	-	* [1]	-	-	681,499,660	-	-
3/10/2005	W/H TAX DIV MSFT	(18,247)	-	* [1]	-	-	681,499,660	-	-
3/14/2005	W/H TAX DIV DD	(7,349)	-	* [1]	-	-	681,499,660	-	-
3/14/2005	W/H TAX DIV MMM	(7,215)	-	* [1]	-	-	681,499,660	-	-
3/16/2005	CHECK WIRE	44,999,980	44,999,980	-	-	-	726,499,640	-	-

Column 1	Column 2	Column 3	Column 4	Column 5	Column 6	Column 7	Column 8	Column 9	Column 10
Date	Transaction Description	Transaction Amount Reported in Customer Statement	Cash Deposits	Cash Withdrawals	Transfers of Principal In	Transfers of Principal Out	Balance of Principal	2-Year Initial Transfers	6-Year Initial Transfers
3/18/2005	W/H TAX DIV AIG	(13,838)	-	* [1]	-	-	726,499,640	-	-
3/24/2005	W/H TAX DIV HD	(9,162)	-	* [1]	-	-	726,499,640	-	-
3/28/2005	W/H TAX DIV BAC	(76,443)	-	* [1]	-	-	726,499,640	-	-
3/30/2005	2004 W/H ADJUSTMENT	(350,886)	-	* [1]	-	-	726,499,640	-	-
3/31/2005	FIDELITY SPARTAN U S TREASURY MONEY MARKET W/H TAX DIV FDLXX	(40)	-	* [1]	-	-	726,499,640	-	-
3/31/2005	W/H TAX DIV PEP	(16,682)	-	* [1]	-	-	726,499,640	-	-
3/31/2005	W/H TAX JAN & FEB 2005	(55,169)	-	* [1]	-	-	726,499,640	-	-
4/1/2005	W/H TAX DIV MRK	(34,816)	-	* [1]	-	-	726,499,640	-	-
4/1/2005	W/H TAX DIV KO	(22,511)	-	* [1]	-	-	726,499,640	-	-
4/1/2005	W/H TAX DIV VIA.B	(2,539)	-	* [1]	-	-	726,499,640	-	-
4/6/2005	CHECK WIRE	350,866	350,866	-	-	-	726,850,506	-	-
4/7/2005	W/H TAX DIV HPQ	(5,031)	-	* [1]	-	-	726,850,506	-	-
4/11/2005	W/H TAX DIV MO	(49,995)	-	* [1]	-	-	726,850,506	-	-
4/13/2005	FIDELITY SPARTAN U S TREASURY MONEY MARKET W/H TAX DIV FDLXX	(6)	-	* [1]	-	-	726,850,506	-	-
4/25/2005	W/H TAX DIV GE	(48,815)	-	* [1]	-	-	726,850,506	-	-
4/29/2005	FIDELITY SPARTAN U S TREASURY MONEY MARKET W/H TAX DIV FDLXX	(8)	-	* [1]	-	-	726,850,506	-	-
4/29/2005	W/H ADJ	(168,558)	-	* [1]	-	-	726,850,506	-	-
4/29/2005	W/H ADJ	(51,354)	-	* [1]	-	-	726,850,506	-	-
5/23/2005	FIDELITY SPARTAN U S TREASURY MONEY MARKET W/H TAX DIV FDLXX	(8)	-	* [1]	-	-	726,850,506	-	-
6/6/2005	W/H TAX DIV WMT	(6,783)	-	* [1]	-	-	726,850,506	-	-
6/10/2005	CHECK WIRE	(3,000,000)	-	-	(3,000,000)	-	723,850,506	-	(3,000,000)
6/10/2005	FIDELITY SPARTAN U S TREASURY MONEY MARKET W/H TAX DIV FDLXX	(19)	-	* [1]	-	-	723,850,506	-	-
6/10/2005	W/H TAX DIV UTX	(3,227)	-	* [1]	-	-	723,850,506	-	-
6/13/2005	W/H TAX DIV MMM	(4,620)	-	* [1]	-	-	723,850,506	-	-
6/17/2005	W/H TAX DIV AIG	(11,261)	-	* [1]	-	-	723,850,506	-	-
6/20/2005	FIDELITY SPARTAN U S TREASURY MONEY MARKET W/H TAX DIV FDLXX	(8)	-	* [1]	-	-	723,850,506	-	-
6/23/2005	W/H TAX DIV HD	(7,544)	-	* [1]	-	-	723,850,506	-	-
6/24/2005	W/H TAX DIV BAC	(62,907)	-	* [1]	-	-	723,850,506	-	-
6/30/2005	W/H TAX DIV PEP	(15,346)	-	* [1]	-	-	723,850,506	-	-
7/1/2005	W/H TAX DIV MRK	(28,331)	-	* [1]	-	-	723,850,506	-	-
7/1/2005	W/H TAX DIV ALL	(7,631)	-	* [1]	-	-	723,850,506	-	-
7/1/2005	W/H TAX DIV VIA.B	(4,132)	-	* [1]	-	-	723,850,506	-	-
7/1/2005	W/H TAX DIV KO	(21,746)	-	* [1]	-	-	723,850,506	-	-
7/6/2005	W/H TAX DIV HPQ	(8,121)	-	* [1]	-	-	723,850,506	-	-
7/8/2005	W/H TAX DIV SLB	(4,567)	-	* [1]	-	-	723,850,506	-	-
7/11/2005	W/H TAX DIV MO	(52,158)	-	* [1]	-	-	723,850,506	-	-
7/25/2005	W/H TAX DIV GE	(80,424)	-	* [1]	-	-	723,850,506	-	-
8/2/2005	CHECK WIRE	4,999,980	4,999,980	-	-	-	728,850,486	-	-
8/16/2005	CHECK WIRE	4,999,980	4,999,980	-	-	-	733,850,466	-	-
9/1/2005	CHECK WIRE	4,999,980	4,999,980	-	-	-	738,850,446	-	-
9/8/2005	FIDELITY SPARTAN U S TREASURY MONEY MARKET W/H TAX DIV FDLXX	(327)	-	* [1]	-	-	738,850,446	-	-
9/12/2005	FIDELITY SPARTAN U S TREASURY MONEY MARKET W/H TAX DIV FDLXX	(3)	-	* [1]	-	-	738,850,446	-	-
9/30/2005	W/H TAX DIV PEP	(10,925)	-	* [1]	-	-	738,850,446	-	-
9/30/2005	W/H TAX DIV S	(1,825)	-	* [1]	-	-	738,850,446	-	-
10/3/2005	W/H TAX DIV KO	(30,684)	-	* [1]	-	-	738,850,446	-	-
10/5/2005	W/H TAX DIV HPQ	(11,122)	-	* [1]	-	-	738,850,446	-	-
10/7/2005	CHECK WIRE	7,999,980	7,999,980	-	-	-	746,850,426	-	-
10/11/2005	W/H TAX DIV MO	(79,118)	-	* [1]	-	-	746,850,426	-	-
10/12/2005	FIDELITY SPARTAN U S TREASURY MONEY MARKET W/H TAX DIV FDLXX	(89)	-	* [1]	-	-	746,850,426	-	-
10/13/2005	FIDELITY SPARTAN U S TREASURY MONEY MARKET W/H TAX DIV FDLXX	(1)	-	* [1]	-	-	746,850,426	-	-
10/14/2005	FIDELITY SPARTAN U S TREASURY MONEY MARKET W/H TAX DIV FDLXX	(0)	-	* [1]	-	-	746,850,426	-	-
10/19/2005	FIDELITY SPARTAN U S TREASURY MONEY MARKET W/H TAX DIV FDLXX	(2)	-	* [1]	-	-	746,850,426	-	-
10/25/2005	W/H TAX DIV GE	(82,283)	-	* [1]	-	-	746,850,426	-	-

Column 1	Column 2	Column 3	Column 4	Column 5	Column 6	Column 7	Column 8	Column 9	Column 10
Date	Transaction Description	Transaction Amount Reported in Customer Statement	Cash Deposits	Cash Withdrawals	Transfers of Principal In	Transfers of Principal Out	Balance of Principal	2-Year Initial Transfers	6-Year Initial Transfers
10/31/2005	W/H TAX DIV MWD	(9,718)	-	* [1]	-	-	746,850,426	-	-
11/15/2005	W/H TAX DIV PG	(49,563)	-	* [1]	-	-	746,850,426	-	-
11/15/2005	W/H TAX DIV ABT	(14,847)	-	* [1]	-	-	746,850,426	-	-
11/17/2005	FIDELITY SPARTAN U S TREASURY MONEY MARKET W/H TAX DIV FDLXX	(25)	-	* [1]	-	-	746,850,426	-	-
11/21/2005	W/H TAX DIV GS	(5,673)	-	* [1]	-	-	746,850,426	-	-
11/21/2005	W/H TAX DIV TXN	(2,545)	-	* [1]	-	-	746,850,426	-	-
11/23/2005	W/H TAX DIV MER	(9,077)	-	* [1]	-	-	746,850,426	-	-
11/23/2005	W/H TAX DIV C	(115,828)	-	* [1]	-	-	746,850,426	-	-
11/30/2005	FIDELITY SPARTAN U S TREASURY MONEY MARKET W/H TAX DIV FDLXX	(5)	-	* [1]	-	-	746,850,426	-	-
12/1/2005	W/H TAX DIV WFC	(44,842)	-	* [1]	-	-	746,850,426	-	-
12/1/2005	W/H TAX DIV INTC	(24,820)	-	* [1]	-	-	746,850,426	-	-
12/2/2005	W/H TAX DIV BA	(10,212)	-	* [1]	-	-	746,850,426	-	-
12/6/2005	W/H TAX DIV PFE	(72,145)	-	* [1]	-	-	746,850,426	-	-
12/8/2005	W/H TAX DIV MSFT	(37,639)	-	* [1]	-	-	746,850,426	-	-
12/9/2005	W/H TAX DIV XOM	(93,777)	-	* [1]	-	-	746,850,426	-	-
12/12/2005	W/H TAX DIV MMM	(17,156)	-	* [1]	-	-	746,850,426	-	-
12/12/2005	W/H TAX DIV UTX	(11,644)	-	* [1]	-	-	746,850,426	-	-
12/12/2005	W/H TAX DIV CVX	(52,479)	-	* [1]	-	-	746,850,426	-	-
12/12/2005	W/H TAX DIV IBM	(16,339)	-	* [1]	-	-	746,850,426	-	-
12/13/2005	W/H TAX DIV JNJ	(50,761)	-	* [1]	-	-	746,850,426	-	-
12/15/2005	W/H TAX DIV TWX	(11,951)	-	* [1]	-	-	746,850,426	-	-
12/15/2005	W/H TAX DIV HD	(10,893)	-	* [1]	-	-	746,850,426	-	-
12/15/2005	W/H TAX DIV KO	(29,367)	-	* [1]	-	-	746,850,426	-	-
12/16/2005	W/H TAX DIV AIG	(19,743)	-	* [1]	-	-	746,850,426	-	-
12/16/2005	FIDELITY SPARTAN U S TREASURY MONEY MARKET W/H TAX DIV FDLXX	(3)	-	* [1]	-	-	746,850,426	-	-
12/20/2005	CHECK WIRE	14,999,980	14,999,980	-	-	-	761,850,406	-	-
12/22/2005	FIDELITY SPARTAN U S TREASURY MONEY MARKET W/H TAX DIV FDLXX	(15)	-	* [1]	-	-	761,850,406	-	-
12/23/2005	W/H TAX DIV BAC	(102,121)	-	* [1]	-	-	761,850,406	-	-
12/30/2005	FIDELITY SPARTAN U S TREASURY MONEY MARKET W/H TAX DIV FDLXX	(6)	-	* [1]	-	-	761,850,406	-	-
12/30/2005	W/H TAX DIV S	(3,744)	-	* [1]	-	-	761,850,406	-	-
1/3/2006	W/H TAX DIV PEP	(22,421)	-	* [1]	-	-	761,850,406	-	-
1/3/2006	W/H TAX DIV VIA.B	(5,719)	-	* [1]	-	-	761,850,406	-	-
1/3/2006	W/H TAX DIV MRK	(43,118)	-	* [1]	-	-	761,850,406	-	-
1/3/2006	W/H TAX DIV WMT	(12,581)	-	* [1]	-	-	761,850,406	-	-
1/4/2006	W/H TAX DIV HPQ	(11,748)	-	* [1]	-	-	761,850,406	-	-
1/6/2006	W/H TAX DIV DIS	(28,185)	-	* [1]	-	-	761,850,406	-	-
1/13/2006	FIDELITY SPARTAN U S TREASURY MONEY MARKET W/H TAX DIV FDLXX	(17)	-	* [1]	-	-	761,850,406	-	-
1/17/2006	CHECK WIRE	4,999,980	4,999,980	-	-	-	766,850,386	-	-
1/31/2006	CHECK WIRE	4,999,980	4,999,980	-	-	-	771,850,366	-	-
1/31/2006	W/H TAX DIV MS	(14,727)	-	* [1]	-	-	771,850,366	-	-
1/31/2006	FIDELITY SPARTAN U S TREASURY MONEY MARKET W/H TAX DIV FDLXX	(26)	-	* [1]	-	-	771,850,366	-	-
2/1/2006	W/H TAX DIV T	(15,313)	-	* [1]	-	-	771,850,366	-	-
2/1/2006	W/H TAX DIV VZ	(13,322)	-	* [1]	-	-	771,850,366	-	-
2/13/2006	W/H TAX DIV TXN	(2,405)	-	* [1]	-	-	771,850,366	-	-
2/15/2006	CHECK WIRE	4,999,980	4,999,980	-	-	-	776,850,346	-	-
2/15/2006	W/H TAX DIV ABT	(21,249)	-	* [1]	-	-	776,850,346	-	-
2/15/2006	W/H TAX DIV PG	(47,089)	-	* [1]	-	-	776,850,346	-	-
2/23/2006	W/H TAX DIV GS	(5,682)	-	* [1]	-	-	776,850,346	-	-
2/24/2006	CHECK WIRE	4,999,980	4,999,980	-	-	-	781,850,326	-	-
2/24/2006	W/H TAX DIV C	(123,376)	-	* [1]	-	-	781,850,326	-	-
2/28/2006	FIDELITY SPARTAN U S TREASURY MONEY MARKET W/H TAX DIV FDLXX	(27)	-	* [1]	-	-	781,850,326	-	-
2/28/2006	W/H TAX DIV MER	(11,363)	-	* [1]	-	-	781,850,326	-	-

Column 1	Column 2	Column 3	Column 4	Column 5	Column 6	Column 7	Column 8	Column 9	Column 10
Date	Transaction Description	Transaction Amount Reported in Customer Statement	Cash Deposits	Cash Withdrawals	Transfers of Principal In	Transfers of Principal Out	Balance of Principal	2-Year Initial Transfers	6-Year Initial Transfers
3/1/2006	W/H TAX DIV INTC	(29,904)	-	*	-	-	781,850,326	-	-
3/1/2006	W/H TAX DIV WFC	(42,544)	-	*	-	-	781,850,326	-	-
3/3/2006	CHECK WIRE	15,999,980	15,999,980	-	-	-	797,850,306	-	-
3/3/2006	W/H TAX DIV BA	(12,272)	-	*	-	-	797,850,306	-	-
3/7/2006	W/H TAX DIV PFE	(88,132)	-	*	-	-	797,850,306	-	-
3/7/2006	W/H TAX DIV UPS	(20,727)	-	*	-	-	797,850,306	-	-
3/9/2006	W/H TAX DIV MSFT	(41,218)	-	*	-	-	797,850,306	-	-
3/10/2006	W/H TAX DIV UTX	(11,000)	-	*	-	-	797,850,306	-	-
3/10/2006	W/H TAX DIV IBM	(15,633)	-	*	-	-	797,850,306	-	-
3/10/2006	W/H TAX DIV CVX	(50,391)	-	*	-	-	797,850,306	-	-
3/10/2006	W/H TAX DIV XOM	(98,663)	-	*	-	-	797,850,306	-	-
3/10/2006	FIDELITY SPARTAN U S TREASURY MONEY MARKET W/H TAX DIV FDLXX	(12)	-	*	-	-	797,850,306	-	-
3/10/2006	W/H TAX DIV TGT	(4,545)	-	*	-	-	797,850,306	-	-
3/13/2006	W/H TAX DIV MMM	(16,727)	-	*	-	-	797,850,306	-	-
3/14/2006	W/H TAX DIV JNJ	(49,498)	-	*	-	-	797,850,306	-	-
3/15/2006	CHECK WIRE	4,999,980	4,999,980	-	-	-	802,850,286	-	-
3/15/2006	W/H TAX DIV TWX	(11,635)	-	*	-	-	802,850,286	-	-
3/16/2006	FIDELITY SPARTAN U S TREASURY MONEY MARKET W/H TAX DIV FDLXX	(1)	-	*	-	-	802,850,286	-	-
3/17/2006	W/H TAX DIV AIG	(19,224)	-	*	-	-	802,850,286	-	-
3/22/2006	CHECK WIRE	14,999,980	14,999,980	-	-	-	817,850,266	-	-
3/23/2006	W/H TAX DIV HD	(15,681)	-	*	-	-	817,850,266	-	-
3/24/2006	W/H TAX DIV BAC	(115,905)	-	*	-	-	817,850,266	-	-
3/30/2006	FIDELITY SPARTAN U S TREASURY MONEY MARKET W/H TAX DIV FDLXX	(24)	-	*	-	-	817,850,266	-	-
3/31/2006	FIDELITY SPARTAN U S TREASURY MONEY MARKET W/H TAX DIV FDLXX	(2)	-	*	-	-	817,850,266	-	-
3/31/2006	W/H TAX DIV S	(3,939)	-	*	-	-	817,850,266	-	-
3/31/2006	W/H TAX DIV PEP	(22,629)	-	*	-	-	817,850,266	-	-
4/3/2006	W/H TAX DIV MRK	(44,046)	-	*	-	-	817,850,266	-	-
4/3/2006	W/H TAX DIV KO	(33,887)	-	*	-	-	817,850,266	-	-
4/3/2006	W/H TAX DIV WMT	(22,477)	-	*	-	-	817,850,266	-	-
4/5/2006	FIDELITY SPARTAN U S TREASURY MONEY MARKET W/H TAX DIV FDLXX	(3)	-	*	-	-	817,850,266	-	-
4/5/2006	W/H TAX DIV HPQ	(12,139)	-	*	-	-	817,850,266	-	-
4/7/2006	CHECK WIRE	9,999,980	9,999,980	-	-	-	827,850,246	-	-
4/7/2006	W/H TAX DIV SLB	(7,041)	-	(7,041)	-	-	827,843,205	-	-
4/7/2006	FIDELITY SPARTAN U S TREASURY MONEY MARKET W/H TAX DIV FDLXX	(1)	-	*	-	-	827,843,205	-	-
4/10/2006	W/H TAX DIV MO	(88,878)	-	*	-	-	827,843,205	-	-
4/21/2006	CHECK WIRE	14,999,980	14,999,980	-	-	-	842,843,185	-	-
4/21/2006	FIDELITY SPARTAN U S TREASURY MONEY MARKET W/H TAX DIV FDLXX	(5)	-	*	-	-	842,843,185	-	-
4/25/2006	W/H TAX DIV GE	(131,624)	-	*	-	-	842,843,185	-	-
4/28/2006	CXL W/H TAX DIV SLB	7,041	-	7,041	-	-	842,850,226	-	-
4/28/2006	W/H TAX DIV MS	(15,726)	-	*	-	-	842,850,226	-	-
4/28/2006	FIDELITY SPARTAN U S TREASURY MONEY MARKET W/H TAX DIV FDLXX	(8)	-	*	-	-	842,850,226	-	-
4/28/2006	W/H TAX DIV MDT	(6,199)	-	*	-	-	842,850,226	-	-
5/1/2006	W/H TAX DIV T	(69,396)	-	*	-	-	842,850,226	-	-
5/1/2006	W/H TAX DIV VZ	(64,200)	-	*	-	-	842,850,226	-	-
5/1/2006	W/H TAX DIV JPM	(47,052)	-	*	-	-	842,850,226	-	-
5/4/2006	CHECK WIRE	14,999,980	14,999,980	-	-	-	857,850,206	-	-
5/5/2006	FIDELITY SPARTAN U S TREASURY MONEY MARKET W/H TAX DIV FDLXX	(5)	-	*	-	-	857,850,206	-	-
5/10/2006	W/H TAX DIV AXP	(8,154)	-	*	-	-	857,850,206	-	-
5/10/2006	FIDELITY SPARTAN U S TREASURY MONEY MARKET W/H TAX DIV FDLXX	(2)	-	*	-	-	857,850,206	-	-
5/15/2006	W/H TAX DIV PG	(55,672)	-	*	-	-	857,850,206	-	-
5/15/2006	W/H TAX DIV ABT	(24,341)	-	*	-	-	857,850,206	-	-
5/19/2006	CHECK WIRE	49,999,980	49,999,980	-	-	-	907,850,186	-	-
5/22/2006	W/H TAX DIV TXN	(2,621)	-	*	-	-	907,850,186	-	-

Column 1	Column 2	Column 3	Column 4	Column 5	Column 6	Column 7	Column 8	Column 9	Column 10
Date	Transaction Description	Transaction Amount Reported in Customer Statement	Cash Deposits	Cash Withdrawals	Transfers of Principal In	Transfers of Principal Out	Balance of Principal	2-Year Initial Transfers	6-Year Initial Transfers
5/22/2006	W/H TAX DIV CAT	(9,294)	-	* [1]	-	-	907,850,186	-	-
5/24/2006	W/H TAX DIV MER	(12,614)	-	* [1]	-	-	907,850,186	-	-
5/25/2006	W/H TAX DIV GS	(8,494)	-	* [1]	-	-	907,850,186	-	-
5/26/2006	W/H TAX DIV C	(133,186)	-	* [1]	-	-	907,850,186	-	-
5/31/2006	FIDELITY SPARTAN U S TREASURY MONEY MARKET W/H TAX DIV FDLXX	(30)	-	* [1]	-	-	907,850,186	-	-
5/31/2006	W/H TAX DIV UPS	(23,007)	-	* [1]	-	-	907,850,186	-	-
6/1/2006	W/H TAX DIV INTC	(32,795)	-	* [1]	-	-	907,850,186	-	-
6/1/2006	W/H TAX DIV WFC	(49,849)	-	* [1]	-	-	907,850,186	-	-
6/2/2006	W/H TAX DIV BA	(13,623)	-	* [1]	-	-	907,850,186	-	-
6/5/2006	W/H TAX DIV WMT	(23,663)	-	* [1]	-	-	907,850,186	-	-
6/6/2006	W/H TAX DIV BMY	(29,899)	-	* [1]	-	-	907,850,186	-	-
6/6/2006	W/H TAX DIV PFE	(99,293)	-	* [1]	-	-	907,850,186	-	-
6/8/2006	W/H TAX DIV MSFT	(44,955)	-	* [1]	-	-	907,850,186	-	-
6/9/2006	W/H TAX DIV XOM	(110,206)	-	* [1]	-	-	907,850,186	-	-
6/12/2006	W/H TAX DIV IBM	(26,358)	-	* [1]	-	-	907,850,186	-	-
6/12/2006	W/H TAX DIV MMM	(18,567)	-	* [1]	-	-	907,850,186	-	-
6/12/2006	W/H TAX DIV UTX	(14,707)	-	* [1]	-	-	907,850,186	-	-
6/13/2006	W/H TAX DIV JNJ	(62,437)	-	* [1]	-	-	907,850,186	-	-
6/15/2006	FIDELITY SPARTAN U S TREASURY MONEY MARKET W/H TAX DIV FDLXX	(24)	-	* [1]	-	-	907,850,186	-	-
6/15/2006	W/H TAX DIV TWX	(12,623)	-	* [1]	-	-	907,850,186	-	-
6/22/2006	W/H TAX DIV HD	(18,163)	-	* [1]	-	-	907,850,186	-	-
6/23/2006	W/H TAX DIV BAC	(131,180)	-	* [1]	-	-	907,850,186	-	-
6/30/2006	W/H TAX DIV S	(4,162)	-	* [1]	-	-	907,850,186	-	-
6/30/2006	W/H TAX DIV PEP	(27,303)	-	* [1]	-	-	907,850,186	-	-
6/30/2006	FIDELITY SPARTAN U S TREASURY MONEY MARKET W/H TAX DIV FDLXX	(93)	-	* [1]	-	-	907,850,186	-	-
7/3/2006	W/H TAX DIV AIG	(21,947)	-	* [1]	-	-	907,850,186	-	-
7/3/2006	W/H TAX DIV MRK	(46,014)	-	* [1]	-	-	907,850,186	-	-
7/3/2006	W/H TAX DIV CVX	(65,590)	-	* [1]	-	-	907,850,186	-	-
7/3/2006	W/H TAX DIV KO	(24,822)	-	* [1]	-	-	907,850,186	-	-
7/5/2006	W/H TAX DIV HPQ	(12,812)	-	* [1]	-	-	907,850,186	-	-
7/7/2006	W/H TAX DIV SLB	(8,805)	-	(8,805)	-	-	907,841,381	-	-
7/10/2006	CHECK WIRE	19,999,980	19,999,980	-	-	-	927,841,361	-	-
7/10/2006	W/H TAX DIV MO	(64,056)	-	* [1]	-	-	927,841,361	-	-
7/14/2006	FIDELITY SPARTAN U S TREASURY MONEY MARKET W/H TAX DIV FDLXX	(9)	-	* [1]	-	-	927,841,361	-	-
7/21/2006	FIDELITY SPARTAN U S TREASURY MONEY MARKET W/H TAX DIV FDLXX	(4)	-	* [1]	-	-	927,841,361	-	-
7/31/2006	W/H TAX DIV MS	(7,368)	-	* [1]	-	-	927,841,361	-	-
7/31/2006	FIDELITY SPARTAN U S TREASURY MONEY MARKET W/H TAX DIV FDLXX	(24)	-	* [1]	-	-	927,841,361	-	-
8/7/2006	CHECK WIRE	24,999,980	24,999,980	-	-	-	952,841,341	-	-
8/7/2006	CXL W/H TAX DIV SLB	8,805	-	8,805	-	-	952,850,146	-	-
8/15/2006	W/H TAX DIV PG	(46,154)	-	* [1]	-	-	952,850,146	-	-
8/15/2006	W/H TAX DIV ABT	(11,404)	-	* [1]	-	-	952,850,146	-	-
8/17/2006	FIDELITY SPARTAN U S TREASURY MONEY MARKET W/H TAX DIV FDLXX	(8)	-	* [1]	-	-	952,850,146	-	-
8/21/2006	W/H TAX DIV TXN	(2,105)	-	* [1]	-	-	952,850,146	-	-
8/21/2006	W/H TAX DIV CAT	(4,775)	-	* [1]	-	-	952,850,146	-	-
8/22/2006	CHECK WIRE	19,999,980	19,999,980	-	-	-	972,850,126	-	-
8/23/2006	W/H TAX DIV MER	(10,060)	-	* [1]	-	-	972,850,126	-	-
8/24/2006	W/H TAX DIV GS	(7,042)	-	* [1]	-	-	972,850,126	-	-
8/25/2006	W/H TAX DIV C	(109,558)	-	* [1]	-	-	972,850,126	-	-
9/1/2006	W/H TAX DIV BA	(10,865)	-	* [1]	-	-	972,850,126	-	-
9/1/2006	W/H TAX DIV WFC	(42,814)	-	* [1]	-	-	972,850,126	-	-
9/1/2006	FIDELITY SPARTAN U S TREASURY MONEY MARKET W/H TAX DIV FDLXX	(12)	-	* [1]	-	-	972,850,126	-	-
9/1/2006	W/H TAX DIV INTC	(26,330)	-	* [1]	-	-	972,850,126	-	-

Column 1	Column 2	Column 3	Column 4	Column 5	Column 6	Column 7	Column 8	Column 9	Column 10
Date	Transaction Description	Transaction Amount Reported in Customer Statement	Cash Deposits	Cash Withdrawals	Transfers of Principal In	Transfers of Principal Out	Balance of Principal	2-Year Initial Transfers	6-Year Initial Transfers
9/5/2006	W/H TAX DIV WMT	(18,872)	-	* [1]	-	-	972,850,126	-	-
9/5/2006	W/H TAX DIV PFE	(79,316)	-	* [1]	-	-	972,850,126	-	-
9/6/2006	W/H TAX DIV UPS	(18,349)	-	* [1]	-	-	972,850,126	-	-
9/7/2006	CHECK WIRE	19,999,980	19,999,980	-	-	-	992,850,106	-	-
9/11/2006	W/H TAX DIV XOM	(86,832)	-	* [1]	-	-	992,850,106	-	-
9/11/2006	W/H TAX DIV IBM	(20,522)	-	* [1]	-	-	992,850,106	-	-
9/11/2006	W/H TAX DIV CVX	(52,311)	-	* [1]	-	-	992,850,106	-	-
9/11/2006	W/H TAX DIV UTX	(11,730)	-	* [1]	-	-	992,850,106	-	-
9/12/2006	W/H TAX DIV JNJ	(49,796)	-	* [1]	-	-	992,850,106	-	-
9/12/2006	W/H TAX DIV MMM	(14,808)	-	* [1]	-	-	992,850,106	-	-
9/14/2006	W/H TAX DIV MSFT	(35,695)	-	* [1]	-	-	992,850,106	-	-
9/15/2006	W/H TAX DIV AIG	(19,254)	-	* [1]	-	-	992,850,106	-	-
9/15/2006	W/H TAX DIV TWX	(10,748)	-	* [1]	-	-	992,850,106	-	-
9/15/2006	FIDELITY SPARTAN U S TREASURY MONEY MARKET W/H TAX DIV FDLXX	(4)	-	* [1]	-	-	992,850,106	-	-
9/21/2006	W/H TAX DIV HD	(13,882)	-	* [1]	-	-	992,850,106	-	-
9/22/2006	W/H TAX DIV BAC	(114,923)	-	* [1]	-	-	992,850,106	-	-
9/27/2006	FIDELITY SPARTAN U S TREASURY MONEY MARKET W/H TAX DIV FDLXX	(14)	-	* [1]	-	-	992,850,106	-	-
9/29/2006	W/H TAX DIV PEP	(22,254)	-	* [1]	-	-	992,850,106	-	-
9/29/2006	W/H TAX DIV S	(3,377)	-	* [1]	-	-	992,850,106	-	-
10/2/2006	W/H TAX DIV KO	(28,690)	-	* [1]	-	-	992,850,106	-	-
10/2/2006	W/H TAX DIV MRK	(36,698)	-	* [1]	-	-	992,850,106	-	-
10/4/2006	CHECK WIRE	19,999,980	19,999,980	-	-	-	1,012,850,086	-	-
10/4/2006	W/H TAX DIV HPQ	(9,979)	-	* [1]	-	-	1,012,850,086	-	-
10/10/2006	W/H TAX DIV MO	(81,098)	-	* [1]	-	-	1,012,850,086	-	-
10/17/2006	FIDELITY SPARTAN U S TREASURY MONEY MARKET W/H TAX DIV FDLXX	(25)	-	* [1]	-	-	1,012,850,086	-	-
10/25/2006	W/H TAX DIV GE	(117,262)	-	* [1]	-	-	1,012,850,086	-	-
10/26/2006	FIDELITY SPARTAN U S TREASURY MONEY MARKET W/H TAX DIV FDLXX	(5)	-	* [1]	-	-	1,012,850,086	-	-
10/27/2006	FIDELITY SPARTAN U S TREASURY MONEY MARKET W/H TAX DIV FDLXX	(0)	-	* [1]	-	-	1,012,850,086	-	-
10/30/2006	FIDELITY SPARTAN U S TREASURY MONEY MARKET W/H TAX DIV FDLXX	(3)	-	* [1]	-	-	1,012,850,086	-	-
10/31/2006	FIDELITY SPARTAN U S TREASURY MONEY MARKET W/H TAX DIV FDLXX	(0)	-	* [1]	-	-	1,012,850,086	-	-
11/2/2006	CHECK WIRE	19,999,980	19,999,980	-	-	-	1,032,850,066	-	-
11/8/2006	CHECK WIRE	19,999,980	19,999,980	-	-	-	1,052,850,046	-	-
11/20/2006	FIDELITY SPARTAN U S TREASURY MONEY MARKET W/H TAX DIV FDLXX	(11)	-	* [1]	-	-	1,052,850,046	-	-
11/20/2006	W/H TAX DIV TXN	(3,913)	-	* [1]	-	-	1,052,850,046	-	-
11/22/2006	W/H TAX DIV C	(149,447)	-	* [1]	-	-	1,052,850,046	-	-
11/22/2006	W/H TAX DIV MER	(14,387)	-	* [1]	-	-	1,052,850,046	-	-
11/27/2006	FIDELITY SPARTAN U S TREASURY MONEY MARKET W/H TAX DIV FDLXX	(7)	-	* [1]	-	-	1,052,850,046	-	-
11/30/2006	FIDELITY SPARTAN U S TREASURY MONEY MARKET W/H TAX DIV FDLXX	(1)	-	* [1]	-	-	1,052,850,046	-	-
12/4/2006	CHECK WIRE	19,999,980	19,999,980	-	-	-	1,072,850,026	-	-
12/20/2006	CHECK WIRE	19,999,980	19,999,980	-	-	-	1,092,850,006	-	-
12/28/2006	CHECK WIRE	19,999,980	19,999,980	-	-	-	1,112,849,986	-	-
1/2/2007	W/H TAX DIV MRK	(53,225)	-	* [1]	-	-	1,112,849,986	-	-
1/2/2007	W/H TAX DIV WMT	(26,844)	-	* [1]	-	-	1,112,849,986	-	-
1/2/2007	W/H TAX DIV PEP	(32,468)	-	* [1]	-	-	1,112,849,986	-	-
1/3/2007	W/H TAX DIV UTX	(16,775)	-	* [1]	-	-	1,112,849,986	-	-
1/3/2007	W/H TAX DIV JNJ	(69,055)	-	* [1]	-	-	1,112,849,986	-	-
1/3/2007	W/H TAX DIV HPQ	(14,257)	-	* [1]	-	-	1,112,849,986	-	-
1/3/2007	W/H TAX DIV MMM	(21,177)	-	* [1]	-	-	1,112,849,986	-	-
1/3/2007	W/H TAX DIV TGT	(6,215)	-	* [1]	-	-	1,112,849,986	-	-
1/3/2007	W/H TAX DIV CVX	(71,817)	-	* [1]	-	-	1,112,849,986	-	-
1/3/2007	W/H TAX DIV MSFT	(53,696)	-	* [1]	-	-	1,112,849,986	-	-
1/3/2007	FIDELITY SPARTAN U S TREASURY MONEY MARKET W/H TAX DIV FDLXX	(1)	-	* [1]	-	-	1,112,849,986	-	-
1/3/2007	W/H TAX DIV PFE	(109,605)	-	* [1]	-	-	1,112,849,986	-	-

Column 1	Column 2	Column 3	Column 4	Column 5	Column 6	Column 7	Column 8	Column 9	Column 10
Date	Transaction Description	Transaction Amount Reported in Customer Statement	Cash Deposits	Cash Withdrawals	Transfers of Principal In	Transfers of Principal Out	Balance of Principal	2-Year Initial Transfers	6-Year Initial Transfers
4/4/2007	W/H TAX DIV HPQ	(14,715)	-	* [1]	-	-	1,152,849,946	-	-
4/10/2007	W/H TAX DIV MO	(120,002)	-	* [1]	-	-	1,152,849,946	-	-
4/19/2007	FIDELITY SPARTAN U S TREASURY MONEY MARKET W/H TAX DIV FDLXX	(30)	-	* [1]	-	-	1,152,849,946	-	-
4/20/2007	FIDELITY SPARTAN U S TREASURY MONEY MARKET W/H TAX DIV FDLXX	(1)	-	* [1]	-	-	1,152,849,946	-	-
4/25/2007	W/H TAX DIV GE	(160,752)	-	* [1]	-	-	1,152,849,946	-	-
5/4/2007	W/H TAX DIV CVS	(4,346)	-	* [1]	-	-	1,152,849,946	-	-
5/15/2007	W/H TAX DIV PG	(77,001)	-	* [1]	-	-	1,152,849,946	-	-
5/21/2007	FIDELITY SPARTAN U S TREASURY MONEY MARKET W/H TAX DIV FDLXX	(20)	-	* [1]	-	-	1,152,849,946	-	-
5/23/2007	W/H TAX DIV MER	(20,383)	-	* [1]	-	-	1,152,849,946	-	-
5/24/2007	W/H TAX DIV GS	(5,965)	-	* [1]	-	-	1,152,849,946	-	-
5/25/2007	W/H TAX DIV C	(181,697)	-	* [1]	-	-	1,152,849,946	-	-
5/31/2007	FIDELITY SPARTAN U S TREASURY MONEY MARKET W/H TAX DIV FDLXX	(4)	-	* [1]	-	-	1,152,849,946	-	-
6/1/2007	W/H TAX DIV WFC	(65,225)	-	* [1]	-	-	1,152,849,946	-	-
6/1/2007	W/H TAX DIV COP	(46,848)	-	* [1]	-	-	1,152,849,946	-	-
6/1/2007	W/H TAX DIV INTC	(45,133)	-	* [1]	-	-	1,152,849,946	-	-
6/1/2007	W/H TAX DIV BA	(18,815)	-	* [1]	-	-	1,152,849,946	-	-
6/4/2007	W/H TAX DIV WMT	(37,012)	-	* [1]	-	-	1,152,849,946	-	-
6/5/2007	W/H TAX DIV PFE	(142,614)	-	* [1]	-	-	1,152,849,946	-	-
6/5/2007	W/H TAX DIV UPS	(29,895)	-	* [1]	-	-	1,152,849,946	-	-
6/6/2007	W/H TAX DIV TYC	(13,788)	-	(13,788)	-	-	1,152,836,159	-	-
6/11/2007	W/H TAX DIV XOM	(137,376)	-	* [1]	-	-	1,152,836,159	-	-
6/11/2007	W/H TAX DIV UTX	(18,862)	-	* [1]	-	-	1,152,836,159	-	-
6/11/2007	W/H TAX DIV IBM	(41,412)	-	* [1]	-	-	1,152,836,159	-	-
6/11/2007	W/H TAX DIV CVX	(86,319)	-	* [1]	-	-	1,152,836,159	-	-
6/12/2007	W/H TAX DIV JNJ	(82,419)	-	* [1]	-	-	1,152,836,159	-	-
6/12/2007	W/H TAX DIV MMM	(24,847)	-	* [1]	-	-	1,152,836,159	-	-
6/14/2007	W/H TAX DIV MSFT	(59,957)	-	* [1]	-	-	1,152,836,159	-	-
6/15/2007	FIDELITY SPARTAN U S TREASURY MONEY MARKET W/H TAX DIV FDLXX	(9)	-	* [1]	-	-	1,152,836,159	-	-
6/15/2007	W/H TAX DIV TWX	(14,701)	-	* [1]	-	-	1,152,836,159	-	-
6/15/2007	W/H TAX DIV WB	(72,472)	-	* [1]	-	-	1,152,836,159	-	-
6/15/2007	W/H TAX DIV AIG	(29,895)	-	* [1]	-	-	1,152,836,159	-	-
6/21/2007	W/H TAX DIV HD	(32,030)	-	* [1]	-	-	1,152,836,159	-	-
6/22/2007	W/H TAX DIV BAC	(173,932)	-	* [1]	-	-	1,152,836,159	-	-
6/29/2007	FIDELITY SPARTAN U S TREASURY MONEY MARKET W/H TAX DIV FDLXX	(19)	-	* [1]	-	-	1,152,836,159	-	-
6/29/2007	W/H TAX DIV PEP	(42,848)	-	* [1]	-	-	1,152,836,159	-	-
6/29/2007	W/H TAX DIV S	(5,015)	-	* [1]	-	-	1,152,836,159	-	-
7/2/2007	W/H TAX DIV MRK	(56,554)	-	* [1]	-	-	1,152,836,159	-	-
7/2/2007	W/H TAX DIV KO	(46,972)	-	* [1]	-	-	1,152,836,159	-	-
7/5/2007	W/H TAX DIV HPQ	(15,012)	-	* [1]	-	-	1,152,836,159	-	-
7/10/2007	W/H TAX DIV MO	(99,600)	-	* [1]	-	-	1,152,836,159	-	-
7/17/2007	CXL W/H TAX DIV TYC	13,788	-	13,788	-	-	1,152,849,946	-	-
7/17/2007	FIDELITY SPARTAN U S TREASURY MONEY MARKET W/H TAX DIV FDLXX	(19)	-	* [1]	-	-	1,152,849,946	-	-
8/2/2007	CHECK WIRE	(15,000,000)	-	(15,000,000)	-	-	1,137,849,946	(15,000,000)	(15,000,000)
8/2/2007	FIDELITY SPARTAN U S TREASURY MONEY MARKET W/H TAX DIV FDLXX	(11)	-	* [1]	-	-	1,137,849,946	-	-
8/6/2007	FIDELITY SPARTAN U S TREASURY MONEY MARKET W/H TAX DIV FDLXX	(1)	-	* [1]	-	-	1,137,849,946	-	-
8/24/2007	W/H TAX DIV C	(74,423)	-	* [1]	-	-	1,137,849,946	-	-
9/4/2007	W/H TAX DIV WMT	(14,874)	-	* [1]	-	-	1,137,849,946	-	-
9/4/2007	W/H TAX DIV WFC	(29,020)	-	* [1]	-	-	1,137,849,946	-	-
9/4/2007	W/H TAX DIV INTC	(18,430)	-	* [1]	-	-	1,137,849,946	-	-
9/5/2007	W/H TAX DIV PFE	(57,313)	-	* [1]	-	-	1,137,849,946	-	-
9/6/2007	CHECK WIRE	(43,000,000)	-	(43,000,000)	-	-	1,094,849,946	(43,000,000)	(43,000,000)
9/6/2007	FIDELITY SPARTAN U S TREASURY MONEY MARKET W/H TAX DIV FDLXX	(25)	-	* [1]	-	-	1,094,849,946	-	-

Column 1	Column 2	Column 3	Column 4	Column 5	Column 6	Column 7	Column 8	Column 9	Column 10
Date	Transaction Description	Transaction Amount Reported in Customer Statement	Cash Deposits	Cash Withdrawals	Transfers of Principal In	Transfers of Principal Out	Balance of Principal	2-Year Initial Transfers	6-Year Initial Transfers
9/7/2007	W/H TAX DIV BA	(7,281)	-	* [1]	-	-	1,094,849,946	-	-
9/10/2007	W/H TAX DIV CVX	(34,689)	-	* [1]	-	-	1,094,849,946	-	-
9/10/2007	W/H TAX DIV IBM	(15,602)	-	* [1]	-	-	1,094,849,946	-	-
9/10/2007	W/H TAX DIV UTX	(9,153)	-	* [1]	-	-	1,094,849,946	-	-
9/10/2007	W/H TAX DIV XOM	(55,519)	-	* [1]	-	-	1,094,849,946	-	-
9/13/2007	W/H TAX DIV MSFT	(23,664)	-	* [1]	-	-	1,094,849,946	-	-
9/14/2007	FIDELITY SPARTAN U S TREASURY MONEY MARKET W/H TAX DIV FDLXX	(5)	-	* [1]	-	-	1,094,849,946	-	-
9/18/2007	FIDELITY SPARTAN U S TREASURY MONEY MARKET W/H TAX DIV FDLXX	(3)	-	* [1]	-	-	1,094,849,946	-	-
9/26/2007	FIDELITY SPARTAN U S TREASURY MONEY MARKET W/H TAX DIV FDLXX	(10)	-	* [1]	-	-	1,094,849,946	-	-
9/28/2007	CHECK WIRE	(12,366,000)	-	(12,366,000)	-	-	1,082,483,946	(12,366,000)	(12,366,000)
9/28/2007	FIDELITY SPARTAN U S TREASURY MONEY MARKET W/H TAX DIV FDLXX	(1)	-	* [1]	-	-	1,082,483,946	-	-
10/1/2007	W/H TAX DIV KO	(17,157)	-	* [1]	-	-	1,082,483,946	-	-
10/10/2007	W/H TAX DIV MO	(39,650)	-	* [1]	-	-	1,082,483,946	-	-
10/25/2007	W/H TAX DIV GE	(104,711)	-	* [1]	-	-	1,082,483,946	-	-
10/31/2007	FIDELITY SPARTAN U S TREASURY MONEY MARKET W/H TAX DIV FDLXX	(28)	-	* [1]	-	-	1,082,483,946	-	-
11/7/2007	CHECK WIRE	19,999,980	19,999,980	-	-	-	1,102,483,926	-	-
11/7/2007	FIDELITY SPARTAN U S TREASURY MONEY MARKET W/H TAX DIV FDLXX	(16)	-	* [1]	-	-	1,102,483,926	-	-
11/13/2007	FIDELITY SPARTAN U S TREASURY MONEY MARKET W/H TAX DIV FDLXX	(21)	-	* [1]	-	-	1,102,483,926	-	-
11/15/2007	FIDELITY SPARTAN U S TREASURY MONEY MARKET W/H TAX DIV FDLXX	(7)	-	* [1]	-	-	1,102,483,926	-	-
11/21/2007	W/H TAX DIV MER	(5,555)	-	* [1]	-	-	1,102,483,926	-	-
11/21/2007	FIDELITY SPARTAN U S TREASURY MONEY MARKET W/H TAX DIV FDLXX	(2)	-	* [1]	-	-	1,102,483,926	-	-
11/21/2007	W/H TAX DIV C	(47,134)	-	* [1]	-	-	1,102,483,926	-	-
11/30/2007	FIDELITY SPARTAN U S TREASURY MONEY MARKET W/H TAX DIV FDLXX	(14)	-	* [1]	-	-	1,102,483,926	-	-
12/3/2007	W/H TAX DIV COP	(11,712)	-	* [1]	-	-	1,102,483,926	-	-
12/3/2007	W/H TAX DIV MCD	(46,595)	-	* [1]	-	-	1,102,483,926	-	-
12/10/2007	W/H TAX DIV UTX	(8,411)	-	* [1]	-	-	1,102,483,926	-	-
12/10/2007	W/H TAX DIV CVX	(31,876)	-	* [1]	-	-	1,102,483,926	-	-
12/10/2007	W/H TAX DIV EXC	(7,360)	-	* [1]	-	-	1,102,483,926	-	-
12/11/2007	FIDELITY SPARTAN U S TREASURY MONEY MARKET W/H TAX DIV FDLXX	(26)	-	* [1]	-	-	1,102,483,926	-	-
12/11/2007	W/H TAX DIV JNJ	(60,278)	-	* [1]	-	-	1,102,483,926	-	-
12/12/2007	W/H TAX DIV MMM	(17,992)	-	* [1]	-	-	1,102,483,926	-	-
12/13/2007	W/H TAX DIV MSFT	(23,130)	-	* [1]	-	-	1,102,483,926	-	-
12/20/2007	FIDELITY SPARTAN U S TREASURY MONEY MARKET W/H TAX DIV FDLXX	(1)	-	* [1]	-	-	1,102,483,926	-	-
12/31/2007	FIDELITY SPARTAN U S TREASURY MONEY MARKET W/H TAX DIV FDLXX	(13)	-	* [1]	-	-	1,102,483,926	-	-
1/2/2008	W/H TAX DIV HPQ	(3,486)	-	* [1]	-	-	1,102,483,926	-	-
1/2/2008	W/H TAX DIV WMT	(8,903)	-	* [1]	-	-	1,102,483,926	-	-
1/3/2008	W/H TAX DIV UPS	(11,039)	-	* [1]	-	-	1,102,483,926	-	-
1/28/2008	FIDELITY SPARTAN U S TREASURY MONEY MARKET W/H TAX DIV FDLXX	(2)	-	* [1]	-	-	1,102,483,926	-	-
2/7/2008	CHECK WIRE	49,999,980	49,999,980	-	-	-	1,152,483,906	-	-
2/20/2008	FIDELITY SPARTAN U S TREASURY MONEY MARKET W/H TAX DIV FDLXX	(13)	-	* [1]	-	-	1,152,483,906	-	-
2/22/2008	W/H TAX DIV C	(52,571)	-	* [1]	-	-	1,152,483,906	-	-
2/28/2008	W/H TAX DIV GS	(4,259)	-	* [1]	-	-	1,152,483,906	-	-
3/3/2008	W/H TAX DIV WFC	(34,895)	-	* [1]	-	-	1,152,483,906	-	-
3/3/2008	W/H TAX DIV INTC	(24,437)	-	* [1]	-	-	1,152,483,906	-	-
3/3/2008	W/H TAX DIV COP	(24,308)	-	* [1]	-	-	1,152,483,906	-	-
3/4/2008	W/H TAX DIV PFE	(70,095)	-	* [1]	-	-	1,152,483,906	-	-
3/4/2008	W/H TAX DIV UPS	(15,059)	-	* [1]	-	-	1,152,483,906	-	-
3/5/2008	W/H TAX DIV MER	(9,583)	-	* [1]	-	-	1,152,483,906	-	-
3/7/2008	W/H TAX DIV BA	(9,735)	-	* [1]	-	-	1,152,483,906	-	-
3/10/2008	W/H TAX DIV EXC	(10,648)	-	* [1]	-	-	1,152,483,906	-	-
3/10/2008	W/H TAX DIV UTX	(10,709)	-	* [1]	-	-	1,152,483,906	-	-
3/10/2008	W/H TAX DIV XOM	(63,888)	-	* [1]	-	-	1,152,483,906	-	-

Column 1	Column 2	Column 3	Column 4	Column 5	Column 6	Column 7	Column 8	Column 9	Column 10
Date	Transaction Description	Transaction Amount Reported in Customer Statement	Cash Deposits	Cash Withdrawals	Transfers of Principal In	Transfers of Principal Out	Balance of Principal	2-Year Initial Transfers	6-Year Initial Transfers
3/10/2008	W/H TAX DIV IBM	(18,254)	-	* [1]	-	-	1,152,483,906	-	-
3/10/2008	W/H TAX DIV CVX	(40,584)	-	* [1]	-	-	1,152,483,906	-	-
3/11/2008	W/H TAX DIV JNJ	(39,139)	-	* [1]	-	-	1,152,483,906	-	-
3/12/2008	W/H TAX DIV MMM	(12,169)	-	* [1]	-	-	1,152,483,906	-	-
3/13/2008	W/H TAX DIV MSFT	(29,115)	-	* [1]	-	-	1,152,483,906	-	-
3/17/2008	W/H TAX DIV WB	(42,836)	-	* [1]	-	-	1,152,483,906	-	-
3/17/2008	FIDELITY SPARTAN U S TREASURY MONEY MARKET W/H TAX DIV FDLXX	(12)	-	* [1]	-	-	1,152,483,906	-	-
3/17/2008	W/H TAX DIV MCD	(14,831)	-	* [1]	-	-	1,152,483,906	-	-
3/17/2008	W/H TAX DIV TWX	(7,416)	-	* [1]	-	-	1,152,483,906	-	-
3/19/2008	FIDELITY SPARTAN U S TREASURY MONEY MARKET W/H TAX DIV FDLXX	(1)	-	* [1]	-	-	1,152,483,906	-	-
3/20/2008	CHECK WIRE	119,999,980	119,999,980	-	-	-	1,272,483,886	-	-
3/24/2008	W/H TAX DIV AIG	(17,037)	-	* [1]	-	-	1,272,483,886	-	-
3/27/2008	W/H TAX DIV HD	(12,321)	-	* [1]	-	-	1,272,483,886	-	-
3/28/2008	W/H TAX DIV BAC	(93,459)	-	* [1]	-	-	1,272,483,886	-	-
3/31/2008	W/H TAX DIV PEP	(19,395)	-	* [1]	-	-	1,272,483,886	-	-
4/1/2008	W/H TAX DIV MRK	(27,746)	-	* [1]	-	-	1,272,483,886	-	-
4/1/2008	W/H TAX DIV KO	(25,434)	-	* [1]	-	-	1,272,483,886	-	-
4/2/2008	W/H TAX DIV HPQ	(6,815)	-	* [1]	-	-	1,272,483,886	-	-
4/4/2008	W/H TAX DIV KFT	(13,964)	-	* [1]	-	-	1,272,483,886	-	-
4/4/2008	FIDELITY SPARTAN U S TREASURY MONEY MARKET W/H TAX DIV FDLXX	(3)	-	* [1]	-	-	1,272,483,886	-	-
4/7/2008	W/H TAX DIV WMT	(18,064)	-	* [1]	-	-	1,272,483,886	-	-
4/18/2008	CHECK WIRE	14,999,980	14,999,980	-	-	-	1,287,483,866	-	-
4/23/2008	FIDELITY SPARTAN U S TREASURY MONEY MARKET W/H TAX DIV FDLXX	(3)	-	* [1]	-	-	1,287,483,866	-	-
4/25/2008	W/H TAX DIV GE	(102,799)	-	* [1]	-	-	1,287,483,866	-	-
4/25/2008	W/H TAX DIV MDT	(4,487)	-	* [1]	-	-	1,287,483,866	-	-
4/30/2008	W/H TAX DIV MS	(8,883)	-	* [1]	-	-	1,287,483,866	-	-
4/30/2008	W/H TAX DIV JPM	(40,917)	-	* [1]	-	-	1,287,483,866	-	-
5/1/2008	W/H TAX DIV T	(77,766)	-	* [1]	-	-	1,287,483,866	-	-
5/1/2008	W/H TAX DIV VZ	(39,870)	-	* [1]	-	-	1,287,483,866	-	-
5/2/2008	W/H TAX DIV BK	(8,614)	-	* [1]	-	-	1,287,483,866	-	-
5/2/2008	W/H TAX DIV CVS	(2,871)	-	* [1]	-	-	1,287,483,866	-	-
5/9/2008	W/H TAX DIV AXP	(6,461)	-	* [1]	-	-	1,287,483,866	-	-
5/15/2008	W/H TAX DIV PG	(40,678)	-	* [1]	-	-	1,287,483,866	-	-
5/15/2008	W/H TAX DIV ABT	(18,305)	-	* [1]	-	-	1,287,483,866	-	-
5/20/2008	W/H TAX DIV CAT	(7,537)	-	* [1]	-	-	1,287,483,866	-	-
5/23/2008	W/H TAX DIV C	(51,684)	-	* [1]	-	-	1,287,483,866	-	-
5/28/2008	FIDELITY SPARTAN U S TREASURY MONEY MARKET W/H TAX DIV FDLXX	(12)	-	* [1]	-	-	1,287,483,866	-	-
5/29/2008	W/H TAX DIV GS	(4,187)	-	* [1]	-	-	1,287,483,866	-	-
6/2/2008	W/H TAX DIV WMT	(34,075)	-	* [1]	-	-	1,287,483,866	-	-
6/2/2008	W/H TAX DIV WFC	(60,656)	-	* [1]	-	-	1,287,483,866	-	-
6/2/2008	W/H TAX DIV INTC	(26,381)	-	* [1]	-	-	1,287,483,866	-	-
6/2/2008	W/H TAX DIV COP	(14,991)	-	* [1]	-	-	1,287,483,866	-	-
6/3/2008	W/H TAX DIV PFE	(130,671)	-	* [1]	-	-	1,287,483,866	-	-
6/3/2008	W/H TAX DIV UPS	(27,315)	-	* [1]	-	-	1,287,483,866	-	-
6/6/2008	CHECK WIRE	14,999,980	14,999,980	-	-	-	1,302,483,846	-	-
6/6/2008	W/H TAX DIV BA	(17,658)	-	* [1]	-	-	1,302,483,846	-	-
6/10/2008	W/H TAX DIV UTX	(19,424)	-	* [1]	-	-	1,302,483,846	-	-
6/10/2008	W/H TAX DIV JNJ	(26,754)	-	* [1]	-	-	1,302,483,846	-	-
6/10/2008	W/H TAX DIV XOM	(129,219)	-	* [1]	-	-	1,302,483,846	-	-
6/10/2008	W/H TAX DIV IBM	(41,387)	-	* [1]	-	-	1,302,483,846	-	-
6/10/2008	W/H TAX DIV EXC	(19,314)	-	* [1]	-	-	1,302,483,846	-	-
6/10/2008	W/H TAX DIV CVX	(82,497)	-	* [1]	-	-	1,302,483,846	-	-

Column 1	Column 2	Column 3	Column 4	Column 5	Column 6	Column 7	Column 8	Column 9	Column 10
Date	Transaction Description	Transaction Amount Reported in Customer Statement	Cash Deposits	Cash Withdrawals	Transfers of Principal In	Transfers of Principal Out	Balance of Principal	2-Year Initial Transfers	6-Year Initial Transfers
6/12/2008	W/H TAX DIV MMM	(22,073)	-	* [1]	-	-	1,302,483,846	-	-
6/12/2008	W/H TAX DIV MSFT	(52,809)	-	* [1]	-	-	1,302,483,846	-	-
6/24/2008	CHECK WIRE	19,999,980	19,999,980	-	-	-	1,322,483,826	-	-
6/27/2008	CHECK WIRE	14,999,980	14,999,980	-	-	-	1,337,483,806	-	-
7/9/2008	CHECK WIRE	74,999,980	74,999,980	-	-	-	1,412,483,786	-	-
7/18/2008	CHECK WIRE	14,999,980	14,999,980	-	-	-	1,427,483,766	-	-
7/21/2008	FIDELITY SPARTAN U S TREASURY MONEY MARKET W/H TAX DIV FDLXX	(64)	-	* [1]	-	-	1,427,483,766	-	-
7/23/2008	FIDELITY SPARTAN U S TREASURY MONEY MARKET W/H TAX DIV FDLXX	(1)	-	* [1]	-	-	1,427,483,766	-	-
8/1/2008	W/H TAX DIV CVS	(4,501)	-	* [1]	-	-	1,427,483,766	-	-
8/8/2008	FIDELITY SPARTAN U S TREASURY MONEY MARKET W/H TAX DIV FDLXX	(4)	-	* [1]	-	-	1,427,483,766	-	-
8/13/2008	FIDELITY SPARTAN U S TREASURY MONEY MARKET W/H TAX DIV FDLXX	(0)	-	* [1]	-	-	1,427,483,766	-	-
8/20/2008	W/H TAX DIV CAT	(11,987)	-	* [1]	-	-	1,427,483,766	-	-
8/22/2008	W/H TAX DIV C	(76,979)	-	* [1]	-	-	1,427,483,766	-	-
8/28/2008	W/H TAX DIV GS	(5,708)	-	* [1]	-	-	1,427,483,766	-	-
9/11/2008	CHECK WIRE	(130,000,000)	-	(130,000,000)	-	-	1,297,483,766	(130,000,000)	(130,000,000)
10/2/2008	W/H TAX DIV IBM	(30,580)	-	* [1]	-	-	1,297,483,766	-	-
10/2/2008	W/H TAX DIV QCOM	(5,489)	-	* [1]	-	-	1,297,483,766	-	-
10/2/2008	W/H TAX DIV UTX	(21,061)	-	* [1]	-	-	1,297,483,766	-	-
10/2/2008	FIDELITY SPARTAN U S TREASURY MONEY MARKET W/H TAX DIV FDLXX	(1)	-	* [1]	-	-	1,297,483,766	-	-
10/2/2008	W/H TAX DIV EXC	(20,941)	-	* [1]	-	-	1,297,483,766	-	-
10/2/2008	W/H TAX DIV COP	(32,578)	-	* [1]	-	-	1,297,483,766	-	-
10/2/2008	W/H TAX DIV WMT	(35,525)	-	* [1]	-	-	1,297,483,766	-	-
10/2/2008	W/H TAX DIV BUD	(12,069)	-	* [1]	-	-	1,297,483,766	-	-
10/2/2008	W/H TAX DIV MCD	(27,639)	-	* [1]	-	-	1,297,483,766	-	-
10/2/2008	W/H TAX DIV PFE	(96,550)	-	* [1]	-	-	1,297,483,766	-	-
10/2/2008	W/H TAX DIV BA	(13,047)	-	* [1]	-	-	1,297,483,766	-	-
10/2/2008	W/H TAX DIV PEP	(43,229)	-	* [1]	-	-	1,297,483,766	-	-
10/2/2008	W/H TAX DIV HD	(8,148)	-	* [1]	-	-	1,297,483,766	-	-
10/2/2008	W/H TAX DIV AIG	(38,592)	-	* [1]	-	-	1,297,483,766	-	-
10/2/2008	W/H TAX DIV MSFT	(57,708)	-	* [1]	-	-	1,297,483,766	-	-
10/2/2008	W/H TAX DIV BAC	(186,243)	-	* [1]	-	-	1,297,483,766	-	-
10/2/2008	W/H TAX DIV INTC	(35,391)	-	* [1]	-	-	1,297,483,766	-	-
10/2/2008	W/H TAX DIV WFC	(42,975)	-	* [1]	-	-	1,297,483,766	-	-
10/2/2008	W/H TAX DIV CVX	(88,210)	-	* [1]	-	-	1,297,483,766	-	-
10/2/2008	FIDELITY SPARTAN U S TREASURY MONEY MARKET W/H TAX DIV FDLXX	(13)	-	* [1]	-	-	1,297,483,766	-	-
10/2/2008	W/H TAX DIV XOM	(138,048)	-	* [1]	-	-	1,297,483,766	-	-
10/2/2008	W/H TAX DIV TWX	(14,822)	-	* [1]	-	-	1,297,483,766	-	-
10/2/2008	W/H TAX DIV JNJ	(84,444)	-	* [1]	-	-	1,297,483,766	-	-
10/2/2008	W/H TAX DIV MMM	(23,933)	-	* [1]	-	-	1,297,483,766	-	-
10/2/2008	W/H TAX DIV UPS	(29,617)	-	* [1]	-	-	1,297,483,766	-	-
10/2/2008	FIDELITY SPARTAN U S TREASURY MONEY MARKET W/H TAX DIV FDLXX	(11)	-	* [1]	-	-	1,297,483,766	-	-
10/10/2008	CHECK WIRE	(180,000,000)	-	(180,000,000)	-	-	1,117,483,766	(180,000,000)	(180,000,000)
10/24/2008	CHECK WIRE	(180,000,000)	-	(180,000,000)	-	-	937,483,766	(180,000,000)	(180,000,000)
11/4/2008	FIDELITY SPARTAN U S TREASURY MONEY MARKET W/H TAX DIV FDLXX	(1)	-	* [1]	-	-	937,483,766	-	-
11/4/2008	W/H TAX DIV MO	(9,603)	-	* [1]	-	-	937,483,766	-	-
11/4/2008	FIDELITY SPARTAN U S TREASURY MONEY MARKET W/H TAX DIV FDLXX	(1)	-	* [1]	-	-	937,483,766	-	-
11/4/2008	W/H TAX DIV HPQ	(12,771)	-	* [1]	-	-	937,483,766	-	-
11/4/2008	W/H TAX DIV PM	(23,780)	-	* [1]	-	-	937,483,766	-	-
11/4/2008	W/H TAX DIV MRK	(52,293)	-	* [1]	-	-	937,483,766	-	-
11/4/2008	W/H TAX DIV KO	(16,006)	-	* [1]	-	-	937,483,766	-	-
11/4/2008	W/H TAX DIV BAX	(9,109)	-	* [1]	-	-	937,483,766	-	-
11/14/2008	CHECK WIRE	(50,000,000)	-	(50,000,000)	-	-	887,483,766	(50,000,000)	(50,000,000)
11/19/2008	CHECK WIRE	(125,000,000)	-	(125,000,000)	-	-	762,483,766	(125,000,000)	(125,000,000)

Column 1	Column 2	Column 3	Column 4	Column 5	Column 6	Column 7	Column 8	Column 9	Column 10
<u>Date</u>	<u>Transaction Description</u>	<u>Transaction Amount Reported in Customer Statement</u>	<u>Cash Deposits</u>	<u>Cash Withdrawals</u>	<u>Transfers of Principal In</u>	<u>Transfers of Principal Out</u>	<u>Balance of Principal</u>	<u>2-Year Initial Transfers</u>	<u>6-Year Initial Transfers</u>
12/3/2008	FIDELITY SPARTAN U S TREASURY MONEY MARKET W/H TAX DIV FDLXX	(0)	-	* ⁽¹⁾	-	-	762,483,766	-	-
12/3/2008	FIDELITY SPARTAN U S TREASURY MONEY MARKET W/H TAX DIV FDLXX	(0)	-	* ⁽¹⁾	-	-	762,483,766	-	-
12/3/2008	FIDELITY SPARTAN U S TREASURY MONEY MARKET W/H TAX DIV FDLXX	(0)	-	* ⁽¹⁾	-	-	762,483,766	-	-
12/3/2008	FIDELITY SPARTAN U S TREASURY MONEY MARKET W/H TAX DIV FDLXX	(1)	-	* ⁽¹⁾	-	-	762,483,766	-	-
12/3/2008	FIDELITY SPARTAN U S TREASURY MONEY MARKET W/H TAX DIV FDLXX	(1)	-	* ⁽¹⁾	-	-	762,483,766	-	-
12/3/2008	FIDELITY SPARTAN U S TREASURY MONEY MARKET W/H TAX DIV FDLXX	(0)	-	* ⁽¹⁾	-	-	762,483,766	-	-
		Total:	\$ 1,514,049,766	\$ (751,566,000)	\$ -	\$ 1	\$ 762,483,766	\$ (735,366,000)	\$ (751,566,000)

⁽¹⁾ Amounts withheld from account holders and paid by BLMIS to the IRS on behalf of account holders during the six-year period prior to the filing date have not been deducted from the balance of principal as those amounts have subsequently been refunded by the IRS.

Column 1	Column 2	Column 3	Column 4	Column 5	Column 6	Column 7	Column 8	Column 9	Column 10
<u>Date</u>	<u>Transaction Description</u>	<u>Transaction Amount Reported in Customer Statement</u>	<u>Cash Deposits</u>	<u>Cash Withdrawals</u>	<u>Transfers of Principal In</u>	<u>Transfers of Principal Out</u>	<u>Balance of Principal</u>	<u>2-Year Initial Transfers</u>	<u>6-Year Initial Transfers</u>
4/8/2003	CHECK WIRE	3,885,000	3,885,000	-	-	-	3,885,000	-	-
4/15/2003	FIDELITY SPARTAN U S TREASURY MONEY MARKET W/H TAX DIV FDLXX	(1)	-	* [1]	-	-	3,885,000	-	-
5/1/2003	CHECK WIRE	1,000,000	1,000,000	-	-	-	4,885,000	-	-
5/9/2003	FIDELITY SPARTAN U S TREASURY MONEY MARKET W/H TAX DIV FDLXX	(1)	-	* [1]	-	-	4,885,000	-	-
5/19/2003	CHECK WIRE	2,892,607	2,892,607	-	-	-	7,777,607	-	-
5/19/2003	FIDELITY SPARTAN U S TREASURY MONEY MARKET W/H TAX DIV FDLXX	(1)	-	* [1]	-	-	7,777,607	-	-
6/5/2003	CHECK WIRE	2,589,000	2,589,000	-	-	-	10,366,607	-	-
6/5/2003	W/H TAX DIV PFE	(445)	-	* [1]	-	-	10,366,607	-	-
6/10/2003	W/H TAX DIV XOM	(624)	-	* [1]	-	-	10,366,607	-	-
6/10/2003	W/H TAX DIV JNJ	(262)	-	* [1]	-	-	10,366,607	-	-
6/12/2003	W/H TAX DIV DD	(131)	-	* [1]	-	-	10,366,607	-	-
6/12/2003	W/H TAX DIV MMM	(103)	-	* [1]	-	-	10,366,607	-	-
6/20/2003	W/H TAX DIV AIG	(45)	-	* [1]	-	-	10,366,607	-	-
6/25/2003	FIDELITY SPARTAN U S TREASURY MONEY MARKET W/H TAX DIV FDLXX	(3)	-	* [1]	-	-	10,366,607	-	-
6/26/2003	W/H TAX DIV HD	(52)	-	* [1]	-	-	10,366,607	-	-
6/27/2003	CHECK WIRE	(1,200,000)	-	(1,200,000)	-	-	9,166,607	-	(1,200,000)
6/27/2003	FIDELITY SPARTAN U S TREASURY MONEY MARKET W/H TAX DIV FDLXX	(0)	-	* [1]	-	-	9,166,607	-	-
6/27/2003	W/H TAX DIV BAC	(359)	-	* [1]	-	-	9,166,607	-	-
6/30/2003	W/H TAX DIV PEP	(100)	-	* [1]	-	-	9,166,607	-	-
7/1/2003	W/H TAX DIV ONE	(92)	-	* [1]	-	-	9,166,607	-	-
7/1/2003	W/H TAX DIV KO	(199)	-	* [1]	-	-	9,166,607	-	-
7/1/2003	W/H TAX DIV MRK	(303)	-	* [1]	-	-	9,166,607	-	-
7/7/2003	W/H TAX DIV WMT	(146)	-	* [1]	-	-	9,166,607	-	-
7/8/2003	CHECK WIRE	5,000,000	5,000,000	-	-	-	14,166,607	-	-
7/8/2003	W/H TAX DIV MO	(499)	-	* [1]	-	-	14,166,607	-	-
7/9/2003	W/H TAX DIV HPQ	(90)	-	* [1]	-	-	14,166,607	-	-
7/10/2003	FIDELITY SPARTAN U S TREASURY MONEY MARKET W/H TAX DIV FDLXX	(1)	-	* [1]	-	-	14,166,607	-	-
7/21/2003	FIDELITY SPARTAN U S TREASURY MONEY MARKET W/H TAX DIV FDLXX	(1)	-	* [1]	-	-	14,166,607	-	-
7/31/2003	W/H TAX DIV MWD	(156)	-	* [1]	-	-	14,166,607	-	-
8/1/2003	W/H TAX DIV VZ	(717)	-	* [1]	-	-	14,166,607	-	-
8/1/2003	W/H TAX DIV SBC	(841)	-	* [1]	-	-	14,166,607	-	-
8/5/2003	CHECK WIRE	1,226,000	1,226,000	-	-	-	15,392,607	-	-
8/8/2003	CHECK WIRE	238,000	238,000	-	-	-	15,630,607	-	-
8/15/2003	W/H TAX DIV PG	(385)	-	* [1]	-	-	15,630,607	-	-
8/22/2003	W/H TAX DIV C	(1,184)	-	* [1]	-	-	15,630,607	-	-
8/27/2003	W/H TAX DIV MER	(99)	-	* [1]	-	-	15,630,607	-	-
9/2/2003	W/H TAX DIV INTC	(85)	-	* [1]	-	-	15,630,607	-	-
9/2/2003	W/H TAX DIV WFC	(508)	-	* [1]	-	-	15,630,607	-	-
9/3/2003	CHECK WIRE	810,000	810,000	-	-	-	16,440,607	-	-
9/4/2003	W/H TAX DIV PFE	(778)	-	* [1]	-	-	16,440,607	-	-
9/5/2003	FIDELITY SPARTAN U S TREASURY MONEY MARKET W/H TAX DIV FDLXX	(15)	-	* [1]	-	-	16,440,607	-	-
9/9/2003	W/H TAX DIV BUD	(124)	-	* [1]	-	-	16,440,607	-	-
9/10/2003	W/H TAX DIV XOM	(1,114)	-	* [1]	-	-	16,440,607	-	-
9/10/2003	W/H TAX DIV IBM	(180)	-	* [1]	-	-	16,440,607	-	-
9/12/2003	W/H TAX DIV DD	(237)	-	* [1]	-	-	16,440,607	-	-
9/19/2003	W/H TAX DIV AIG	(195)	-	* [1]	-	-	16,440,607	-	-
9/26/2003	W/H TAX DIV BAC	(1,348)	-	* [1]	-	-	16,440,607	-	-
9/30/2003	W/H TAX DIV PEP	(315)	-	* [1]	-	-	16,440,607	-	-
10/1/2003	W/H TAX DIV MRK	(970)	-	* [1]	-	-	16,440,607	-	-
10/1/2003	W/H TAX DIV KO	(638)	-	* [1]	-	-	16,440,607	-	-
10/1/2003	W/H TAX DIV VIA.B	(68)	-	* [1]	-	-	16,440,607	-	-
10/2/2003	CHECK WIRE	3,885,000	3,885,000	-	-	-	20,325,607	-	-

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<u>Date</u>	<u>Transaction Description</u>	<u>Transaction Amount Reported in Customer Statement</u>	<u>Cash Deposits</u>	<u>Cash Withdrawals</u>	<u>Transfers of Principal In</u>	<u>Transfers of Principal Out</u>	<u>Balance of Principal</u>	<u>2-Year Initial Transfers</u>	<u>6-Year Initial Transfers</u>
10/2/2003	CHECK WIRE	7,330,000	7,330,000	-	-	-	27,655,607	-	-
10/3/2003	CHECK WIRE	975,000	975,000	-	-	-	28,630,607	-	-
10/8/2003	W/H TAX DIV HPQ	(285)	-	* [1]	-	-	28,630,607	-	-
10/9/2003	W/H TAX DIV MO	(1,591)	-	* [1]	-	-	28,630,607	-	-
10/14/2003	FIDELITY SPARTAN U S TREASURY MONEY MARKET W/H TAX DIV FDLXX	(6)	-	* [1]	-	-	28,630,607	-	-
11/3/2003	CHECK WIRE	5,000,000	5,000,000	-	-	-	33,630,607	-	-
11/5/2003	CHECK WIRE	18,000,000	18,000,000	-	-	-	51,630,607	-	-
11/7/2003	W/H TAX DIV MSFT	(3,593)	-	* [1]	-	-	51,630,607	-	-
11/14/2003	W/H TAX DIV PG	(1,238)	-	* [1]	-	-	51,630,607	-	-
11/21/2003	CHECK WIRE	3,550,000	3,550,000	-	-	-	55,180,607	-	-
11/25/2003	FIDELITY SPARTAN U S TREASURY MONEY MARKET W/H TAX DIV FDLXX	(6)	-	* [1]	-	-	55,180,607	-	-
11/26/2003	W/H TAX DIV C	(3,751)	-	* [1]	-	-	55,180,607	-	-
11/26/2003	W/H TAX DIV MER	(299)	-	* [1]	-	-	55,180,607	-	-
12/1/2003	CHECK WIRE	5,600,000	5,600,000	-	-	-	60,780,607	-	-
12/1/2003	W/H TAX DIV WFC	(1,531)	-	* [1]	-	-	60,780,607	-	-
12/1/2003	W/H TAX DIV INTC	(269)	-	* [1]	-	-	60,780,607	-	-
12/4/2003	W/H TAX DIV PFE	(2,424)	-	* [1]	-	-	60,780,607	-	-
12/9/2003	W/H TAX DIV JNJ	(1,470)	-	* [1]	-	-	60,780,607	-	-
12/10/2003	CHECK WIRE	(1,030,000)	-	(1,030,000)	-	-	59,750,607	-	(1,030,000)
12/10/2003	W/H TAX DIV IBM	(572)	-	* [1]	-	-	59,750,607	-	-
12/10/2003	W/H TAX DIV XOM	(3,445)	-	* [1]	-	-	59,750,607	-	-
12/12/2003	W/H TAX DIV MMM	(561)	-	* [1]	-	-	59,750,607	-	-
12/16/2003	FIDELITY SPARTAN U S TREASURY MONEY MARKET W/H TAX DIV FDLXX	(6)	-	* [1]	-	-	59,750,607	-	-
12/31/2003	FIDELITY SPARTAN U S TREASURY MONEY MARKET W/H TAX DIV FDLXX	(2)	-	* [1]	-	-	59,750,607	-	-
1/2/2004	W/H TAX DIV ONE	(230)	-	* [1]	-	-	59,750,607	-	-
1/2/2004	W/H TAX DIV PEP	(233)	-	* [1]	-	-	59,750,607	-	-
1/5/2004	W/H TAX DIV WMT	(332)	-	* [1]	-	-	59,750,607	-	-
1/6/2004	W/H TAX DIV DIS	(371)	-	* [1]	-	-	59,750,607	-	-
1/7/2004	W/H TAX DIV HPQ	(209)	-	* [1]	-	-	59,750,607	-	-
1/8/2004	FIDELITY SPARTAN U S TREASURY MONEY MARKET W/H TAX DIV FDLXX	(1)	-	* [1]	-	-	59,750,607	-	-
1/9/2004	CHECK WIRE	5,000,000	5,000,000	-	-	-	64,750,607	-	-
1/9/2004	W/H TAX DIV MO	(1,201)	-	* [1]	-	-	64,750,607	-	-
1/15/2004	FIDELITY SPARTAN U S TREASURY MONEY MARKET W/H TAX DIV FDLXX	(1)	-	* [1]	-	-	64,750,607	-	-
1/16/2004	CHECK WIRE	4,500,000	4,500,000	-	-	-	69,250,607	-	-
1/30/2004	W/H TAX DIV MWD	(374)	-	* [1]	-	-	69,250,607	-	-
2/2/2004	W/H TAX DIV SBC	(1,443)	-	* [1]	-	-	69,250,607	-	-
2/2/2004	W/H TAX DIV VZ	(1,489)	-	* [1]	-	-	69,250,607	-	-
2/3/2004	CHECK WIRE	3,610,000	3,610,000	-	-	-	72,860,607	-	-
2/13/2004	CHECK WIRE	22,410,000	22,410,000	-	-	-	95,270,607	-	-
2/17/2004	CHECK WIRE	2,000,000	2,000,000	-	-	-	97,270,607	-	-
2/17/2004	W/H TAX DIV PG	(2,443)	-	* [1]	-	-	97,270,607	-	-
2/26/2004	W/H TAX DIV GS	(447)	-	* [1]	-	-	97,270,607	-	-
2/27/2004	W/H TAX DIV MER	(630)	-	* [1]	-	-	97,270,607	-	-
2/27/2004	W/H TAX DIV C	(8,303)	-	* [1]	-	-	97,270,607	-	-
3/1/2004	W/H TAX DIV WFC	(3,060)	-	* [1]	-	-	97,270,607	-	-
3/1/2004	W/H TAX DIV INTC	(1,041)	-	* [1]	-	-	97,270,607	-	-
3/5/2004	W/H TAX DIV G	(640)	-	* [1]	-	-	97,270,607	-	-
3/5/2004	W/H TAX DIV PFE	(5,189)	-	* [1]	-	-	97,270,607	-	-
3/5/2004	W/H TAX DIV BA	(548)	-	* [1]	-	-	97,270,607	-	-
3/9/2004	W/H TAX DIV JNJ	(2,866)	-	* [1]	-	-	97,270,607	-	-
3/9/2004	W/H TAX DIV BUD	(709)	-	* [1]	-	-	97,270,607	-	-
3/10/2004	W/H TAX DIV XOM	(6,647)	-	* [1]	-	-	97,270,607	-	-

Column 1	Column 2	Column 3	Column 4	Column 5	Column 6	Column 7	Column 8	Column 9	Column 10
Date	Transaction Description	Transaction Amount Reported in Customer Statement	Cash Deposits	Cash Withdrawals	Transfers of Principal In	Transfers of Principal Out	Balance of Principal	2-Year Initial Transfers	6-Year Initial Transfers
3/10/2004	W/H TAX DIV IBM	(1,088)	-	* [1]	-	-	97,270.607	-	-
3/10/2004	W/H TAX DIV UTX	(395)	-	* [1]	-	-	97,270.607	-	-
3/12/2004	W/H TAX DIV MMM	(731)	-	* [1]	-	-	97,270.607	-	-
3/15/2004	W/H TAX DIV DD	(1,378)	-	* [1]	-	-	97,270.607	-	-
4/6/2004	FIDELITY SPARTAN U S TREASURY MONEY MARKET W/H TAX DIV FDLXX	(39)	-	* [1]	-	-	97,270.607	-	-
4/30/2004	W/H TAX DIV MWD	(1,281)	-	* [1]	-	-	97,270.607	-	-
4/30/2004	W/H TAX DIV JPM	(983)	-	* [1]	-	-	97,270.607	-	-
5/3/2004	W/H TAX DIV VZ	(4,931)	-	* [1]	-	-	97,270.607	-	-
5/3/2004	W/H TAX DIV SBC	(4,851)	-	* [1]	-	-	97,270.607	-	-
5/10/2004	CHECK WIRE	10,300.000	10,300,000	-	-	-	107,570.607	-	-
5/14/2004	W/H TAX DIV PG	(3,772)	-	* [1]	-	-	107,570.607	-	-
5/17/2004	W/H TAX DIV TXN	(220)	-	* [1]	-	-	107,570.607	-	-
5/26/2004	W/H TAX DIV MER	(948)	-	* [1]	-	-	107,570.607	-	-
5/27/2004	W/H TAX DIV GS	(674)	-	* [1]	-	-	107,570.607	-	-
5/28/2004	W/H TAX DIV C	(12,285)	-	* [1]	-	-	107,570.607	-	-
6/1/2004	W/H TAX DIV INTC	(1,535)	-	* [1]	-	-	107,570.607	-	-
6/1/2004	W/H TAX DIV WFC	(4,607)	-	* [1]	-	-	107,570.607	-	-
6/4/2004	CHECK WIRE	10,300.000	10,300,000	-	-	-	117,870.607	-	-
6/4/2004	W/H TAX DIV PFE	(7,673)	-	* [1]	-	-	117,870.607	-	-
6/4/2004	W/H TAX DIV G	(963)	-	* [1]	-	-	117,870.607	-	-
6/7/2004	FIDELITY SPARTAN U S TREASURY MONEY MARKET W/H TAX DIV FDLXX	(17)	-	* [1]	-	-	117,870.607	-	-
6/7/2004	W/H TAX DIV WMT	(2,262)	-	* [1]	-	-	117,870.607	-	-
6/8/2004	W/H TAX DIV JNJ	(5,032)	-	* [1]	-	-	117,870.607	-	-
6/9/2004	W/H TAX DIV BUD	(1,067)	-	* [1]	-	-	117,870.607	-	-
6/10/2004	W/H TAX DIV XOM	(10,474)	-	* [1]	-	-	117,870.607	-	-
6/10/2004	W/H TAX DIV UTX	(769)	-	* [1]	-	-	117,870.607	-	-
6/10/2004	W/H TAX DIV IBM	(1,843)	-	* [1]	-	-	117,870.607	-	-
6/11/2004	W/H TAX DIV BA	(660)	-	* [1]	-	-	117,870.607	-	-
6/14/2004	W/H TAX DIV DD	(2,074)	-	* [1]	-	-	117,870.607	-	-
6/14/2004	W/H TAX DIV MMM	(1,187)	-	* [1]	-	-	117,870.607	-	-
6/18/2004	FIDELITY SPARTAN U S TREASURY MONEY MARKET W/H TAX DIV FDLXX	(2)	-	* [1]	-	-	117,870.607	-	-
6/24/2004	W/H TAX DIV HD	(1,418)	-	* [1]	-	-	117,870.607	-	-
6/30/2004	W/H TAX DIV PEP	(2,916)	-	* [1]	-	-	117,870.607	-	-
7/1/2004	W/H TAX DIV KO	(4,504)	-	* [1]	-	-	117,870.607	-	-
7/7/2004	W/H TAX DIV HPQ	(1,815)	-	* [1]	-	-	117,870.607	-	-
7/8/2004	CHECK WIRE	10,000.000	10,000,000	-	-	-	127,870.607	-	-
7/9/2004	W/H TAX DIV MO	(10,251)	-	* [1]	-	-	127,870.607	-	-
7/26/2004	W/H TAX DIV GE	(1,666)	-	* [1]	-	-	127,870.607	-	-
8/18/2004	FIDELITY SPARTAN U S TREASURY MONEY MARKET W/H TAX DIV FDLXX	(43)	-	* [1]	-	-	127,870.607	-	-
8/23/2004	FIDELITY SPARTAN U S TREASURY MONEY MARKET W/H TAX DIV FDLXX	(0)	-	* [1]	-	-	127,870.607	-	-
9/7/2004	W/H TAX DIV WMT	(3,503)	-	* [1]	-	-	127,870.607	-	-
9/10/2004	W/H TAX DIV UTX	(1,179)	-	* [1]	-	-	127,870.607	-	-
9/13/2004	W/H TAX DIV MMM	(1,819)	-	* [1]	-	-	127,870.607	-	-
9/14/2004	W/H TAX DIV MSFT	(7,350)	-	* [1]	-	-	127,870.607	-	-
9/16/2004	W/H TAX DIV HD	(1,635)	-	* [1]	-	-	127,870.607	-	-
9/17/2004	W/H TAX DIV AIG	(1,673)	-	* [1]	-	-	127,870.607	-	-
9/24/2004	W/H TAX DIV BAC	(15,922)	-	* [1]	-	-	127,870.607	-	-
9/30/2004	W/H TAX DIV PEP	(3,361)	-	* [1]	-	-	127,870.607	-	-
10/1/2004	W/H TAX DIV MRK	(7,307)	-	* [1]	-	-	127,870.607	-	-
10/1/2004	W/H TAX DIV KO	(5,192)	-	* [1]	-	-	127,870.607	-	-
10/1/2004	W/H TAX DIV VIA.B	(902)	-	* [1]	-	-	127,870.607	-	-

Column 1	Column 2	Column 3	Column 4	Column 5	Column 6	Column 7	Column 8	Column 9	Column 10
<u>Date</u>	<u>Transaction Description</u>	<u>Transaction Amount Reported in Customer Statement</u>	<u>Cash Deposits</u>	<u>Cash Withdrawals</u>	<u>Transfers of Principal In</u>	<u>Transfers of Principal Out</u>	<u>Balance of Principal</u>	<u>2-Year Initial Transfers</u>	<u>6-Year Initial Transfers</u>
10/6/2004	W/H TAX DIV HPQ	(2,092)	-	* [1]	-	-	127,870,607	-	-
10/7/2004	CHECK WIRE	10,000,000	10,000,000	-	-	-	137,870,607	-	-
10/12/2004	W/H TAX DIV MO	(12,915)	-	* [1]	-	-	137,870,607	-	-
10/15/2004	CHECK WIRE	6,200,000	6,200,000	-	-	-	144,070,607	-	-
10/20/2004	CHECK WIRE	4,590,000	4,590,000	-	-	-	148,660,607	-	-
11/3/2004	FIDELITY SPARTAN U S TREASURY MONEY MARKET W/H TAX DIV FDLXX	(81)	-	* [1]	-	-	148,660,607	-	-
11/4/2004	CHECK WIRE	8,975,000	8,975,000	-	-	-	157,635,607	-	-
11/4/2004	FIDELITY SPARTAN U S TREASURY MONEY MARKET W/H TAX DIV FDLXX	(0)	-	* [1]	-	-	157,635,607	-	-
11/5/2004	CHECK WIRE	2,100,000	2,100,000	-	-	-	159,735,607	-	-
11/9/2004	FIDELITY SPARTAN U S TREASURY MONEY MARKET W/H TAX DIV FDLXX	(0)	-	* [1]	-	-	159,735,607	-	-
11/23/2004	CHECK WIRE	4,900,000	4,900,000	-	-	-	164,635,607	-	-
11/24/2004	W/H TAX DIV MER	(757)	-	* [1]	-	-	164,635,607	-	-
12/1/2004	CHECK WIRE	4,930,000	4,930,000	-	-	-	169,565,607	-	-
12/1/2004	W/H TAX DIV INTC	(1,246)	-	* [1]	-	-	169,565,607	-	-
12/1/2004	W/H TAX DIV WFC	(3,923)	-	* [1]	-	-	169,565,607	-	-
12/3/2004	W/H TAX DIV BA	(1,260)	-	* [1]	-	-	169,565,607	-	-
12/3/2004	W/H TAX DIV PFE	(10,049)	-	* [1]	-	-	169,565,607	-	-
12/7/2004	W/H TAX DIV JNJ	(2,535)	-	* [1]	-	-	169,565,607	-	-
12/10/2004	W/H TAX DIV XOM	(13,795)	-	* [1]	-	-	169,565,607	-	-
12/10/2004	W/H TAX DIV IBM	(2,394)	-	* [1]	-	-	169,565,607	-	-
12/13/2004	FIDELITY SPARTAN U S TREASURY MONEY MARKET W/H TAX DIV FDLXX	(41)	-	* [1]	-	-	169,565,607	-	-
12/14/2004	W/H TAX DIV DD	(2,695)	-	* [1]	-	-	169,565,607	-	-
12/15/2004	CHECK WIRE	5,000,000	5,000,000	-	-	-	174,565,607	-	-
12/16/2004	FIDELITY SPARTAN U S TREASURY MONEY MARKET W/H TAX DIV FDLXX	(1)	-	* [1]	-	-	174,565,607	-	-
12/31/2004	FIDELITY SPARTAN U S TREASURY MONEY MARKET W/H TAX DIV FDLXX	(7)	-	* [1]	-	-	174,565,607	-	-
1/3/2005	W/H TAX DIV WMT	(1,529)	-	* [1]	-	-	174,565,607	-	-
1/11/2005	CHECK WIRE	6,000,000	6,000,000	-	-	-	180,565,607	-	-
1/25/2005	CHECK WIRE	6,000,000	6,000,000	-	-	-	186,565,607	-	-
2/1/2005	CHECK WIRE	6,000,000	6,000,000	-	-	-	192,565,607	-	-
2/14/2005	W/H TAX DIV TXN	(509)	-	* [1]	-	-	192,565,607	-	-
2/16/2005	CHECK WIRE	5,000,000	5,000,000	-	-	-	197,565,607	-	-
2/24/2005	W/H TAX DIV GS	(206)	-	* [1]	-	-	197,565,607	-	-
2/25/2005	W/H TAX DIV C	(26,891)	-	* [1]	-	-	197,565,607	-	-
2/28/2005	W/H TAX DIV MER	(1,716)	-	* [1]	-	-	197,565,607	-	-
3/1/2005	W/H TAX DIV INTC	(5,981)	-	* [1]	-	-	197,565,607	-	-
3/1/2005	W/H TAX DIV WFC	(9,778)	-	* [1]	-	-	197,565,607	-	-
3/4/2005	W/H TAX DIV G	(1,917)	-	* [1]	-	-	197,565,607	-	-
3/4/2005	W/H TAX DIV BA	(2,412)	-	* [1]	-	-	197,565,607	-	-
3/7/2005	FIDELITY SPARTAN U S TREASURY MONEY MARKET W/H TAX DIV FDLXX	(63)	-	* [1]	-	-	197,565,607	-	-
3/8/2005	W/H TAX DIV JNJ	(10,000)	-	* [1]	-	-	197,565,607	-	-
3/8/2005	W/H TAX DIV PFE	(16,909)	-	* [1]	-	-	197,565,607	-	-
3/9/2005	W/H TAX DIV BUD	(2,364)	-	* [1]	-	-	197,565,607	-	-
3/10/2005	W/H TAX DIV UTX	(2,831)	-	* [1]	-	-	197,565,607	-	-
3/10/2005	W/H TAX DIV XOM	(20,554)	-	* [1]	-	-	197,565,607	-	-
3/10/2005	W/H TAX DIV IBM	(3,474)	-	* [1]	-	-	197,565,607	-	-
3/10/2005	W/H TAX DIV MSFT	(10,249)	-	* [1]	-	-	197,565,607	-	-
3/14/2005	W/H TAX DIV DD	(4,128)	-	* [1]	-	-	197,565,607	-	-
3/14/2005	W/H TAX DIV MMM	(4,053)	-	* [1]	-	-	197,565,607	-	-
3/18/2005	W/H TAX DIV AIG	(3,887)	-	* [1]	-	-	197,565,607	-	-
3/21/2005	CHECK WIRE	5,600,000	5,600,000	-	-	-	203,165,607	-	-
3/24/2005	W/H TAX DIV HD	(2,573)	-	* [1]	-	-	203,165,607	-	-
3/28/2005	W/H TAX DIV BAC	(21,463)	-	* [1]	-	-	203,165,607	-	-

Column 1	Column 2	Column 3	Column 4	Column 5	Column 6	Column 7	Column 8	Column 9	Column 10
<u>Date</u>	<u>Transaction Description</u>	<u>Transaction Amount Reported in Customer Statement</u>	<u>Cash Deposits</u>	<u>Cash Withdrawals</u>	<u>Transfers of Principal In</u>	<u>Transfers of Principal Out</u>	<u>Balance of Principal</u>	<u>2-Year Initial Transfers</u>	<u>6-Year Initial Transfers</u>
3/31/2005	W/H TAX DIV PEP	(4,686)	-	* [1]	-	-	203,165,607	-	-
4/1/2005	W/H TAX DIV MRK	(9,778)	-	* [1]	-	-	203,165,607	-	-
4/1/2005	W/H TAX DIV VIA.B	(1,426)	-	* [1]	-	-	203,165,607	-	-
4/1/2005	W/H TAX DIV KO	(6,323)	-	* [1]	-	-	203,165,607	-	-
4/7/2005	W/H TAX DIV HPQ	(1,413)	-	* [1]	-	-	203,165,607	-	-
4/11/2005	W/H TAX DIV MO	(14,042)	-	* [1]	-	-	203,165,607	-	-
4/13/2005	FIDELITY SPARTAN U S TREASURY MONEY MARKET W/H TAX DIV FDLXX	(66)	-	* [1]	-	-	203,165,607	-	-
4/20/2005	CHECK WIRE	4,600,000	4,600,000	-	-	-	207,765,607	-	-
4/25/2005	W/H TAX DIV GE	(27,412)	-	* [1]	-	-	207,765,607	-	-
5/2/2005	CHECK WIRE	3,000,000	3,000,000	-	-	-	210,765,607	-	-
5/23/2005	FIDELITY SPARTAN U S TREASURY MONEY MARKET W/H TAX DIV FDLXX	(44)	-	* [1]	-	-	210,765,607	-	-
6/6/2005	W/H TAX DIV WMT	(1,981)	-	* [1]	-	-	210,765,607	-	-
6/10/2005	W/H TAX DIV UTX	(942)	-	* [1]	-	-	210,765,607	-	-
6/13/2005	W/H TAX DIV MMM	(1,349)	-	* [1]	-	-	210,765,607	-	-
6/17/2005	W/H TAX DIV AIG	(3,289)	-	* [1]	-	-	210,765,607	-	-
6/20/2005	FIDELITY SPARTAN U S TREASURY MONEY MARKET W/H TAX DIV FDLXX	(37)	-	* [1]	-	-	210,765,607	-	-
6/22/2005	CHECK WIRE	4,000,000	4,000,000	-	-	-	214,765,607	-	-
6/23/2005	W/H TAX DIV HD	(2,203)	-	* [1]	-	-	214,765,607	-	-
6/24/2005	W/H TAX DIV BAC	(18,371)	-	* [1]	-	-	214,765,607	-	-
6/30/2005	W/H TAX DIV PEP	(4,482)	-	* [1]	-	-	214,765,607	-	-
7/1/2005	W/H TAX DIV VIA.B	(1,207)	-	* [1]	-	-	214,765,607	-	-
7/1/2005	W/H TAX DIV MRK	(8,274)	-	* [1]	-	-	214,765,607	-	-
7/1/2005	W/H TAX DIV ALL	(2,229)	-	* [1]	-	-	214,765,607	-	-
7/1/2005	W/H TAX DIV KO	(6,350)	-	* [1]	-	-	214,765,607	-	-
7/6/2005	W/H TAX DIV HPQ	(2,372)	-	* [1]	-	-	214,765,607	-	-
7/8/2005	W/H TAX DIV SLB	(1,334)	-	* [1]	-	-	214,765,607	-	-
7/11/2005	W/H TAX DIV MO	(15,232)	-	* [1]	-	-	214,765,607	-	-
7/25/2005	W/H TAX DIV GE	(23,486)	-	* [1]	-	-	214,765,607	-	-
9/8/2005	FIDELITY SPARTAN U S TREASURY MONEY MARKET W/H TAX DIV FDLXX	(319)	-	* [1]	-	-	214,765,607	-	-
9/12/2005	FIDELITY SPARTAN U S TREASURY MONEY MARKET W/H TAX DIV FDLXX	(5)	-	* [1]	-	-	214,765,607	-	-
9/30/2005	W/H TAX DIV S	(534)	-	* [1]	-	-	214,765,607	-	-
9/30/2005	W/H TAX DIV PEP	(3,197)	-	* [1]	-	-	214,765,607	-	-
10/3/2005	W/H TAX DIV KO	(8,981)	-	* [1]	-	-	214,765,607	-	-
10/5/2005	W/H TAX DIV HPQ	(3,255)	-	* [1]	-	-	214,765,607	-	-
10/11/2005	W/H TAX DIV MO	(23,156)	-	* [1]	-	-	214,765,607	-	-
10/12/2005	FIDELITY SPARTAN U S TREASURY MONEY MARKET W/H TAX DIV FDLXX	(109)	-	* [1]	-	-	214,765,607	-	-
10/13/2005	FIDELITY SPARTAN U S TREASURY MONEY MARKET W/H TAX DIV FDLXX	(0)	-	* [1]	-	-	214,765,607	-	-
10/14/2005	FIDELITY SPARTAN U S TREASURY MONEY MARKET W/H TAX DIV FDLXX	(0)	-	* [1]	-	-	214,765,607	-	-
10/19/2005	FIDELITY SPARTAN U S TREASURY MONEY MARKET W/H TAX DIV FDLXX	(1)	-	* [1]	-	-	214,765,607	-	-
10/25/2005	W/H TAX DIV GE	(24,083)	-	* [1]	-	-	214,765,607	-	-
10/31/2005	W/H TAX DIV MWD	(2,844)	-	* [1]	-	-	214,765,607	-	-
11/1/2005	CHECK WIRE	(6,000,000)	-	(6,000,000)	-	-	208,765,607	-	(6,000,000)
11/15/2005	W/H TAX DIV ABT	(4,345)	-	* [1]	-	-	208,765,607	-	-
11/15/2005	W/H TAX DIV PG	(14,365)	-	* [1]	-	-	208,765,607	-	-
11/17/2005	FIDELITY SPARTAN U S TREASURY MONEY MARKET W/H TAX DIV FDLXX	(45)	-	* [1]	-	-	208,765,607	-	-
11/21/2005	W/H TAX DIV GS	(1,644)	-	* [1]	-	-	208,765,607	-	-
11/21/2005	W/H TAX DIV TXN	(738)	-	* [1]	-	-	208,765,607	-	-
11/23/2005	W/H TAX DIV MER	(2,631)	-	* [1]	-	-	208,765,607	-	-
11/23/2005	W/H TAX DIV C	(33,572)	-	* [1]	-	-	208,765,607	-	-
11/30/2005	CHECK WIRE	(3,000,000)	-	(3,000,000)	-	-	205,765,607	-	(3,000,000)
11/30/2005	FIDELITY SPARTAN U S TREASURY MONEY MARKET W/H TAX DIV FDLXX	(6)	-	* [1]	-	-	205,765,607	-	-

Column 1	Column 2	Column 3	Column 4	Column 5	Column 6	Column 7	Column 8	Column 9	Column 10
Date	Transaction Description	Transaction Amount Reported in Customer Statement	Cash Deposits	Cash Withdrawals	Transfers of Principal In	Transfers of Principal Out	Balance of Principal	2-Year Initial Transfers	6-Year Initial Transfers
12/1/2005	W/H TAX DIV INTC	(7,194)	-	* [1]	-	-	205,765,607	-	-
12/1/2005	W/H TAX DIV WFC	(12,997)	-	* [1]	-	-	205,765,607	-	-
12/2/2005	W/H TAX DIV BA	(2,960)	-	* [1]	-	-	205,765,607	-	-
12/6/2005	W/H TAX DIV PFE	(20,912)	-	* [1]	-	-	205,765,607	-	-
12/8/2005	W/H TAX DIV MSFT	(10,910)	-	* [1]	-	-	205,765,607	-	-
12/9/2005	W/H TAX DIV XOM	(27,181)	-	* [1]	-	-	205,765,607	-	-
12/12/2005	W/H TAX DIV UTX	(3,377)	-	* [1]	-	-	205,765,607	-	-
12/12/2005	W/H TAX DIV MMM	(4,973)	-	* [1]	-	-	205,765,607	-	-
12/12/2005	W/H TAX DIV IBM	(4,736)	-	* [1]	-	-	205,765,607	-	-
12/12/2005	W/H TAX DIV CVX	(15,209)	-	* [1]	-	-	205,765,607	-	-
12/13/2005	W/H TAX DIV JNJ	(14,712)	-	* [1]	-	-	205,765,607	-	-
12/15/2005	W/H TAX DIV TWX	(3,464)	-	* [1]	-	-	205,765,607	-	-
12/15/2005	W/H TAX DIV KO	(8,512)	-	* [1]	-	-	205,765,607	-	-
12/15/2005	W/H TAX DIV HD	(3,157)	-	* [1]	-	-	205,765,607	-	-
12/16/2005	FIDELITY SPARTAN U S TREASURY MONEY MARKET W/H TAX DIV FDLXX	(3)	-	* [1]	-	-	205,765,607	-	-
12/16/2005	W/H TAX DIV AIG	(5,722)	-	* [1]	-	-	205,765,607	-	-
12/22/2005	FIDELITY SPARTAN U S TREASURY MONEY MARKET W/H TAX DIV FDLXX	(13)	-	* [1]	-	-	205,765,607	-	-
12/23/2005	W/H TAX DIV BAC	(29,599)	-	* [1]	-	-	205,765,607	-	-
12/30/2005	FIDELITY SPARTAN U S TREASURY MONEY MARKET W/H TAX DIV FDLXX	(9)	-	* [1]	-	-	205,765,607	-	-
12/30/2005	W/H TAX DIV S	(1,085)	-	* [1]	-	-	205,765,607	-	-
1/3/2006	W/H TAX DIV VIA.B	(1,366)	-	* [1]	-	-	205,765,607	-	-
1/3/2006	W/H TAX DIV MRK	(12,497)	-	* [1]	-	-	205,765,607	-	-
1/3/2006	W/H TAX DIV PEP	(6,499)	-	* [1]	-	-	205,765,607	-	-
1/3/2006	W/H TAX DIV WMT	(3,647)	-	* [1]	-	-	205,765,607	-	-
1/4/2006	W/H TAX DIV HPQ	(3,405)	-	* [1]	-	-	205,765,607	-	-
1/13/2006	FIDELITY SPARTAN U S TREASURY MONEY MARKET W/H TAX DIV FDLXX	(7)	-	* [1]	-	-	205,765,607	-	-
1/31/2006	FIDELITY SPARTAN U S TREASURY MONEY MARKET W/H TAX DIV FDLXX	(23)	-	* [1]	-	-	205,765,607	-	-
1/31/2006	W/H TAX DIV MS	(4,043)	-	* [1]	-	-	205,765,607	-	-
2/1/2006	W/H TAX DIV VZ	(3,656)	-	* [1]	-	-	205,765,607	-	-
2/1/2006	W/H TAX DIV T	(4,202)	-	* [1]	-	-	205,765,607	-	-
2/13/2006	W/H TAX DIV TXN	(660)	-	* [1]	-	-	205,765,607	-	-
2/15/2006	W/H TAX DIV PG	(12,926)	-	* [1]	-	-	205,765,607	-	-
2/15/2006	W/H TAX DIV ABT	(5,833)	-	* [1]	-	-	205,765,607	-	-
2/23/2006	W/H TAX DIV GS	(1,560)	-	* [1]	-	-	205,765,607	-	-
2/24/2006	W/H TAX DIV C	(33,867)	-	* [1]	-	-	205,765,607	-	-
2/28/2006	FIDELITY SPARTAN U S TREASURY MONEY MARKET W/H TAX DIV FDLXX	(4)	-	* [1]	-	-	205,765,607	-	-
2/28/2006	W/H TAX DIV MER	(3,119)	-	* [1]	-	-	205,765,607	-	-
3/1/2006	W/H TAX DIV WFC	(11,678)	-	* [1]	-	-	205,765,607	-	-
3/1/2006	W/H TAX DIV INTC	(8,209)	-	* [1]	-	-	205,765,607	-	-
3/3/2006	W/H TAX DIV BA	(3,369)	-	* [1]	-	-	205,765,607	-	-
3/7/2006	W/H TAX DIV UPS	(5,690)	-	* [1]	-	-	205,765,607	-	-
3/7/2006	W/H TAX DIV PFE	(24,193)	-	* [1]	-	-	205,765,607	-	-
3/8/2006	CHECK WIRE	(16,000,000)	-	(16,000,000)	-	-	189,765,607	-	(16,000,000)
3/9/2006	W/H TAX DIV MSFT	(11,315)	-	* [1]	-	-	189,765,607	-	-
3/10/2006	W/H TAX DIV UTX	(3,019)	-	* [1]	-	-	189,765,607	-	-
3/10/2006	FIDELITY SPARTAN U S TREASURY MONEY MARKET W/H TAX DIV FDLXX	(3)	-	* [1]	-	-	189,765,607	-	-
3/10/2006	W/H TAX DIV CVX	(13,833)	-	* [1]	-	-	189,765,607	-	-
3/10/2006	W/H TAX DIV XOM	(27,083)	-	* [1]	-	-	189,765,607	-	-
3/10/2006	W/H TAX DIV IBM	(4,291)	-	* [1]	-	-	189,765,607	-	-
3/10/2006	W/H TAX DIV TGT	(1,248)	-	* [1]	-	-	189,765,607	-	-

Column 1	Column 2	Column 3	Column 4	Column 5	Column 6	Column 7	Column 8	Column 9	Column 10
Date	Transaction Description	Transaction Amount Reported in Customer Statement	Cash Deposits	Cash Withdrawals	Transfers of Principal In	Transfers of Principal Out	Balance of Principal	2-Year Initial Transfers	6-Year Initial Transfers
3/13/2006	W/H TAX DIV MMM	(4,592)	-	* [1]	-	-	189,765,607	-	-
3/14/2006	W/H TAX DIV INJ	(13,587)	-	* [1]	-	-	189,765,607	-	-
3/15/2006	W/H TAX DIV TWX	(3,194)	-	* [1]	-	-	189,765,607	-	-
3/17/2006	W/H TAX DIV AIG	(5,277)	-	* [1]	-	-	189,765,607	-	-
3/23/2006	W/H TAX DIV HD	(4,305)	-	* [1]	-	-	189,765,607	-	-
3/24/2006	W/H TAX DIV BAC	(31,816)	-	* [1]	-	-	189,765,607	-	-
3/30/2006	FIDELITY SPARTAN U S TREASURY MONEY MARKET W/H TAX DIV FDLXX	(17)	-	* [1]	-	-	189,765,607	-	-
3/31/2006	FIDELITY SPARTAN U S TREASURY MONEY MARKET W/H TAX DIV FDLXX	(1)	-	* [1]	-	-	189,765,607	-	-
3/31/2006	W/H TAX DIV S	(1,018)	-	* [1]	-	-	189,765,607	-	-
3/31/2006	W/H TAX DIV PEP	(5,839)	-	* [1]	-	-	189,765,607	-	-
4/3/2006	W/H TAX DIV MRK	(11,379)	-	* [1]	-	-	189,765,607	-	-
4/3/2006	W/H TAX DIV WMT	(5,810)	-	* [1]	-	-	189,765,607	-	-
4/3/2006	W/H TAX DIV KO	(8,755)	-	* [1]	-	-	189,765,607	-	-
4/5/2006	W/H TAX DIV HPQ	(3,134)	-	* [1]	-	-	189,765,607	-	-
4/5/2006	FIDELITY SPARTAN U S TREASURY MONEY MARKET W/H TAX DIV FDLXX	(2)	-	* [1]	-	-	189,765,607	-	-
4/7/2006	W/H TAX DIV SLB	(1,933)	-	(1,933)	-	-	189,763,674	-	-
4/7/2006	FIDELITY SPARTAN U S TREASURY MONEY MARKET W/H TAX DIV FDLXX	(1)	-	* [1]	-	-	189,763,674	-	-
4/10/2006	W/H TAX DIV MO	(22,958)	-	* [1]	-	-	189,763,674	-	-
4/21/2006	FIDELITY SPARTAN U S TREASURY MONEY MARKET W/H TAX DIV FDLXX	(4)	-	* [1]	-	-	189,763,674	-	-
4/25/2006	W/H TAX DIV GE	(36,131)	-	* [1]	-	-	189,763,674	-	-
4/28/2006	CXL W/H TAX DIV SLB	1,933	-	1,933	-	-	189,765,607	-	-
4/28/2006	FIDELITY SPARTAN U S TREASURY MONEY MARKET W/H TAX DIV FDLXX	(6)	-	* [1]	-	-	189,765,607	-	-
4/28/2006	W/H TAX DIV MDT	(1,494)	-	* [1]	-	-	189,765,607	-	-
4/28/2006	W/H TAX DIV MS	(3,791)	-	* [1]	-	-	189,765,607	-	-
5/1/2006	W/H TAX DIV T	(16,728)	-	* [1]	-	-	189,765,607	-	-
5/1/2006	W/H TAX DIV VZ	(15,476)	-	* [1]	-	-	189,765,607	-	-
5/1/2006	W/H TAX DIV JPM	(11,341)	-	* [1]	-	-	189,765,607	-	-
5/5/2006	FIDELITY SPARTAN U S TREASURY MONEY MARKET W/H TAX DIV FDLXX	(11)	-	* [1]	-	-	189,765,607	-	-
5/10/2006	W/H TAX DIV AXP	(1,966)	-	* [1]	-	-	189,765,607	-	-
5/10/2006	FIDELITY SPARTAN U S TREASURY MONEY MARKET W/H TAX DIV FDLXX	(1)	-	* [1]	-	-	189,765,607	-	-
5/15/2006	W/H TAX DIV PG	(13,420)	-	* [1]	-	-	189,765,607	-	-
5/15/2006	W/H TAX DIV ABT	(5,868)	-	* [1]	-	-	189,765,607	-	-
5/22/2006	W/H TAX DIV CAT	(2,240)	-	* [1]	-	-	189,765,607	-	-
5/22/2006	W/H TAX DIV TXN	(632)	-	* [1]	-	-	189,765,607	-	-
5/24/2006	W/H TAX DIV MER	(2,965)	-	* [1]	-	-	189,765,607	-	-
5/25/2006	W/H TAX DIV GS	(2,048)	-	* [1]	-	-	189,765,607	-	-
5/26/2006	W/H TAX DIV C	(32,105)	-	* [1]	-	-	189,765,607	-	-
5/31/2006	W/H TAX DIV UPS	(5,408)	-	* [1]	-	-	189,765,607	-	-
5/31/2006	FIDELITY SPARTAN U S TREASURY MONEY MARKET W/H TAX DIV FDLXX	(34)	-	* [1]	-	-	189,765,607	-	-
6/1/2006	W/H TAX DIV INTC	(7,708)	-	* [1]	-	-	189,765,607	-	-
6/1/2006	W/H TAX DIV WFC	(11,717)	-	* [1]	-	-	189,765,607	-	-
6/2/2006	W/H TAX DIV BA	(3,202)	-	* [1]	-	-	189,765,607	-	-
6/5/2006	W/H TAX DIV WMT	(5,562)	-	* [1]	-	-	189,765,607	-	-
6/6/2006	W/H TAX DIV PFE	(23,339)	-	* [1]	-	-	189,765,607	-	-
6/6/2006	W/H TAX DIV BMY	(7,207)	-	* [1]	-	-	189,765,607	-	-
6/8/2006	CHECK WIRE	10,000,000	10,000,000	-	-	-	199,765,607	-	-
6/8/2006	W/H TAX DIV MSFT	(10,566)	-	* [1]	-	-	199,765,607	-	-
6/9/2006	W/H TAX DIV XOM	(25,906)	-	* [1]	-	-	199,765,607	-	-
6/12/2006	W/H TAX DIV IBM	(6,190)	-	* [1]	-	-	199,765,607	-	-
6/12/2006	W/H TAX DIV MMM	(4,364)	-	* [1]	-	-	199,765,607	-	-
6/12/2006	W/H TAX DIV UTX	(1,728)	-	* [1]	-	-	199,765,607	-	-

Column 1	Column 2	Column 3	Column 4	Column 5	Column 6	Column 7	Column 8	Column 9	Column 10
Date	Transaction Description	Transaction Amount Reported in Customer Statement	Cash Deposits	Cash Withdrawals	Transfers of Principal In	Transfers of Principal Out	Balance of Principal	2-Year Initial Transfers	6-Year Initial Transfers
6/13/2006	W/H TAX DIV JNJ	(14,676)	-	* [1]	-	-	199,765,607	-	-
6/15/2006	FIDELITY SPARTAN U S TREASURY MONEY MARKET W/H TAX DIV FDLXX	(24)	-	* [1]	-	-	199,765,607	-	-
6/15/2006	W/H TAX DIV TWX	(2,966)	-	* [1]	-	-	199,765,607	-	-
6/22/2006	W/H TAX DIV HD	(4,269)	-	* [1]	-	-	199,765,607	-	-
6/23/2006	W/H TAX DIV BAC	(30,833)	-	* [1]	-	-	199,765,607	-	-
6/30/2006	W/H TAX DIV PEP	(6,409)	-	* [1]	-	-	199,765,607	-	-
6/30/2006	FIDELITY SPARTAN U S TREASURY MONEY MARKET W/H TAX DIV FDLXX	(50)	-	* [1]	-	-	199,765,607	-	-
6/30/2006	W/H TAX DIV S	(978)	-	* [1]	-	-	199,765,607	-	-
7/3/2006	W/H TAX DIV KO	(5,834)	-	* [1]	-	-	199,765,607	-	-
7/3/2006	W/H TAX DIV CVX	(15,417)	-	* [1]	-	-	199,765,607	-	-
7/3/2006	W/H TAX DIV MRK	(10,815)	-	* [1]	-	-	199,765,607	-	-
7/3/2006	W/H TAX DIV AIG	(5,159)	-	* [1]	-	-	199,765,607	-	-
7/5/2006	W/H TAX DIV HPQ	(3,011)	-	* [1]	-	-	199,765,607	-	-
7/7/2006	W/H TAX DIV SLB	(2,073)	-	(2,073)	-	-	199,763,534	-	-
7/10/2006	W/H TAX DIV MO	(15,056)	-	* [1]	-	-	199,763,534	-	-
7/14/2006	FIDELITY SPARTAN U S TREASURY MONEY MARKET W/H TAX DIV FDLXX	(39)	-	* [1]	-	-	199,763,534	-	-
7/21/2006	FIDELITY SPARTAN U S TREASURY MONEY MARKET W/H TAX DIV FDLXX	(5)	-	* [1]	-	-	199,763,534	-	-
7/31/2006	W/H TAX DIV MS	(1,664)	-	* [1]	-	-	199,763,534	-	-
7/31/2006	FIDELITY SPARTAN U S TREASURY MONEY MARKET W/H TAX DIV FDLXX	(34)	-	* [1]	-	-	199,763,534	-	-
8/7/2006	CXL W/H TAX DIV SLB	2,073	-	2,073	-	-	199,765,607	-	-
8/15/2006	W/H TAX DIV PG	(10,426)	-	* [1]	-	-	199,765,607	-	-
8/15/2006	W/H TAX DIV ABT	(2,576)	-	* [1]	-	-	199,765,607	-	-
8/17/2006	FIDELITY SPARTAN U S TREASURY MONEY MARKET W/H TAX DIV FDLXX	(22)	-	* [1]	-	-	199,765,607	-	-
8/21/2006	W/H TAX DIV TXN	(475)	-	* [1]	-	-	199,765,607	-	-
8/21/2006	W/H TAX DIV CAT	(1,079)	-	* [1]	-	-	199,765,607	-	-
8/23/2006	W/H TAX DIV MER	(2,273)	-	* [1]	-	-	199,765,607	-	-
8/24/2006	W/H TAX DIV GS	(1,591)	-	* [1]	-	-	199,765,607	-	-
8/25/2006	W/H TAX DIV C	(24,749)	-	* [1]	-	-	199,765,607	-	-
9/1/2006	FIDELITY SPARTAN U S TREASURY MONEY MARKET W/H TAX DIV FDLXX	(14)	-	* [1]	-	-	199,765,607	-	-
9/1/2006	W/H TAX DIV WFC	(9,672)	-	* [1]	-	-	199,765,607	-	-
9/1/2006	W/H TAX DIV INTC	(5,948)	-	* [1]	-	-	199,765,607	-	-
9/1/2006	W/H TAX DIV BA	(2,454)	-	* [1]	-	-	199,765,607	-	-
9/5/2006	W/H TAX DIV PFE	(17,917)	-	* [1]	-	-	199,765,607	-	-
9/5/2006	W/H TAX DIV WMT	(4,263)	-	* [1]	-	-	199,765,607	-	-
9/6/2006	W/H TAX DIV UPS	(4,145)	-	* [1]	-	-	199,765,607	-	-
9/11/2006	W/H TAX DIV UTX	(2,650)	-	* [1]	-	-	199,765,607	-	-
9/11/2006	W/H TAX DIV XOM	(19,615)	-	* [1]	-	-	199,765,607	-	-
9/11/2006	W/H TAX DIV CVX	(11,817)	-	* [1]	-	-	199,765,607	-	-
9/11/2006	W/H TAX DIV IBM	(4,636)	-	* [1]	-	-	199,765,607	-	-
9/12/2006	W/H TAX DIV JNJ	(11,249)	-	* [1]	-	-	199,765,607	-	-
9/12/2006	W/H TAX DIV MMM	(3,345)	-	* [1]	-	-	199,765,607	-	-
9/14/2006	W/H TAX DIV MSFT	(8,064)	-	* [1]	-	-	199,765,607	-	-
9/15/2006	W/H TAX DIV TWX	(2,428)	-	* [1]	-	-	199,765,607	-	-
9/15/2006	W/H TAX DIV AIG	(4,350)	-	* [1]	-	-	199,765,607	-	-
9/15/2006	FIDELITY SPARTAN U S TREASURY MONEY MARKET W/H TAX DIV FDLXX	(10)	-	* [1]	-	-	199,765,607	-	-
9/18/2006	CHECK WIRE	(11,500,000)	-	(11,500,000)	-	-	188,265,607	-	(11,500,000)
9/21/2006	W/H TAX DIV HD	(3,136)	-	* [1]	-	-	188,265,607	-	-
9/22/2006	W/H TAX DIV BAC	(25,961)	-	* [1]	-	-	188,265,607	-	-
9/27/2006	FIDELITY SPARTAN U S TREASURY MONEY MARKET W/H TAX DIV FDLXX	(21)	-	* [1]	-	-	188,265,607	-	-
9/29/2006	W/H TAX DIV PEP	(5,027)	-	* [1]	-	-	188,265,607	-	-
9/29/2006	W/H TAX DIV S	(763)	-	* [1]	-	-	188,265,607	-	-

Column 1	Column 2	Column 3	Column 4	Column 5	Column 6	Column 7	Column 8	Column 9	Column 10
<u>Date</u>	<u>Transaction Description</u>	<u>Transaction Amount Reported in Customer Statement</u>	<u>Cash Deposits</u>	<u>Cash Withdrawals</u>	<u>Transfers of Principal In</u>	<u>Transfers of Principal Out</u>	<u>Balance of Principal</u>	<u>2-Year Initial Transfers</u>	<u>6-Year Initial Transfers</u>
10/2/2006	W/H TAX DIV MRK	(8,290)	-	* [1]	-	-	188,265,607	-	-
10/2/2006	W/H TAX DIV KO	(6,481)	-	* [1]	-	-	188,265,607	-	-
10/4/2006	W/H TAX DIV HPQ	(2,254)	-	* [1]	-	-	188,265,607	-	-
10/10/2006	W/H TAX DIV MO	(18,320)	-	* [1]	-	-	188,265,607	-	-
10/17/2006	FIDELITY SPARTAN U S TREASURY MONEY MARKET W/H TAX DIV FDLXX	(28)	-	* [1]	-	-	188,265,607	-	-
10/25/2006	W/H TAX DIV GE	(26,489)	-	* [1]	-	-	188,265,607	-	-
10/26/2006	FIDELITY SPARTAN U S TREASURY MONEY MARKET W/H TAX DIV FDLXX	(6)	-	* [1]	-	-	188,265,607	-	-
10/27/2006	FIDELITY SPARTAN U S TREASURY MONEY MARKET W/H TAX DIV FDLXX	(1)	-	* [1]	-	-	188,265,607	-	-
10/30/2006	FIDELITY SPARTAN U S TREASURY MONEY MARKET W/H TAX DIV FDLXX	(5)	-	* [1]	-	-	188,265,607	-	-
10/31/2006	FIDELITY SPARTAN U S TREASURY MONEY MARKET W/H TAX DIV FDLXX	(0)	-	* [1]	-	-	188,265,607	-	-
11/7/2006	CHECK WIRE	(38,500,000)	-	(38,500,000)	-	-	149,765,607	-	(38,500,000)
11/20/2006	FIDELITY SPARTAN U S TREASURY MONEY MARKET W/H TAX DIV FDLXX	(15)	-	* [1]	-	-	149,765,607	-	-
11/20/2006	W/H TAX DIV TXN	(786)	-	* [1]	-	-	149,765,607	-	-
11/22/2006	W/H TAX DIV MER	(2,888)	-	* [1]	-	-	149,765,607	-	-
11/22/2006	W/H TAX DIV C	(30,003)	-	* [1]	-	-	149,765,607	-	-
11/27/2006	FIDELITY SPARTAN U S TREASURY MONEY MARKET W/H TAX DIV FDLXX	(6)	-	* [1]	-	-	149,765,607	-	-
11/30/2006	FIDELITY SPARTAN U S TREASURY MONEY MARKET W/H TAX DIV FDLXX	(0)	-	* [1]	-	-	149,765,607	-	-
1/2/2007	W/H TAX DIV PEP	(5,330)	-	* [1]	-	-	149,765,607	-	-
1/2/2007	W/H TAX DIV MRK	(8,762)	-	* [1]	-	-	149,765,607	-	-
1/2/2007	W/H TAX DIV WMT	(4,424)	-	* [1]	-	-	149,765,607	-	-
1/3/2007	W/H TAX DIV WB	(11,600)	-	* [1]	-	-	149,765,607	-	-
1/3/2007	W/H TAX DIV TGT	(1,052)	-	* [1]	-	-	149,765,607	-	-
1/3/2007	W/H TAX DIV BA	(2,631)	-	* [1]	-	-	149,765,607	-	-
1/3/2007	W/H TAX DIV TWX	(2,389)	-	* [1]	-	-	149,765,607	-	-
1/3/2007	W/H TAX DIV BAC	(27,076)	-	* [1]	-	-	149,765,607	-	-
1/3/2007	W/H TAX DIV UTX	(2,840)	-	* [1]	-	-	149,765,607	-	-
1/3/2007	W/H TAX DIV KO	(6,731)	-	* [1]	-	-	149,765,607	-	-
1/3/2007	W/H TAX DIV XOM	(20,070)	-	* [1]	-	-	149,765,607	-	-
1/3/2007	W/H TAX DIV IBM	(4,784)	-	* [1]	-	-	149,765,607	-	-
1/3/2007	W/H TAX DIV PFE	(18,531)	-	* [1]	-	-	149,765,607	-	-
1/3/2007	FIDELITY SPARTAN U S TREASURY MONEY MARKET W/H TAX DIV FDLXX	(2)	-	* [1]	-	-	149,765,607	-	-
1/3/2007	W/H TAX DIV MMM	(3,586)	-	* [1]	-	-	149,765,607	-	-
1/3/2007	W/H TAX DIV MSFT	(9,098)	-	* [1]	-	-	149,765,607	-	-
1/3/2007	W/H TAX DIV EXC	(2,728)	-	* [1]	-	-	149,765,607	-	-
1/3/2007	FIDELITY SPARTAN U S TREASURY MONEY MARKET W/H TAX DIV FDLXX	(21)	-	* [1]	-	-	149,765,607	-	-
1/3/2007	W/H TAX DIV MCD	(12,667)	-	* [1]	-	-	149,765,607	-	-
1/3/2007	W/H TAX DIV HPQ	(2,337)	-	* [1]	-	-	149,765,607	-	-
1/3/2007	W/H TAX DIV INTC	(7,199)	-	* [1]	-	-	149,765,607	-	-
1/3/2007	W/H TAX DIV CVX	(12,161)	-	* [1]	-	-	149,765,607	-	-
1/3/2007	W/H TAX DIV AIG	(4,560)	-	* [1]	-	-	149,765,607	-	-
1/3/2007	W/H TAX DIV JNJ	(11,693)	-	* [1]	-	-	149,765,607	-	-
1/3/2007	W/H TAX DIV S	(790)	-	* [1]	-	-	149,765,607	-	-
1/3/2007	W/H TAX DIV HD	(4,886)	-	* [1]	-	-	149,765,607	-	-
1/3/2007	W/H TAX DIV WFC	(11,745)	-	* [1]	-	-	149,765,607	-	-
1/4/2007	W/H TAX DIV UPS	(4,443)	-	* [1]	-	-	149,765,607	-	-
1/10/2007	W/H TAX DIV MO	(5,236)	-	* [1]	-	-	149,765,607	-	-
1/12/2007	W/H TAX DIV DIS	(6,915)	-	* [1]	-	-	149,765,607	-	-
1/25/2007	W/H TAX DIV GE	(17,850)	-	* [1]	-	-	149,765,607	-	-
1/29/2007	FIDELITY SPARTAN U S TREASURY MONEY MARKET W/H TAX DIV FDLXX	(4)	-	* [1]	-	-	149,765,607	-	-
1/31/2007	FIDELITY SPARTAN U S TREASURY MONEY MARKET W/H TAX DIV FDLXX	(1)	-	* [1]	-	-	149,765,607	-	-

Column 1	Column 2	Column 3	Column 4	Column 5	Column 6	Column 7	Column 8	Column 9	Column 10
Date	Transaction Description	Transaction Amount Reported in Customer Statement	Cash Deposits	Cash Withdrawals	Transfers of Principal In	Transfers of Principal Out	Balance of Principal	2-Year Initial Transfers	6-Year Initial Transfers
2/6/2007	FIDELITY SPARTAN U S TREASURY MONEY MARKET W/H TAX DIV FDLXX	(4)	-	* [1]	-	-	149,765,607	-	-
2/13/2007	FIDELITY SPARTAN U S TREASURY MONEY MARKET W/H TAX DIV FDLXX	(16)	-	* [1]	-	-	149,765,607	-	-
2/16/2007	FIDELITY SPARTAN U S TREASURY MONEY MARKET W/H TAX DIV FDLXX	(7)	-	* [1]	-	-	149,765,607	-	-
2/20/2007	FIDELITY SPARTAN U S TREASURY MONEY MARKET W/H TAX DIV FDLXX	(6)	-	* [1]	-	-	149,765,607	-	-
2/22/2007	FIDELITY SPARTAN U S TREASURY MONEY MARKET W/H TAX DIV FDLXX	(2)	-	* [1]	-	-	149,765,607	-	-
2/23/2007	FIDELITY SPARTAN U S TREASURY MONEY MARKET W/H TAX DIV FDLXX	(1)	-	* [1]	-	-	149,765,607	-	-
2/28/2007	FIDELITY SPARTAN U S TREASURY MONEY MARKET W/H TAX DIV FDLXX	(3)	-	* [1]	-	-	149,765,607	-	-
3/1/2007	W/H TAX DIV COP	(3,866)	-	* [1]	-	-	149,765,607	-	-
3/6/2007	W/H TAX DIV UPS	(2,563)	-	* [1]	-	-	149,765,607	-	-
3/9/2007	FIDELITY SPARTAN U S TREASURY MONEY MARKET W/H TAX DIV FDLXX	(6)	-	* [1]	-	-	149,765,607	-	-
3/12/2007	W/H TAX DIV TGT	(599)	-	* [1]	-	-	149,765,607	-	-
3/12/2007	W/H TAX DIV MMM	(3,174)	-	* [1]	-	-	149,765,607	-	-
3/12/2007	W/H TAX DIV CVX	(3,617)	-	* [1]	-	-	149,765,607	-	-
3/12/2007	W/H TAX DIV UTX	(882)	-	* [1]	-	-	149,765,607	-	-
3/13/2007	W/H TAX DIV JNJ	(9,608)	-	* [1]	-	-	149,765,607	-	-
3/15/2007	W/H TAX DIV TWX	(1,909)	-	* [1]	-	-	149,765,607	-	-
3/15/2007	W/H TAX DIV WB	(9,257)	-	* [1]	-	-	149,765,607	-	-
3/16/2007	W/H TAX DIV AIG	(3,682)	-	* [1]	-	-	149,765,607	-	-
3/20/2007	FIDELITY SPARTAN U S TREASURY MONEY MARKET W/H TAX DIV FDLXX	(9)	-	* [1]	-	-	149,765,607	-	-
3/22/2007	W/H TAX DIV HD	(4,091)	-	* [1]	-	-	149,765,607	-	-
3/23/2007	W/H TAX DIV BAC	(21,753)	-	* [1]	-	-	149,765,607	-	-
3/28/2007	CHECK WIRE	10,000,000	10,000,000	-	-	-	159,765,607	-	-
3/28/2007	FIDELITY SPARTAN U S TREASURY MONEY MARKET W/H TAX DIV FDLXX	(19)	-	* [1]	-	-	159,765,607	-	-
3/30/2007	W/H TAX DIV PEP	(4,999)	-	* [1]	-	-	159,765,607	-	-
3/30/2007	FIDELITY SPARTAN U S TREASURY MONEY MARKET W/H TAX DIV FDLXX	(2)	-	* [1]	-	-	159,765,607	-	-
3/30/2007	W/H TAX DIV S	(732)	-	* [1]	-	-	159,765,607	-	-
4/2/2007	W/H TAX DIV WMT	(5,546)	-	* [1]	-	-	159,765,607	-	-
4/2/2007	W/H TAX DIV KO	(7,176)	-	* [1]	-	-	159,765,607	-	-
4/2/2007	W/H TAX DIV MRK	(8,566)	-	* [1]	-	-	159,765,607	-	-
4/4/2007	W/H TAX DIV HPQ	(2,274)	-	* [1]	-	-	159,765,607	-	-
4/10/2007	CHECK WIRE	10,000,000	10,000,000	-	-	-	169,765,607	-	-
4/10/2007	W/H TAX DIV MO	(18,543)	-	* [1]	-	-	169,765,607	-	-
4/16/2007	CHECK WIRE	6,000,000	6,000,000	-	-	-	175,765,607	-	-
4/19/2007	FIDELITY SPARTAN U S TREASURY MONEY MARKET W/H TAX DIV FDLXX	(33)	-	* [1]	-	-	175,765,607	-	-
4/20/2007	FIDELITY SPARTAN U S TREASURY MONEY MARKET W/H TAX DIV FDLXX	(1)	-	* [1]	-	-	175,765,607	-	-
4/25/2007	W/H TAX DIV GE	(25,225)	-	* [1]	-	-	175,765,607	-	-
4/30/2007	CHECK WIRE	5,000,000	5,000,000	-	-	-	180,765,607	-	-
5/4/2007	W/H TAX DIV CVS	(741)	-	* [1]	-	-	180,765,607	-	-
5/9/2007	CHECK WIRE	16,000,000	16,000,000	-	-	-	196,765,607	-	-
5/15/2007	W/H TAX DIV PG	(13,141)	-	* [1]	-	-	196,765,607	-	-
5/16/2007	CHECK WIRE	12,000,000	12,000,000	-	-	-	208,765,607	-	-
5/21/2007	FIDELITY SPARTAN U S TREASURY MONEY MARKET W/H TAX DIV FDLXX	(27)	-	* [1]	-	-	208,765,607	-	-
5/23/2007	W/H TAX DIV MER	(3,479)	-	* [1]	-	-	208,765,607	-	-
5/24/2007	W/H TAX DIV GS	(1,017)	-	* [1]	-	-	208,765,607	-	-
5/25/2007	W/H TAX DIV C	(31,009)	-	* [1]	-	-	208,765,607	-	-
5/31/2007	FIDELITY SPARTAN U S TREASURY MONEY MARKET W/H TAX DIV FDLXX	(5)	-	* [1]	-	-	208,765,607	-	-
6/1/2007	W/H TAX DIV COP	(7,995)	-	* [1]	-	-	208,765,607	-	-
6/1/2007	W/H TAX DIV BA	(3,211)	-	* [1]	-	-	208,765,607	-	-
6/1/2007	W/H TAX DIV WFC	(11,131)	-	* [1]	-	-	208,765,607	-	-
6/1/2007	W/H TAX DIV INTC	(7,702)	-	* [1]	-	-	208,765,607	-	-
6/4/2007	W/H TAX DIV WMT	(6,317)	-	* [1]	-	-	208,765,607	-	-

Column 1	Column 2	Column 3	Column 4	Column 5	Column 6	Column 7	Column 8	Column 9	Column 10
Date	Transaction Description	Transaction Amount Reported in Customer Statement	Cash Deposits	Cash Withdrawals	Transfers of Principal In	Transfers of Principal Out	Balance of Principal	2-Year Initial Transfers	6-Year Initial Transfers
6/5/2007	W/H TAX DIV UPS	(5,102)	-	* [1]	-	-	208,765,607	-	-
6/5/2007	W/H TAX DIV PFE	(24,339)	-	* [1]	-	-	208,765,607	-	-
6/6/2007	W/H TAX DIV TYC	(2,353)	-	(2,353)	-	-	208,763,254	-	-
6/11/2007	W/H TAX DIV XOM	(23,445)	-	* [1]	-	-	208,763,254	-	-
6/11/2007	W/H TAX DIV UTX	(3,219)	-	* [1]	-	-	208,763,254	-	-
6/11/2007	W/H TAX DIV IBM	(7,068)	-	* [1]	-	-	208,763,254	-	-
6/11/2007	W/H TAX DIV CVX	(14,731)	-	* [1]	-	-	208,763,254	-	-
6/12/2007	W/H TAX DIV JNJ	(14,066)	-	* [1]	-	-	208,763,254	-	-
6/12/2007	W/H TAX DIV MMM	(4,241)	-	* [1]	-	-	208,763,254	-	-
6/13/2007	CHECK WIRE	3,700,000	3,700,000	-	-	-	212,463,254	-	-
6/14/2007	W/H TAX DIV MSFT	(10,232)	-	* [1]	-	-	212,463,254	-	-
6/15/2007	W/H TAX DIV AIG	(5,102)	-	* [1]	-	-	212,463,254	-	-
6/15/2007	FIDELITY SPARTAN U S TREASURY MONEY MARKET W/H TAX DIV FDLXX	(8)	-	* [1]	-	-	212,463,254	-	-
6/15/2007	W/H TAX DIV TWX	(2,509)	-	* [1]	-	-	212,463,254	-	-
6/15/2007	W/H TAX DIV WB	(12,368)	-	* [1]	-	-	212,463,254	-	-
6/20/2007	CHECK WIRE	10,000,000	10,000,000	-	-	-	222,463,254	-	-
6/21/2007	W/H TAX DIV HD	(5,466)	-	* [1]	-	-	222,463,254	-	-
6/22/2007	W/H TAX DIV BAC	(29,684)	-	* [1]	-	-	222,463,254	-	-
6/29/2007	W/H TAX DIV PEP	(7,312)	-	* [1]	-	-	222,463,254	-	-
6/29/2007	FIDELITY SPARTAN U S TREASURY MONEY MARKET W/H TAX DIV FDLXX	(16)	-	* [1]	-	-	222,463,254	-	-
6/29/2007	W/H TAX DIV S	(856)	-	* [1]	-	-	222,463,254	-	-
7/2/2007	W/H TAX DIV MRK	(9,652)	-	* [1]	-	-	222,463,254	-	-
7/2/2007	W/H TAX DIV KO	(8,016)	-	* [1]	-	-	222,463,254	-	-
7/5/2007	CHECK WIRE	9,000,000	9,000,000	-	-	-	231,463,254	-	-
7/5/2007	W/H TAX DIV HPQ	(2,562)	-	* [1]	-	-	231,463,254	-	-
7/10/2007	W/H TAX DIV MO	(16,998)	-	* [1]	-	-	231,463,254	-	-
7/11/2007	CHECK WIRE	11,500,000	11,500,000	-	-	-	242,963,254	-	-
7/17/2007	CXL W/H TAX DIV TYC	2,353	-	2,353	-	-	242,965,607	-	-
7/17/2007	FIDELITY SPARTAN U S TREASURY MONEY MARKET W/H TAX DIV FDLXX	(30)	-	* [1]	-	-	242,965,607	-	-
8/6/2007	CHECK WIRE	12,000,000	12,000,000	-	-	-	254,965,607	-	-
8/6/2007	FIDELITY SPARTAN U S TREASURY MONEY MARKET W/H TAX DIV FDLXX	(20)	-	* [1]	-	-	254,965,607	-	-
8/20/2007	CHECK WIRE	(2,500,000)	-	(2,500,000)	-	-	252,465,607	(2,500,000)	(2,500,000)
8/20/2007	FIDELITY SPARTAN U S TREASURY MONEY MARKET W/H TAX DIV FDLXX	(15)	-	* [1]	-	-	252,465,607	-	-
8/24/2007	W/H TAX DIV C	(16,262)	-	* [1]	-	-	252,465,607	-	-
9/4/2007	W/H TAX DIV INTC	(4,027)	-	* [1]	-	-	252,465,607	-	-
9/4/2007	W/H TAX DIV WFC	(6,341)	-	* [1]	-	-	252,465,607	-	-
9/4/2007	W/H TAX DIV WMT	(3,250)	-	* [1]	-	-	252,465,607	-	-
9/5/2007	W/H TAX DIV PFE	(12,523)	-	* [1]	-	-	252,465,607	-	-
9/7/2007	W/H TAX DIV BA	(1,591)	-	* [1]	-	-	252,465,607	-	-
9/10/2007	W/H TAX DIV UTX	(2,000)	-	* [1]	-	-	252,465,607	-	-
9/10/2007	W/H TAX DIV XOM	(12,131)	-	* [1]	-	-	252,465,607	-	-
9/10/2007	W/H TAX DIV CVX	(7,580)	-	* [1]	-	-	252,465,607	-	-
9/10/2007	W/H TAX DIV IBM	(3,409)	-	* [1]	-	-	252,465,607	-	-
9/13/2007	W/H TAX DIV MSFT	(5,171)	-	* [1]	-	-	252,465,607	-	-
9/14/2007	FIDELITY SPARTAN U S TREASURY MONEY MARKET W/H TAX DIV FDLXX	(24)	-	* [1]	-	-	252,465,607	-	-
9/18/2007	FIDELITY SPARTAN U S TREASURY MONEY MARKET W/H TAX DIV FDLXX	(3)	-	* [1]	-	-	252,465,607	-	-
9/26/2007	FIDELITY SPARTAN U S TREASURY MONEY MARKET W/H TAX DIV FDLXX	(18)	-	* [1]	-	-	252,465,607	-	-
10/1/2007	W/H TAX DIV KO	(3,978)	-	* [1]	-	-	252,465,607	-	-
10/10/2007	W/H TAX DIV MO	(9,192)	-	* [1]	-	-	252,465,607	-	-
10/12/2007	CHECK WIRE	(5,750,000)	-	(5,750,000)	-	-	246,715,607	(5,750,000)	(5,750,000)
10/12/2007	FIDELITY SPARTAN U S TREASURY MONEY MARKET W/H TAX DIV FDLXX	(36)	-	* [1]	-	-	246,715,607	-	-
10/25/2007	W/H TAX DIV GE	(24,278)	-	* [1]	-	-	246,715,607	-	-

Column 1	Column 2	Column 3	Column 4	Column 5	Column 6	Column 7	Column 8	Column 9	Column 10
<u>Date</u>	<u>Transaction Description</u>	<u>Transaction Amount Reported in Customer Statement</u>	<u>Cash Deposits</u>	<u>Cash Withdrawals</u>	<u>Transfers of Principal In</u>	<u>Transfers of Principal Out</u>	<u>Balance of Principal</u>	<u>2-Year Initial Transfers</u>	<u>6-Year Initial Transfers</u>
10/31/2007	FIDELITY SPARTAN U S TREASURY MONEY MARKET W/H TAX DIV FDLXX	(2)	-	* [1]	-	-	246,715,607	-	-
11/6/2007	CHECK WIRE	15,000,000	15,000,000	-	-	-	261,715,607	-	-
11/7/2007	FIDELITY SPARTAN U S TREASURY MONEY MARKET W/H TAX DIV FDLXX	(17)	-	* [1]	-	-	261,715,607	-	-
11/13/2007	FIDELITY SPARTAN U S TREASURY MONEY MARKET W/H TAX DIV FDLXX	(19)	-	* [1]	-	-	261,715,607	-	-
11/15/2007	FIDELITY SPARTAN U S TREASURY MONEY MARKET W/H TAX DIV FDLXX	(6)	-	* [1]	-	-	261,715,607	-	-
11/19/2007	CHECK WIRE	15,000,000	15,000,000	-	-	-	276,715,607	-	-
11/20/2007	CHECK WIRE	5,000,000	5,000,000	-	-	-	281,715,607	-	-
11/21/2007	FIDELITY SPARTAN U S TREASURY MONEY MARKET W/H TAX DIV FDLXX	(5)	-	* [1]	-	-	281,715,607	-	-
11/21/2007	W/H TAX DIV C	(10,835)	-	* [1]	-	-	281,715,607	-	-
11/21/2007	W/H TAX DIV MER	(1,277)	-	* [1]	-	-	281,715,607	-	-
11/30/2007	FIDELITY SPARTAN U S TREASURY MONEY MARKET W/H TAX DIV FDLXX	(7)	-	* [1]	-	-	281,715,607	-	-
12/3/2007	W/H TAX DIV MCD	(11,039)	-	* [1]	-	-	281,715,607	-	-
12/3/2007	W/H TAX DIV COP	(2,692)	-	* [1]	-	-	281,715,607	-	-
12/7/2007	CHECK WIRE	5,000,000	5,000,000	-	-	-	286,715,607	-	-
12/10/2007	W/H TAX DIV CVX	(7,552)	-	* [1]	-	-	286,715,607	-	-
12/10/2007	W/H TAX DIV UTX	(1,993)	-	* [1]	-	-	286,715,607	-	-
12/10/2007	W/H TAX DIV EXC	(1,744)	-	* [1]	-	-	286,715,607	-	-
12/11/2007	FIDELITY SPARTAN U S TREASURY MONEY MARKET W/H TAX DIV FDLXX	(7)	-	* [1]	-	-	286,715,607	-	-
12/11/2007	W/H TAX DIV JNJ	(14,284)	-	* [1]	-	-	286,715,607	-	-
12/12/2007	W/H TAX DIV MMM	(4,264)	-	* [1]	-	-	286,715,607	-	-
12/13/2007	W/H TAX DIV MSFT	(5,480)	-	* [1]	-	-	286,715,607	-	-
12/19/2007	CHECK WIRE	(7,000,000)	-	(7,000,000)	-	-	279,715,607	(7,000,000)	(7,000,000)
12/20/2007	FIDELITY SPARTAN U S TREASURY MONEY MARKET W/H TAX DIV FDLXX	(0)	-	* [1]	-	-	279,715,607	-	-
12/31/2007	FIDELITY SPARTAN U S TREASURY MONEY MARKET W/H TAX DIV FDLXX	(3)	-	* [1]	-	-	279,715,607	-	-
1/2/2008	W/H TAX DIV HPQ	(873)	-	* [1]	-	-	279,715,607	-	-
1/2/2008	W/H TAX DIV WMT	(2,229)	-	* [1]	-	-	279,715,607	-	-
1/3/2008	W/H TAX DIV UPS	(2,615)	-	* [1]	-	-	279,715,607	-	-
1/8/2008	CHECK WIRE	10,800,000	10,800,000	-	-	-	290,515,607	-	-
1/17/2008	CHECK WIRE	12,000,000	12,000,000	-	-	-	302,515,607	-	-
1/22/2008	CHECK WIRE	10,000,000	10,000,000	-	-	-	312,515,607	-	-
1/28/2008	FIDELITY SPARTAN U S TREASURY MONEY MARKET W/H TAX DIV FDLXX	(25)	-	* [1]	-	-	312,515,607	-	-
2/5/2008	CHECK WIRE	11,000,000	11,000,000	-	-	-	323,515,607	-	-
2/13/2008	CHECK WIRE	9,000,000	9,000,000	-	-	-	332,515,607	-	-
2/20/2008	FIDELITY SPARTAN U S TREASURY MONEY MARKET W/H TAX DIV FDLXX	(20)	-	* [1]	-	-	332,515,607	-	-
2/21/2008	CHECK WIRE	15,000,000	15,000,000	-	-	-	347,515,607	-	-
2/22/2008	W/H TAX DIV C	(13,898)	-	* [1]	-	-	347,515,607	-	-
2/28/2008	CHECK WIRE	15,000,000	15,000,000	-	-	-	362,515,607	-	-
2/28/2008	W/H TAX DIV GS	(1,126)	-	* [1]	-	-	362,515,607	-	-
3/3/2008	W/H TAX DIV INTC	(6,461)	-	* [1]	-	-	362,515,607	-	-
3/3/2008	W/H TAX DIV COP	(6,426)	-	* [1]	-	-	362,515,607	-	-
3/3/2008	W/H TAX DIV WFC	(9,225)	-	* [1]	-	-	362,515,607	-	-
3/4/2008	W/H TAX DIV PFE	(18,531)	-	* [1]	-	-	362,515,607	-	-
3/4/2008	W/H TAX DIV UPS	(3,981)	-	* [1]	-	-	362,515,607	-	-
3/5/2008	W/H TAX DIV MER	(2,534)	-	* [1]	-	-	362,515,607	-	-
3/7/2008	CHECK WIRE	30,000,000	30,000,000	-	-	-	392,515,607	-	-
3/7/2008	W/H TAX DIV BA	(2,574)	-	* [1]	-	-	392,515,607	-	-
3/10/2008	W/H TAX DIV UTX	(2,831)	-	* [1]	-	-	392,515,607	-	-
3/10/2008	W/H TAX DIV CVX	(10,729)	-	* [1]	-	-	392,515,607	-	-
3/10/2008	W/H TAX DIV IBM	(4,826)	-	* [1]	-	-	392,515,607	-	-
3/10/2008	W/H TAX DIV EXC	(2,815)	-	* [1]	-	-	392,515,607	-	-
3/10/2008	W/H TAX DIV XOM	(16,890)	-	* [1]	-	-	392,515,607	-	-
3/11/2008	W/H TAX DIV JNJ	(10,347)	-	* [1]	-	-	392,515,607	-	-

Column 1	Column 2	Column 3	Column 4	Column 5	Column 6	Column 7	Column 8	Column 9	Column 10
Date	Transaction Description	Transaction Amount Reported in Customer Statement	Cash Deposits	Cash Withdrawals	Transfers of Principal In	Transfers of Principal Out	Balance of Principal	2-Year Initial Transfers	6-Year Initial Transfers
3/12/2008	W/H TAX DIV MMM	(3,217)	-	* [1]	-	-	392,515,607	-	-
3/13/2008	W/H TAX DIV MSFT	(7,697)	-	* [1]	-	-	392,515,607	-	-
3/17/2008	W/H TAX DIV WB	(11,325)	-	* [1]	-	-	392,515,607	-	-
3/17/2008	W/H TAX DIV MCD	(3,921)	-	* [1]	-	-	392,515,607	-	-
3/17/2008	FIDELITY SPARTAN U S TREASURY MONEY MARKET W/H TAX DIV FDLXX	(23)	-	* [1]	-	-	392,515,607	-	-
3/17/2008	W/H TAX DIV TWX	(1,960)	-	* [1]	-	-	392,515,607	-	-
3/19/2008	FIDELITY SPARTAN U S TREASURY MONEY MARKET W/H TAX DIV FDLXX	(0)	-	* [1]	-	-	392,515,607	-	-
3/24/2008	W/H TAX DIV AIG	(4,504)	-	* [1]	-	-	392,515,607	-	-
3/27/2008	W/H TAX DIV HD	(3,257)	-	* [1]	-	-	392,515,607	-	-
3/28/2008	W/H TAX DIV BAC	(24,708)	-	* [1]	-	-	392,515,607	-	-
3/31/2008	W/H TAX DIV PEP	(5,127)	-	* [1]	-	-	392,515,607	-	-
4/1/2008	W/H TAX DIV KO	(6,724)	-	* [1]	-	-	392,515,607	-	-
4/1/2008	W/H TAX DIV MRK	(7,335)	-	* [1]	-	-	392,515,607	-	-
4/2/2008	W/H TAX DIV HPQ	(1,802)	-	* [1]	-	-	392,515,607	-	-
4/4/2008	W/H TAX DIV KFT	(3,692)	-	* [1]	-	-	392,515,607	-	-
4/4/2008	FIDELITY SPARTAN U S TREASURY MONEY MARKET W/H TAX DIV FDLXX	(5)	-	* [1]	-	-	392,515,607	-	-
4/7/2008	W/H TAX DIV WMT	(4,776)	-	* [1]	-	-	392,515,607	-	-
4/23/2008	FIDELITY SPARTAN U S TREASURY MONEY MARKET W/H TAX DIV FDLXX	(5)	-	* [1]	-	-	392,515,607	-	-
4/25/2008	W/H TAX DIV MDT	(1,306)	-	* [1]	-	-	392,515,607	-	-
4/25/2008	W/H TAX DIV GE	(27,177)	-	* [1]	-	-	392,515,607	-	-
4/30/2008	W/H TAX DIV MS	(2,587)	-	* [1]	-	-	392,515,607	-	-
4/30/2008	W/H TAX DIV JPM	(11,914)	-	* [1]	-	-	392,515,607	-	-
5/1/2008	W/H TAX DIV VZ	(11,609)	-	* [1]	-	-	392,515,607	-	-
5/1/2008	W/H TAX DIV T	(22,643)	-	* [1]	-	-	392,515,607	-	-
5/2/2008	W/H TAX DIV BK	(2,508)	-	* [1]	-	-	392,515,607	-	-
5/2/2008	W/H TAX DIV CVS	(836)	-	* [1]	-	-	392,515,607	-	-
5/9/2008	W/H TAX DIV AXP	(1,881)	-	* [1]	-	-	392,515,607	-	-
5/15/2008	W/H TAX DIV PG	(11,844)	-	* [1]	-	-	392,515,607	-	-
5/15/2008	W/H TAX DIV ABT	(5,330)	-	* [1]	-	-	392,515,607	-	-
5/20/2008	W/H TAX DIV CAT	(2,195)	-	* [1]	-	-	392,515,607	-	-
5/23/2008	W/H TAX DIV C	(15,049)	-	* [1]	-	-	392,515,607	-	-
5/28/2008	FIDELITY SPARTAN U S TREASURY MONEY MARKET W/H TAX DIV FDLXX	(26)	-	* [1]	-	-	392,515,607	-	-
5/29/2008	W/H TAX DIV GS	(1,219)	-	* [1]	-	-	392,515,607	-	-
6/2/2008	W/H TAX DIV WFC	(17,551)	-	* [1]	-	-	392,515,607	-	-
6/2/2008	W/H TAX DIV WMT	(9,861)	-	* [1]	-	-	392,515,607	-	-
6/2/2008	W/H TAX DIV COP	(4,338)	-	* [1]	-	-	392,515,607	-	-
6/2/2008	W/H TAX DIV INTC	(7,681)	-	* [1]	-	-	392,515,607	-	-
6/3/2008	W/H TAX DIV UPS	(7,905)	-	* [1]	-	-	392,515,607	-	-
6/3/2008	W/H TAX DIV PFE	(37,815)	-	* [1]	-	-	392,515,607	-	-
6/6/2008	W/H TAX DIV BA	(5,110)	-	* [1]	-	-	392,515,607	-	-
6/10/2008	W/H TAX DIV CVX	(23,874)	-	* [1]	-	-	392,515,607	-	-
6/10/2008	W/H TAX DIV IBM	(11,977)	-	* [1]	-	-	392,515,607	-	-
6/10/2008	W/H TAX DIV UTX	(5,621)	-	* [1]	-	-	392,515,607	-	-
6/10/2008	W/H TAX DIV JNJ	(7,742)	-	* [1]	-	-	392,515,607	-	-
6/10/2008	W/H TAX DIV XOM	(37,396)	-	* [1]	-	-	392,515,607	-	-
6/10/2008	W/H TAX DIV EXC	(5,589)	-	* [1]	-	-	392,515,607	-	-
6/12/2008	W/H TAX DIV MSFT	(15,282)	-	* [1]	-	-	392,515,607	-	-
6/12/2008	W/H TAX DIV MMM	(6,388)	-	* [1]	-	-	392,515,607	-	-
7/21/2008	FIDELITY SPARTAN U S TREASURY MONEY MARKET W/H TAX DIV FDLXX	(18)	-	* [1]	-	-	392,515,607	-	-
7/23/2008	FIDELITY SPARTAN U S TREASURY MONEY MARKET W/H TAX DIV FDLXX	(1)	-	* [1]	-	-	392,515,607	-	-

Column 1	Column 2	Column 3	Column 4	Column 5	Column 6	Column 7	Column 8	Column 9	Column 10
Date	Transaction Description	Transaction Amount Reported in Customer Statement	Cash Deposits	Cash Withdrawals	Transfers of Principal In	Transfers of Principal Out	Balance of Principal	2-Year Initial Transfers	6-Year Initial Transfers
8/1/2008	W/H TAX DIV CVS	(1,213)	-	* [1]	-	-	392,515,607	-	-
8/8/2008	FIDELITY SPARTAN U S TREASURY MONEY MARKET W/H TAX DIV FDLXX	(3)	-	* [1]	-	-	392,515,607	-	-
8/13/2008	FIDELITY SPARTAN U S TREASURY MONEY MARKET W/H TAX DIV FDLXX	(0)	-	* [1]	-	-	392,515,607	-	-
8/20/2008	W/H TAX DIV CAT	(3,229)	-	* [1]	-	-	392,515,607	-	-
8/22/2008	W/H TAX DIV C	(20,736)	-	* [1]	-	-	392,515,607	-	-
8/27/2008	CHECK WIRE	7,000,000	7,000,000	-	-	-	399,515,607	-	-
8/28/2008	W/H TAX DIV GS	(1,538)	-	* [1]	-	-	399,515,607	-	-
9/24/2008	CHECK WIRE	(155,000,000)	-	(155,000,000)	-	-	244,515,607	(155,000,000)	(155,000,000)
10/2/2008	W/H TAX DIV EXC	(5,616)	-	* [1]	-	-	244,515,607	-	-
10/2/2008	W/H TAX DIV BA	(3,515)	-	* [1]	-	-	244,515,607	-	-
10/2/2008	W/H TAX DIV BAC	(49,945)	-	* [1]	-	-	244,515,607	-	-
10/2/2008	W/H TAX DIV COP	(8,775)	-	* [1]	-	-	244,515,607	-	-
10/2/2008	W/H TAX DIV MCD	(7,411)	-	* [1]	-	-	244,515,607	-	-
10/2/2008	W/H TAX DIV TWX	(3,975)	-	* [1]	-	-	244,515,607	-	-
10/2/2008	W/H TAX DIV JNJ	(22,650)	-	* [1]	-	-	244,515,607	-	-
10/2/2008	FIDELITY SPARTAN U S TREASURY MONEY MARKET W/H TAX DIV FDLXX	(13)	-	* [1]	-	-	244,515,607	-	-
10/2/2008	FIDELITY SPARTAN U S TREASURY MONEY MARKET W/H TAX DIV FDLXX	(0)	-	* [1]	-	-	244,515,607	-	-
10/2/2008	W/H TAX DIV AIG	(10,349)	-	* [1]	-	-	244,515,607	-	-
10/2/2008	W/H TAX DIV PFE	(26,008)	-	* [1]	-	-	244,515,607	-	-
10/2/2008	W/H TAX DIV INTC	(9,533)	-	* [1]	-	-	244,515,607	-	-
10/2/2008	W/H TAX DIV WMT	(9,528)	-	* [1]	-	-	244,515,607	-	-
10/2/2008	W/H TAX DIV WFC	(11,576)	-	* [1]	-	-	244,515,607	-	-
10/2/2008	W/H TAX DIV HD	(2,165)	-	* [1]	-	-	244,515,607	-	-
10/2/2008	FIDELITY SPARTAN U S TREASURY MONEY MARKET W/H TAX DIV FDLXX	(2)	-	* [1]	-	-	244,515,607	-	-
10/2/2008	W/H TAX DIV QCOM	(1,458)	-	* [1]	-	-	244,515,607	-	-
10/2/2008	W/H TAX DIV BUD	(3,251)	-	* [1]	-	-	244,515,607	-	-
10/2/2008	W/H TAX DIV CVX	(23,661)	-	* [1]	-	-	244,515,607	-	-
10/2/2008	W/H TAX DIV PEP	(11,594)	-	* [1]	-	-	244,515,607	-	-
10/2/2008	W/H TAX DIV UPS	(7,943)	-	* [1]	-	-	244,515,607	-	-
10/2/2008	FIDELITY SPARTAN U S TREASURY MONEY MARKET W/H TAX DIV FDLXX	(11)	-	* [1]	-	-	244,515,607	-	-
10/2/2008	W/H TAX DIV MSFT	(15,478)	-	* [1]	-	-	244,515,607	-	-
10/2/2008	W/H TAX DIV MMM	(6,419)	-	* [1]	-	-	244,515,607	-	-
10/2/2008	W/H TAX DIV XOM	(37,026)	-	* [1]	-	-	244,515,607	-	-
10/2/2008	W/H TAX DIV IBM	(8,237)	-	* [1]	-	-	244,515,607	-	-
10/2/2008	W/H TAX DIV UTX	(5,649)	-	* [1]	-	-	244,515,607	-	-
10/6/2008	CHECK WIRE	(10,000,000)	-	(10,000,000)	-	-	234,515,607	(10,000,000)	(10,000,000)
10/27/2008	CHECK WIRE	(30,000,000)	-	(30,000,000)	-	-	204,515,607	(30,000,000)	(30,000,000)
11/4/2008	W/H TAX DIV HPQ	(3,426)	-	* [1]	-	-	204,515,607	-	-
11/4/2008	FIDELITY SPARTAN U S TREASURY MONEY MARKET W/H TAX DIV FDLXX	(1)	-	* [1]	-	-	204,515,607	-	-
11/4/2008	FIDELITY SPARTAN U S TREASURY MONEY MARKET W/H TAX DIV FDLXX	(1)	-	* [1]	-	-	204,515,607	-	-
11/4/2008	W/H TAX DIV MRK	(14,025)	-	* [1]	-	-	204,515,607	-	-
11/4/2008	W/H TAX DIV KO	(4,293)	-	* [1]	-	-	204,515,607	-	-
11/4/2008	W/H TAX DIV BAX	(2,443)	-	* [1]	-	-	204,515,607	-	-
11/4/2008	W/H TAX DIV PM	(6,378)	-	* [1]	-	-	204,515,607	-	-
11/4/2008	FIDELITY SPARTAN U S TREASURY MONEY MARKET W/H TAX DIV FDLXX	(0)	-	* [1]	-	-	204,515,607	-	-
11/4/2008	W/H TAX DIV MO	(2,587)	-	* [1]	-	-	204,515,607	-	-
11/14/2008	CHECK WIRE	(65,000,000)	-	(65,000,000)	-	-	139,515,607	(65,000,000)	(65,000,000)
12/3/2008	FIDELITY SPARTAN U S TREASURY MONEY MARKET W/H TAX DIV FDLXX	(1)	-	* [1]	-	-	139,515,607	-	-
12/3/2008	FIDELITY SPARTAN U S TREASURY MONEY MARKET W/H TAX DIV FDLXX	(0)	-	* [1]	-	-	139,515,607	-	-
12/3/2008	FIDELITY SPARTAN U S TREASURY MONEY MARKET W/H TAX DIV FDLXX	(1)	-	* [1]	-	-	139,515,607	-	-
12/3/2008	FIDELITY SPARTAN U S TREASURY MONEY MARKET W/H TAX DIV FDLXX	(1)	-	* [1]	-	-	139,515,607	-	-

Column 1	Column 2	Column 3	Column 4	Column 5	Column 6	Column 7	Column 8	Column 9	Column 10
<u>Date</u>	<u>Transaction Description</u>	<u>Transaction Amount Reported in Customer Statement</u>	<u>Cash Deposits</u>	<u>Cash Withdrawals</u>	<u>Transfers of Principal In</u>	<u>Transfers of Principal Out</u>	<u>Balance of Principal</u>	<u>2-Year Initial Transfers</u>	<u>6-Year Initial Transfers</u>
12/3/2008	FIDELITY SPARTAN U S TREASURY MONEY MARKET W/H TAX DIV FDLXX	(0)	-	* ⁽¹⁾	-	-	139,515,607	-	-
12/3/2008	FIDELITY SPARTAN U S TREASURY MONEY MARKET W/H TAX DIV FDLXX	(0)	-	* ⁽¹⁾	-	-	139,515,607	-	-
Total:			\$ 491,995,607	\$ (352,480,000)	\$ -	\$ -	\$ 139,515,607	\$ (275,250,000)	\$ (352,480,000)

⁽¹⁾ Amounts withheld from account holders and paid by BLMIS to the IRS on behalf of account holders during the six-year period prior to the filing date have not been deducted from the balance of principal as those amounts have subsequently been refunded by the IRS.

EXHIBIT C

BLMIS Account Name	BLMIS Account Number
GROUPEMENT FINANCIER FRANCAIS C/O ACCESS INT'L ADVISORS	1FN087
GROUPEMENT FINANCIER LTD	1FR096

EXHIBIT D

Date	Transaction Description	Transaction Amount		Cash Deposits	Cash Withdrawals	Transfers of Principal In	Transfers of Principal Out	Balance of Principal	Preference	Two Year	Six Year
		Reported in Customer Statement							Period Initial Transfers	Initial Transfers	Initial Transfers
12/13/2004	FIDELITY SPARTAN U S TREASURY MONEY MARKET W/H TAX DIV FDLXX	(41)	-	-	* [1]	-	-	169,565,607	-	-	-
12/14/2004	W/H TAX DIV DD	(2,695)	-	-	* [1]	-	-	169,565,607	-	-	-
12/15/2004	CHECK WIRE	5,000,000	5,000,000	-	-	-	-	174,565,607	-	-	-
12/16/2004	FIDELITY SPARTAN U S TREASURY MONEY MARKET W/H TAX DIV FDLXX	(1)	-	-	* [1]	-	-	174,565,607	-	-	-
12/31/2004	FIDELITY SPARTAN U S TREASURY MONEY MARKET W/H TAX DIV FDLXX	(7)	-	-	* [1]	-	-	174,565,607	-	-	-
1/3/2005	W/H TAX DIV WMT	(1,529)	-	-	* [1]	-	-	174,565,607	-	-	-
1/11/2005	CHECK WIRE	6,000,000	6,000,000	-	-	-	-	180,565,607	-	-	-
1/25/2005	CHECK WIRE	6,000,000	6,000,000	-	-	-	-	186,565,607	-	-	-
2/1/2005	CHECK WIRE	6,000,000	6,000,000	-	-	-	-	192,565,607	-	-	-
2/14/2005	W/H TAX DIV TXN	(509)	-	-	* [1]	-	-	192,565,607	-	-	-
2/16/2005	CHECK WIRE	5,000,000	5,000,000	-	-	-	-	197,565,607	-	-	-
2/24/2005	W/H TAX DIV GS	(206)	-	-	* [1]	-	-	197,565,607	-	-	-
2/25/2005	W/H TAX DIV C	(26,891)	-	-	* [1]	-	-	197,565,607	-	-	-
2/28/2005	W/H TAX DIV MER	(1,716)	-	-	* [1]	-	-	197,565,607	-	-	-
3/1/2005	W/H TAX DIV INTC	(5,981)	-	-	* [1]	-	-	197,565,607	-	-	-
3/1/2005	W/H TAX DIV WFC	(9,778)	-	-	* [1]	-	-	197,565,607	-	-	-
3/4/2005	W/H TAX DIV G	(1,917)	-	-	* [1]	-	-	197,565,607	-	-	-
3/4/2005	W/H TAX DIV BA	(2,412)	-	-	* [1]	-	-	197,565,607	-	-	-
3/7/2005	FIDELITY SPARTAN U S TREASURY MONEY MARKET W/H TAX DIV FDLXX	(63)	-	-	* [1]	-	-	197,565,607	-	-	-
3/8/2005	W/H TAX DIV JNJ	(10,000)	-	-	* [1]	-	-	197,565,607	-	-	-
3/8/2005	W/H TAX DIV PFE	(16,909)	-	-	* [1]	-	-	197,565,607	-	-	-
3/9/2005	W/H TAX DIV BUD	(2,364)	-	-	* [1]	-	-	197,565,607	-	-	-
3/10/2005	W/H TAX DIV IBM	(3,474)	-	-	* [1]	-	-	197,565,607	-	-	-
3/10/2005	W/H TAX DIV UTX	(2,831)	-	-	* [1]	-	-	197,565,607	-	-	-
3/10/2005	W/H TAX DIV MSFT	(10,249)	-	-	* [1]	-	-	197,565,607	-	-	-
3/10/2005	W/H TAX DIV XOM	(20,554)	-	-	* [1]	-	-	197,565,607	-	-	-
3/14/2005	W/H TAX DIV DD	(4,128)	-	-	* [1]	-	-	197,565,607	-	-	-
3/14/2005	W/H TAX DIV MMM	(4,053)	-	-	* [1]	-	-	197,565,607	-	-	-
3/18/2005	W/H TAX DIV AIG	(3,887)	-	-	* [1]	-	-	197,565,607	-	-	-
3/21/2005	CHECK WIRE	5,600,000	5,600,000	-	-	-	-	203,165,607	-	-	-
3/24/2005	W/H TAX DIV HD	(2,573)	-	-	* [1]	-	-	203,165,607	-	-	-
3/28/2005	W/H TAX DIV BAC	(21,463)	-	-	* [1]	-	-	203,165,607	-	-	-
3/31/2005	W/H TAX DIV PEP	(4,686)	-	-	* [1]	-	-	203,165,607	-	-	-
4/1/2005	W/H TAX DIV VIA.B	(1,426)	-	-	* [1]	-	-	203,165,607	-	-	-
4/1/2005	W/H TAX DIV KO	(6,323)	-	-	* [1]	-	-	203,165,607	-	-	-
4/1/2005	W/H TAX DIV MRK	(9,778)	-	-	* [1]	-	-	203,165,607	-	-	-
4/7/2005	W/H TAX DIV HPQ	(1,413)	-	-	* [1]	-	-	203,165,607	-	-	-
4/11/2005	W/H TAX DIV MO	(14,042)	-	-	* [1]	-	-	203,165,607	-	-	-
4/13/2005	FIDELITY SPARTAN U S TREASURY MONEY MARKET W/H TAX DIV FDLXX	(66)	-	-	* [1]	-	-	203,165,607	-	-	-
4/20/2005	CHECK WIRE	4,600,000	4,600,000	-	-	-	-	207,765,607	-	-	-
4/25/2005	W/H TAX DIV GE	(27,412)	-	-	* [1]	-	-	207,765,607	-	-	-
5/2/2005	CHECK WIRE	3,000,000	3,000,000	-	-	-	-	210,765,607	-	-	-
5/23/2005	FIDELITY SPARTAN U S TREASURY MONEY MARKET W/H TAX DIV FDLXX	(44)	-	-	* [1]	-	-	210,765,607	-	-	-
6/6/2005	W/H TAX DIV WMT	(1,981)	-	-	* [1]	-	-	210,765,607	-	-	-
6/10/2005	W/H TAX DIV UTX	(942)	-	-	* [1]	-	-	210,765,607	-	-	-
6/13/2005	W/H TAX DIV MMM	(1,349)	-	-	* [1]	-	-	210,765,607	-	-	-
6/17/2005	W/H TAX DIV AIG	(3,289)	-	-	* [1]	-	-	210,765,607	-	-	-
6/20/2005	FIDELITY SPARTAN U S TREASURY MONEY MARKET W/H TAX DIV FDLXX	(37)	-	-	* [1]	-	-	210,765,607	-	-	-
6/22/2005	CHECK WIRE	4,000,000	4,000,000	-	-	-	-	214,765,607	-	-	-
6/23/2005	W/H TAX DIV HD	(2,203)	-	-	* [1]	-	-	214,765,607	-	-	-
6/24/2005	W/H TAX DIV BAC	(18,371)	-	-	* [1]	-	-	214,765,607	-	-	-
6/30/2005	W/H TAX DIV PEP	(4,482)	-	-	* [1]	-	-	214,765,607	-	-	-
7/1/2005	W/H TAX DIV VIA.B	(1,207)	-	-	* [1]	-	-	214,765,607	-	-	-
7/1/2005	W/H TAX DIV MRK	(8,274)	-	-	* [1]	-	-	214,765,607	-	-	-
7/1/2005	W/H TAX DIV ALL	(2,229)	-	-	* [1]	-	-	214,765,607	-	-	-
7/1/2005	W/H TAX DIV KO	(6,350)	-	-	* [1]	-	-	214,765,607	-	-	-
7/6/2005	W/H TAX DIV HPQ	(2,372)	-	-	* [1]	-	-	214,765,607	-	-	-
7/8/2005	W/H TAX DIV SLB	(1,334)	-	-	* [1]	-	-	214,765,607	-	-	-

BLMIS ACCOUNT NO. IFN087 - GROUPE AMERICAIN INC. CAIS C/O ACCESS INT'L ADVISORS

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Date	Transaction Description	Transaction Amount		Cash Withdrawals	Transfers of Principal In	Transfers of Principal Out	Balance of Principal	Preference	Two Year	Six Year
		Reported in Customer Statement	Cash Deposits					Period Initial Transfers	Initial Transfers	Initial Transfers
1/22/1996	CHECK WIRE	2,999,980	2,999,980	-	-	-	2,999,980	-	-	-
1/24/1996	CHECK WIRE	11,621,000	11,621,000	-	-	-	14,620,980	-	-	-
2/20/1996	FIDELITY CASH RESERVES SBI W/H TAX DIV FCRXX	(8)	-	(8)	-	-	14,620,972	-	-	-
2/20/1996	W/H TAX DIV CCI	(286)	-	(286)	-	-	14,620,687	-	-	-
3/1/1996	W/H TAX DIV F	(562)	-	(562)	-	-	14,620,125	-	-	-
3/1/1996	W/H TAX DIV BA	(131)	-	(131)	-	-	14,619,994	-	-	-
3/1/1996	W/H TAX DIV COL	(19)	-	(19)	-	-	14,619,975	-	-	-
3/1/1996	W/H TAX DIV INTC	(49)	-	(49)	-	-	14,619,925	-	-	-
3/11/1996	W/H TAX DIV IBM	(215)	-	(215)	-	-	14,619,711	-	-	-
3/11/1996	W/H TAX DIV XON	(1,373)	-	(1,373)	-	-	14,618,338	-	-	-
3/11/1996	W/H TAX DIV MOB	(553)	-	(553)	-	-	14,617,785	-	-	-
3/11/1996	W/H TAX DIV AN	(461)	-	(461)	-	-	14,617,324	-	-	-
3/11/1996	W/H TAX DIV GM	(433)	-	(433)	-	-	14,616,891	-	-	-
3/12/1996	W/H TAX DIV BAC	(303)	-	(303)	-	-	14,616,588	-	-	-
3/12/1996	W/H TAX DIV NJ	(320)	-	(320)	-	-	14,616,268	-	-	-
3/14/1996	W/H TAX DIV DD	(427)	-	(427)	-	-	14,615,840	-	-	-
3/15/1996	W/H TAX DIV ARC	(308)	-	(308)	-	-	14,615,532	-	-	-
3/15/1996	W/H TAX DIV MCD	(65)	-	(65)	-	-	14,615,467	-	-	-
3/21/1996	FIDELITY CASH RESERVES SBI W/H TAX DIV FCRXX	(12)	-	(12)	-	-	14,615,455	-	-	-
3/22/1996	W/H TAX DIV AIG	(55)	-	(55)	-	-	14,615,400	-	-	-
3/29/1996	W/H TAX DIV PEP	(215)	-	(215)	-	-	14,615,185	-	-	-
4/1/1996	W/H TAX DIV MRK	(585)	-	(585)	-	-	14,614,600	-	-	-
4/1/1996	W/H TAX DIV KO	(439)	-	(439)	-	-	14,614,161	-	-	-
4/1/1996	W/H TAX DIV S	(124)	-	(124)	-	-	14,614,037	-	-	-
4/1/1996	W/H TAX DIV EK	(186)	-	(186)	-	-	14,613,851	-	-	-
4/2/1996	W/H TAX DIV C	(301)	-	(301)	-	-	14,613,550	-	-	-
4/8/1996	W/H TAX DIV WMT	(168)	-	(168)	-	-	14,613,382	-	-	-
4/10/1996	W/H TAX DIV HWP	(143)	-	(143)	-	-	14,613,239	-	-	-
4/17/1996	FIDELITY CASH RESERVES SBI W/H TAX DIV FCRXX	(30)	-	(30)	-	-	14,613,209	-	-	-
4/25/1996	W/H TAX DIV GE	(1,072)	-	(1,072)	-	-	14,612,137	-	-	-
4/30/1996	W/H TAX DIV DOW	(275)	-	(275)	-	-	14,611,862	-	-	-
5/1/1996	W/H TAX DIV T	(749)	-	(749)	-	-	14,611,114	-	-	-
5/1/1996	W/H TAX DIV NYN	(346)	-	(346)	-	-	14,610,768	-	-	-
5/1/1996	W/H TAX DIV BEL	(447)	-	(447)	-	-	14,610,321	-	-	-
5/1/1996	W/H TAX DIV BMY	(522)	-	(522)	-	-	14,609,799	-	-	-
5/1/1996	W/H TAX DIV AIT	(407)	-	(407)	-	-	14,609,392	-	-	-
5/2/1996	W/H TAX DIV PNU	(188)	-	(188)	-	-	14,609,204	-	-	-
5/3/1996	CHECK WIRE	999,980	999,980	-	-	-	15,609,184	-	-	-
5/10/1996	W/H TAX DIV AXP	(156)	-	(156)	-	-	15,609,028	-	-	-
5/14/1996	FIDELITY CASH RESERVES SBI W/H TAX DIV FCRXX	(21)	-	(21)	-	-	15,609,007	-	-	-
5/17/1996	W/H TAX DIV CCI	(303)	-	(303)	-	-	15,608,705	-	-	-
5/17/1996	W/H TAX DIV DIS	(81)	-	(81)	-	-	15,608,624	-	-	-
5/21/1996	W/H TAX DIV AIG	(57)	-	(57)	-	-	15,608,566	-	-	-
6/3/1996	AMERICAN INTL GROUP INC CXL W/H TAX 5/07/96 AIG	57	-	57	-	-	15,608,624	-	-	-
6/3/1996	W/H TAX DIV F	(536)	-	(536)	-	-	15,608,088	-	-	-
6/3/1996	W/H TAX DIV INTC	(48)	-	(48)	-	-	15,608,040	-	-	-
6/3/1996	W/H TAX DIV COL	(19)	-	(19)	-	-	15,608,021	-	-	-
6/7/1996	W/H TAX DIV BA	(140)	-	(140)	-	-	15,607,880	-	-	-
6/10/1996	W/H TAX DIV MOB	(561)	-	(561)	-	-	15,607,319	-	-	-
6/10/1996	W/H TAX DIV AN	(461)	-	(461)	-	-	15,606,859	-	-	-
6/10/1996	W/H TAX DIV IBM	(288)	-	(288)	-	-	15,606,571	-	-	-
6/11/1996	W/H TAX DIV NJ	(381)	-	(381)	-	-	15,606,190	-	-	-
6/12/1996	W/H TAX DIV MMM	(273)	-	(273)	-	-	15,605,917	-	-	-
6/12/1996	W/H TAX DIV BAC	(291)	-	(291)	-	-	15,605,626	-	-	-
6/14/1996	W/H TAX DIV MCD	(75)	-	(75)	-	-	15,605,550	-	-	-
6/21/1996	W/H TAX DIV AIG	(56)	-	(56)	-	-	15,605,494	-	-	-
6/25/1996	FIDELITY CASH RESERVES SBI W/H TAX DIV FCRXX	(51)	-	(51)	-	-	15,605,443	-	-	-
6/28/1996	W/H TAX DIV PEP	(267)	-	(267)	-	-	15,605,176	-	-	-
7/1/1996	W/H TAX DIV WMT	(177)	-	(177)	-	-	15,605,000	-	-	-
7/1/1996	W/H TAX DIV KO	(474)	-	(474)	-	-	15,604,526	-	-	-
7/1/1996	W/H TAX DIV MRK	(618)	-	(618)	-	-	15,603,907	-	-	-
7/5/1996	W/H TAX DIV SLB	(131)	-	(131)	-	-	15,603,776	-	-	-
7/10/1996	W/H TAX DIV HWP	(186)	-	(186)	-	-	15,603,591	-	-	-

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Date	Transaction Description	Transaction Amount		Cash	Transfers of	Transfers of	Balance of	Preference	Two Year	Six Year
		Reported in	Cash Deposits					Withdrawals	Principal In	Principal Out
		Customer Statement						Transfers	Transfers	Transfers
7/15/1996	W/H TAX DIV C	(379)	-	(379)	-	-	15,603,211	-	-	-
7/22/1996	FIDELITY CASH RESERVES SBI W/H TAX DIV FCRXX	(16)	-	(16)	-	-	15,603,196	-	-	-
7/25/1996	CHECK WIRE	999,965	999,965	-	-	-	16,603,161	-	-	-
7/25/1996	W/H TAX DIV GE	(1,126)	-	(1,126)	-	-	16,602,035	-	-	-
7/30/1996	W/H TAX DIV DOW	(261)	-	(261)	-	-	16,601,773	-	-	-
8/1/1996	W/H TAX DIV BEL	(448)	-	(448)	-	-	16,601,326	-	-	-
8/1/1996	W/H TAX DIV EK	(201)	-	(201)	-	-	16,601,125	-	-	-
8/1/1996	W/H TAX DIV T	(782)	-	(782)	-	-	16,600,342	-	-	-
8/1/1996	W/H TAX DIV BMY	(554)	-	(554)	-	-	16,599,789	-	-	-
8/1/1996	W/H TAX DIV PNU	(199)	-	(199)	-	-	16,599,590	-	-	-
8/1/1996	W/H TAX DIV NYN	(367)	-	(367)	-	-	16,599,223	-	-	-
8/1/1996	W/H TAX DIV AIT	(412)	-	(412)	-	-	16,598,811	-	-	-
8/9/1996	W/H TAX DIV AXP	(157)	-	(157)	-	-	16,598,653	-	-	-
8/16/1996	W/H TAX DIV DIS	(107)	-	(107)	-	-	16,598,547	-	-	-
8/19/1996	W/H TAX DIV CCI	(348)	-	(348)	-	-	16,598,198	-	-	-
8/19/1996	FIDELITY CASH RESERVES SBI W/H TAX DIV FCRXX	(23)	-	(23)	-	-	16,598,176	-	-	-
9/3/1996	W/H TAX DIV F	(727)	-	(727)	-	-	16,597,449	-	-	-
9/3/1996	W/H TAX DIV INTC	(68)	-	(68)	-	-	16,597,380	-	-	-
9/3/1996	W/H TAX DIV COL	(22)	-	(22)	-	-	16,597,358	-	-	-
9/6/1996	W/H TAX DIV BA	(157)	-	(157)	-	-	16,597,202	-	-	-
9/10/1996	W/H TAX DIV IBM	(328)	-	(328)	-	-	16,596,874	-	-	-
9/10/1996	W/H TAX DIV XON	(1,594)	-	(1,594)	-	-	16,595,280	-	-	-
9/10/1996	W/H TAX DIV GM	(511)	-	(511)	-	-	16,594,769	-	-	-
9/10/1996	W/H TAX DIV AN	(530)	-	(530)	-	-	16,594,239	-	-	-
9/10/1996	W/H TAX DIV JNJ	(423)	-	(423)	-	-	16,593,815	-	-	-
9/10/1996	W/H TAX DIV MOB	(645)	-	(645)	-	-	16,593,170	-	-	-
9/12/1996	FIDELITY CASH RESERVES SBI W/H TAX DIV FCRXX	(12)	-	(12)	-	-	16,593,158	-	-	-
9/12/1996	W/H TAX DIV DD	(536)	-	(536)	-	-	16,592,622	-	-	-
9/12/1996	W/H TAX DIV BAC	(325)	-	(325)	-	-	16,592,297	-	-	-
9/13/1996	W/H TAX DIV MCD	(89)	-	(89)	-	-	16,592,208	-	-	-
9/13/1996	W/H TAX DIV ARC	(32)	-	(32)	-	-	16,592,175	-	-	-
9/20/1996	W/H TAX DIV AIG	(78)	-	(78)	-	-	16,592,097	-	-	-
9/27/1996	W/H TAX DIV PEP	(313)	-	(313)	-	-	16,591,784	-	-	-
10/1/1996	W/H TAX DIV MRK	(855)	-	(855)	-	-	16,590,930	-	-	-
10/1/1996	W/H TAX DIV EK	(237)	-	(237)	-	-	16,590,692	-	-	-
10/1/1996	W/H TAX DIV KO	(554)	-	(554)	-	-	16,590,138	-	-	-
10/7/1996	W/H TAX DIV WMT	(208)	-	(208)	-	-	16,589,930	-	-	-
10/15/1996	FIDELITY CASH RESERVES SBI W/H TAX DIV FCRXX	(12)	-	(12)	-	-	16,589,918	-	-	-
11/1/1996	W/H TAX DIV T	(915)	-	(915)	-	-	16,589,003	-	-	-
11/8/1996	FIDELITY CASH RESERVES SBI W/H TAX DIV FCRXX	(2)	-	(2)	-	-	16,589,001	-	-	-
11/19/1996	W/H TAX DIV CCI	(353)	-	(353)	-	-	16,588,648	-	-	-
12/2/1996	W/H TAX DIV INTC	(74)	-	(74)	-	-	16,588,574	-	-	-
12/2/1996	W/H TAX DIV F	(762)	-	(762)	-	-	16,587,812	-	-	-
12/5/1996	CHECK WIRE	(14,080,909)	-	(14,080,909)	-	-	2,506,903	-	-	-
12/6/1996	W/H TAX DIV BA	(163)	-	(163)	-	-	2,506,740	-	-	-
12/10/1996	W/H TAX DIV GM	(515)	-	(515)	-	-	2,506,225	-	-	-
12/10/1996	W/H TAX DIV IBM	(303)	-	(303)	-	-	2,505,922	-	-	-
12/10/1996	W/H TAX DIV AN	(536)	-	(536)	-	-	2,505,385	-	-	-
12/10/1996	W/H TAX DIV XON	(1,641)	-	(1,641)	-	-	2,503,744	-	-	-
12/10/1996	W/H TAX DIV MOB	(660)	-	(660)	-	-	2,503,084	-	-	-
12/10/1996	W/H TAX DIV JNJ	(418)	-	(418)	-	-	2,502,666	-	-	-
12/12/1996	W/H TAX DIV MTC	(156)	-	(156)	-	-	2,502,510	-	-	-
12/12/1996	W/H TAX DIV BAC	(336)	-	(336)	-	-	2,502,174	-	-	-
12/12/1996	W/H TAX DIV MMM	(346)	-	(346)	-	-	2,501,828	-	-	-
12/13/1996	W/H TAX DIV MCD	(90)	-	(90)	-	-	2,501,737	-	-	-
12/16/1996	W/H TAX DIV DD	(545)	-	(545)	-	-	2,501,192	-	-	-
12/16/1996	W/H TAX DIV KO	(509)	-	(509)	-	-	2,500,683	-	-	-
12/18/1996	FIDELITY CASH RESERVES SBI W/H TAX DIV FCRXX	(6)	-	(6)	-	-	2,500,678	-	-	-
12/23/1996	CHECK WIRE	10,543,185	10,543,185	-	-	-	13,043,863	-	-	-
1/2/1997	W/H TAX DIV EK	(233)	-	(233)	-	-	13,043,630	-	-	-
1/6/1997	CHECK WIRE	600,000	600,000	-	-	-	13,643,630	-	-	-
1/10/1997	FIDELITY SPARTAN U S TREASURY MONEY MARKET W/H TAX DIV FDLX	(1)	-	(1)	-	-	13,643,629	-	-	-
1/15/1997	CHECK WIRE	(254,000)	-	(254,000)	-	-	13,389,629	-	-	-

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Date	Transaction Description	Transaction Amount		Cash	Transfers of	Transfers of	Balance of	Preference	Two Year	Six Year
		Reported in	Cash					Period	Initial	Initial
		Customer Statement	Deposits	Withdrawals	Principal In	Principal Out	Principal	Transfers	Transfers	Transfers
1/22/1997	CHECK WIRE	(235,000)	-	(235,000)	-	-	13,154,629	-	-	-
2/12/1997	CHECK WIRE	(272,000)	-	(272,000)	-	-	12,882,629	-	-	-
2/18/1997	FIDELITY SPARTAN U S TREASURY MONEY MARKET W/H TAX DIV FDLX	(19)	-	(19)	-	-	12,882,611	-	-	-
2/20/1997	W/H TAX DIV CCI	(332)	-	(332)	-	-	12,882,279	-	-	-
3/3/1997	W/H TAX DIV INTC	(53)	-	(53)	-	-	12,882,225	-	-	-
3/3/1997	W/H TAX DIV F	(603)	-	(603)	-	-	12,881,623	-	-	-
3/3/1997	W/H TAX DIV COL	(17)	-	(17)	-	-	12,881,605	-	-	-
3/7/1997	W/H TAX DIV BA	(131)	-	(131)	-	-	12,881,475	-	-	-
3/10/1997	W/H TAX DIV XON	(1,289)	-	(1,289)	-	-	12,880,186	-	-	-
3/10/1997	W/H TAX DIV GM	(483)	-	(483)	-	-	12,879,703	-	-	-
3/10/1997	W/H TAX DIV MOB	(565)	-	(565)	-	-	12,879,138	-	-	-
3/10/1997	W/H TAX DIV AN	(466)	-	(466)	-	-	12,878,672	-	-	-
3/10/1997	W/H TAX DIV IBM	(233)	-	(233)	-	-	12,878,439	-	-	-
3/11/1997	W/H TAX DIV JNJ	(329)	-	(329)	-	-	12,878,110	-	-	-
3/11/1997	FIDELITY SPARTAN U S TREASURY MONEY MARKET W/H TAX DIV FDLX	(1)	-	(1)	-	-	12,878,109	-	-	-
3/12/1997	W/H TAX DIV BAC	(284)	-	(284)	-	-	12,877,824	-	-	-
3/12/1997	W/H TAX DIV MMM	(282)	-	(282)	-	-	12,877,542	-	-	-
3/13/1997	CHECK WIRE	(400,000)	-	(400,000)	-	-	12,477,542	-	-	-
3/14/1997	W/H TAX DIV DD	(418)	-	(418)	-	-	12,477,124	-	-	-
3/31/1997	W/H TAX DIV PEP	(188)	-	(188)	-	-	12,476,936	-	-	-
4/1/1997	W/H TAX DIV KO	(365)	-	(365)	-	-	12,476,571	-	-	-
4/4/1997	W/H TAX DIV SLB	(125)	-	(125)	-	-	12,476,446	-	-	-
4/9/1997	W/H TAX DIV WMT	(163)	-	(163)	-	-	12,476,283	-	-	-
4/15/1997	W/H TAX DIV C	(311)	-	(311)	-	-	12,475,972	-	-	-
4/16/1997	CHECK WIRE	(222,000)	-	(222,000)	-	-	12,253,972	-	-	-
4/16/1997	W/H TAX DIV HWP	(129)	-	(129)	-	-	12,253,843	-	-	-
4/17/1997	CHECK WIRE	2,000,000	2,000,000	-	-	-	14,253,843	-	-	-
4/24/1997	FIDELITY SPARTAN U S TREASURY MONEY MARKET W/H TAX DIV FDLX	(27)	-	(27)	-	-	14,253,816	-	-	-
5/1/1997	W/H TAX DIV BEL	(338)	-	(338)	-	-	14,253,478	-	-	-
5/1/1997	W/H TAX DIV AIT	(334)	-	(334)	-	-	14,253,144	-	-	-
5/1/1997	W/H TAX DIV BMY	(408)	-	(408)	-	-	14,252,736	-	-	-
5/1/1997	W/H TAX DIV T	(567)	-	(567)	-	-	14,252,169	-	-	-
5/9/1997	W/H TAX DIV AXP	(115)	-	(115)	-	-	14,252,054	-	-	-
5/12/1997	FIDELITY SPARTAN U S TREASURY MONEY MARKET W/H TAX DIV FDLX	(9)	-	(9)	-	-	14,252,045	-	-	-
5/16/1997	W/H TAX DIV DIS	(96)	-	(96)	-	-	14,251,949	-	-	-
5/19/1997	W/H TAX DIV CCI	(337)	-	(337)	-	-	14,251,612	-	-	-
6/2/1997	W/H TAX DIV F	(705)	-	(705)	-	-	14,250,907	-	-	-
6/2/1997	W/H TAX DIV INTC	(59)	-	(59)	-	-	14,250,848	-	-	-
6/2/1997	W/H TAX DIV COL	(19)	-	(19)	-	-	14,250,829	-	-	-
6/10/1997	W/H TAX DIV AN	(475)	-	(475)	-	-	14,250,354	-	-	-
6/10/1997	W/H TAX DIV MOB	(568)	-	(568)	-	-	14,249,786	-	-	-
6/10/1997	W/H TAX DIV IBM	(314)	-	(314)	-	-	14,249,472	-	-	-
6/11/1997	FIDELITY SPARTAN U S TREASURY MONEY MARKET W/H TAX DIV FDLX	(5)	-	(5)	-	-	14,249,467	-	-	-
6/12/1997	CHECK WIRE	(8,520,000)	-	(8,520,000)	-	-	5,729,467	-	-	-
6/12/1997	CHECK WIRE	(843,277)	-	(843,277)	-	-	4,886,190	-	-	-
7/1/1997	TRANS TO 1FR02630 (1FR026)	(2,035,823)	-	-	-	(2,035,823)	2,850,367	-	-	-
7/9/1997	W/H TAX DIV HWP	(91)	-	(91)	-	-	2,850,276	-	-	-
7/14/1997	W/H TAX DIV WMT	(98)	-	(98)	-	-	2,850,178	-	-	-
7/18/1997	FIDELITY SPARTAN U S TREASURY MONEY MARKET W/H TAX DIV FDLX	(29)	-	(29)	-	-	2,850,149	-	-	-
7/25/1997	W/H TAX DIV GE	(539)	-	(539)	-	-	2,849,610	-	-	-
7/29/1997	TRANS TO 1FR02630 (1FR026)	(23,460)	-	-	-	(23,460)	2,826,150	-	-	-
8/1/1997	W/H TAX DIV BMY	(240)	-	(240)	-	-	2,825,910	-	-	-
8/1/1997	W/H TAX DIV T	(337)	-	(337)	-	-	2,825,573	-	-	-
8/1/1997	W/H TAX DIV BEL	(204)	-	(204)	-	-	2,825,369	-	-	-
8/1/1997	W/H TAX DIV AIT	(192)	-	(192)	-	-	2,825,177	-	-	-
8/8/1997	W/H TAX DIV AXP	(66)	-	(66)	-	-	2,825,111	-	-	-
8/20/1997	FIDELITY SPARTAN U S TREASURY MONEY MARKET W/H TAX DIV FDLX	(4)	-	(4)	-	-	2,825,108	-	-	-
8/22/1997	W/H TAX DIV DIS	(56)	-	(56)	-	-	2,825,052	-	-	-
9/12/1997	W/H TAX DIV MCD	(26)	-	(26)	-	-	2,825,025	-	-	-
9/12/1997	W/H TAX DIV MMM	(98)	-	(98)	-	-	2,824,928	-	-	-
9/19/1997	W/H TAX DIV AIG	(24)	-	(24)	-	-	2,824,904	-	-	-
9/23/1997	FIDELITY SPARTAN U S TREASURY MONEY MARKET W/H TAX DIV FDLX	(34)	-	(34)	-	-	2,824,869	-	-	-
9/26/1997	W/H TAX DIV NB	(110)	-	(110)	-	-	2,824,760	-	-	-

BLMIS ACCOUNT NO. 1FN087 - GROUPE FIDELITY INVESTMENTS CANAIS C/O ACCESS INT'L ADVISORS

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Date	Transaction Description	Transaction Amount		Cash	Transfers of	Transfers of	Balance of	Preference	Two Year	Six Year	
		Reported in	Customer Statement					Deposits	Withdrawals	Principal In	Principal Out
								Transfers	Transfers	Transfers	
10/1/1997	W/H TAX DIV KO	(152)	-	(152)	-	-	2,824,608	-	-	-	
10/1/1997	W/H TAX DIV S	(40)	-	(40)	-	-	2,824,569	-	-	-	
10/1/1997	W/H TAX DIV MRK	(244)	-	(244)	-	-	2,824,325	-	-	-	
10/7/1997	W/H TAX DIV PEP	(85)	-	(85)	-	-	2,824,241	-	-	-	
10/10/1997	W/H TAX DIV SLB	(42)	-	(42)	-	-	2,824,199	-	-	-	
10/14/1997	W/H TAX DIV WMT	(68)	-	(68)	-	-	2,824,131	-	-	-	
10/15/1997	W/H TAX DIV HWP	(62)	-	(62)	-	-	2,824,069	-	-	-	
10/15/1997	W/H TAX DIV C	(123)	-	(123)	-	-	2,823,946	-	-	-	
10/22/1997	FIDELITY SPARTAN U S TREASURY MONEY MARKET W/H TAX DIV FDLX)	(11)	-	(11)	-	-	2,823,935	-	-	-	
10/27/1997	W/H TAX DIV GE	(376)	-	(376)	-	-	2,823,560	-	-	-	
11/3/1997	W/H TAX DIV T	(238)	-	(238)	-	-	2,823,321	-	-	-	
11/3/1997	W/H TAX DIV BEL	(269)	-	(269)	-	-	2,823,053	-	-	-	
11/3/1997	W/H TAX DIV BMY	(170)	-	(170)	-	-	2,822,882	-	-	-	
11/3/1997	W/H TAX DIV AIT	(141)	-	(141)	-	-	2,822,741	-	-	-	
11/10/1997	W/H TAX DIV AXP	(48)	-	(48)	-	-	2,822,694	-	-	-	
11/20/1997	FIDELITY SPARTAN U S TREASURY MONEY MARKET W/H TAX DIV FDLX)	(4)	-	(4)	-	-	2,822,690	-	-	-	
11/21/1997	W/H TAX DIV DIS	(40)	-	(40)	-	-	2,822,650	-	-	-	
11/26/1997	CHECK WIRE	(598,015)	-	(598,015)	-	-	2,224,635	-	-	-	
12/17/1997	FIDELITY SPARTAN U S TREASURY MONEY MARKET W/H TAX DIV FDLX)	(6)	-	(6)	-	-	2,224,629	-	-	-	
1/20/1998	FIDELITY SPARTAN U S TREASURY MONEY MARKET W/H TAX DIV FDLX)	(2)	-	(2)	-	-	2,224,627	-	-	-	
1/30/1998	CHECK WIRE	(7,288,507)	-	(7,288,507)	-	-	(5,063,880)	-	-	-	
10/5/1999	MISC	(0)	-	(0)	-	-	(5,063,881)	-	-	-	
Total:				\$ 29,764,110	\$ (32,768,708)	\$ -	\$ (2,059,283)	\$ (5,063,881)	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -

EXHIBIT E

SUBSEQUENT TRANSFERS FROM GROUPEMENT FINANCIER TO DEFENDANT NATIXIS FINANCIAL PRODUCTS LLC

<u>Date</u>	<u>Amount</u>
11/5/2003	(17,000,000)
1/15/2004	(3,000,000)
2/11/2004	(11,245,000)
5/5/2004	(6,275,000)
6/3/2004	(6,227,000)
7/6/2004	(1,500,000)
7/7/2004	(12,000,000)
10/4/2004	(5,000,000)
10/14/2004	(3,100,000)
10/18/2004	(2,700,000)
11/2/2004	(4,487,000)
11/4/2004	(1,219,500)
11/22/2004	(2,500,000)
11/29/2004	(2,500,000)
12/14/2004	(2,500,000)
1/10/2005	(3,000,000)
1/24/2005	(3,000,000)
1/31/2005	(3,000,000)
2/14/2005	(2,500,000)
3/16/2005	(3,150,000)
4/15/2005	(3,999,980)
6/15/2005	(3,000,000)
7/22/2005	(3,717,460)
5/31/2006	(5,000,000)
6/1/2006	(4,999,980)
3/28/2007	(5,999,980)
5/11/2007	(5,999,980)
6/14/2007	(4,999,980)
1/8/2008	(14,500,000)
Total:	\$ (148,120,860)

EXHIBIT 2

**UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK**

SECURITIES INVESTOR PROTECTION
CORPORATION,

Plaintiff-Applicant,

v.

BERNARD L. MADOFF INVESTMENT
SECURITIES LLC,

Defendant.

Adv. Pro. No. 08-01789 (SMB)

SIPA Liquidation

(Substantively Consolidated)

In re:
BERNARD L. MADOFF,

Debtor.

IRVING H. PICARD, Trustee for the Liquidation
of Bernard L. Madoff Investment Securities LLC
and the Estate of Bernard L. Madoff,

Plaintiff,

v.

NATIXIS FINANCIAL PRODUCTS, LLC,

Defendant.

Adv. Pro. No. 10-05353 (SMB)

**[PROPOSED] ORDER GRANTING THE TRUSTEE'S MOTION FOR LEAVE TO
FILE AN AMENDED COMPLAINT**

This cause having come before the Court on December 28, 2018 on the motion (the "Motion") of Irving H. Picard, as trustee (the "Trustee") for the substantively consolidated liquidation of the business of Bernard L. Madoff Investment Securities, LLC and the chapter 7 estate of Bernard L. Madoff, under the Securities Investor Protection Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78aaa, *et seq.*, by and through his counsel, Baker & Hostetler LLP, seeking entry of an order, pursuant to Rule 15 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, as incorporated in this proceeding by Rule 7015 of

the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure, granting leave for the Trustee to file an Amended Complaint; and the Court having considered the Memorandum of Law in Support of the Trustee's Motion for Leave to File an Amended Complaint; and any objections thereto; and due notice of the Motion hearing having been given, and it appearing that no other or further notice need be given; and the Court having determined that the legal and factual bases set forth in the Motion establish just cause for the relief granted herein; and upon the proceedings before the Court and after due deliberation, it is hereby

ORDERED THAT:

1. The Motion is GRANTED.
2. The Trustee is granted leave to file his Amended Complaint.

Dated: _____, 2019,
New York, New York.

HONORABLE STUART M. BERNSTEIN
UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY JUDGE